

judicial decisions by state and District of Columbia courts. See *Richardson v. District of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 83 F.3d 1513, 1514 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing *District of Columbia v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) and *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413 (1923), *aff'd*, No. 94-5079, 1994 WL 474995 (D.C. Cir. 1994), *cert. denied*, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995)).

Here, plaintiff's sole request for relief is for the reversal of the judgment of the Superior Court, which is untenable. The "*Rooker-Feldman*" bars district courts "from hearing cases that amount to the functional equivalent of an appeal from a state court." *Gray v. Poole*, 275 F.3d 1113, 1119 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Plaintiff attempts to circumvent this issue by citing to a federal statute, namely, 28 U.S.C. § 1655. First, the court finds no applicability of this statute to plaintiff's instant claims. Second, even if plaintiff had stated a valid federal question, it could not proceed as pled, because it would be "inextricably intertwined with a state court decision that the district court is in essence being called upon to review the state-court decision," *Stanton v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals*, 127 F.3d 72, 75 (D.C. Cir.1997) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

Therefore, this case is dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). An order consistent with this memorandum opinion is issued separately.


United States District Judge

Date:

5/6/20