

EXHIBIT 11

1 PETER C. McMAHON (State Bar No. 161841)
KATHERINE DEBSKI (State Bar No. 271528)
2 MCMAHON SEREPCA LLP
985 Industrial Road, Suite 201
San Carlos, CA 94070-4157
3 Tel: 650-637-0600
Fax: 650-637-0700
4

5 Attorneys for Third Party
IPVALUE MANAGEMENT, INC.

6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
7 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
8 SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
9

10 GOOGLE, INC., and YOUTUBE, LLC,

11 Plaintiff(s),

12 v.

13 IPVALUE MANAGEMENT INC.,

14 Defendant.
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Case No. C11-80016 MISC RS (BZ)

**DECLARATION OF KEITH M.
WILSON IN SUPPORT OF THIRD
PARTY IPVALUE MANAGEMENT,
INC.'S OPPOSITION TO GOOGLE,
INC.'S AND YOUTUBE, LLC'S
MOTION TO COMPEL
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS**

1 I, Keith Wilson, declare as follows:

2 1. I am a Senior Vice President, Legal at IPVALUE Management, Inc.
3 (“IPVALUE”). I submit this declaration in support of *IPVALUE's Opposition To Google, Inc.'s*
4 *and YouTube, LLC's Motion To Compel Production of Documents from Third Party IPVALUE*
5 (“Opposition”). I have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein, and, if called upon to
6 testify thereto, I am competent to do so and would do so.

7 2. Prior to joining IPVALUE, I held various roles in the field of patent law
8 including General and IP Counsel at Solus Micro Technologies and Chief Patent Counsel at
9 Litton Industries. My practice generally involved counseling and advocacy regarding patent
10 commercialization, and related assertion, litigation, and negotiation of contracts. I have been
11 practicing in this area since 1994.

12 3. I have been the Senior Vice President, Legal at IPVALUE since 2002. In
13 this capacity, I am the head of the small number of attorneys who provide legal advice and
14 counseling to IPVALUE (“Legal Group”): From my experience, I equate the attorneys in the
15 Legal Group as being “in-house counsel” to IPVALUE. These attorneys bear the title “IP
16 Counsel.” I provide this declaration in part to edify the Court regarding IPVALUE’s business
17 model, and the duties and functions of the IP Counsel within IPVALUE’s Legal Group. In
18 addition, I provide this declaration because I am one of the “custodians” identified by Google,
19 and because four of the other custodians identified, Paul Riley, Sanjay Prasad, Mitch Rosenfeld,
20 and Steven Shin, all served as IP Counsel in my group during their tenure at IPVALUE.

21 4. In my capacity I am personally aware of IPVALUE’s business model. It
22 should be understood that IPVALUE is not an assignee or owner of the patents at issue, and
23 IPVALUE has no ownership interest whatsoever in Xerox Corporation (“Xerox”). The business
24 of IPVALUE consists of two major components: (1) the identification of patent
25 commercialization opportunities, and (2) the conduct of the licensing or sales that comprise that
26 commercialization. These functions are led and primarily conducted by the “Technology and
27 Operations Group,” and the “Licensing Group,” respectively. The Technology and Operations
28 Group includes generally non-attorney technical and financial specialists. Their role includes the

1 identification of patent commercialization opportunities and the gathering of information about
2 products and businesses of potential licensees. The Licensing Group focuses on license
3 negotiations, and its members are typically designated as "Vice President, Licensing." or similar
4 titles including the word "Licensing." The members of the Licensing Group are both attorneys
5 and non-attorneys. However, the attorneys perform business functions and, with some
6 exceptions, do not provide legal advice to IPVALUE.

7 5. During the period relevant to the matter at bar, neither Sanjay Prasad,
8 Mitch Rosenfield, nor Steven Shin held any position in either the Licensing Group or the
9 Technology and Operations Group. Each of these gentlemen served as IP Counsel in the Legal
10 Group.

11 6. The situation is different with Paul Riley. Mr. Riley once held the position
12 of "IP Counsel." However, during the period which is relevant to the matter at bar, Mr. Riley
13 switched positions – leaving the Legal Group, and moving to the Licensing Group. Indeed, Mr.
14 Riley led licensing negotiations with Google. This is the reason that during our "meet and
15 confer" efforts with Google, we offered and agreed to identify Mr. Riley as a "Custodian," and
16 both his "internal" and "external" communications have been (or will be imminently) produced
17 to Google. In other words, IPVALUE has never sought to exclude Mr. Riley from the document
18 production because we recognized that for part of the time, he has been in the Legal Group, and
19 for part of the time, he has been in the Licensing Group.

20 7. The Legal Group focuses on providing legal advice to the company, and
21 its members are designated as "IP Counsel" or "Vice President, IP Counsel", depending on
22 experience level. Their duties are to advise the company regarding legal issues, such as patent
23 infringement theories, and defenses to patent assertion. The IP Counsel are not members of
24 Technology and Operations Group or the Licensing Group, but they provide legal advice and
25 services to both groups.

26 8. The job duties of an IP Counsel are to provide legal advice to IPVALUE.
27 The vast majority of these activities include advising the company regarding patent legal issues
28 or other legal issues. For example, an IP Counsel will advise the Technology and Operations

1 Group regarding evidence that could be used to demonstrate that a product infringes a certain
2 patent. To do this, the IP Counsel may review and analyze various rules of patent claim
3 construction, infringement, or validity. In large part I say “vast majority” because an IP Counsel
4 may perform administrative or other functions (it is a small company of 39 employees, only two
5 of whom are administrators) that do not relate at all to the issues at bar in the lawsuit. These
6 communications with the Technology and Operations Group are internal to IPVALUE (part of
7 what we refer to here as “INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS”).

8 9. In short, IPVALUE is organized such that members of the Legal Group
9 wear a “Legal” hat, and do not wear a “business” hat. With respect to the Xerox / Google
10 assertion, neither I nor Mr. Shin, Mr. Prasad, or Mr. Rosenfield have worn the “business” hat —
11 our role has strictly been providing legal advice wearing the “legal” hat.

12 10. As it pertains to the matter at bar, the IP Counsel (Prasad, Rosenfield, and
13 Shin) may have also participated in negotiations led by the Licensing Group, typically by
14 advising the Licensing Group member (e.g. Mr. Riley) and by presenting claim charts to a
15 potential licensee and its attorneys. Advice to the Licensing Group form part of our INTERNAL
16 COMMUNICATIONS. Copies of presentations made to potential licensees are part of what we
17 refer to here as “EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS”. In addition, Xerox may have requested
18 that IPVALUE generate materials, such as claim charts, for review by Xerox counsel prior to the
19 use of similar materials by IPVALUE in negotiations. In such a case, the IP Counsel typically is
20 responsible for generating and providing the material that is suitable for such a review. We also
21 group these documents into the group called EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS. With respect
22 to the IP Counsel, all of these EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS have been gathered and have
23 been or are being produced to Google as agreed, including creating privilege logs as appropriate.

24 11. During the course of negotiations with Google, IPVALUE likely received
25 arguments in response to its patent assertion, such as arguments that the products at issue do not
26 infringe the patent, or that the patent is not valid. The IPVALUE IP Counsel involved at the time
27 would have advised the company regarding the merits of Google’s response, and was sometimes
28 asked to participate in meetings to communicate IPVALUE’s response to Google. In my

1 experience, such a limited support role would analogously be provided by “in-house” or outside
2 counsel during negotiations. Indeed, in the matter at bar, the Licensing Group (Mr. Riley)
3 performed the “business functions” by leading the licensing negotiations, and any participation
4 by a Legal Group member was strictly to provide advice and counseling to IPVALUE before,
5 during, and after negotiations – and to explain legal positions and answer legal questions from
6 Google’s team.

7 12. Here, when analyzing the role of an IP Counsel, it is important to
8 understand that an IP Counsel performing his/her duties would have generated INTERNAL
9 COMMUNICATIONS (strictly within IPVALUE) and EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS (to
10 Xerox (in this case), and to other third parties). In the matter at bar, IPVALUE has produced its
11 EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS to Google. In the matter at bar, the Court is determining
12 whether in response to this Third Party Subpoena - IPVALUE will be required to produce its
13 Legal Group’s INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS.

14 13. I am mindful of my obligations under the Federal Rules of Civil
15 Procedure, i.e., Rule 11 and 26(g). As a result, it is difficult for me to quantify the percentage of
16 strictly privileged communications for each Legal Group IP Counsel. However, because the
17 entire internal function of an IP Counsel is to provide legal advice, I believe that a very high
18 percentage of the internal data and documents of IPVALUE’s IP Counsel will relate to advice
19 and counseling to other IPVALUE personnel. Although I have never quantified this percentage,
20 I am comfortable estimating that well over 90 percent of the documents generated and received
21 by each IP Counsel for each matter involved are for purposes of the IP Counsel providing legal
22 advice to the company. This is the natural result of the function of IP Counsel in the company.

23 14. I am one of the “custodians” whom Google is seeking the Court to order
24 production of my INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS. I have been the head of the Legal Group
25 at IPVALUE throughout IPVALUE’s work in connection with the Xerox/Google assertion. My
26 personal involvement with this project has included nothing except legal advice in connection
27 with the patent assertion. I have advised the company regarding infringement of Xerox’s patents
28 by Google and Yahoo. I participated in a few telephone calls with Google in connection with

1 this assertion, and I advised the company regarding preparation for these meetings. I have
2 advised the company regarding the counter-arguments presented to IPVALUE.

3 15. My documents in the Xerox/Google project were generated in the course
4 of providing legal advice regarding the project. The documents relate to the assertion of Xerox's
5 patents against Google and Yahoo, and the related issues of patent claim construction,
6 infringement, validity, and damages. With the exception of documents communicated with
7 Google or Yahoo, the vast majority of these documents are privileged. Although I have not
8 conducted a formal privilege review, I am comfortable estimating that more than 90 percent of
9 my "responsive" documents in this project would be considered privileged.

10 16. It is my understanding that the Court has expressed concern that
11 IPVALUE's IP Counsel are, in a sense, serving as in-house counsel for Xerox and may have in
12 its custody information that Xerox is required to produce, such as information required to be
13 disclosed by patentees under the Patent Local Rules. First, IPVALUE is not serving as legal
14 counsel to Xerox. Xerox has its own in-house counsel, including counsel who are designated to
15 support Xerox with respect to Xerox's assertion against Google. Second, I am familiar with the
16 relevant Patent Local Rules, and the types of documents that are required to be disclosed are not
17 the types of documents that IPVALUE possess; those documents, if they exist, are in the hands
18 of Xerox, who is the owner of the patents, and not in the hands of IPVALUE. Accordingly,
19 Xerox holds the patent-owner's records regarding development and ownership of the patent.
20 Xerox also holds any documents relating to whether Xerox is practicing the asserted patent.
21 IPVALUE's role as a licensing agent did not give IPVALUE any ownership interest in the
22 asserted patent, nor did it give IPVALUE possession of the patent-owner's records or any other
23 documents called for by the Patent Local Rules of the Northern District of California.
24 Moreover, in the event that IPVALUE was provided any of such documents, then those
25 documents would be provided in communications from Xerox, and such documents would fall in
26 the category of EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS, which, as stated above, have already been
27 gathered for production. Any subsequent INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS regarding that
28

1 information, assuming that information exists or ever existed in IP Counsel files, invariably
 2 would be privileged communications.

3 17. In the matter at bar, as it pertains to the EXTERNAL
 4 COMMUNICATIONS that IPVALUE has gathered and produced, IPVALUE has received an
 5 Invoice for approximately \$51,000 for January 2011 services from the legal counsel conducting
 6 the privilege and confidentiality review. I expect to receive additional Invoices for similar
 7 amounts for February and March services as well.

8 18. In addition, we have estimated that the amount of data that will be
 9 collected and processed by our Electronic Discovery Vendor will be at least seven (7) gigabytes
 10 of data (this does not include the collection of Shin's, Prasad's, Rosenfield's, or my data). The
 11 amounts listed below are "cut and pasted" from the Estimate that we have received from the
 12 Electronic Discovery Vendor's Contract, to wit:

Estimated Amount of Data	7GB	
PROCESSING		
First Pass Processing	\$275/GB * 5 GB	\$1,375
Responsive data processing @ Responsive Rate	\$550/GB * 2 GB	\$1,100
HOSTING		
Database Configuration and Setup	\$1,500 * 1	\$1,500
iConnect Hosting/Per GB/ Per Mo.	\$45/GB/mo. * 2 GB	\$90/mo.*
iConnect User License/Per User/Per Mo.	\$85/user/mo. *2 users	\$170/mo.*
Production Costs:		
TIFF Production for Native Files/Per TIFF (Est. 100,000/pages)	\$0.06/page	\$6,000
Electronic Bates Numbering/Per page (Est. 100,000/pages)	\$0.01/page	\$1,000
Attorney/Other Endorsements/Per page (Est. 100,000/pages)	\$0.01/page	\$1,000
Load File Production/Per load file (est. 3 per production)	\$150/load file	\$450
Media: \$300/Hard Drive or \$25/DVD (Required media will be based on production size)		\$300
Misc:		
Project Management/Per hour (If required to help setup searches, database assistance, etc.)		
Estimate 2 hours	\$175.00/hour	\$300
WebEx Training/Per session (1 Session)	\$500/session	\$500
ESTIMATED ONE TIME FEES Scenario 2:		\$13,785 (Plus Production Costs)
ESTIMATED MONTHLY RECURRING FEES Scenario 2 :		\$260*

EXHIBIT 12

CRAVATH, SWAINE & MOORE LLP

WORLDWIDE PLAZA
825 EIGHTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, NY 10019-7475

TELEPHONE: (212) 474-1000
FACSIMILE: (212) 474-3700

CITYPOINT
ONE ROPEMAKER STREET
LONDON EC2Y 9HR
TELEPHONE: 44-20-7453-1000
FACSIMILE: 44-20-7460-1100

WRITER'S DIRECT DIAL NUMBER

(212) 474-1778

THOMAS E. DUNN
MARK J. GREENE
SARKIS JEBEJIAN
DAVID R. HARRIOTT
MICHAEL A. PASKIN
ANDREW J. PITTS
MICHAEL T. REYNOLDS
ANTHONY L. RYAN
GEORGE E. ZOBITZ
GEORGE A. STEPHANAKIS
DARIN P. MCATEE
GARY A. BORNSTEIN
TIMOTHY G. CAMERON
KARIN A. DEMASI
LIZABETHANN R. EISEN
DAVID S. FINKELSTEIN
DAVID GREENWALD
RACHEL G. SKAISTIS
PAUL H. ZUMBRO
JOEL F. HEROLD
ERIC W. HILFERS
GEORGE F. SCHOEN
ERIK R. TAVZEL

CRAIG F. ARCELLA
TEENA-ANN V. SANKOORIKAL
ANDREW R. THOMPSON
DAMIEN R. ZOUBEK
LAUREN ANGELULLI
TATIANA LAPUSHCHIK
ERIC L. SCHIDLE
ALYSSA K. CAPLES
JENNIFER S. CONWAY
MINH VAN NGO
KEVIN J. ORSINI

SPECIAL COUNSEL
SAMUEL C. BUTLER
GEORGE J. GILLESPIE, III

OF COUNSEL
PAUL C. SAUNDERS

ALLEN FINKELSON
STUART W. GOLD
JOHN W. WHITE
JOHN E. BEERBOWER
EVAN R. CHESLER
MICHAEL L. SCHLER
RICHARD LEVIN
KRIS F. HEINZELMAN
S. ROBBINS KIESSLING
ROGER D. TURNER
PHILIP A. GELSTON
RORY O. MILLSON
RICHARD W. CLARY
WILLIAM P. ROGERS, JR.
JAMES D. COOPER
STEPHEN L. GOROON
DANIEL L. MOSLEY
PETER S. WILSON
JAMES C. VARDOLL, III
ROBERT H. BARON
KEVIN J. GREHAN
STEPHEN S. MADGEN
C. ALLEN PARKER

MARC S. ROSENBERG
SUSAN WEBSTER
DAVID MERCADO
ROWAN D. WILSON
PETER T. BARBUR
SANDRA C. GOLOSTEIN
THOMAS G. RAFFERTY
MICHAEL S. GOLDMAN
RICHARD HALL
JULIE A. NORTH
ANDREW W. NEEDHAM
STEPHEN L. BURNS
KEITH R. HUMMEL
DANIEL SLIFKIN
JEFFREY A. SMITH
ROBERT J. TOWNSEND, III
WILLIAM J. WHELAN, III
SCOTT A. BARSHAY
PHILIP J. BOECKMAN
ROGER G. BROOKS
WILLIAM V. FOGG
FAIZA J. SAIED
RICHARD J. STARK

June 7, 2011

Xerox Corp. v. Google Inc., et al., Civ. A. No. 10-136-LPS

Dear Andrea:

I write in response to your letter of May 26, 2011, regarding Xerox's privilege log.

First, as you know, Xerox's position was that it would not engage in discussions concerning privilege log issues until Google produced the balance of its privilege log. Xerox finally received a supplemental privilege log from Google only this past Friday, June 3. However, Google has informed Xerox that it has not produced all documents redacted for privilege and has not produced a privilege log covering those redactions. When does Google estimate it will produce these materials?

Second, regarding Xerox's assertion of common-interest privilege with respect to the documents cited in your letter, Xerox and IPVALUE Management Inc. ("IPValue") share a common interest in licensing the '979 Patent or successfully asserting it in litigation. As the owner of the patent, Xerox would benefit from either outcome. IPValue in turn stands to gain a commission following any license of the patent or successful outcome of this, or other, litigation by Xerox involving the patent. (See, e.g., "Master Services Agreement" between Xerox and IPValue, beginning at XRX01231057, at ¶¶ 8.01 and 13.02, and Ex. A, which Xerox hereby produces and which is attached to the email conveying this letter; see also "Addendum to Master Services Agreement Regarding Amended and Restated LP57a and Amended and Restated 58a", beginning at XRX00042859.) Furthermore, IPValue acts as Xerox's agent in licensing negotiations, which implicate various legal issues. Because Xerox and IPValue lawyers generated and shared certain privileged communications and/or work product in furtherance of those common interests and objectives, Xerox withheld such materials from production pursuant to the common-interest privilege.

We are puzzled by Google's suggestion that communications between Xerox and IPValue are not privileged simply because they may "serve the business

purposes of both IPValue and Xerox". Is it Google's position that attorney-client communications or attorney work product generated in the context of a business decision or in furtherance of a business objective cannot be privileged? If so, we would expect a substantial revision of Google's privilege log.

Third, regarding the documents Google cites as having "no basis for any claim of attorney-client privilege", Google's apparent position is that unless a document communicates legal advice to or from Xerox's attorneys, it should not be noted on the privilege log as subject to attorney-client privilege. We do not understand the basis for this position. When IPValue attorneys exchange communications with their client that involve or reflect legal advice, those communications are subject to attorney-client privilege. If IPValue shares such communications with Xerox, the underlying attorney-client privilege is not waived pursuant to the doctrine of common-interest privilege. Thus, Xerox's privilege log correctly indicates the nature of the underlying privilege associated with each document listed, and whether that document is also entitled to protection under the common-interest doctrine.

Finally, Xerox is re-reviewing various documents on its May 13, 2011, privilege log and will notify Defendants promptly of any changes in privilege designations that Xerox feels should be made.

Please note that Xerox is copying counsel for Yahoo on this letter. As Xerox has mentioned in prior correspondence with Google, to the extent either Defendant intends to raise issues concerning common-interest privilege and Xerox's privilege log, all such issues should be raised now. It is not efficient or fair for Xerox to participate in serial discussions with each Defendant concerning the same subject matter.

Very truly yours,

/s/

Scott A. Leslie

Andrea Roberts
Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan LLP
555 Twin Dolphin Drive, 5th Floor
Redwood Shores, CA 94065-2139

VIA EMAIL

COPIES TO COUNSEL FOR YAHOO! INC. AND RIGHT MEDIA LLC

EXHIBIT 13

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

DIAGNOSTICS SYSTEMS CORPORATION,)
)
) **Plaintiff,**)
) **v.**)
) **SYMANTEC CORPORATION; F-SECURE, INC.; NETIQ CORPORATION; QUEST SOFTWARE, INC.; NETSCOUT SYSTEMS, INC.; ORACLE CORPORATION; SAS INSTITUTE, INC.; BUSINESS OBJECTS AMERICAS f/k/a BUSINESS OBJECTS INC.; BMC SOFTWARE, INC.; COGNOS CORPORATION; INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION; SAP AMERICA, INC.; MICROSTRATEGY, INC. d/b/a MSIMICROSTRATEGY INCORPORATED; INFORMATION BUILDERS, INC.; ASPEN TECHNOLOGY, INC. d/b/a MASSACHUSETTS ASPEN TECHNOLOGY, INC.,**)
) **Defendants.**)

CASE NO. SA CV 06-1211 DOC (ANx)

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER/DISCOVERY REFEREE WITH SOME MODIFICATIONS

Before the Court is NetScout Systems, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Documents ("Motion").
The Court issued an Order on April 4, 2008, resolving all pending motions, with the exception of

1 the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine claims made by Plaintiff. In that Order,
2 the Court appointed Hon. James L. Smith of JAMS as a Special Master (“Special Master”) to
3 review documents for which DSC asserts the attorney-client privilege and/or the work product
4 doctrine. The Special Master has provided the Report and Recommendation of Special
5 Master/Discovery Referee (“R&R”) to the Court, and the parties have been provided a copy.
6 The Court gave the parties the opportunity to make oral arguments regarding their objections to
7 the R&R. After considering the papers filed by the parties, oral argument by the parties, and the
8 R&R, the Court hereby ADOPTS the R&R with some modifications.

9 **I. BACKGROUND**

10 The present lawsuit involves two patents for which Plaintiff alleges infringement by
11 Defendants.

12 On December 23, 1997, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office issued U.S. Letters Patent
13 No. 5,701,400 (“the ‘400 patent”) entitled “Method and apparatus for applying if-then-else rules
14 to data sets in a relational database and generating from the results of application of said rules a
15 database of diagnostics linked to said data sets to aid in executive analysis of financial data.”
16 Plaintiff Diagnostic Systems Corporation (“DSC”) alleges that it is the owner by assignment of
17 all rights and interests in the ‘400 patent.

18 On July 16, 1996, the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office issued U.S. Letters Patent No.
19 5,537,590 (“the ‘590 patent”) entitled “Apparatus for applying rules to data sets in a relational
20 database to generate a database of diagnostic records linked to the data sets.” DSC alleges that it
21 is the owner by assignment of all rights and interests in the ‘590 patent.

22 The ‘590 and ‘400 patents came into DSC’s possession after tracing a circuitous path.
23 Carlos Armando Amado (“Amado”) is the named inventor of the ‘590 Patent, the 400 Patent,
24 and U.S. Patent No. 5,293,615 (“‘615 Patent”). On March 7, 2003, Amado filed a patent
25 infringement action against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”), claiming that Microsoft had
26 infringed the ‘590, ‘400, and ‘615 patents. Amado dismissed his causes of action against
27 Microsoft arising from the ‘590 Patent and the ‘400 Patent on September 13, 2004, after
28 receiving the Court’s claim construction ruling and before the summary judgment hearing. The

1 '615 Patent was not dismissed and was litigated to a verdict.

2 Amado assigned the '590 Patent and '400 Patent to Acacia Patent Acquisition
3 Corporation ("APAC") on December 6, 2005. Pursuant to this assignment, Amado retained a
4 50% royalty for any proceeds obtained from enforcement of the patents. In addition, Amado
5 agreed in the assignment to "execute and deliver all papers" and "generally do everything
6 possible to aid ASSIGNEE [APAC] to obtain and enforce proper patent protection for said
7 inventions in all countries." APAC assigned its interest in the '590 Patent and '400 Patent to
8 DSC on September 6, 2006. In this Assignment and Assumption Agreement, DSC assumed all
9 of APAC's "rights, obligations, interests and liabilities under the Amado Assignment
10 Agreement." Furthermore, APAC agreed in the assignment to "execute and deliver all papers"
11 and "generally do everything possible to aid ASSIGNEE [DSC] to obtain and enforce proper
12 patent protection." In the same month, DSC allegedly contacted over 100 companies to seek
13 licenses on these patents and offered to disclose details of the patents, explain the due diligence
14 process, and discuss the reasons DSC believed that the other companies' products infringed the
15 patents.

16 Both DSC and APAC are wholly-owned subsidiaries of Acacia Research Corporation
17 ("Acacia") and are in the business of acquiring, licensing, and enforcing patented technologies.
18 Furthermore, APAC and DSC share the same officers, directors, and address.

19 On December 14, 2006, DSC filed its initial Complaint in this action. Subsequently, on
20 November 8, 2007, DSC filed its Consolidated First Amended Complaint, adding additional
21 defendants. DSC alleges that Defendants have directly infringed and continue to directly
22 infringe the '400 and '590 patents (collectively, "the Patents"). DSC also alleges Defendants
23 have indirectly infringed the Patents by providing non-staple articles of commerce to others for
24 use in an infringing system and by inducing others to infringe. DSC alleges that Defendants'
25 acts of infringement include making, using, selling, or offering for sale numerous products.
26 DSC claims Defendants' infringement of the Patents has been willful and deliberate.

27 DSC is seeking a declaration, decree, damages, a preliminary injunction, a permanent
28 injunction, costs, expenses, and pre and post-judgment interest on DSC's damages, and

1 attorneys' fees. DSC alleges infringement by the following remaining defendants in the action:
2 Symantec Corporation ("Symantec"); NetIQ Corporation ("NetIQ"); NetScout Systems, Inc.
3 ("NetScout"); Oracle Corporation ("Oracle"); Business Objects Americas f/k/a Business Objects
4 Inc. ("BOA"); Cognos Corporation ("Cognos"); International Business Machines Corporation
5 ("IBM"); SAP America, Inc. ("SAP"); Microstrategy, Inc. d/b/a MSIMicroStrategy Incorporated
6 ("Microstrategy"); and Information Builders, Inc. ("Information Builders").

7 DSC has reached settlement agreements with numerous defendants who were previously
8 named in the case. The action against Motive, Inc. was dismissed pursuant to a settlement
9 agreement on August 9, 2007. The action against CA, Inc. was dismissed pursuant to a
10 settlement and licensing agreement on August 15, 2007. The action against BMC Software, Inc.
11 was dismissed pursuant to a stipulated dismissal on March 24, 2008. Finally, the actions against
12 SAS Institute, Inc., Aspen Technology, Inc. d/b/a Massachusetts Aspen Technology, Inc., F-
13 Secure, Inc., and Quest Software, Inc. were dismissed pursuant to stipulated dismissals on March
14 25, 2008.

15 NetScout's Motion to Compel was originally scheduled for hearing on September 25,
16 2007. The week of the September 25, 2007 hearing, the parties discussed their discovery
17 disputes and conducted depositions. They ultimately resolved the majority of their discovery
18 disputes through an agreement reported to the Court on September 27, 2007. In addition, the
19 Court's Order on April 4, 2008 resolved other issues in NetScout's Motion to Compel.
20 Accordingly, only one remaining unresolved issue exists in NetScout's Motion to Compel,
21 which the Court addresses in this Order. The remaining unresolved issue is the discovery of
22 documents for which DSC claims the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine.
23 NetScout seeks to compel discovery of certain documents for which DSC claims the attorney-
24 client privilege and work product doctrine.

25 The Court assigned a Special Master to review, *in camera*, the documents at issue. The
26 Special Master reviewed each of the 1,302 documents identified in "PLAINTIFF'S PRIVILEGE
27 LOG 10-29-2007" ("Privilege Log") for the purposes of determining whether the listed
28 documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work product doctrine. The

1 Special Master provided a copy of the Privilege Log with two additional columns on the right
2 hand side of the spreadsheet labeled "Sustained" and "Produce." For each of the 1,302
3 documents, the Special Master indicated his recommendation to sustain the attorney-client
4 privilege or work product doctrine or to produce the document.

5 In the R&R, the Special Master made special note of the fact that, during the relevant
6 time period, the management team of DSC included 5 attorneys. However, in addition to acting
7 as attorneys, these individuals also functioned in the capacity of corporate executives to further
8 the business goals of DSC, primarily in regard to the licensing of the technology that is the
9 subject of this action. Accordingly, the Special Master recommended that communications
10 related primarily to these business functions should generally not be protected by the privileges
11 asserted. The Special Master determined that over 550 of the documents were mislabeled in the
12 privilege log and should be produced.

13 The Court gave the parties the opportunity to conduct oral arguments regarding the
14 Special Master's recommendations on May 23, 2008. Plaintiff and NetScout each submitted
15 supplemental briefing following that hearing. Briefing in this matter is now complete, and the
16 Court addresses the Special Master's R&R in the instant Order.

17 **II. LEGAL STANDARD**

18 A party may serve on another party a request to produce all relevant and non-privileged
19 documents in the possession, custody or control of the party served. Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a). The
20 party receiving the request shall serve a written response within 30 days, either stating that
21 inspection will be permitted or objecting to the request and stating the reasons for the objection.
22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(b). The party making the request may seek a court order to compel disclosure
23 when the responding party objects to the requests or otherwise fails to respond to the request or
24 to produce the documents. *Id.*

25 "The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential
26 communications known to the common law. *Upjohn Co. v. U.S.*, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct.
27 677 (1981) (citing 8 J. Wigmore, *Evidence* § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). The elements of
28 the attorney-client privilege are:

1 (1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
2 legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
3 to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
4 his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
5 by the legal advisor, (8) except the protection be waived.

6 8 J. Wigmore, *Evidence* § 2292, at 554.

7 The work product doctrine is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Pursuant to Rule
8 26(b)(3), “[o]rdinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared
9 in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative.” The United
10 States Supreme Court has set forth the essential nature of the doctrine as follows:

11 In performing his various duties . . . it is essential that a lawyer work
12 with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
13 opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client’s
14 case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to
15 be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
16 and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference. That
17 is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers act within
18 the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and
19 to protect their clients’ interests. This work is reflected, of course, in
20 interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental
21 impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and
22 intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed . . . as the ‘Work
23 product of the lawyer.’ Were such materials open to opposing
24 counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing
25 would remain unwritten. An attorney’s thoughts, heretofore
26 inviolate, would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp
27 practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and
28 in the preparation of cases for trial.

1 *Hickman v. Taylor*, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11, 67 S.Ct. 385 (1947).

2 **III. DISCUSSION**

3 Upon referral of this matter to the Special Master, the Special Master conducted a
4 thorough and comprehensive review of all 1,302 documents in the Privilege Log. After
5 analyzing and reviewing each document, the Special Master denoted whether the privilege
6 asserted should be sustained, or whether the document should be produced. The following
7 findings were crucial to the Special Master's determinations:

8 It should be noted that during the time period reflected in the
9 documents the management team of Plaintiff Diagnostic Systems
10 Corporation (DSC) included 5 attorneys. All of these individuals, in
11 addition to being designated as 'General Counsel' or 'Counsel'
12 carried other titles including 'Director,' 'Chief Operating Officer,'
13 and 'Vice-President.' In reviewing the documents it became clear
14 these individuals were at times functioning primarily as attorneys
15 representing DSC and at other times were functioning in the capacity
16 of corporate executives furthering the business goals of DSC,
17 primarily in regard to the licensing of the technology that is the
18 subject of this action. Communications relating primarily to these
19 business functions were generally found not to be protected by the
20 privileges asserted.

21 R&R at 2:9-2:17.

22 In response, Plaintiff objects to many of the findings in the Special Master's R&R. For
23 the majority of these objections, Plaintiff argues that these documents were created in
24 anticipation of litigation, even if the documents were also generated for, or also serve, a business
25 purpose. Plaintiff further argues that the documents relate to the Rule 11 investigation for the
26 instant lawsuit, and that any discovery of the documents would be premature. Plaintiff asks the
27 Court to reverse the Special Master and sustain Plaintiff's assertion under the attorney-client
28 privilege, work product doctrine, and/or common-interest doctrine for the following privilege

1 entry numbers: 1144; 855; 797; 942; 794-796; 730; 776; 784; 12-13; 1061; 1067-1068;
2 1097-1112; 1114-1117; 1118; 1120-1121; 1272-1273; 1284-1287; 1289-1298; 40-43; 433-434;
3 443; 526-527; 553-588; 594; 596-609; 612-623; 626-699; 701-706; 708-730; 738-747; 749-759;
4 765-771; 775-777; 779-780; 784; 789-790; 793-800; 802-805; 807-896; 957; 960; 962-963;
5 969-970; 975-981; 983-984; 989; 991; 994-1007; 1009; 1011-1022; 1026-
6 1056; 1058; 1278-1280; 1288; and 1300-1301.

7 Defendants argue that the Court should order production of the documents marked
8 “Produce” by the Special Master. In addition, Defendants argue that the Special Master did not
9 go far enough. Although Defendants do not have access to the *in camera* documents for the
10 purposes of making specific objections, Defendants object to the privilege being sustained as to
11 documents such as privilege entry number 917, as well as communications between Amado and
12 his counsel in the Microsoft action, Morrison & Foerster, and between Amado and his patent
13 attorney, Ronald Fish.

14 At the outset, the Court notes that Plaintiff, through its business structure, attempts to
15 sweep wide swaths of documents within the scope of the privileges asserted. Plaintiff has set up
16 its business in such a way to allow Plaintiff to argue that many documents, including those
17 central to Plaintiff’s primary business, are privileged documents. “[T]he burden is on a party
18 claiming the protection of a privilege to establish those facts that are the essential elements of the
19 privileged relationship.” *von Bulow v. von Bulow*, 811 F.2d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1987) (citation
20 omitted). Although Plaintiff has met its burden with respect to many of the documents for which
21 the protected status is sustained, Plaintiff has failed to do so with respect to a substantial number
22 of documents. As such, the Court adopts the Special Master’s report in large part, with some
23 modifications to the Special Master’s findings. Applying a *de novo* standard of review, *see* Fed.
24 R. Civ. P. 53(f), the Court finds the vast majority of the Special Master’s recommendations to be
25 well reasoned and correct.

26 The Court upholds the distinction drawn by the Special Master between documents
27 created when DSC employees were functioning primarily as attorneys representing DSC and
28 documents created when the DSC employees were functioning in the capacity of corporate

1 | executives furthering the business goals of DSC. The latter category should not fall within the
2 | scope of the broad protection to which DSC claims entitlement. Further, the record is replete
3 | with evidence demonstrating the DSC employees' dual roles as both attorneys and business
4 | executives. This evidence is affirmed by an *in camera* review of the documents contained
5 | within the privilege log.

6 | DSC's only business is to analyze, investigate, and attempt to enforce the patents-in-suit.
7 | While much of DSC's activities relate to litigation and legal advice, for which the protection
8 | asserted by DSC is proper, much of DSC and the related entities' activities center on their
9 | business objectives to license and acquire patents and do not bestow the same protections on
10 | related documents. Acacia's business "is to acquire rights and patents and monetize them."
11 | Vella Dep. at 17. APAC, a subsidiary of Acacia was created to acquire patents and portfolios on
12 | behalf of Acacia, which are subsequently assigned to additional subsidiaries because the
13 | "economic interests in those portfolios varied." Vella Dep. at 18, 21. DSC is a subsidiary
14 | whose only business is "the business of monetizing the patents in suit." *See* Vella Dep. at 18,
15 | 64, 177. DSC does not make any products and the patents are its only asset. *Id.* at 64, 173, 194.
16 | DSC's purpose is to either attempt to license the patents or enforce them through litigation and
17 | judgment. *Id.* at 64, 177. In this vein, some of DSC, Acacia, and APAC's employees' functions
18 | do occur in anticipation of litigation, but not all. In addition some of the employees'
19 | communications are subject to the attorney-client privilege, but not all.

20 | As explained by the Special Master, the DSC entities' employees take multiple roles, both
21 | business and legal. This distinction is evidenced by examining the activities of Matthew Vella
22 | ("Vella"), DSC's corporate representative who is also an attorney. When asked about the
23 | company's financial reporting, Vella explained that DSC is a public company and further stated,
24 | "I'm the person that tells the rest of the company what might or might not happen with DSC's
25 | business. . . . And what I do is meet with them . . . and I give them a state of DSC and a state of
26 | other subsidiaries address, if you will. [Lately,] the reporting was so simple that I think I had to
27 | create a spreadsheet for DSC." Vella Dep. at 170-174. Vella also prepared a presentation titled
28 | "Next Generation Patent Appraisal (Buying Patents)" for the Ocean Tomo Spring 2008 Live IP

1 Auction held in San Francisco at the end of March 2008. *See* Fossum Decl., Ex. A. The
2 presentation is focused on the business of how to identify patents to acquire and “targets” to
3 assert them against, how to “assess value,” and how to develop an “assertion plan.” *See id.* The
4 presentation details the extensive process and analysis Vella goes through when evaluating
5 patents to acquire and targets to assert those patents against. *See id.* These functions are clearly
6 business functions, and documents resulting from these functions cannot be categorized in
7 sweeping assertions of privileges and protection in order shield the documents from discovery
8 simply because Vella is a lawyer.

9 Just as distinctions can be drawn between specific employees’ roles, distinctions can also
10 be drawn between the relevant time periods. Plaintiff attempts to make the time period during
11 which litigation was anticipated as broad as possible. However, Plaintiff’s business model does
12 not allow it to claim such broad privileges. The events leading up to the instant litigation
13 demonstrate the distinctions based on relevant time periods. DSC sent out letters to over 100
14 potential licensees in September 2006, seeking to obtain licenses of the patents-in-suit. Vella
15 Dep. at 64. As explained by Vella, during the period leading up to the issuance of these letters,
16 “there [was] a bunch of evidence flying around. We’re trying to figure out not only who’s
17 getting letters, but who’s likely to get sued.” Vella Dep. at 127. When speaking about these
18 September 2006 letters, DSC’s counsel stated that “none of these letters are accusations of
19 infringement. They’re offers to license.” *Id.* at 299. Vella further explains, “We merely offer
20 that they might want to evaluate taking a license. That’s very different [from an accusation of
21 infringement]. And many of them said no thanks.” *Id.* at 304. Such offers to license are a
22 central aspect of DSC’s business model. Thus, although DSC claims that litigation was
23 anticipated related to many potential defendants during this time period, the record negates such
24 a claim. It would be illogical for the Court to conclude that DSC anticipated litigation against all
25 of these companies to whom DSC sent letters. After sending the letters, DSC waited several
26 months to sue the Defendants in this action, then waited another ten months to add additional
27 Defendants. The anticipation of litigation was a developing process and varied as to the relevant
28 Defendants. DSC initially pursued its business to monetize the patents, and had not yet

1 formalized specific litigation plans in order to allow it to claim such broad, sweeping
2 protections.

3 These facts negate the broad claims to the work product doctrine and attorney-client
4 privilege that DSC asks the Court to uphold. With respect to the work product doctrine,
5 numerous authorities have drawn a line between documents created in anticipation of litigation
6 and those not subject to work product protections based on the use of those documents in
7 activities related to the ordinary course of a company's business. The advisory committee's note
8 to Rule 26(b)(3) explains that "materials assembled in the ordinary course of business . . . are not
9 under the qualified immunity provided by this subdivision." Rule 26(b)(3), advisory
10 committee's note. One court explained that "patent infringement investigations, tests or analyses
11 . . . would not be protected from disclosure as work product if they were prepared in the normal
12 course of plaintiff's business." *Phillips Elecs. North Am. Corp. v. Universal Elecs. Inc.*, 892
13 F.Supp. 108, 110 (D. Del. 1995). Further, "[a] more or less routine investigation . . . is not
14 sufficient to immunize an investigative report developed in the ordinary course of business."
15 *Green v. Baca*, 2004 WL 1151649, at *5 (C.D. Cal. May 19, 2004) (citation omitted). "There is
16 no protection for documents prepared in the ordinary course of business, even if they may be
17 useful in litigation." *Clavo v. Zarrabian*, 2003 WL 24272641, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sep. 24, 2003);
18 *see also L.H. v. Schwarzenegger*, 2007 WL 2009807, at *8-9 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 6, 2007) (holding
19 that documents prepared as part of "routine" procedures are not protected by work product
20 doctrine); *Kintera, Inc. v. Convio, Inc.*, 219 F.R.D. 503, 507 (S.D. Cal. 2003) (holding that, in
21 order for a document to be protected, it must be one "that would not have been generated but for
22 the pendency or imminence of litigation"). If the Court were to adopt DSC's position with
23 respect to the work product doctrine, virtually all activities engaged in by a company premised
24 entirely on licensing and/or enforcing patents via litigation would be classified as "in
25 anticipation of litigation" and would therefore be work product; such a sweeping application of
26 the work product doctrine is unsupported. In this case, many of DSC's business activities are
27 distinguishable from DSC's activities in anticipation of litigation. The Special Master properly
28 excluded documents deriving from these business activities from the scope of the work product

1 doctrine.

2 A similar conclusion is reached with respect to DSC's claims of the attorney-client
3 privilege. In order for the attorney-client privilege to apply, among other factors, legal advice
4 must be sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, and the communications
5 must relate to that legal advice. 8 J. Wigmore, *Evidence* § 2292, at 554. "The mere fact that
6 outside counsel was copied with the e-mail will not shield communication not made for the
7 purpose of securing legal advice." *United States v. ChevronTexaco Corp.*, 241 F.Supp.2d 1065,
8 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2002). As further explained by the Court in *ChevronTexaco*:

9 Corporations may not conduct their business affairs in private simply
10 by staffing a transaction with attorneys. Because in-house counsel
11 may operate in a purely or primarily business capacity in connection
12 with many corporate endeavors, the presumption that attaches to
13 communications with outside counsel does not extend to
14 communications with in-house counsel.

15 With respect to internal communications involving in-house
16 counsel, Chevron must make a 'clear showing' that the 'speaker'
17 made the communications for the purpose of obtaining or providing
18 legal advice. In order to show that a communication relates to *legal*
19 advice, the proponent of the privilege must demonstrate that the
20 'primary purpose' of the communication was securing legal advice.
21 Extending protection to communications primarily and sufficiently
22 animated by some other purpose would not be necessary to
23 encourage forthright disclosures by clients to lawyers-so such
24 communications should not be privileged.

25 . . .

26 [W]here . . . the attorneys not only served as legal advisors
27 but also helped implement the business transaction, we cannot
28 simply assume that every communication involving in-house counsel

1 that related to this transaction was made primarily for the purpose of
2 securing legal advice.

3 *Id.* at 1076 (internal citations omitted).

4 Here, DSC properly claims the attorney-client privilege in some instances. However,
5 DSC is not entitled to protection by the privilege simply because in house counsel were involved
6 in the transactions. The management team of DSC and the related entities consisted of five
7 attorneys during the relevant time period, and these attorneys fulfill important business roles for
8 the companies. In those instances where DSC has failed to make a clear showing that the
9 primary purpose of the communication was securing legal advice, the assertion of the privilege is
10 overturned. The Court does not support an assertion of the privilege that will allow DSC to hide
11 behind communications involving its in-house counsel to protect broad swaths of documents,
12 where those communications are not clearly related to a primary purpose of securing legal
13 advice. The Special Master was correct to construe the attorney-client privilege strictly, and to
14 only apply protections where there was a clear showing that the communication was directed
15 specifically toward legal advice.

16 In sum, the Special Master properly parsed the specific roles of the employees and the
17 relevant time periods to determine which communications were related purely to DSC's business
18 and which were subject to the attorney client privilege and work product doctrine. Furthermore,
19 DSC's arguments regarding the Rule 11 pre-filing investigation discovery being premature do
20 not preclude production of the documents that the Special Master has recommended be
21 produced. These documents are not the Rule 11 pre-filing investigation; instead, they are
22 documents generated in the ordinary course of DSC and the related entities' line of business.
23 For these reasons, the Court adopts the Special Master's R&R with modifications set forth
24 below.

25 Prior to setting forth this Court's modifications to the R&R, however, the Court first
26 addresses the recent arguments made by the parties related to waiver of the privilege between
27 Amado and Ronald Fish ("Fish") and between Amado and Morrison & Foerster ("MoFo"), as
28 well as the Petition to Make Special "search report" ("PTMS Report").

1 Defendants argue that Amado waived any attorney client privilege due to the fact that
2 DSC has listed communications between Amado and Fish and between Amado and MoFo on its
3 privilege log. This argument fails for several reasons. At the outset, the evidence indicates that
4 Amado provided these documents to Shore Chan Bragalone LLP (“SCB”), the law firm
5 providing counsel to both DSC and Amado in this action. Amado cannot have waived the
6 privilege by providing this information to his counsel, SCB. Furthermore, there is no indication
7 that Amado provided this information to DSC himself. Defendants ask the Court to infer that
8 Amado provided the information to DSC based on its inclusion on the privilege log. However, if
9 anything, the evidence would likely lead to an inference that SCB provided the information to
10 DSC. An inference that SCB shared these documents with DSC is insufficient to waive
11 Amado’s privilege, and it would require inference upon inference to conclude that Amado
12 waived his privilege as to these documents to which the attorney-client privilege clearly applies.

13 Even if DSC possesses this information, DSC is entitled to protection based on the
14 common interest privilege. “[W]here the same attorney represents two parties having a common
15 interest, and each party communicates with the attorney, the communications are privileged from
16 disclosure at the instance of a third person.” *Simpson v. Motorists Mutual Ins. Co.*, 494 F.2d
17 850, 855 (7th Cir. 1974). Under the joint client or common interest doctrine, “communications
18 among joint clients and their counsel are not privileged in disputes between the joint clients, but
19 are protected from disclosure to others.” *Griffith v. Davis*, 161 F.R.D. 687, 693 (C.D. Cal.
20 1995). “[T]he joint client doctrine typically has been applied to overcome what would otherwise
21 have constituted a waiver of confidentiality because a communication has been shared between
22 two clients.” *Id.* Defendants argue that the common interest doctrine does not apply between
23 Amado and DSC because the shared interest is only a financial interest. However, in this case,
24 the shared interest is greater than simply financial. Amado and DSC share an interest in the
25 outcome of the instant litigation. Amado has been substantially involved in this litigation
26 through depositions and numerous court appearances, through which he has been represented by
27 SCB. Although he is not a named party, he is nearly a Plaintiff in the instant action. His clear
28 common goal and involvement in the instant action, as well as his shared counsel with DSC,

1 create a common interest privilege. For these reasons, the Special Master was correct in
2 sustaining the privilege as to those communications between MoFo and Amado and Fish and
3 Amado arising from the prior action.

4 Plaintiff argues in its recent briefing that the Special Master erred in recommending that
5 privilege entry numbers 1272 and 1273 be produced. These documents constitute a Petition to
6 Make Special “search report” (“PTMS Report”) and associated invoice, conducted by Patent
7 Agent Matt Kasap (“Kasap”). A petition to make special is a procedural device available to
8 applicants to accelerate and review prosecution of a patent application. Manual of Patent
9 Examination Procedure (8th ed. Rev. 5 2007) § 708.02 (“MPEP”). Section 708.02 requires that
10 the applicant “[s]ubmit[] a statement(s) that a pre-examination search was made, listing the field
11 of search by class and subclass, publication . . . [and] [s]ubmit[] one copy each of the references
12 deemed most closely related to the subject matter encompassed by the claims if said references
13 are not already of record . . .” *Id.*

14 Plaintiff argues that the “search report” and invoice constitute communications between
15 Kasap (a non-lawyer patent agent), Amado, and Fish (Amado’s patent attorney), subject to the
16 attorney-client privilege. The Court finds the reasoning in *Gorman v. Polar Electro, Inc.*, 137
17 F.Supp.2d 223 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), to be directly on point. There, the Court reached a correct
18 holding in explaining that “the attorney-client privilege applies to confidential communications
19 with patent agents acting under the authority and control of counsel, when the communications
20 relate to the prosecution of a patent application in the United States.” *Id.* at 227 (internal
21 citations omitted). Thus, it is necessary to determine whether the patent agent was “acting under
22 the authority and control of an attorney when he obtained the information sought to be
23 disclosed.” *Id.* at 228.

24 Here, the evidence indicates that Kasap was not acting under the authority and control of
25 Fish. It was Amado himself who sent a letter by facsimile to Kasap requesting performance of
26 the PTMS search report. The letter indicates that Amado had been referred to Kasap by Fish.
27 Kasap then provided the search report to Amado and billed Amado for the services, as evidenced
28 by an *in camera* review of privilege entry numbers 1272 and 1273. The facts that Fish referred

1 Amado to Kasap and was copied on the invoice and the search report are insufficient to support
2 a finding that Kasap was acting under Fish's authority and control. Instead, Kasap was acting
3 under the authority and control of Amado directly. Under these authorities and this evidence,
4 the Court finds that this was an unprivileged patent agent-client relationship. Thus, DSC has
5 failed to meet its burden as to the attorney-client privilege for these documents. Accordingly,
6 the Special Master was correct in his recommendation that privilege entry numbers 1272 and
7 1273 be produced.

8 With this analysis and perspective in mind, the Court adopts the Special Master's R&R
9 with the following modifications after reviewing, *in camera*, each of the documents pertaining to
10 the parties' objections:

- 11 • Privilege entry number 1144 is hereby sustained. Both the "Sustained" and
12 "Produce" boxes were inadvertently checked. This is a communication between
13 Amado and outside counsel.
- 14 • Privilege entry number 849 is hereby ordered to be produced. This is consistent
15 with the finding as to privilege entry number 855. The document pertains to
16 licensing activities in the ordinary course of DSC's business.
- 17 • Privilege entry number 797 is hereby sustained. This is consistent with the finding
18 as to privilege entry numbers 800 and 801. The document includes
19 communication with outside counsel for the purposes of obtaining legal advice.
- 20 • Privilege entry number 940 is hereby ordered to be produced. This is consistent
21 with the finding as to privilege entry number 942. This is a communication
22 between Amado and DSC regarding DSC's ordinary course of business and
23 licensing plans.
- 24 • Privilege entry numbers 795 and 796 are hereby sustained. These documents are
25 draft claim constructions prepared by outside litigation counsel. This is consistent
26 with the findings as to privilege entry numbers 541, 542, and 986.
- 27 • Privilege entry number 730 is hereby sustained. This document was prepared by
28 outside legal counsel and compares claims of patent and infringer products. This

1 is consistent with the findings as to privilege entry numbers 541, 542, and 986.

- 2 • Privilege entry number 776 is hereby sustained. This is consistent with the
3 findings as to privilege entry numbers 541, 542, and 986.
- 4 • Privilege entry number 778 is hereby ordered to be produced. This is consistent
5 with the finding as to privilege entry number 784. This is a communication
6 between Amado and DSC regarding DSC's ordinary course of business and
7 licensing plans.
- 8 • Privilege entry number 443 is hereby sustained. The communication between
9 counsel clearly demonstrates specific considerations related to anticipated
10 litigation.

11 DSC has failed to meet its burden to show that the privileges asserted apply to all other
12 documents for which the Special Master has recommended production. All other objections by
13 DSC and Defendants are hereby OVERRULED. DSC is hereby ORDERED to produce all
14 documents in compliance with the findings contained in the REPORT OF SPECIAL MASTER /
15 DISCOVERY REFEREE subject to the above modifications. DSC shall produce these
16 documents no later than August 27, 2008.

17 **IV. DISPOSITION**

18 For the above mentioned reasons, the Court hereby adopts the Report of the Special
19 Master with modifications. DSC is hereby ORDERED to PRODUCE the documents denoted by
20 the following privilege entry numbers:

- 21 • 12-13;
22 • 40-43;
23 • 204;
24 • 234-235;
25 • 431-436;
26 • 444;
27 • 479;
28 • 481;

- 1 • 526-527;
- 2 • 553-729;
- 3 • 731-775;
- 4 • 777-794;
- 5 • 798-799;
- 6 • 802-842;
- 7 • 845;
- 8 • 849-852;
- 9 • 854;
- 10 • 856-896;
- 11 • 925;
- 12 • 940-985;
- 13 • 987-991;
- 14 • 993-1022;
- 15 • 1024-1121;
- 16 • 1272-1273;
- 17 • 1278-1280; and
- 18 • 1282-1302.

19
20 These documents shall be produced no later than August 27, 2008.

21
22 IT IS SO ORDERED.

23 DATED: August 12, 2008


24
25 
26 DAVID O. CARTER
27 United States District Judge
28

EXHIBIT 14

Andrea P Roberts

From: RStark@cravath.com
Sent: Wednesday, June 22, 2011 6:03 PM
To: David Perlson; SLeslie@cravath.com
Cc: AHale@cravath.com; aharasymiak@cravath.com; AMayo@ashby-geddes.com; Andrea P Roberts; angela.quach@davispolk.com; Tony Fenwick; david.lisson@davispolk.com; dmoore@potteranderson.com; felicia.yu@davispolk.com; Google-Xerox; Jack B Blumenfeld; John Day; jeremy.brodsky@davispolk.com; KKunz@cravath.com; lmaguire@ashby-geddes.com; Matthew B. Lehr; mnoreika@mnat.com; Richard L. Horwitz
Subject: Re: Xerox v. Google - Letter re Xerox's Privilege Log

David -

To close the loop with you on the question of the common-interest privilege, we have reviewed the two cases you rely on and do not agree that they are on point here.

The purported relationship at issue in Leader Techs. was between the plaintiff and various litigation financing companies with whom the plaintiff had not even consummated a financing deal. It makes sense, then, that the Court would find no common interest that could protect the sharing of otherwise privileged communications. Even under those circumstances though, Judge Stark acknowledged at the hearing that the issue was a close one. (See Leader Techs. at 376.) In Corning, the privileged documents generated by counsel for SRU were shared with a potential investor ("BD") prior to any deal being reached. Thus, Judge Farnan concluded that BD had "not provided proof sufficient to establish that, at the time of their negotiations, BD and SRU shared identical legal interests in the subject opinions of counsel". (Corning at 190.)

These two scenarios are very different from the instant case, where IPValue has been retained for the sole purpose of asserting Xerox's IP and that relationship is memorialized in agreements between the two companies. Xerox will continue to assert common-interest privilege

- Rick

----- Original Message -----

From: David Perlson [davidperlson@quinnemanuel.com]

Sent: 06/08/2011 11:32 AM MST

To: Scott Leslie

Cc: Andrew Hale; Andrei Harasymiak; "AMayo@ashby-geddes.com" <AMayo@ashby-geddes.com>; Andrea P Roberts <andreaproberts@quinnemanuel.com>; "angela.quach@davispolk.com" <angela.quach@davispolk.com>; "anthony.fenwick@davispolk.com" <anthony.fenwick@davispolk.com>; "david.lisson@davispolk.com" <david.lisson@davispolk.com>; "dmoore@potteranderson.com" <dmoore@potteranderson.com>; "felicia.yu@davispolk.com" <felicia.yu@davispolk.com>; Google-Xerox <Google-Xerox@quinnemanuel.com>; "jblumenfeld@mnat.com" <jblumenfeld@mnat.com>; "jday@ashby-geddes.com" <jday@ashby-geddes.com>; "jeremy.brodsky@davispolk.com" <jeremy.brodsky@davispolk.com>; Katherine Kunz; "lmaguire@ashby-geddes.com" <lmaguire@ashby-geddes.com>; "matthew.lehr@davispolk.com" <matthew.lehr@davispolk.com>; "mnoreika@mnat.com" <mnoreika@mnat.com>; "rhorwitz@potteranderson.com" <rhorwitz@potteranderson.com>; Richard Stark
Subject: RE: Xerox v. Google - Letter re Xerox's Privilege Log

Folks, here are a couple if the cases I referred to on the call. Thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Scott Leslie [mailto:SLeslie@cravath.com]

Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:32 PM

To: David Perlson

Cc: ahale@cravath.com; aharasymiak@cravath.com; AMayo@ashby-geddes.com; Andrea P Roberts; angela.quach@davispolk.com; anthony.fenwick@davispolk.com; david.lisson@davispolk.com; dmoore@potteranderson.com; felicia.yu@davispolk.com; Google-Xerox; jblumenfeld@mnat.com; jday@ashby-geddes.com; jeremy.brodsky@davispolk.com; kkunz@cravath.com; lmaguire@ashby-geddes.com; matthew.lehr@davispolk.com; mnoreika@mnat.com; rhorwitz@potteranderson.com; Richard Stark

Subject: RE: Xerox v. Google - Letter re Xerox's Privilege Log

David -

Sure -- a PDF version of the document is attached.

Best,

Scott

Scott A. Leslie
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
(212) 474-1778 (phone)
(212) 474-3700 (fax)

(See attached file: XRX01231057-XRX01231201.pdf)

From: David Perlson <davidperlson@quinnemanuel.com>

To: Scott Leslie <SLeslie@cravath.com>, Andrea P Roberts <andreaproberts@quinnemanuel.com>, "matthew.lehr@davispolk.com" <matthew.lehr@davispolk.com>, "anthony.fenwick@davispolk.com" <anthony.fenwick@davispolk.com>, "david.lisson@davispolk.com" <david.lisson@davispolk.com>, "jeremy.brodsky@davispolk.com" <jeremy.brodsky@davispolk.com>, "angela.quach@davispolk.com" <angela.quach@davispolk.com>, "felicia.yu@davispolk.com" <felicia.yu@davispolk.com>, "jblumenfeld@mnat.com" <jblumenfeld@mnat.com>, "mnoreika@mnat.com" <mnoreika@mnat.com>, "rhorwitz@potteranderson.com" <rhorwitz@potteranderson.com>, "dmoore@potteranderson.com" <dmoore@potteranderson.com>, Google-Xerox <Google-Xerox@quinnemanuel.com>

Cc: Richard Stark <RStark@cravath.com>, "aharasymiak@cravath.com" <aharasymiak@cravath.com>, "kkunz@cravath.com" <kkunz@cravath.com>, "ahale@cravath.com" <ahale@cravath.com>, "jday@ashby-geddes.com" <jday@ashby-geddes.com>, "lmaguire@ashby-geddes.com" <lmaguire@ashby-geddes.com>, "AMayo@ashby-geddes.com" <AMayo@ashby-geddes.com>

Date: 06/07/2011 06:24 PM

Subject: RE: Xerox v. Google - Letter re Xerox's Privilege Log

Scott, can you send us the document you produced as a PDF instead so we don't have to load it to see it. Thanks

-----Original Message-----

From: Scott Leslie [mailto:SLeslie@cravath.com]

Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 2:55 PM

To: Andrea P Roberts; matthew.lehr@davispolk.com; anthony.fenwick@davispolk.com; david.lisson@davispolk.com; jeremy.brodsky@davispolk.com; angela.quach@davispolk.com; felicia.yu@davispolk.com; jblumenfeld@mnat.com; mnoreika@mnat.com; rhorwitz@potteranderson.com; dmoore@potteranderson.com; Google-Xerox

Cc: Richard Stark; aharasymiak@cravath.com; kkunz@cravath.com; ahale@cravath.com; jday@ashby-geddes.com; lmaguire@ashby-geddes.com; AMayo@ashby-geddes.com

Subject: Xerox v. Google - Letter re Xerox's Privilege Log

Counsel -

Please see the attached letter and accompanying .zip file.

Best,

Scott

Scott A. Leslie
Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP
825 Eighth Avenue
New York, NY 10019
(212) 474-1778 (phone)
(212) 474-3700 (fax)

(See attached file: 2011-06-07 - Ltr. re Xerox's Privilege Log.pdf)

(See attached file: XRX018.zip)

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