

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

MITCHELL J. CURRY,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	Civ. No. 09-110-SLR
	)	
SCOTT FITZGERALD, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**MEMORANDUM ORDER**

At Wilmington this <sup>14<sup>th</sup></sup> day of April, 2009, having screened the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915;

IT IS ORDERED that the complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, for the reasons that follow:

1. **Background.** Plaintiff Mitchell J. Curry, (“plaintiff”), who proceeds pro se, filed this claim as an “action in racketeering” (i.e., RICO) and alleges defendants conspired to violate his right to due process.<sup>1</sup>

2. **Standard of Review.** When a litigant proceeds in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B) provides that the court may dismiss a complaint, at any time, if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).

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<sup>1</sup>Presumably plaintiff refers to the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. The complaint, however, makes no reference to the RICO statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 *et seq.*

3. The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § § 1915(e)(2)(B) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on 12(b)(6) motions. *Courteau v. United States*, 287 F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (not reported); *Allah v. Seiverling*, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000); *Tourscher v. McCullough*, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999)(applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standard to dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)). The court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to plaintiff. *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, however, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” *Id.* at 1965 (citations omitted). The “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” *Id.* (citations omitted).

4. Plaintiff is required to make a “showing” rather than a blanket assertion of an entitlement to relief. *Phillips v. County of Allegheny*, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). “[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice,’ but also the ‘grounds’ on which

the claim rests.” *Id.* (citing *Twombly*, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3). Therefore, “stating . . . a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ the required element.” *Id.* at 235 (quoting *Twombly*, 127 S.Ct. at 1965 n.3). “This ‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,’ but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” *Id.* at 234. Because plaintiff proceeds pro se, his pleading is liberally construed and his complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 127 S.Ct. at 2200 (citations omitted).

5. **Discussion.** Plaintiff and his brother resided at an address in Milford, Delaware for over thirty years and plaintiff believed that he resided there legally. He alleges that defendants conspired to remove him from the residence “to circumvent the courts to avoid plaintiff’s legal inquiries regarding the premises.” Plaintiff alleges that he was forcefully removed from the residence by defendants, without warrants or due process, and the residence was demolished on February 22 at or around 10:00 AM.<sup>2</sup>

6. To advance a civil claim under RICO, plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” *Lum v. Bank of Am.*, 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing *Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc.*, 473 U.S. 479 (1985)). A “pattern of racketeering activity” requires “at least two acts” of conduct indictable under various enumerated federal criminal statutes. *Id.*; 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1),

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<sup>2</sup>No year is provided. The court notes that since the complaint was signed on February 20, 2009, the acts complained of may have occurred in 2008 or earlier.

(5). Plaintiff's claims fail as he has not sufficiently pled the elements of a civil RICO claim, including the required two predicate acts.

7. To the extent that plaintiff alleges a conspiracy claim, it too fails. For a conspiracy claim, there must be evidence of (1) an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and (2) actions taken in concert by defendants with the specific intent to violate that right. *Williams v. Fedor*, 69 F. Supp. 2d 649, 665-66 (M.D. Pa.), *aff'd*, 211 F.3d 1263 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing *Kerr v. Lyford*, 171 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1999)). See also *Parkway Garage, Inc. v. City of Phila.*, 5 F.3d 685, 700 (3d Cir. 1993) (plaintiff must show that two or more conspirators reached an agreement to deprive him or her of a constitutional right under color of law); *Kelley v. Myler*, 149 F.3d 641, 648-49 (7th Cir. 1998) (an agreement or an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of constitutional rights must exist). The complaint does not contain sufficient allegations that indicate how defendants acted in concert to deprive plaintiff of his right to due process. Therefore, the conspiracy claim is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

8. **Conclusion.** Based upon the foregoing analysis, the complaint is dismissed as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A(b)(1). Amendment of the complaint would be futile. See *Alston v. Parker*, 363 F.3d 229 (3d Cir. 2004); *Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 2002); *Borelli v. City of Reading*, 532 F.2d 950, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1976).

  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE