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1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	IN AND FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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4	PERSONALIZED USER MODEL, L.L.P., : CIVIL ACTION
5	Plaintiff, :
6	v. :
	GOOGLE, INC.,
7	: NO. 09-525-LPS Defendant.
8	— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —
9	Wilmington, Delaware Wednesday, July 27, 2011
10	Telephone Conference
11	
12	BEFORE: HONORABLE LEONARD P. STARK, U.S.D.C.J.
13	
14	APPEARANCES:
15	MORRIS NICHOLS ARSHT & TUNNELL, LLP
16	BY: KAREN JACOBS LOUDEN, ESQ.
17	and
	SNR DENTON, LLP
18	BY: MARK C. NELSON, ESQ. (Dallas, Texas)
19	and
20	SNR DENTON, LLP
21	BY: MARC S. FRIEDMAN, ESQ. (New York, New York)
22	and
23	una
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25	Brian P. Gaffigan Registered Merit Reporter
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1	APPEARANCES: (Continued)
2	CND DENEON LLD
3	SNR DENTON, LLP BY: CHRISTIAN E. SAMAY, ESQ. (Short Hill, New Jersey)
4	Counsel for Plaintiff
5	
6	POTTER ANDERSON & CORROON, LLP BY: DAVID E. MOORE, ESQ.
7	and
8	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP
9	BY: DAVID A. PERLSON, ESQ. (San Francisco, California)
10	and
11	
12	QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER & HEDGES, LLP BY: ANDREA PALLIOS ROBERTS, ESQ. (Rodwood Shoros, California)
13	(Redwood Shores, California)
14	Counsel for Defendant
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16	- 000 -
17	PROCEEDINGS
18	(REPORTER'S NOTE: The following telephone
19	conference was held in chambers, beginning at 3:15 p.m.)
20	THE COURT: Good afternoon, counsel. This is
21	Judge Stark. Who is there, please? Counsel, this is Judge
22	Stark. Who is there, please?
23	MR. MOORE: Good afternoon, your Honor. David
24	Moore from Potter Anderson on behalf of Google. With me on
25	the line is David Perlson and also Andrea Roberts from Quinn

1 Emanuel.

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MS. JACOBS LOUDEN: Good afternoon, your Honor. For the plaintiff, Personalized User Model, this is Karen Jacobs Louden from Morris Nichols. I have on the line with me, Mark Nelson, Mark Friedman and Christian Samay from SNR Denton.

THE COURT: I have a court reporter here with me. It is our case of Personalized User Model versus Google Inc., Civil Action No 09-525-LPS.

Today's call is for us to take a look again, I should say yet again, at the dispute over -- well, now it is basically whether some additional communications need to be produced by the plaintiff as a result of the waiver that has been found by the Court of privilege. I'm somewhat familiar with the dispute at this point and have reviewed the papers, but I will give you each a chance to address the remaining scope of the dispute.

Google is the moving party, so you can go first.

MR. PERLSON: Thank you, your Honor. Good

afternoon. I apologize we're back here yet again, but they

are, from our perspective, very important materials.

What we are seeking here, your Honor, there are these eight withheld documents. We are seeking them to the extent that they concern conception and changed testimony and changed interrogatories relating to the date of conception,

which were subjects that were discussed at these January 19th and February 7th meetings and thus we think that they are within the scope of the Court's order.

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PUM has never said that these withheld documents do not concern conception with the changed testimony and interrogatory response. Instead, what they're saying is these documents do not relate to Category A and B that the Court did allow. At least, that is the way PUM is interpreting those categories. What it seems to be happening here is that PUM is interpreting these categories in such a way that A, B, and C are necessarily exclusive of each other such that if a document is concerning the preparation of the interrogatory responses, that cannot concern one of the subject matters that the Court did allow.

We would submit, your Honor, that is not how the Court ruled. Your Honor specifically addressed the situation at the hearing and found that when there is overlap, what is going to be protected is the work product, i.e., the interrogatory responses themselves.

I do not think that applies to any of the -at least based on their log, it does not appear to apply to
any of the things they are still withholding, all of which I
think are e-mails, and none of which the plaintiff before
has claimed worked product protection. They throw away the
related claim in their brief, but it certainly does not seem

like these are the interrogatory responses themselves that they are withholding.

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Just as a practical matter, as we pointed out, it does seem quite clear that SRI and the ownership issue regarding it was discussed in connection with the changed interrogatory response. If it was discussed the day after the meeting, the February 7th meeting, it would be just as relevant as if it is discussed in a February 7th meeting; but under PUM's interpretation, if there was an e-mail from PUM's counsel or the inventors, and this was on February 8th, and it says if we agree to pick a September 21st conception date to include in its interrogatory response, this would put the ownership issue to bed. They are saying that would not need to be produced. We would submit, your Honor, that is just the type of thing that your Honor's order did allow for, and that these documents should be produced.

Another point is that they are saying that our argument is that because the Court granted its motion with respect to Category B, the subject matters discussed in the meeting, that PUM cannot withhold any documents outside of drafts and supplemental interrogatory responses, but that is not our argument.

Our argument is that anything that falls within the subjects that your Honor did allow needs to be produced regardless of whether it falls into the category that your

Honor did not allow, with the sole exception of the work product, the interrogatory responses themselves, as your Honor ruled.

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A couple other things. They seem to be somehow saying that documents on February 8th should not be produced because they do not relate to the meetings themselves, but there is nothing in your Honor's order that provided a cutoff of February 7th, which is when that last meeting occurred. In fact, I inquired as to the dates. We had specifically said that was not the cutoff. The cutoff was the interrogatory response. So these communications regarding conception the day after the February 7th meeting are just as relevant to the discussions in the meeting itself.

Finally, your Honor, I would just note that to the extent that your Honor is not inclined to rule on the papers themselves, that seems appropriate for a submission in camera so that your Honor can determine whether these you documents fall within the scope of your ruling.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

Let me hear from the plaintiff, please.

MR. NELSON: Your Honor, this is Mark Nelson, speaking on behalf of plaintiff PUM.

We, too, unfortunately find ourselves back here again and really did not want to. Our position is different than what Google states it. I think they misunderstand our

position.

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We complied fully we believe with the order by producing the documents relating to the scheduling of the meetings and documents relating to the subjects discussed at those meetings, but your Honor's order specifically denies them communications regarding PUM's preparation of its fourth supplemental responses.

It seems like when we kind of cut to the chase, that what Google is really looking for here is documents that somehow overlap. I think the question is, well, how do you define relating to conception or relating to the changed response? Because these e-mails, contrary to what counsel said, most are work product, and many of them do have the draft interrogatory response attached as part of a Blackberry readable e-mail. In one sense, well, they all relate to the changed interrogatory response because the ones that have the draft on them, that is what it is.

To the extent there is overlap like what I think counsel for Google was talking about where you had something to do with actual discussion of conception, for example, we produced that overlapping e-mail. I believe that e-mail is -- I need to find it here.

There was an e-mail from Jennifer Bent to Roy

Twersky on February 8th at 10:30 a.m. talking about a

document relating to conception. That document was one of

the documents that was discussed at the meeting. Well, we did produce that.

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The other documents that are here generally relate to -- well, really relate to the preparation of the fourth supplemental interrogatory response. During the meet and confer on this issue, we were again hamstrung because we were trying to explain in our view what these documents were, but, again, Google would not indicate to us that if we gave them any sort of a real description of what the documents were, they would not use that as a waiver against us, and then we would be back here on another ground.

I guess to summarize, we fully believe that we complied with the order. We view this as just an attempt I guess by Google to snatch most of Category C which the Court denied them the relief from under the Court's order. We read the order again as very clear that communications relating to the preparation of the fourth supplemental response were not part of what was included within the waiver. That is what these documents are. That is really all I can say.

Google made a few other points. They attach a piece of one of the other e-mails in trying to maybe create a smoking gun on the SRI issue. That e-mail, and then the e-mail that is attached to our letter, confirmed what Mr. Twersky said in his deposition: that there was a

question as to what the legal meaning of conception was. We provided that legal meaning to them. We think, here, this is just an overreach by Google to try to get a second bite at something that the Court already denied them.

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THE COURT: Mr. Nelson, I think everybody agrees it comes down to overlap. So I do want to make sure I fully understand PUM's position.

In your letter, at page 2, I'm near the top of the page, you write: "The remaining withheld communications reflecting both attorney-client communications and work product relate to PUM's preparation of its Fourth Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 1, the category of communications that the Court specifically denied Google."

Do the remaining eight withheld e-mails relate solely to PUM's preparation of its Fourth Supplemental Response to Interrogatory No. 1?

MR. NELSON: Let me try to figure out a way to answer that sort of most accurately without waiving privilege.

The majority of the e-mails are essentially transmittals that would have the interrogatory's proposed supplemental response attached to it. A couple of the e-mails relate to a question about certain aspects unrelated to conception in that proposed supplemental response. A couple of the other ones relate to -- one relates to a

1 document that was -- I'm in a difficult position, your 2 Honor, because, again, if I go into these in too much 3 detail, I feel like I risk a waiver. THE COURT: What do you think of the suggestion 4 that I review the eight e-mails in camera? 5 MR. NELSON: We are fine with that. 6 think it is necessary, but we are certainly fine with that. 7 8 If I give a more detailed description here over the 9 telephone, I feel I risk a waiver, and so I am not sure --10 and I do not want to misrepresent something to the Court in 11 case the Court finds for Google, and then they come back 12 and say, well, I said that something did not relate in any way to the changed interrogatory and under some tortured 13 14 interpretation Google says it does. THE COURT: It is just eight e-mails that are at 15 16 issue; correct? 17 MR. NELSON: Yes, it is. 18 THE COURT: Well, I am inclined to order you to 19 submit them for in camera review. Is there anything further 20 you want to say before I turn back to Mr. Perlson? 21 MR. NELSON: No, your Honor. 22 THE COURT: Mr. Perlson, you have heard my 2.3 inclination. Is there anything else you want to add? 2.4 MR. PERLSON: No, your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: Then I think given that we have

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1	spent a quite a lot of time collectively on these issues and
2	we at least have narrowed it down to eight e-mails, and
3	counsel for plaintiff is in a difficult position in trying
4	to represent further what they say without risking a further
5	waiver, although review in camera is something I do not have
6	time to do very often, I think under the circumstances it is
7	the appropriate way to resolve this dispute, hopefully, once
8	and for all.
9	I'm hereby ordering the plaintiff submit for in
10	camera review a copy of the eight e-mails and to get those
11	into us by the end of the day tomorrow.
12	Is there anything further we need to discuss at
13	this time, Mr. Perlson?
14	MR. PERLSON: No, your Honor. Thank you.
15	THE COURT: Mr. Nelson?
16	MR. NELSON: No, your Honor. Thank you.
17	THE COURT: Thank you very much. Good-bye.
18	(Conference ends at 3:30 p.m.)
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20	I hereby certify the foregoing is a true and accurate
21	transcript from my stenographic notes in the proceeding.
22	/s Brian P. Gaffigan
23	Official Court Reporter U.S. District Court
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