


judicial defendants have engaged in a conspiracy, *see id.*, but, as found in the previous case, plaintiff “does not allege sufficiently specific facts to support a plausible claim that the named defendants have conspired to violate his federal constitutional rights.” *Ealy*, 2009 WL 1107821, at *6. *See id.* (describing “allegations [that] continue at length about the existence of a conspiracy against [plaintiff] beginning in, or soon after, the 1990 [incident] when he was assaulted by six Dayton Police Officers”). Furthermore, plaintiff has not pointed to any conduct that can be found or reasonably inferred to have been outside of defendants’ official duties or in “clear absence of [their] jurisdiction.” *Id.*, at *5.

Judges are absolutely immune from lawsuits arising from acts, as alleged here, taken in their judicial capacity. *See Mirales v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991); *Thanh Vong Hoai v. Superior Court for District of Columbia*, 344 Fed. Appx. 620 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (per curiam); *Sindram v. Suda*, 986 F.2d 1459, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1993); *see accord Ealy*, 2009 WL 1107821, at *5 (explaining that “[p]laintiff’s claims against the state and federal judges are barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity. Absolute immunity is triggered when judges engage in “paradigmatic judicial acts, or acts of actual adjudication, *i.e.*, acts involved in resolving disputes between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the court.”) (quoting *Barrett v. Harrington*, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th Cir.1997)) (other citations omitted). Hence, this case will be dismissed. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: ~~January~~ ^{February 2} _____, 2015


United States District Judge