


United States Department of State

May 2002



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further strengthened in the wake of the September 11 attacks. Key Egyptian Government and religious officials condemned the attacks; President Mubarak was the first Arab leader to support the US military campaign in Afghanistan publicly. Egypt also supported efforts to cut off the flow of terrorism financing by strengthening banking regulations, including preparing a money-laundering bill for this purpose. The Government of Egypt renewed its appeals to foreign governments to extradite or return Egyptian fugitives.

Other actions taken by the Government of Egypt to support US counterterrorism efforts following the September 11 attacks included continuing to place a high priority on protecting US citizens and facilities in Egypt from attack; strengthening security for US forces transiting the Suez Canal; implementing aviation security directives; agreeing to participate in the voluntary Advanced Passenger Information System; and granting extensive overflight and Canal transit clearances.

Egypt itself has been for many years a victim of terrorism, although it has abated. No terrorism-related deaths were reported in Egypt in 2001, but the Egyptian Government continued to regard terrorism and extremist activity as an urgent challenge. The Egyptian Government indicted nearly 300 Egyptians and foreigners on terrorism-related charges. They will be tried by a military tribunal. Other terrorists' detentions were extended. Of those arrested, 87 were members of a group Egyptian authorities dubbed "al-Wa'ad" (The Promise). They were accused of planning to assassinate key Egyptian figures and blow up strategic targets; at the time of the arrests, authorities reportedly discovered arms caches and bomb-making materials. Those arrested included 170 al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya (IG) members, accused of killing police and civilians. They also were accused of targeting tourists and robbing banks between 1994 and 1998. Egypt's principal terrorist organizations, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and the IG, suffered setbacks following September 11. International members of both groups and some suspects were returned to Egypt from abroad for trial. The Government renewed its appeals to foreign governments to extradite or return other Egyptian



*Members of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade train for attacks on Israeli targets in Gaza Strip. The group is responsible for carrying out numerous shootings and suicide operations against Israeli military personnel and civilians.*

fugitives. In early 2001, IG leader Rifa'i Ahmad Taha Musa published a book in which he attempted to justify terrorist attacks that result in mass civilian casualties. He disappeared several months thereafter, and his whereabouts at the time of this report's publication remained unknown.

### **Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip**

Traditionally, Israel has been one of the United States' staunchest supporters in fighting terrorism. September 11 reinforced US-Israeli security cooperation in this area. There is no known al-Qaida presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Authority Chairman Arafat forcefully denounced the September 11 attacks. Even HAMAS publicly distanced itself from Usama Bin Ladin.

Israeli-Palestinian violence escalated in 2001, and terrorist activity increased in scale and lethality. Israel responded to terrorist attacks with military strikes against PA facilities, targeted killings of suspected terrorists, and tightened security measures, including roadblocks and closures of Palestinian towns and villages.

HAMAS conducted several suicide bombings inside Israeli cities from March to June, culminating in the attack outside a Tel Aviv nightclub on

1 June that killed 22 Israeli teenagers and injured at least 65 others. On 9 August, HAMAS mounted a suicide attack in a Jerusalem pizzeria, killing 15 persons and wounding more than 60 others.

Attacks by the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) against Israel were similar to those of HAMAS. They included car bombings, shooting attacks, and suicide bombings. In general, PIJ operations were significantly less lethal than those of HAMAS. The PIJ claimed several shootings during the year, including an attack on 4 November in which a PIJ member ambushed an Israeli bus carrying schoolchildren in the French Hill section of East Jerusalem. The attack killed two children, including one dual US-Israeli national, and wounded at least 35 other persons.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) raised its profile in 2001. It carried out car bombings in Jerusalem, few of which caused serious injury. The PFLP, however, assassinated Israeli cabinet minister Rehav'am Ze'evi in an East Jerusalem hotel on 17 October, purportedly in retaliation for Israel's killing of its leader, Abu Ali Mustafa.

Members of the Tanzim, which is made up of small and loosely organized cells of militants drawn from the street-level membership of Fatah, conducted attacks against Israeli targets in the West Bank over the course of the year. In mid-March, Israel arrested several Tanzim members who confessed to participating in at least 25 shootings over a five-month period. Some Tanzim militants also were active in al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, which claimed responsibility for numerous attacks in the West Bank —mainly shootings and roadside bombings against settlers and Israeli soldiers. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade also claimed credit for at least one mortar attack.

Other secular Palestinian entities carried out terrorist attacks in 2001. Israel announced in the fall that it had detained 15 members of a terrorist squad linked to the Iraq-based Palestine Liberation Front. In early May, the Damascus-based Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) tried to smuggle weapons into

Gaza aboard the *Santorini*. Apparently unaffiliated Palestinians also committed acts of political violence. For example, on 14 February, a Palestinian from Gaza, employed by Israel's Egged civilian bus company and with no known links to any terrorist organization, drove his bus into a group of Israeli soldiers at a bus stop killing eight and wounding 21 persons.

Israeli Arabs, constituting nearly one-fifth of Israel's population, appeared to have played a limited role in the violence in 2001. On 9 September, Israeli Arab Muhammad Hubayshi conducted a suicide attack at a train station in Nahariyah. HAMAS claimed credit for the attack. Israeli Arabs generally refrained from aiding and abetting terrorists from the West Bank and Gaza, however. At year's end, Israel indicted four Israeli Arabs linked to rejectionist groups, although they were uninvolved in terrorist operations or planning.

Jewish extremists attacked Palestinian civilians and their properties in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2001. The attacks claimed the lives of Palestinian civilians and destroyed Palestinian farmlands, homes, businesses, and automobiles. In April, six Israeli policemen were wounded when settlers blew up a Palestinian shop. In late November, Israel's Shin Bet security service assessed that five Palestinians were killed and fourteen wounded in attacks that were likely staged by Israeli settlers in the West Bank. Investigations into many of these attacks produced inconclusive results, leading to several arrests but no formal charges.

During 2001, Israeli military forces killed more than two dozen suspected terrorists affiliated with HAMAS, the PIJ, Fatah, or the PFLP. An unspecified number of Palestinian civilians also were killed in the strikes.

Unlike the pre-*intifadah* era, when Israeli-PA security cooperation was generally effective, PA counterterrorism activities remained sporadic throughout the year. Israel's destruction of the PA's security infrastructure contributed to the ineffectiveness of the PA. Significantly reduced Israeli-PA security cooperation and a lax security

environment allowed HAMAS and other groups to rebuild terrorist infrastructure in the Palestinian territories.


PA security services did thwart some attacks aimed at Israelis. They also discovered and confiscated some caches of weapons and explosives. But violence continued throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, resulting in almost 200 Israelis and over 500 Palestinians killed in 2001.

Early in December, the White House called upon Arafat to take "meaningful, long-term and enduring action against terrorists operating out of Palestinian territory." On 16 December, Arafat issued a public statement urging adherence to his call for a cease-fire. This was followed by PA arrests of dozens of HAMAS and PIJ activists, although the conditions of their arrest and the military role that some of them may have played remain unclear. The PA also closed some social services centers run by HAMAS and the PIJ. In December, and under pressure from the PA, HAMAS announced that it would halt suicide attacks within Israel. It retained the option of continuing operations against Israel inside the West Bank and Gaza Strip, however. The top PIJ leadership inside and outside the West Bank and Gaza Strip did not endorse Arafat's call for a cease-fire agreement.

(In January 2002, Israeli forces boarded the vessel *Karine-A* in the Red Sea and uncovered nearly 50 tons of Iranian arms, including Katyusha missiles, apparently bound for militants in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.)

### **Jordan**

Jordanian officials strongly condemned the September 11 attacks and responded favorably to US requests for assistance. King Abdullah served as an influential and moderating force in the region and stressed in multilateral venues the need to combat terrorism cooperatively. Jordan strengthened its counterterrorism laws, defining terrorism more broadly, specifying punishment for terrorist offenses, and facilitating the seizure of terrorist finances. Moreover, the Government of



*Jordan's King Abdullah II attended the presidential-level UN Summit on aid in Monterrey, Mexico. King Abdullah is an influential and moderating force in the region, emphasizing the need to combat terrorism through cooperative and multilateral means.*

Jordan continued its vigilant counterterrorism posture in 2001, facing threats that included possible retribution for the late-1999 interdiction of an al-Qaida-linked terrorist plot and efforts to exploit Jordanian territory for attacks against Israel.

In late April, Jordanian authorities publicly released details of the arrest on 29 January of 13 militants who allegedly had planned to attack unspecified Israeli and Western targets in the country. The 13 were referred to a state security court for trial on four counts: membership in an illegal organization, conspiracy to carry out terrorist acts, possession of explosives without a license and for illegal purposes, and preparing an explosive device without a license. Some cell members possessed homemade explosives at the time they were detained.

## Overview of State-Sponsored Terrorism

*"Every nation in every region now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists."*

*President George W. Bush  
20 September 2001*

President Bush put state supporters of terrorism on notice in his 20 September address to the joint session of Congress: "Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists." The seven designated state sponsors—Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan—clearly heard the President's message. While some of these countries appear to be reconsidering their present course, none has yet taken all necessary actions to divest itself fully of ties to terrorism.

Sudan and Libya seem closest to understanding what they must do to get out of the terrorism business, and each has taken measures pointing it in the right direction. Iran, North Korea, and Syria have, in some narrow areas, made limited moves to cooperate with the international community's campaign against terrorism. Iran and Syria, however, seek to have it both ways. On the one hand, they clamped down on certain terrorist groups, such as al-Qaida. On the other hand, they maintained their support for other terrorist groups, such as HAMAS and Hizballah, insisting they were national liberation movements. North Korea's initial positive moves halted abruptly.

Until all states that support or tolerate terrorism cease their sponsorship, whether by choice or coercion, they remain a critical foundation for terrorist groups and their operations. Even though the year 2001 saw a continuation of a slow trend away from state sponsorship as the guiding force

behind the overall global terrorist threat, state sponsors still represent a key impediment to the international campaign against terrorism.

In certain areas, including Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, state sponsors remain an important driving force behind terrorism. Iran continues its firm support for Hizballah, HAMAS, and the Palestine Islamic Jihad. Iraq employs terrorism against dissident Iraqi groups opposed to Saddam Hussein's regime. Syria continued its support for Hizballah and allowed HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other Palestinian rejectionist groups to maintain offices in Damascus.

### Cuba

Since September 11, Fidel Castro has vacillated over the war on terrorism. In October, he labeled the US-led war on terrorism "worse than the original attacks, militaristic, and fascist."

When this tactic earned ostracism rather than praise, he undertook an effort to demonstrate Cuban support for the international campaign against terrorism and signed all 12 UN counterterrorism conventions as well as the Ibero-American declaration on terrorism at the 2001 summit. Although Cuba decided not to protest the detention of suspected terrorists at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, it continued to denounce the global effort against terrorism—even by asserting that the United States was intentionally targeting Afghan children and Red Cross hospitals.

Cuba's signature of UN counterterrorism conventions notwithstanding, Castro continued to view terror as a legitimate revolutionary tactic. The Cuban Government continued to allow at least 20 Basque ETA members to reside in Cuba as privileged guests and provided some degree of safehaven and support to members of the Colombian FARC and ELN groups. In August, a Cuban spokesman revealed that Sinn Fein's official repre-



### **State Sponsor: Implications**

Designating countries that repeatedly support international terrorism (i.e., placing a country on the "terrorism list") imposes four main sets of US Government sanctions:

1. A ban on arms-related exports and sales,
2. Controls over exports of dual use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist list country's military capability or ability to support terrorism,
3. Prohibitions on economic assistance; and
4. Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions, including
  - Requiring the United States to oppose loans by the World Bank and other international financial institutions;

- Lifting the diplomatic immunity to allow families of terrorist victims to file civil lawsuits in US courts;
- Denying companies and individuals tax credits for income earned in terrorist list countries;
- Denial of duty-free treatment for goods exported to the United States;
- Authority to prohibit any US person from engaging in a financial transaction with terrorism list government without a Treasury Department license;
- Prohibition of Defense Department contracts above \$100,000 with companies controlled by terrorist list states.

representative for Cuba and Latin America, Niall Connolly, who was one of three Irish Republican Army members arrested in Colombia on suspicion of providing explosives training to the FARC, had been based in Cuba for five years. In addition, the recent arrest in Brazil of the leader of a Chilean terrorist group, the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez (FPMR), has raised the strong possibility that in the mid-1990s, the Cuban Government harbored FPMR terrorists wanted for murder in Chile. The arrested terrorist told Brazilian authorities he had traveled through Cuba on his way to Brazil. Chilean investigators had traced calls from FPMR relatives in Chile to Cuba following an FPMR prison break in 1996, but the Cuban Government twice denied extradition requests, claiming that the wanted persons were not in Cuba and the phone numbers were incorrect.

Numerous US fugitives continued to live on the island, including Joanne Chesimard, wanted in the United States for the murder in 1973 of a New Jersey police officer and living as a guest of the Castro regime since 1979.

### **Iran**

Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism in 2001. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals. Although some within Iran would like to end this support, hardliners who hold the reins of power continue to thwart any efforts to moderate these policies. Since the outbreak of the *intifadah*, support has intensified for Palestinian groups that use violence against Israel. During the past year, however, Iran appears to have reduced its involvement in other forms of terrorist activity. There is no evidence of Iranian sponsorship or foreknowledge of the September 11 attacks in the United States. President Khatami condemned the attacks and offered condolences to the American people.



*The Karine-A at the port in Elat. Israel claims the ship contained 50 tons of mostly Iranian-supplied weapons for use by militants against Israelis.*

During 2001, Iran sought a high-profile role in encouraging anti-Israeli activity by way of increasing its support for anti-Israeli terrorist groups. Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to refer to Israel as a "cancerous tumor" that must be removed. Matching this rhetoric with action, Iran continued to provide Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups—notably HAMAS, the Palestine Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC—with varying amounts of funding, safehaven, training, and weapons. It also encouraged Hizballah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups to coordinate their planning and to escalate their activities.

In addition, Iran provided limited support to terrorist groups in the Gulf, Africa, Turkey, and Central Asia. This support is at a considerably lower level than that provided to the groups opposed to Israel and has been decreasing in recent years. The Iranian Government took no direct action in 2001 to implement Ayatollah Khomeini's *fatwa* against Salman Rushdie, but the decree has not been revoked nor has the \$2.8 million bounty for his death been withdrawn. Moreover, on the anniversary of the *fatwa* in February, some hardline Iranians stressed again that the decree is irrevocable and should be carried out.

During Operation Enduring Freedom, Tehran informed the United States that, in the event US warplanes went down inside Iran, Iranian forces would assist downed air crews in accordance with international convention. Iran also worked with the

United States and its allies at the Bonn Conference in late 2001 to help in the formation of the Afghan Interim Authority. Tehran pledged to close its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan to prevent the infiltration of Taliban and al-Qaida escapees. There are, however, reports that Arab Afghans, including al-Qaida members, used Iran as a transit route to enter and leave from Afghanistan.

### **Iraq**

Iraq was the only Arab-Muslim country that did not condemn the September 11 attacks against the United States. A commentary of the official Iraqi station on September 11 stated that America was "...reaping the fruits of [its] crimes against humanity." Subsequent commentary in a newspaper run by one of Saddam's sons expressed sympathy for Usama Bin Ladin following initial US retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan. In addition, the regime continued to provide training and political encouragement to numerous terrorist groups, although its main focus was on dissident Iraqi activity overseas.

Iraq provided bases to several terrorist groups including the Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MEK), the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), and the Abu Nidal organization (ANO). In 2001, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) raised its profile in the West Bank and Gaza Strip by carrying out successful terrorist attacks against Israeli targets. In recognition of the PFLP's growing role, an Iraqi Vice President met with former PFLP Secretary General Habbash in Baghdad in January 2001 and expressed continued Iraqi support for the *intifadah*. Also, in mid-September, a senior delegation from the PFLP met with an Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister. Baghdad also continued to host other Palestinian rejectionist groups, including the Arab Liberation Front, and the 15 May Organization.

Meanwhile, Czech police continued to provide protection to the Prague office of the US Government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), which produces Radio Free Iraq programs and

## **Appendix A**

### **Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 2001**

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*Note: The incidents listed have met the US Government's Incident Review Panel criteria. An International Terrorist Incident is judged significant if it results in loss of life or serious injury to persons, abduction or kidnapping of persons, major property damage, and/or is an act or attempted act that could reasonably be expected to create the conditions noted.*

#### **January**

##### **3 January**

##### **Switzerland**

In Zurich, a bomb exploded outside the glass entrance doors to the office of El Al Airlines, causing damage to the doors, according to press reports. The Revolutionary Perspective claimed responsibility in a message faxed to the Associated Press.

##### **Yemen**

In Sanaa, the US Ambassador to Yemen and the Yemeni Ambassador to Washington were aboard a Yemeni airliner that was hijacked by a Yemeni national during an internal flight according to press reports. The plane, which had 91 passengers on board, landed safely at Djibouti Airport. No passengers or crew were injured.

##### **5 January**

##### **India**

In Srinagar, a grenade exploded in the downtown area injuring 27 persons, including four police officers, according to press reports. The grenade was thrown at a police picket but fell short of its target. No one claimed responsibility.

##### **6 January**

##### **Greece**

In Athens, press reported an incendiary bomb placed under the vehicle of a Turkish commercial attache exploded, resulting in no injuries but causing major damage to the car. A group calling themselves the "Crazy Gas Cannisters" claimed responsibility.

##### **8 January**

##### **Algeria**

In Annaba, according to press reports, armed militants killed six Russian citizens. The Armed Islamic Group is probably responsible.

##### **9 January**

##### **Russia**

In Chechnya, according to press accounts, a US citizen working for Medecins Sans Frontieres, was kidnapped. On 4 February the hostage was released unharmed.

- 24 July**                    **Sri Lanka**  
 In Colombo, armed militants attacked the international and military airports, killing six persons—four military and two civilians—and injuring nine others. Also destroyed were five commercial and eight military aircraft, several ammunition dumps, and oil storage depots, according to press reports. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam claimed responsibility.
- 27 July**                    **Yemen**  
 In Sanaa, armed men stopped a German diplomat's car, kidnapping and taking the Embassy employee to the provincial capital of Dhamar, according to US Embassy reports. Tribal militants in the Seruwa region are probably responsible.
- August**
- 4 August**                    **India**  
 In Atholi, armed militants killed 17 persons at a trading post, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
- 9 August**                    **Israel**  
 In Jerusalem, a suicide bomber walked into a busy downtown restaurant and detonated a 10-pound bomb he was wearing, killing 15 persons including US citizens Judith Greenbaum and Malka Roth and five Dutch and wounding 130 others including four US citizens, according to press reports. HAMAS claimed responsibility.
- 10 August**                    **India**  
 In Narbal, a bomb exploded, killing one person and injuring five others, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
- India**  
 In Kashmir, a bomb exploded at a Muslim shrine, killing six persons and injuring 24 others, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
- India**  
 In Srinagar, a bomb exploded, killing one person and injuring five others, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
- 13 August**                    **India**  
 In Damhalhanjipora, armed militants using firearms and rifle grenades fired on the Kashmir Tourist Minister's residence, killing a policeman and three mercenaries, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.
- 14 August**                    **India**  
 In Riasi, armed militants killed three persons, then placed grenades under the bodies that exploded when they were examined, killing two more persons, according to press reports. No one claimed responsibility.

## Appendix B

### Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations Contents

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**HAMAS (Islamic  
Resistance  
Movement)**

**External Aid**

Unknown. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Bin Ladin, and Afghan militant groups support the organization. Also may obtain some funding through various Islamic nongovernmental organizations.

**Description**

Formed in late 1987 as an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. Various HAMAS elements have used both political and violent means, including terrorism, to pursue the goal of establishing an Islamic Palestinian state in place of Israel. Loosely structured, with some elements working clandestinely and others working openly through mosques and social service institutions to recruit members, raise money, organize activities, and distribute propaganda. HAMAS's strength is concentrated in the Gaza Strip and a few areas of the West Bank. Also has engaged in political activity, such as running candidates in West Bank Chamber of Commerce elections.

**Activities**

HAMAS activists, especially those in the Izz el-Din al-Qassam Brigades, have conducted many attacks—including large-scale suicide bombings—against Israeli civilian and military targets. In the early 1990s, they also targeted Fatah rivals and began a practice of targeting suspected Palestinian collaborators, which continues. Increased operational activity in 2001 during the *intifadah*, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. Group has not targeted US interests and continues to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the territories.

**Strength**

Unknown number of hardcore members; tens of thousands of supporters and sympathizers.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primarily the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Israel. In August 1999, Jordanian authorities closed the group's Political Bureau offices in Amman, arrested its leaders, and prohibited the group from operating on Jordanian territory. HAMAS leaders also present in other parts of the Middle East, including Syria, Lebanon, and Iran.

**External Aid**

Receives funding from Palestinian expatriates, Iran, and private benefactors in Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab states. Some fundraising and propaganda activity take place in Western Europe and North America.

**Harakat ul-Mujahidin  
(HUM) (Movement of  
Holy Warriors)**

**Description**

The HUM is an Islamic militant group based in Pakistan that operates primarily in Kashmir. It is politically aligned with the radical political party, Jamiat-i Ulema-i Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F). Long-time leader of the group, Fazlur Rehman Khalil, in mid-February 2000 stepped down as HUM emir, turning the reins over to the popular Kashmiri commander and his second-in-command, Farooq Kashmiri. Khalil, who has been linked to Bin Ladin and

**The Palestine Islamic  
Jihad (PIJ)**

**Description**

Originated among militant Palestinians in the Gaza Strip during the 1970s. PIJ-Shiqaqi faction, currently led by Ramadan Shallah in Damascus, is most active. Committed to the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state and the destruction of Israel through holy war. Also opposes moderate Arab governments that it believes have been tainted by Western secularism.

**Activities**

PIJ activists have conducted many attacks including large-scale suicide bombings against Israeli civilian and military targets. The group increased its operational activity in 2001 during the *Intifadah*, claiming numerous attacks against Israeli interests. The group has not targeted US interests and continues to confine its attacks to Israelis inside Israel and the territories.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

Primarily Israel, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and other parts of the Middle East, including Lebanon and Syria, where the leadership is based.

**External Aid**

Receives financial assistance from Iran and limited logistic support assistance from Syria.

**Palestine Liberation  
Front (PLF)**

**Description**

Broke away from the PFLP-GC in mid-1970s. Later split again into pro-PLO, pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions. Pro-PLO faction led by Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas), who became member of PLO Executive Committee in 1984 but left it in 1991.

**Activities**

The Abu Abbas-led faction is known for aerial attacks against Israel. Abbas's group also was responsible for the attack in 1985 on the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of US citizen Leon Klinghoffer. A warrant for Abu Abbas's arrest is outstanding in Italy.

**Strength**

Unknown.

**Location/Area of Operation**

PLO faction based in Tunisia until Achille Lauro attack. Now based in Iraq.

**External Aid**

Receives support mainly from Iraq. Has received support from Libya in the past.