While in federal courts such as this one, a plaintiff "may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel[,]" 28 U.S.C. § 1654, the United States is "the real party in interest," *Cobb v. California*, No. 15-cv-176, 2015 WL 512896, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2015), and a "*pro se* plaintiff may not file a *qui tam* action[,]" *Jones v. Jindal*, 409 Fed. App'x. 356 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam). *See also Gunn v. Credit Suisse Grp. AG*, 610 Fed. App'x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that "every circuit that has [addressed the issue] is in agreement that a *pro se* litigant may not pursue a *qui tam* action on behalf of the Government.") (citing cases); *U.S. ex rel. Szymczak v. Covenant Healthcare Sys., Inc.*, 207 Fed. App'x 731, 732 (7th Cir. 2006) ("[A] *qui tam* relator—even one with a personal bone to pick with the defendant—sues on behalf of the government and not himself. He therefore must comply with the general rule prohibiting nonlawyers from representing other litigants."). Indeed, it is well established that "*pro se* parties may not pursue [*qui tam*] actions on behalf of the United States." *Walker v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC*, 142 F. Supp. 3d 63, 65 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting *U.S. ex rel. Fisher v. Network Software Assocs.*, 377 F. Supp. 2d 195, 196–97 (D.D.C. 2005)); *see Canen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.*, 118 F. Supp. 3d 164, 170 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that "courts in this jurisdiction consistently have held that *pro se* plaintiffs . . . are not adequately able to represent the interests of the United States") (citing cases).

Therefore, plaintiff has neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to pursue the claims of the United States without counsel. Accordingly, this case is dismissed. Furthermore, plaintiff's motion for service by United States Marshals Service [ECF No. 4] is denied as moot. A separate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.



Date: November 16, 2018

United States District Judge