


defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Further, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570). Although a *pro se* complaint is “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it too “must plead ‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than the mere possibility of misconduct,’” *Atherton v. District of Columbia Office of the Mayor*, 567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (quoting *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678-79). With these considerations in mind, the Court concludes that the complaint must be dismissed.

The complaint sets forth few factual allegations, and the plaintiff demands the protection of rights without having alleged that the defendants actually have violated those rights. Thus, the complaint “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 557 (brackets, internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court and will dismiss the complaint without prejudice. An Order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion is issued separately.


United States District Judge

DATE: 2/9/2015