

TRANSCRIPT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD J. LEON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

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PROCEEDINGS COURTROOM DEPUTY: I Honor, we have Civil Action 13-851 and Civil Action 13-881 Larry Klayman et al. versus Barack Hussein Obama, et al. I would ask that counsel please approach the lectern and identify yourself and those at your respective tables.

MR. KLAYMAN: Thank you, your Honor. Larry Klayman.
Pleasure to be here.
THE COURT: Welcome.
MR. KLAYMAN: May I ask permission for my associates to
sit at counsel table? They are members of the California Bar? They came with me.

THE COURT: Are they counsel of record in the case? MR. KLAYMAN: They are not counsel of record. I am counsel of record.

THE COURT: What are the Courts are they members of? MR. KLAYMAN: In California. Mr. Muboobian. MR. MUBOOBIAN: California Supreme Court and Central District of California. THE COURT: And who else? MR. KLAYMAN: Miss Mona Falah. THE COURT: What Courts? MR. KLAYMAN: California Supreme Court. THE COURT: All right. They can sit there. MR. KLAYMAN: Thank you.

The COURT: Hold on now. We are just introducing ourselves. You can have a seat.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay. Thank you.
THE COURT: Mr. Gilligan.
MR. GILLIGAN: Thank you, your Honor. James Gilligan with the Department of Justice for the Government Defendants. With me at counsel table are Marcia Berman, Bryan Dearinger, Rodney Patton, Tony Coppalino and also joining us today is Elizabeth Shapiro.

THE COURT: Don't forget Mr. Moss.
MR. GILLIGAN: I thought he would introduce himself.
MR. MOSS: Good morning, your Honor, Randolph Moss on behalf of the Verizon Defendants.

THE COURT: Welcome. All right. Very good. Mr. Klayman.

MR. KLAYMAN: Thank you, your Honor. If I may address some preliminary matters with the Court.

THE COURT: Sure.
MR. KLAYMAN: I would like to approach the bench with a binder that we prepared about relevant documents that we referred to in our briefs and also with two requests that we made to the NSA through the Justice Department to authenticate those documents for purposes of any use that your Honor may decide to employ them for in this case.

It is our understanding from Mr. Gilligan, we got an
e-mail that they would not produce anyone to authenticate the documents, nor would they deny or admit the authenticity of the documents. So we do have a tutor request pending. It is at Section 21 of this binder which I would like to provide to your Honor with it.

THE COURT: You can hold off on providing anything right now.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay.
THE COURT: Let's see where this goes.
MR. KLAYMAN: The second matter is that we filed a Motion To Amend the Complaint, both of the different complaints. Within the original complaint, it was either implicit or otherwise that we were going under the APA by virtue of the nature are the of the relief we were requesting, but we thought we should make it clearer. So yesterday evening we filed a Motion For Leave To Amend the Complaints to add the APA remedy.

In addition, it sets forth the relief that we requested in the Preliminary Injunction Motions. Your Honor should have that on the Court's PACER system, but I have do have a hard copy if you would like to have it.

THE COURT: That's fine. Obviously the Government
hasn't had a chance to respond yet so we will and see what the Government's response is.

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes. In addition, yesterday as we were preparing, we learned of additional information that bears on
our clients who are sitting at counsel table with us.
THE COURT: Welcome.
MR. KLAYMAN: Charles and May Ann Strange.
THE COURT: Welcome.
MR. KLAYMAN: Which bears on the Government intruding into their private communications with regard to computers and we filed a Motion For Leave to file this affidavit. It is the affidavit of David M. Syler. He is the computer expert who inspected that computer. We ask for leave to file that. I have a copy of that if your Honor would like a copy of that.

THE COURT: Any objection? Come on up, Mr. Gilligan. MR. GILLIGAN: Regarding the Amended Complaints, your Honor, we would like to reserve judgment on those since we just received them last night, and we do object to the attempts to introduce new evidence that was only provided to us last night the evening before the argument in this matter.

THE COURT: Why don't we do this. You can have until the end of the week to file any objection you have to it and then I will take it under advisement.

MR. GILLIGAN: Very well, your Honor. Thank you. MR. KLAYMAN: I think that does it for the preliminary matters your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: All right. You don't have to leave. MR. KLAYMAN: Okay.

MR. KLAYMAN: I will get my binder. Now we will do the
argument.
THE COURT: You can stay.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay. Does your Honor have any time limitation?

THE COURT: Yes. What I was thinking, as you will see in a minute, my focus is going to be essentially today two part; and I think a half an hour each side. I give you chance to split yours with a rebuttal, because you are the moving party. But the Government can have a half hour total and you can have a half hour total, but you can split it $20 / 10$, however you want to split it. It is your choice.

But my focus today is really two part. First is the authority of this Court to handle this case by what authority and, secondly, what if any standing has been demonstrated on the part of the Plaintiffs to, if this Court has authority, to hear this case, what standing if any has been demonstrated by the Plaintiffs that would enable this Court to go forward in evaluating this case? So that's kind of where my focus is.

The problem, frankly, Mr. Klayman, is on the first issue, the briefs are very thin on both sides. Judge Pauly apparently in New York specifically asked for briefing on this issue and based on what my clerks could find, there wasn't a whole heck of a lot that was filed; and, to me, this is the overarching question: By what authority can this Court, Article III Court involve itself in evaluating decisions of a separate

Article III Court set by Congress with the very specific statutory framework that does not in any way, shape or form provide for jurisdiction in this Court?

By what authority can this Court do that? Statutory or constitutional and if you have got some analogies, that would be helpful because frankly I have been searching for it.

MR. KLAYMAN: Let me get right to it, your Honor.
THE COURT: Please.
MR. KLAYMAN: Because we thought you would ask that question. You raised that at the status conference.

THE COURT: Good.
MR. KLAYMAN: We prepared a bench brief on that. May I provide that to you? A very short brief bench brief but --

THE COURT: Make sure Mr. Gilligan gets that.
MR. GILLIGAN: Reserving my right to object, your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. That's fine.
MR. KLAYMAN: Okay. And a copy for your Clerk?
THE COURT: I can't listen and read at the same time so I will give them a copy. How is that? You go ahead.

MR. KLAYMAN: Let me just emphasize that there are two lawsuits here. One was a lawsuit filed with regard to Verizon where you have Judge Vincent's order which is at issue and that was the order of April 25, 2013. And in that order, as your Honor knows, it is incredibly overly broad. It allows for the
collection of any telephone records, metadata, et cetera on every Verizon customer of which I am one and of which all of our Plaintiffs are one as well.

THE COURT: The Government is prepared to concede that apparently based on their briefs.

MR. KLAYMAN: All right.

THE COURT: They make a distinction between different Verizon accounts.

MR. KLAYMAN: We are users and, of course, as users and subscribers, we are subject to having our telephone calls routed through Verizon. So we are affected with or without any kind of subscription with Verizon, but that is the case --

THE COURT: Okay.
MR. KLAYMAN: -- here and that's not in dispute and Verizon is here and they can confirm in fact that we are subscribers if they would like to.

Interestingly enough, that order was renewed later, okay, by Judge McLaughlin and that -- from our reading of that order, it is virtually the same order. Okay. It is overly broad. There is some redactions. We don't exactly what she has in there because it hasn't been released, but let us presume it is the same order.

That order will go out of effect on January 3, 2014. So there will be no order. So whatever I argue today as of January 3, 2014, there will be no Court Order unless it is
renewed; and your Honor could step in immediately at that time. However, you can step in now and here is why.

Number one, what happened at the FISA Court was all ex parte. We as Plaintiffs did not have the opportunity to participate in that proceeding. It was done ex parte. Information was provided to the Judge, Judge Vincent. There was a long history as we set forward in the briefs and as we documented in various Court Orders of the NSA lying to the FISA Court and lying to the U.S. Government about what's going on with regard to their metadata program.

In addition, there was an audit done just in 2012 which showed that were 2,712 approximately violations of Section 215 and Section 702 of the Privacy Act. 2,712.

On top of that the Inspector General found 12
instances where individuals at the NSA accessed actual conversations and other types of information to spy on their boyfriends, girlfriends, husbands and wives thinking that they were cheating on them at the time.

Now, if that can go on with the lower level employees, just think what the potential is with regard to upper level employees and big interests that are challenging this administration. I will let your Honor be the judge of whether we are a big interest or not. But, you know, we are quite adversarial towards the administration, and so is Mr. Strange whose son was an NSA cryptologist assigned to Navy Seal Team

Six. He went down tragically in a cash on August 6, 2011, in a raid where the mission was termed Extortion 17. It was retaliation by the Taliban because Seal Team Six had taken out Osama bin Ladin. He has lawsuits which I filed on his behalf. We are in front of Congress in a Congressional inquiry and one of the issues there is is the administration and did the military, are they culpable for the deaths of these individuals either through negligence or otherwise?

So I am kind of answering the question combining it. There you have the standing and we have set forth in detail affidavits our standing. I will get to that.

THE COURT: Let's look at the question directly. MR. KLAYMAN: Let's look at the first one.

THE COURT: Directly.
MR. KLAYMAN: Right.
THE COURT: Is there any doubt in your mind, any that when Congress devised the scheme it devised creating the FISA Court and providing within it for review by the review Court and then possible review by the U.S. Supreme Court that Congress intended in any way, shape or form for other Article III Courts to have a jurisdictional basis to review the decisions of those FISA orders? Is there any doubt in your mind about that?

MR. KLAYMAN: I have no doubt that you have the authority to review that order.

THE COURT: Hold on. If the answer to my question is
you have no doubt, I will see what Mr. Gilligan says.
MR. KLAYMAN: And I have more to add.
THE COURT: I know. No. I will see what Mr. Gilligan says, but assuming, and he can correct me if $I$ am assuming incorrectly, that the Government's position will be no other Article III Court has any authority to second guess those decisions and to review those decisions of the FISA Court. I am assuming that's going to be his position. He might tell me otherwise.

If I go to the next step and start evaluating the jurisdictional question with regard to the Preliminary Injunction you are seeking, I can't do it without first deciding that I have the authority. I have to decide that first, Mr. Klayman. I have to make that decision and I have to make it unfortunately in a situation where Congress has made it pretty clear that they don't think I have that authority.

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, what's key about Congress' acts whether Section 215 or 702 or the entire panoply of the Patriot Act is that it does not exclude Article III Courts from reviewing issues with regard to individual litigants. Obviously that had to be intended because we don't live in a totalitarian state where the Government and the Courts don't give due process rights to the American people.

How is it that I would have no rights or Mr. Strange and his wife would have no rights and the other two Defendants

Michael Ferrari and Matt Garrison would have no rights. So, consequently, Congress not writing out any other review by an Article III Court which says that you can reach issues of constitutionality, that's right in the Constitution in Article III; and it is also in 1331, 18 USC 1331: The District Courts have the authority to rule upon constitutional matters. We are challenging not just a violation -THE COURT: Is it really that simple? MR. KLAYMAN: It is that simple.

THE COURT: Is it really that simple? So, for example, let me give a hypothetical.

MR. KLAYMAN: Combined with other things I am going to add.

THE COURT: Let me give you a hypothetical, Mr.
Klayman. If a Court, let's say a Tax Court Judge or a Claims Court Judge were to issue a subpoena that called for the production of records, a person of whose records would claim that it would violate their constitutional rights for those to be produced by the record holder. If in a Tax Court Judge or Claims Court Judge were to permit the production of those records in the face of a claim of a violation of their constitutional rights, do you think I could review that decision? Would I have the jurisdictional authority the review that decision?

MR. KLAYMAN: Here is the distinction. It was the fix

I am making initially. If an individual who is having their records subpoenaed by the $I R S$ has the right to intervene in that proceeding of the Tax Court and oppose that subpoena.

THE COURT: Not the IRS. If there is a Motion To Quash the subpoena in the litigation, the litigation in the Tax Court or the Claims Court, if there was a Motion To Quash the subpoena by the person whose records they were, not the person who was holding the records, the person whose records they were, could the Article III Court, this Court, U.S. District Court in D.C., would we have jurisdiction to either issue such an order or to review a denial of such a request that was made in the Tax court or the Claims Court?

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, your Honor, I don't think that analogy in all due respect applies here.

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. KLAYMAN: It doesn't apply because, as I was
saying, the individual whose records are being obtained has a right to intervene in the Tax Court action. I have no right, Mr. Strange and his wife have no right to intervene before the FISA Court, plus it is secret. No one even knows it is going on. It is a Star Chamber proceeding.

If you look at the statistics that are out there, the FISA Court, no lack of respect, rubber stamps what the Government wants. They have only ever turned down any request .03 percent of the time.

THE COURT: So if you are right and the Government is wrong, again $I$ am assuming the Government is going to take the opposite position, we will find out in a few minutes -MR. KLAYMAN: Well, I know they will.

THE COURT: If that's --

MR. KLAYMAN: I have been litigating with Mr. Gilligan for 20 some years.

THE COURT: If that's the Government's position, in effect you are asking me to find that the statutory framework that was designed for $F I S C$ review is unconstitutional.

MR. KLAYMAN: You are not overruling what FISC did. In this case, in the confines of this case, you can rule independently as to whether or not obtaining those records, which are ongoing by the way -- these aren't past records. This is going on today. As of today, records of myself and others, metadata records with regard to Verizon, and we are just talking about Verizon now, are in fact being acquired by the NSA and they have total ability to get into to them to determine who I associate with and who $I$ deal with.

THE COURT: They are being produced pursuant to an order by a Federal Court, an Article III Judge who has found that doing so is consistent with the statute and constitutional. What you are in essence asking me to do is to at a minimum review, but you want me to more than review, you want me to overrule it effectively, superimpose this Court's authority into
the work of the FISA Court. That's what you are asking me to do.

MR. KLAYMAN: That's only with regard to lawsuit number one, but you can make a ruling here with regard to myself and the other Plaintiffs that pertain to what's going on with regard to us at a minimum. You can reach the constitutional issues. This is -- we did not have -- Judge Vincent's order is not entitled to collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. We had no ability to participate in that.

It is in no force and effect with regard to us, the Plaintiffs. And in this day and age, not to get too philosophical, as Jefferson said, our third President: When the people fear the Government, there is tyranny. The people are frightened to death. This is an issue that unites left, right and center. ACLU, liberal. Freedom Watch, conservative. We agree on these things.

You, your Honor, are the last step, the last bastion of protection for the American people and, if a Judge does something with regard to the original order which impacts us, we have a right to exercise our due process rights by going into the only Court that we can be in, and that's this Court.

And Congress did not say we can't be in this Court. In fact, Congress explicitly in the Constitution at Section 1331 says you can reach the constitutional issues; and what we are in effectively going to ask to you do in a Preliminary Injunction
is simply hold the Government to the letter of the law. Just follow the law.

That doesn't contravene Judge Vincent's order if you enter a Preliminary Injunction following Section 215 of the Privacy Act and Section 702, start obeying the law. It doesn't presume anything with regard to Vincent, but in fact allows us to exercise our rights.

Now, with regard to case number two, there is no Vincent order there. They are doing what they want. This is like the Wild West but worse. We have never seen in the history of this country this kind of violation of the privacy rights of the American citizens. We live in an Orwellian state. Every time everyone picks up the phone, they believe they are being listened to. Every time someone calls their boyfriend or girlfriend or your girlfriend goes to the doctor or you go to the doctor, all these associational facts can be picked up through the metadata. You saw the expert Ed Felton's affidavits here, and the Government has the audacity to come back and say we can't do anything to correct that within six months when an expert says you can do it like that.

The Government has a history of lying here, and it has been confirmed by judges that sit on both courts, this Court and the FISA Court.

So, your Honor, you do have that authority and all you are, basically if you enjoin the Government and we respectfully
request that you do, is to enjoin them to follow the law. That doesn't contravene any Court Order.

THE COURT: Well, let's take Judge Vincent and Judge McLaughlin, they have issued orders that they believe are lawful, consistent with the Constitution and consistent with the statutory framework that Congress enacted 215. Now, if this Court were to issue an order to prohibit any further collection, the Court would effectively be countermanding their order.

MR. KLAYMAN: You know --

THE COURT: How can they look at it in any other way? The order is prospective in nature. It is for 90 days. It only lasts for 90 days and, of course, in that 90 -day period right now at least for the most recent order. And I think it is 15 separate Article III Judges on the FISA Court have issued these orders every 90 days for the last seven years roughly, 6, 7 years.

So the point is that under the framework that was designed by Congress, Article III Judges have been consistently finding for a lengthy period of time every 90 days that the order being sought by the $F B I$ with regard to the NSA's capacity is consistent with 215 and consistent with the Constitution.

MR. KLAYMAN: Your Honor, no disrespect to Judges of which I founded a group called Judicial Watch to honor judges and I gave awards to judges who did a good job and criticized those who did not, but the reality is King George had judges too
back in 1776 and those judges were ruling against the colonialists caused them to rise up and wage a revolution.

You are the safety valve to that happening. The potential for this is so extreme, no outrageous, so totalitarian that if there is no other way to have this reviewed, the American people will rise up because they are upset at what's going on; and that's why you -- and we thank you for giving us an opportunity to be heard and to do this timely, we appreciate that, but you cannot be in any way enslaved by the decisions of other judges in a Court where we had no right to make an argument, we have no right to make an appeal, it is done in secret, secret, Star Chamber and then on top of that --

THE COURT: Is it your position that that framework is unconstitutional?

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes, but I am not asking you to reach it at the Preliminary Injunction stage. It is my position.

THE COURT: Well --
MR. KLAYMAN: Not with regard, not with regard if there is some kind of nexus between an investigation -- there is no investigation here of any of the hundreds of millions of Americans or tens of millions of Americans that use Verizon, certainly not with regard to the 300 million that are affected by the Prizm program. There is no investigation.

There is no showing of a reasonable suspicion of any connection to terrorism or crime. It is not -- it is open
ended. It is not definite as to time which you have to have to satisfy the Fourth Amendment. You just can't have an open ended collection of records now and into the future and there is no predicate facts here that people have done anything wrong, that I have done anything wrong or Mr. Strange or the other Plaintiffs.

So Congress not having closed the door, if they had intended to cut off all of our rights, which they can't do, they would have said so in the legislation. They did not. And the fact that it is not in there does not preclude an alternative avenue for relief, and you are the person that the American people are depending on to protect us.

And that's why the only alternative is for the people to take matters into their own hands. That's why I respect the Courts. That's why I became a lawyer. That's why I am here and I am an idealist. Yes, I fight against Government corruption and tyranny, but $I$ actually believe in the system. That's because -- that's why I do what I do.

So a Judge like you or a Judge like Royce Lamberth on this Court, okay, who made many decisions which were against the flow, he went upstream, who protects the American people, sometimes even against members of his own original political party like Gale Norton.

You guys are our only protection. We have no other protection, and that's why it is so important because the

American people need to know that you are here for us.

THE COURT: Well, if the statutory framework does not permit other courts to get involved in reviewing and evaluating or even posing itself in these orders, then it would seem to me the only way the Court could actually get to that is to rule it as unconstitutional. Do you see any other alternative?

MR. KLAYMAN: We are not challenging the Patriot Act if it is applied properly at this stage. What we are saying is it has to be relevant. The people that are being surveyed, there has to be an actual investigation --

THE COURT: Well, the relevance --
MR. KLAYMAN: -- based on predicate facts.
THE COURT: -- relevance decisions are decisions under the framework made by an Article III Judge. There is nothing in the statutory framework that permits other Article III Courts to second guess that decision. These judges all made relevant findings.

MR. KLAYMAN: That decision -- those decisions if they apply to the way the statute is written, the Patriot Act, and if it is some nexus between the individual who is having their information gathered and reviewed by the Government and terrorism or committing a crime, okay; but when other people are being subjected to this as we now know is the case by the admissions, forced admissions of the NSA after the director of NSA lied to Congress. Frankly, he should --

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. What is your basis to believe that the NSA has done any queries relating to either you or your client?

MR. KLAYMAN: Well, in our affidavits we submitted, that gets to the standing issue. My colleagues have received text messages that $I$ never sent. I think they are messing with me. They are saying, Mr. Klayman, we have the ability to destroy you if we want to.

THE COURT: Text messages from whom?

MR. KLAYMAN: From me. From me to colleagues. Mr. Strange the affidavit set forth that he got text messages also that were inexplicable. He got e-mails from his dead son Michael that were sent to him, and this latest affidavit shows that a disk that was given to him that supposedly had a report dealing with the circumstances of Extortion 17's being shot down, that that was infected with spyware which now allows the Government to go into his computer.

It is not inconceivable, your Honor, it is not part of the record. As Mr. Gilligan knows, I objected during the years that we were fighting the Clinton's at Judicial Watch. I had people following me home. My staff. I had somebody come into the office and read -- bounce stuff off of my windows for wiretaps and things like that. This goes on in the Government and, unfortunately, we have to then turn to someone like yourself who has integrity who can step in and who has the
courage to protect the American people.

And that's why I am not one of those conservatives that thinks the judicial branch is a lesser branch of the other two. I think it is more important because you are the last guard, you are the last sentry to the tyranny in this country and, if you can't step in, then the alternatives are far worse.

And right now we live in what is in effect a police state because you can't pick the phone up without fear that it is going to be used against you. They can access your accountant. They can access your lawyer. They can access you. Ed Snowden said when he gave his interview, he could access your e-mail records. They could access your proctologist.

So we can't live in a country like that, and you have to be able to make a ruling at least with regard to us, and what we are saying here for purposes of the Preliminary Injunction we will make it simple for you. Just enjoin them to follow the laws that exist. You can deliberate further on the constitutional issues. Follow the Patriot Act. The Patriot Act does not provide that you can get all domestic calls, e-mails, social media, youtube, Skype, it doesn't provide for that, only if there is some connection to a foreign person and only if there is an issue of terrorism.

Admittedly by their own admissions which are suspect even what they wrote because they have been caught lying so many times by courts documented -- frankly I don't know why clapper
isn't in prison by this time -- if $I$ did it, I certainly would be there if I lied to Congress like that -- and that's the impression that you have to dispel, your Honor, is that there is a noble class in the United States that's above the law and the rest of the citizens they can burn in heck.

And that's why Congress did not exclude your review for particular citizens that were affected illegally. You would not be countermanding Vincent's order. You would simply be entering it yourself.

THE COURT: So would it be your position, Mr. Klayman, that in the absence of specific preclusion of Article III Courts from reviewing and second guessing the decisions of the FISC Judges, this Court does have authority under the Constitution to review it?

MR. KLAYMAN: You have authority under the Constitution, yes, your Honor, you do under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments as we laid out in our briefs. Under the First Amendment, associational. There is the NAACP case where the Supreme Court stepped in and said you just can't get the address books of the NAACP. You can't do that. And with the First Amendment rights of association with our clients and privileges, attorney-client privilege, work product privilege, they are being breached.

The Fifth Amendment you have a right of self-incrimination. The Government gets into our records and
listens to our telephone calls, there goes the right of self-incrimination in any criminal proceeding.

Fourth Amendment, no unreasonable searches and seizures are permitted, not just to property but to person as in the Supreme Court Katz case. And it is even more relevant today with cell phones and smart phones and that kind of thing where the Government can get everything they want about you.

So right now we live in a country where people genuinely believe -- it has only been diverted in the last few weeks because of obamacare -- that they believe they are in a constant state of surveillance.

But the one other point I want to emphasize we are only dealing with Verizon in case one. All the other providers -Sprint, AT\&T, Google, youtube, Yahoo, there was no order. Vincent issued no order, no Court issued an order. So you have got that one free and clear and that's the main stay. You don't have to contravene anyone's order in regard to case number two.

With regard to who I am and who my clients are, Charlie and Mary Ann Strange and the others, you have authority to make a ruling with regard to us; and that doesn't contravene anything that Vincent did. It is just with regard to us. That's what we are asking. If you look at the ACLU's briefs, they are same the same thing to Judge Pauley. We want a decision with regard to us.

Whether that's considered precedent in other areas, you
have a great opportunity to help Judge Vincent and Judge McLaughlin understand what the law is.

THE COURT: I view it more as a challenge.

MR. KLAYMAN: Yes, apparently they don't understand it too well, at least Judge Vincent. We don't about Judge McLaughlin because we can't see her entire order. It may be different. Maybe. But the point is that you have the ability to make a ruling with regard to us.

THE COURT: Now, you have used 25 minutes. Do you want to save five?

MR. KLAYMAN: I will save five, your Honor. Thank you for your time.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Gilligan, am I assuming correctly or not?

MR. GILLIGAN: The answer that you have been waiting for, your Honor, is yes and no.

THE COURT: Oh, you want it both ways.

MR. GILLIGAN: What lawyer doesn't, your Honor.

THE COURT: The Department of Justice seems to like it both ways. Let's see how you are going to parse this one out.

MR. GILLIGAN: I think very simply, your Honor, and we attempted to parse it this way in our briefs and, if we weren't clear, I hope to clear the matter up now.

To the extent that the Plaintiffs are challenging the statutory authority of the Government to engage in the
intelligence gathering programs at issue here, the statutory authority, our position is that the Court lacks jurisdiction because the various provisions of the FISA at issue preclude review by third parties such as the Plaintiffs here in District Court.

We have not taken the same position with respect to the constitutional claims. We think the Court lacks authority to reach the constitutional claims because of the standing issue, but so far as preclusion goes, our position on preclusion is that that is limited to the claims that the Government lacks statutory authority to engage in these various intelligence gathering activities.

The reason for the distinction, if that's the question I see crossing your mind, your Honor, is Supreme Court's decision in Webster versus Doe. The Supreme Court has held many times in such cases as Block versus Community Nutrition Institute that a statute can implicitly preclude other types of review; but when it comes to precluding review of constitutional claims, the Court explained in Webster versus Doe that it insists on a clearer expression on the part of Congress to preclude review.

THE COURT: So in the absence of a specific preclusion of this Court and similar Article III Courts to deal with challenges of -- to violations of constitutional rights, because the Patriot Act didn't specifically preclude that this Court,
you believe has that authority?
MR. GILLIGAN: Yes, on behalf of a Plaintiff who has demonstrated his or her standing.

THE COURT: Standing.
MR. GILLIGAN: All right. So starting with the preclusion issue --

THE COURT: Where in the Constitution would that power come from?

MR. GILLIGAN: The power to review the --
THE COURT: For those who have proper standing. Just Article III?

MR. GILLIGAN: The Court said in Webster versus Doe, your Honor, that it would raise troublesome constitutional issues if Congress were to presume to preclude review of constitutional claims brought by parties with standing within the Federal jurisdiction of a District Court so we have not pressed that issue in this case.

But with respect to the arguments that the Government lacks statutory authority, we believe the Plaintiffs' claims are precluded by not just one, but two statutes. First there is Section 215 itself which your Honor alluded to earlier and, as your Honor said, it sets forth a detailed scheme for judicial review of FISA production orders that allows challenges by recipients of those orders that must be brought under seal and heard under seal in the FISC.

There is no provision made in Section 215 for challenges by third parties such as the Plaintiffs here in District Court, and we believe that reflects, as your Honor said, a Congressional intent that they should not be permitted to do so.

THE COURT: So when an Article III FISC Judge makes a decision that a request by the $F B I$ is consistent with the authority given under 215, that decision by a FISC Court Article III Judge, if I understand your position correctly, is not reviewable by this Court?

MR. GILLIGAN: That's our position. That is correct, your Honor.

THE COURT: Not reviewable by any other Article III Court, only those that are in statutory framework, the review Court I think it is called shorthand name for it and then the Supreme Court ultimately?

MR. GILLIGAN: Correct, your Honor. As the Supreme Court said in Block versus Community Nutrition Institute, preclusion occurs when a statute provides a mechanism for judicial consideration of particular issues at the behest of particular persons but not others; and we believe that Section 215 fits that description quite precisely.

The same is also true --

THE COURT: And that includes also relevance assessments?

MR. GILLIGAN: Absolutely.
THE COURT: So if a FISC Judge is making a relevance assessment as it relates to the request that's being made, which, of course, Judge Vincent made, Judge McLaughlin made, others, Judge Eagan, et cetera, again that's a decision exclusively within the purview of the review Court, not other Article III Courts?

MR. GILLIGAN: Correct, your Honor. And we believe the same is true with respect to Section 702. Mr. Klayman alluded to the second lawsuit, and he suggested that there are no FISC orders at issue there. That's not exactly right, your Honor.

Under Section 702 which involves the targeting of communications of non U.S. persons located overseas, that's the Prizm Program, the FISC must approve certifications provided by the Attorney General that identify the categories of individuals from whom foreign intelligence will be sought. FISC must approve the certifications that FISC must approve, the Government's targeting and minimization procedures.

So that involves FISC approval as well and so that statute also provides for review of directives from the Attorney General to provide information that are issued to telecommunications providers by those providers in the FISC but does not provide for any sort of review by any other parties in District Court. So we believe that the preclusion argument applies there as well.

The second statute that we would draw your Honor's attention to on the preclusion issue is 18 USC Section 2712, the provision that was discussed at length in the Jewel decision, the decision from the Northern District of California which is cited in our briefs.

Section 2712 creates cause of action against the Government, your Honor, for monetary damages for violations of three specific provisions of the FISA that restrict the use and disclosure of intelligence information that's acquired under authority of the FISA. Those three provisions that may form the basis of an action under 2712 do not include Section 215 and Section 2712 does not provide for injunctive relief.

And so as held by the District Court in Jewel, Section 2712 also reflects an intent by Congress not to allow claims such as this one alleging use and improper -- I should say use and abuse of information obtained under FISA because that statute specifies a particular remedy, monetary damages, non injunctive relief; and it specifies the three provisions upon which an action can be based. They do not include Section 215.

So on these two bases we believe that the Court lacks jurisdiction under the APA or any other statute including Section 1331 that is not a provision of jurisdiction.

THE COURT: So what about an argument, Mr. Gilligan, where the Plaintiffs contend that the decision by a FISC Judge on relevance or a decision by a FISC Judge interpreting
authority under 215 has as a consequence a constitutional violation to one or more individuals?

If that's their argument, if their argument is this FISC Judge, his erroneous ruling, his erroneous interpretation of 215, his erroneous ruling on relevance has had as a consequence a violation of the constitutional rights of my client, under that circumstance, is it your position that a Court like mine can inject itself in that and assess and evaluate whether or not a Constitutional violation has occurred as a result of that erroneous ruling?

MR. GILLIGAN: Your Honor, as long as the Plaintiffs could in that hypothetical, it is not the case here, meet the requirements of Article III standing, we believe that -- or at least we have not contested in this case that the Court would have jurisdiction to review the constitutional claims. Now, the constitutional claims in this case have no likely success on the merits.

Smith forecloses the Fourth Amendment claim. The First Amendment claim is foreclosed by the principle as expressed by the D.C. Circuit and Reporters Committee that a good faith investigation conducted in observance of Fourth Amendment requirements without any intent to punish or deter First Amendment protected freedoms, gives rise to no First Amendment violation.

But I think before obviously you can get to the merits,
there is the standing issue in this case. And it does turn on the fact that the Plaintiffs have offered no proof whatsoever that any communications records of theirs, any information contained in any of their communications has been collected by the Government under any of the programs at issue here.

The Prizm Program, again, that involves the targeting of communications of non U.S. persons located outside the United States. The Plaintiffs have adduced no facts to demonstrate that communications of theirs could have been picked up under that program.

The --

THE COURT: Then let's focus on the first case. They are contending as Verizon customers that that data has been harvested as has the data of all Verizon customers, and it is sitting in storage somewhere in the Government up at Fort Meade and it may or may not have been used yet, but it is in the possession of the Government and the Government is in a position at a later time if the authority is provided by the FISA Court to query it and to determine, you know, whether or not it provides any relevant information of an investigation of a national security nature, right? That's their position, right? MR. GILLIGAN: That is their position. There is several flaws in their position.

THE COURT: What are the flaws?

MR. GILLIGAN: The flaws are that -- to say that they
are customers of Verizon is sort of glossing over an important distinction. The order of Judge Vincent's that was unofficially disclosed but later officially acknowledged by the Government was directed to Verizon Business Network Services, Inc.

The Plaintiffs in this case claim to be customers of Verizon Wireless. As reflected in this Court's decision in the Shea case, also cited in our briefs, these are two separate business entities. We have acknowledged that at the time of the disclosed order by Judge Vincent, Verizon Business Network Services was a participant in the Section 215 telephony metadata program.

But the Government has not acknowledged the identities of any carriers who have before or since been participants in the program. There is no evidence, in other words, that Verizon Wireless Communications is a participating carrier in the program. Plaintiffs have not adduced any so it is only speculation on their part that their records have been collected as part of that program.

Even if it were --

THE COURT: How could that be determined? I mean if the Government holds all the cards, so to speak, there is no way they could -- if your theory of how they -- what they must do, I should say, to demonstrate standing is what I believe it is and the Government holds all the cards, they could never essentially unless the Government were to reveal the program as it has
acknowledged with the Judge Vincent's order for Verizon Business Services Network, Inc., they could never have standing, could they?

MR. GILLIGAN: Well, your Honor --

THE COURT: Established standing.
MR. GILLIGAN: That point was raised by the Plaintiffs in the Amnesty International case cited in our papers. It is very relevant to this case. They said that the question of their standing could be cleared up if the Government would simply advise the Courts whether or not any of the Plaintiffs communications in that case -- that was a challenge to collection under Section 702 --

THE COURT: Right.
MR. GILLIGAN: -- had been acquired under the authority of Section 702, and the Court responded, the Supreme Court responded in footnote four of that opinion that it is the Plaintiff's burden to come forth with proof of specific facts establishing their injuries, establishing their standing; and it is not the Government's burden to disprove their standing by revealing the details of its classified intelligence gathering programs. That principal holds true here.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GILLIGAN: Your Honor, I would just add a couple further points. The Plaintiffs seemed to have changed here in their reply brief the nature of the relief they are seeking from
the Court. They are now seeking what seems to be a classic obey the law injunction which does to the meet the specificity requirements of Rule $65(\mathrm{~d})(1)(\mathrm{c})$ and we would submit that that is an improper form of relief for the Court to issue under any circumstances.

THE COURT: From the Government's point of view, could the Court resolve the Preliminary Injunction Motion simply on the grounds of finding that there is no jurisdiction? Once the Court, of course, finds that it has the authority to act, assuming that for the sake of discussion, an adequate basis for jurisdiction, therefore, doesn't have to parse out the imminence of harm, likely success on the merits?

MR. GILLIGAN: I am sorry, your Honor. I am not sure I am following the thrust of your question.

THE COURT: Is it your position that this Court could resolve this Preliminary Injunction request simply on the basis of no standing?

MR. GILLIGAN: Yes. If the Court found there was no standing, absolutely. That would dispose of -- the Court would have no jurisdiction even to assess the likelihood of success on the claims on the merits and certainly a finding on standing would mean that a fortiori there could be no showing of irreparable harm because even if the Plaintiffs could somehow have gotten over the line of showing standing, they have certainly not shown the kind of imminent, concrete injury that's
necessary for an immediate award of equitable relief by the Court.

THE COURT: All right. Now, what's the Government's position on the Plaintiffs' constitutional rights or interest in the documentation that's being held by Verizon?

MR. GILLIGAN: In the documentation that's being held --

THE COURT: Yes, the metadata information that is being held by Verizon. What constitutional interests do they have in that data?

MR. GILLIGAN: Without a showing that any of their metadata have been collected, none, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. GILLIGAN: If the premise -- is the premise of your question hypothetically that we have collected metadata of their communications?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. GILLIGAN: Smith versus Maryland holds quite clearly that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such data. It is non content information regarding the telephone number making a call, the telephone number receiving a call, the date and time of a call, information which even prior to Smith, the D.C. Circuit had held in Reporters Committee was of a kind not protected by the Fourth Amendment call detail records.

Courts before and since Smith have consistently held that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in such -THE COURT: That was '79, right?

MR. GILLIGAN: So it was, your Honor.

THE COURT: Things have changed a little since '79. MR. GILLIGAN: So they have.

THE COURT: And in terms of computer technology, things have changed an awful lot since '79.

MR. GILLIGAN: So they have, your Honor.

THE COURT: Take a look at that recent GPS opinion the Court issued.

MR. GILLIGAN: Right.

THE COURT: The Supreme Court in that case certainly signalled a grave concern about protecting privacy interests of individuals even though suspected of committing crimes and those who the Government had reason to believe had committed crimes or were in the process of committing crimes; and the technology that was being used in that case I think it would be fair to say pales in comparison, pales in comparison to the technology that NSA has at its disposal to query hundreds of millions of records, maybe a billion records in matters of minutes or an hour.

So the concerns that the Supreme Court echoed recently is a far cry from Smith V Maryland. What you can do now with computers to go through that data and construct a profile of an
individual's life, his whereabouts, his spending habits, his, you know, appointments that he has, whatever is so extraordinary that Smith's value may be very limited if at all in this case.

MR. GILLIGAN: Well, your Honor, I would like to make several points about that if I could.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. GILLIGAN: Smith, of course, remains the law and it is controlling here. There were some questions raised in the concurrences, not the majority opinion, but in the concurrences in Smith and particularly in Justice Sotomayor's concurrence about whether the views expressed in cases such as Smith --

THE COURT: You don't mean in Smith. You meant in Jones?

MR. GILLIGAN: I am sorry. Smith versus Jones. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Jones.

THE COURT: Jones.

MR. GILLIGAN: Thank you, your Honor. Queried whether the so-called third party doctrine remains appropriate in the digital age. That doctrine being under the Fourth Amendment that once information is disclosed to a third party, you no longer have a reasonable expectation of privacy in it. That doctrine is the underpinning of Smith and also such cases as U.S. versus Miller which is cited in Smith.

But Smith remains controlling here and notably the dissenters in Smith made the very sort of argument that seemed
to be crossing the minds of the concurring Justices in Jones.

The dissenters pointed out that even in 1979 if you had a list of numbers that a person had called from his or her home, that could be very revealing of the identities of the persons called, the places called; and that could expose very intimate details about that person's life. That argument was made even in 1979.

Nevertheless, the majority held that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in those non content data. And I think it is worth noting here, your Honor, that even if we assumed strictly for purposes of argument that the Plaintiffs did have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information that could be gleaned from metadata about their communications, under the telephony metadata program, NSA analysts cannot access or review any records that may be in that database save those that are responsive to queries made under the reasonable articulable suspicion standard.

The database can only be queried using identifiers which is typically to say telephone numbers that are associated with foreign terrorist organizations. You can only query the database and retrieve records that are responsive to queries based on reasonable articulable suspicion that the number you are using to base your query on is associated with a foreign terrorist organization.

As set forth in our papers, including our declarations
as a result of that limitation, which is imposed by the FISC's orders, only a tiny fraction of the records in that database have ever been viewed by human eyes; and there is no evidence in this case, none, even if you assume that the Plaintiffs' records were in there, that any of the records have actually been reviewed subject to a query of that kind.

THE COURT: So the records that the NSA has in its possession are just numbers, right?

MR. GILLIGAN: Yes.

THE COURT: And in order for the NSA to get behind those numbers, so to speak, to see the names associated with them, the account and that, they would have to get a separate order?

MR. GILLIGAN: It is actually one step even beyond that, your Honor. The database doesn't even have names in it. It is just the metadata numbers called, numbers calling, time and date of the call, trunk lines, what are called --

THE COURT: Duration of call.

MR. GILLIGAN: Things like that. No names of any subscribers, no names of any parties to recall, just numbers. Even to get access to the numbers, you don't need a FISC order to get access, but there has to be a determination by a designated official under the terms of the FISC orders that you have reasonable articulable suspicion that the number you want to use as a search term is associated with foreign terrorist
organizations.

Only if that standard is met can you, so to speak, plug that number into the system and see what records, you know, what records there are of contact with that identifier.

And - -

THE COURT: At that point if that were to happen, you still, the Government still does not have the names associated with those numbers?

MR. GILLIGAN: That's absolutely correct. Further inquiry would need to be made under whatever lawful authorities are available to the NSA or perhaps the $F B I$ or another member of the intelligence community to find out, you know, who those numbers might belong to and to get further investigative leads.

THE COURT: So you need a third order from a FISC Judge?

MR. GILLIGAN: You would not need another order under the program. Once, once -- once the Court issues the order allowing the collection, then the Government under the terms of the order is allowed to make queries under the reasonable articulable standard, suspicion standard without getting further authority from the FISC. That said, there is a very intricate system of oversight to ensure compliance.

THE COURT: Oversight by whom?

MR. GILLIGAN: Oversight by -- well, first of all, there are technological and administrative safeguards.

THE COURT: You mean NSA.

MR. GILLIGAN: But not only at NSA.

THE COURT: FISC doesn't have the capacity or the manpower to oversee anything.

MR. GILLIGAN: But under the terms of the FISC's
orders, the Government must report to the FISC periodically regarding its use of the -- I shorten it and call it the RAS R A $S$ standard -- and all compliance incidents must be reported to the FISC. There is oversight by the NSA's Inspector General. There is oversight conducted with the Department of Justice and I believe the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to ensure that all the safeguards in the FISC's orders are being complied with; and if there is any failure to comply, that has been reported to the FISC.

That is the origin in fact of the orders cited in Mr. Klayman's briefs. The Government discovered those compliance problems, reported them to the FISC. The FISC took them very seriously.

THE COURT: What, that girlfriend issue where the NSA employee is using his -- misusing I should say -- his authority to check up on his girlfriend?

MR. GILLIGAN: Well, those were a different sort of compliance issue and $I$ hasten to point out -THE COURT: That's an issue. MR. GILLIGAN: I hasten to point out that there were a
total of 12 such issues over a period spanning a decade and in each case it was determined by the IG as reported in a letter to Senator Grassley that those were unauthorized incidents, mostly involving the information of non U.S. persons and the individuals who committed these infractions were either disciplined or they retired or resigned before being disciplined.

THE COURT: I hope so.

MR. GILLIGAN: So I think what we have there is evidence of an oversight system that works. Coming back to your Honor's original point, no, there is no further FISC order needed to query the database once the data are collected, but there is an interlocking array of oversight mechanisms to ensure compliance.

THE COURT: How about to get -- let's assume they do the query. How about if they want to go to the next step and get the names associated with the phone numbers --

MR. GILLIGAN: Well, just --

THE COURT: -- do they need an order to get that from Verizon?

MR. GILLIGAN: Well, the FBI, for example, if the NSA provided the number to the $F B I$ saying, here, you might find this number to be of interest to such and such investigation, the FBI can issue a national security letter, for example, to Verizon or whoever the carrier might be and say provide us subscriber
information behind this number.

The Government as a result of other investigative and intelligence efforts may already know who a particular number belongs to once it comes back as responsive to a query in the database.

THE COURT: It is possible.
MR. GILLIGAN: It is possible.
THE COURT: What if they don't? Do they need an order? MR. GILLIGAN: Well, they have other legal procedures that they can follow in order to do that. As I say, if the information is given to the FBI, the FBI could issue a national security letter to the carrier asking for information about the subscriber to that number. But -- so to come back to the bottom line.

THE COURT: You have about two minutes left.
MR. GILLIGAN: I have got about two minutes left. Then I will say again, your Honor, that we believe that based on the showing that the Plaintiffs have made today, there is certainly insufficient demonstration of injuries certainly to show the kind of irreparable harm required for injunctive relief here, and we also submit an insufficient showing especially under the rigorous application of Article III's requirements that Amnesty International says must be applied to a case like this, insufficient evidence to establish their standing. In all events, the Court lacks jurisdiction to reach the statutory
claims that the Plaintiffs have presented. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Gilligan. Mr. Klayman. MR. KLAYMAN: Yes. Briefly, your Honor, with regard to what's at issue, the Government has been forced to admit despite a pattern of lying that it is collecting the metadata of 300 plus million Americans. That's a fact. It is not in dispute.

Number two, Judge Bates -- and we have cited his order in our briefs -- has ruled that the monitoring system doesn't work. In fact, it is even worse than what's going on with obamacare right now.

Number three, we have a situation here where if we are to accept what they say is true and the Government now has a history of lying, as your Honor pointed out at the status conference, we have got to go to discovery so let's go to discovery and find out what's going on here.

Number four, my clients have in affidavits, in original affidavits, supplemental affidavits set forth a real injury here. They have had their text messages, myself included messed with. They have had their computers tampered with susceptible to removing information. They are in the line of fire. I am in the line of fire. Not only am I the head of a public interest group, but $I$ am a fierce advocate against this administrative. I have sued the NSA. Mr. Strange his son was an NSA cryptologist and extremely critical of the NSA and the military
for what happened to his son and has gone very public. I have a lawsuit for him in that regard. Attorney-client privilege, work product, other privileges are at stake.

With regard to Smith, your Honor has it right. Not only is it outmoded, but it severely limited to one little narrow part of data and the order was finite in time, it was only two days, and also it was limited to a criminal investigation. 300 million Americans are not subject to criminal investigation at this time. Who knows in the future with the way things are going?

But the reality is that the IG himself, the NSA's own IG, in that report and we gave you documents are in the record, the report finds 2,700 violations of these statutes since 2012 is there, plus 12 violations that we know of people getting into the private affairs of their boyfriends and girlfriends and husbands and wives. Just think what the potential is for anything else.

Your Honor, with regard -- and this was overlooked. No one wants to talk about Mr. Snowden here for obvious reasons, but I have a bench brief. I would like to provide it to your Honor. Give a copy to Mr. Gilligan.

MR. GILLIGAN: Reserving again my right to object, your Honor.

MR. KLAYMAN: Of course.

THE COURT: You can reserve it.

MR. KLAYMAN: Thank you. Mr. Snowden made admissions against interest. By making these admissions, these statements against interest, he subjected himself to criminal prosecution. He is now a fugitive from justice, has to live in Russia for fear that he might be killed in this country.

And these allegations set forth -- they are not allegations, they are admissions -- that NSA did have access and does have access on an ongoing basis to the metadata of 300 million Americans such that if the NSA wants to coerce and intimidate you, even you, a Federal Judge, they can get into it.

Consequently, Snowden's statements come into evidence. The binder has documents where admissions by the Government, they are public documents now, they don't even have the integrity to come forward and authenticate those documents. Heads I win. Tails you lose. We are the Government. You the people are nothing. You don't matter to us at all. We will do what we want and we have all the cards and heck with you, you take a hike.

Like Louis XIV "after me the flood." You know what that gave rise to. That kind of attitude why 90 percent of the people don't trust the Government, don't trust anybody. If this continues without your intervening, where are we as a nation? And it was Ronald Reagan that said 200 and some years after Thomas Jefferson "that if we lose our freedoms, we can lose them in a generation and we have to preserve them for our kids." The
potential for tyranny here which does exist is even greater into the future.

And there is not one American that can pick up his phone or send an e-mail message or go on Facebook, youtube or Skype and now not think he is being surveyed, but here we have standing because we set forth concrete information in affidavits of exactly what's going on. If the Government wants to refute it, let them take our depositions. We will be very happy to take theirs.

I was a Justice Department lawyer. I had a security clearance. I can easily get another security clearance I am sure and let them sit down and answer questions under oath. Let them this time answer them truthfully, not lie like they have been continuously lying for the last year. That's why I am getting emotional because when $I$ listen to this as an American, I am not just embarrassed. I am horrified. This is not my Government if this kind of conduct is allowed to continue.

So we look to you, your Honor, to look into this, to make the ruling and we can, yes, given the number of violations that have occurred, given the information that we put forward, you can issue a Preliminary Injunction which says you are to obey the strictures of the law with regard to these Plaintiffs. You can set a monitoring mechanism into effect where they have to report to you with reports, sworn declarations that there is monitoring that's going on inside the agency; but, your Honor,
you are the person that ultimately will be in charge for a finite number of persons, just four Plaintiffs here, to see whether indeed there is compliance.

We should have the opportunity to test those reports through whatever discovery you may fashion -- depositions, document requests, whatever. We should also be able to proceed without a bond. There is no injury here to the Government to obey the law and if we are at the point where you can't enjoin the Government, in this case NSA, from obeying the law, then you might as well white out Section 65 with regard to the Government and we are completely defenseless.

So, your Honor, we are appreciative of your time but we look to you to protect not just Plaintiffs but the American people against the NSA which has frankly been out of control and is creating a situation where the American people feel that their Government is against them and can destroy them and will keep them submissive such that they can't even complain about their grievances and, in that respect, we are in worse shape than we were in 1775. Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you, Mr. Klayman.
MR. KLAYMAN: Let me add one point in that regard. As we said in the briefs, if the NSA had been in existence and available to King George, the Founding Fathers would have never made it to Philadelphia for the Declaration of Independence. They would have been picked up, arrested and executed. Thank
you.

THE COURT: Well, I always thought when they signed that Declaration of Independence, they were signing their own death warrant there, Mr. Klayman. It was pretty well known that they were.

My experience has been, counsel, that in cases of this kind of this novelty and nuance and importance that it is always best to give counsel a week to submit any supplemental briefing they wish. They don't have to, but they are welcome to do it.

My experience was and has been as an advocate and as a Judge that it is invariable that this afternoon or tonight you would say $I$ wish $I$ had said $X$ or $Y$ or $Z$, and in the heat of the moment I didn't. So I will give you all until next week if you want to. I am not doing rounds of briefing here. I am just giving you a chance to supplement the briefing which you have already submitted which is, to say the least, extensive.

I am particularly, of course, concerned about and interested in the authority of this Court to interject itself. Mr. Gilligan has made his points. You have made your points on that issue and, if on reflection you want to supplement those or you want to put it in more detail, that's up to you. I am not telling you have to. I am just telling you you are welcome to if you wish to.

On the issue of standing, you have made your points and he has made his. If you want to put a little more on that or
articulate it in a little different way, you are welcome to do that. My principal focus at the moment are those two issues. think those are critical to the resolution of this request for a PI.

I think the rest of the briefing on the other issues is pretty much intact in terms of what I need, but on the issue of this Court's authority or lack thereof to inject itself in this situation and on the issue of standing, I think those are the two issues that the Court after having read all the briefs has continued to struggle with to ensure that I get it right. I mean I am not kidding myself. I know what's going to happen here no matter how I rule. It is going to the Court of Appeals. It doesn't matter how I rule, it is going to the court of Appeals and it probably will go to the Supreme Court after that, at least certainly one side or the other. It doesn't matter however I rule.

This is, at the moment anyway, this is the first hearing of this kind and depending upon how fast Judge Pauley is and how fast $I$ am, this may be the first ruling, but it is going to be one of the first two rulings. I don't know how he is going to come out and, frankly, I am not sure how I am going to come out, but I will tell you one thing. However I come out, I know it is going upstairs.

So I will give you my best shot at it and I will try to do it expeditiously, but you can have until let's say next

Tuesday, COB. That's a little more than a week. I don't want you to have to worry about this over Thanksgiving. That wouldn't be fair.

MR. KLAYMAN: Can $I$ say one thing, your Honor?

THE COURT: No more arguments.

MR. KLAYMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: I think I have given you plenty of argument time and I appreciate both sides argument. They are very helpful to me, but $I$ think at this point, I have heard what I need to hear today. Get whatever else you want to get in. Again, no rounds. I am not doing rounds. If you want to supplement, you can supplement but that's it. No replies to the supplements and you have got until the closing business of next Tuesday to get it in if you want to do it.

And try to keep it, counsel, under 20 pages. I mean really I am not looking for 20 , believe me. I was going to say keep it under ten but $I$ know that some of these issues are novel and you may feel like you need to go a little longer than that and I would rather not have to field a Motion to, you know, get permission to write, but try to keep it limited. Don't go overboard. I have got plenty to read. I have had plenty to read.

MR. GILLIGAN: Thank you.

THE COURT: We will stand in recess.
(Whereupon, at 12:55 p.m., the proceedings were

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