(1980) (citation omitted); *see Lane v. Pena*, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (the United States may be sued only upon consent "unequivocally expressed in statutory text[.]"). The CVRA provides:

Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to authorize a cause of action for damages or to create, to enlarge, or to imply any duty or obligation to any victim or other person for the breach of which the United States or any of its officers or employees could be held liable in damages. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer under his direction.

18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). Hence, plaintiff's claim for damages is barred by sovereign immunity.

Plaintiff also "demand[s] that the court reopen and conclude all the cases I have filed in 5 Federal District courts to ascertain if I am a victim of denial of due process by federal district court judges." Compl. at 2. But this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to review the decisions of other district courts. *See* 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (general jurisdictional provisions); *Fleming v. United States*, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172 (D.D.C. 1994), *cert. denied* 513 U.S. 1150 (1995), citing *District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413, 415, 416 (1923). Furthermore, plaintiff's alleged status as a victim of court decisions does not establish her standing to sue under the CVRA applicable to victims of crime. *See* 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(2)(D) ("For purposes of this paragraph, the term 'crime victim' means the person against whom the State offense is committed or . . . that person's family member or other lawful representative."). And "the defect of standing is a defect in subject matter jurisdiction" as well. *Haase v. Sessions*, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Hence, this case will be dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: October 27, 2014

United States District Judge