


**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE**

ANTHONY J. HUTT,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	
	:	
v.	:	Civ. No. 12-144-LPS
	:	
PERRY PHELPS, et al.,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

Anthony J. Hutt, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, Pro Se Plaintiff.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

May 22, 2012
Wilmington, Delaware


STARK, U.S. District Judge:

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Anthony J. Hutt (“Plaintiff”), filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his constitutional rights.¹ Plaintiff is incarcerated at the James T. Vaughn Correctional Center (“VCC”) in Smyrna, Delaware. He appears *pro se* and has been granted leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (D.I. 5) The Court proceeds to review and screen the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he was a victim of Defendants’ pattern and practice of the use of a chemical agent as an instrument of punishment and torture in an excessive and unlawful manner in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. He alleges that, as a result of the practice, he has suffered injuries to his skin, eyes, and lungs. He filed a grievance regarding the use of chemical agents, but it was returned as “non-grievable.” Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as injunctive relief.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

This Court must dismiss, at the earliest practicable time, certain *in forma pauperis* and prisoner actions that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (*in forma pauperis* actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (actions in which prisoner seeks redress from governmental defendant); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (prisoner actions brought with respect to prison conditions). The

¹Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal right, and that the person who caused the deprivation acted under color of state law. *See West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).

Court must accept all factual allegations in a complaint as true and take them in the light most favorable to a *pro se* plaintiff. See *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007); *Phillips v. County of Allegheny*, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). Because Plaintiff proceeds *pro se*, his pleading is liberally construed and his Complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson*, 551 U.S. at 94 (internal quotation marks omitted).

An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319,325 (1989). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and § 1915A(b)(1), a court may dismiss a complaint as frivolous if it is “based on an indisputably meritless legal theory” or a “clearly baseless” or “fantastic or delusional” factual scenario. *Neitzke*, 490 at 327-28; see also *Wilson v. Rackmill*, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); *Deutsch v. United States*, 67 F.3d 1080, 1091-92 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding frivolous a suit alleging that prison officials took inmate’s pen and refused to give it back).

The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and § 1915A(b)(1) is identical to the legal standard used when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6) motions. See *Tourscher v. McCullough*, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). However, before dismissing a complaint or claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to the screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 and 1915A, the Court must grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint, unless amendment would be inequitable or futile. See *Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp.*, 293 F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

A well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere labels and conclusions. See *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). When

determining whether dismissal is appropriate, the Court conducts a two-part analysis. *See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside*, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). First, the factual and legal elements of a claim are separated. *See id.* The Court must accept all of the complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. *See id.* at 210-11. The assumption of truth is inapplicable to legal conclusions or to “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action supported by mere conclusory statements.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. Second, the Court must determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” *Fowler*, 578 F.3d at 211. In other words, the complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief; rather, it must “show” such an entitlement with its facts. *Id.* A claim is facially plausible when its factual content allows the Court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. *See Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678. The plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Id.* “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” *Id.* (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570).

IV. **DISCUSSION**

A. **Deficient Pleading**

A civil rights complaint must state the conduct, time, place, and persons responsible for the alleged civil rights violations. *See Evancho v. Fisher*, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005); *Hall v. Pennsylvania State Police*, 570 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir. 1978)). The instant Complaint fails to indicate when or where the alleged constitutional violations occurred and, therefore, is deficiently pled.

The Complaint, as it now stands, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). However, since it appears plausible that Plaintiff may be able to articulate a claim against Defendants (or name alternative defendants), he will be given an opportunity to amend his pleading to correct the pleading defects. *See O'Dell v. United States Gov't*, 256 F. App'x 444 (3d Cir. Dec. 6, 2007) (not published) (leave to amend is proper where plaintiff's claims do not appear "patently meritless and beyond all hope of redemption").

B. Grievance Procedure

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Cpl. Lise Merson ("Merson"), the grievance representative, returned his grievance as "non-grievable" without providing any reasons. To the extent that Plaintiff bases his claim upon his dissatisfaction with the grievance procedure or the return of his grievance as "non-grievable," the claim fails because an inmate does not have a "free-standing constitutional right to an effective grievance process." *Woods v. First Corr. Med., Inc.*, 446 F. App'x 400, 403 (3d Cir. Aug. 18, 2011 (not published) (citing *Flick v. Alba*, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991)).

Plaintiff cannot maintain a constitutional claim based upon his perception that his grievance was not properly processed or that the grievance process is inadequate. Therefore, the Court will dismiss the claim against Merson as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).

V. CONCLUSION

For the above reasons, the Court will dismiss the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1). All claims against Merson will be dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff will be given leave to file an Amended Complaint.

An appropriate Order follows.