



devoid of any factual support do not enjoy the same presumption of truth. *Id.* at 679. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555. “A document filed *pro se* is to be liberally construed and a *pro se* complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted). Nevertheless, a *pro se* plaintiff’s complaint “must present a claim on which the Court can grant relief.” *Utterback v. Geithner*, 754 F.Supp.2d 52, 54 (D.D.C.2010) (quoting *Chandler v. Roche*, 215 F.Supp.2d 166, 168 (D.D.C.2002)).

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish his discrimination claim, and relies instead only on conclusory, uncorroborated statements. Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that Towers Watson knew his age or race when rejecting his application. Further, this complaint is one of nine nearly-identical complaints, with only the defendant’s name changed, filed by Ndremizara against other companies that have failed to hire him. Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss 2–3. Taking judicial notice of these cases, this Court notes especially the order granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss in *Ndremizara v. Hanover Insurance Company*, No. 4:12-CV-40109 (D. Mass., May 31, 2013), which notes the same deficiencies in Ndremizara’s complaint.

A separate Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date.

Signed by Royce C. Lamberth, United States District Judge, on August 21, 2013.