See Blair-Bey v. Quick, 151 F.3d 1036, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (describing § 23-110 as "a remedy analogous to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for prisoners sentenced in D.C. Superior Court who wished to challenge their conviction or sentence"); *Byrd*, 119 F.3d at 36-37 ("Since passage of the Court Reform Act [in 1970], . . . a District of Columbia prisoner seeking to collaterally attack his sentence must do so by motion in the sentencing court - the Superior Court - pursuant to D.C. Code § 23-110."). Section 23-110 states:

> [an] application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section shall not be entertained by . . . any Federal . . . court if it appears . . . that the Superior Court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.

D.C. Code § 23-110(g). This local statute "divests federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions by prisoners who could have raised viable claims pursuant to § 23-110(a)," *Williams v. Martinez*, 586 F.3d 995, 998 (D.C. Cir. 2009), including a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. *See Adams v. Middlebrooks*, 810 F. Supp. 2d 119, 123-25 (D.D.C. 2011).

To the extent that petitioner is raising a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, which is not a viable claim under D.C. Code § 23-110, it appears that petitioner has not exhausted that claim by filing a motion in the District of Columbia Court of Appeals to recall the mandate. *See* Pet. ¶ 10 (indicating no further petitions beyond a direct appeal). And the exhaustion of available state remedies is a prerequisite to obtaining relief under § 2254. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); *Martinez*, 586 F.3d at 999 (noting that "we clarified that after 'a cogent ruling from the D.C. Court of Appeals concerning local relief, if any . . . the District Court will be in a position to rule intelligently on [petitioner's] federal petition for habeas corpus.' ") (quoting *Streater v. Jackson*, 691 F.2d 1026, 1028 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

Because the petitioner has not shown that his local remedy is inadequate to address his claims, this habeas action will be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. A separate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

United States District Judge

DATE: June 12, 2015