remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." D.C. Code § 23-110(g); *see Williams v. Martinez*, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ("Section 23-110(g)'s plain language makes clear that it only divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners who could have raised viable claims pursuant to section 23-110(a)."). Neither lack of success in his previous attempt to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence, *see Wilson v. Office of the Chairperson*, 892 F. Supp. 277, 280 (D.D.C. 1995), nor a procedural bar, *see Garris v. Lindsay,* 794 F.2d 722, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1986), renders his local remedy inadequate or ineffective. Furthermore, a federal district court neither can direct the actions of a Superior Court judge nor review that judge's decisions. *See, e.g., Hoai v. Superior Court*, 539 F. Supp. 2d 432, 435 (D.D.C. 2008) ("Simply stated, neither the public interest, nor the interests in practical judicial administration, would be served by a federal court reviewing the decisions of our local judicial officers who are acting pursuant to their judicial authority.").

The plaintiff has no recourse in this federal district court, and therefore, the complaint will be dismissed. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.



DATE: 12/5/14

United States District Judge