Silvers v. Google, Inc. Doc. 137

Case 9:05-cv-80387-KLR

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# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 05-80387 CIV RYSKAMP/VITUNAC

STEVEN A. SILVERS, an individual,
Plaintiff,
v.
GOOGLE INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant.
GOOGLE INC., a Delaware corporation,
Counterclaimant,
<i>v</i> .
STEVEN A. SILVERS, an individual; STELOR PRODUCTIONS, INC., a Delaware Corporation; STELOR PRODUCTIONS, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company, and STEVEN ESRIG, an individual,
Counterdefendants.
CORRECTED <sup>1</sup> STELOR PRODUCTIONS, LLC AND STEVEN ESRIG'S OF

# PPOSITION TO GOOGLE INC.'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE TWO SEPARATE MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Stelor Productions, LLC and Steven Esrig, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits their opposition to Google Inc.'s Motion for Leave to File Two Separate Motions for Summary Judgment (the "motion"):

BURLINGTON · SCHWIEP · KAPLAN & BLONSKY, P.A.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> This filing corrects the certificate of service and a typo.

Google's motion should be denied because it has not shown good cause for the need to file two separate summary judgment motions. Google requests leave to file a summary judgment on the issue of "the invalidity of Steven Silvers' Googles trademark registration" and a second summary judgment motion "as to monetary relief." Google's motion should be denied because the Court's bifurcation Order limits the scope to Phase I of the litigation to issues related to Silver's ownership of the mark. Because damages and other relief are excluded from Phase I of the litigation, Google's motion for leave to file a separate summary judgment motion on the issue of monetary relief should be denied.

The Southern District of Florida Local Rules, Rule 7.1.C.2 provides that the "practice of filing multiple motions for partial summary judgment shall be prohibited, absent prior permission from the Court." Google does not show good cause for their need to file multiple summary judgment motions.

Google filed a motion to bifurcate these proceedings. Google's motion requested that the case be bifurcated into 'separate validity/priority and liability/relief' phases. (D.E. 23 at 15) (emphasis added.) The Court granted that Motion on February 6, 2006. (D.E. 68.) As noted in the Order, Google moved to bifurcate both discovery and trial "to allow the court to first consider the extent and scope of rights, if any held by Silvers." (*Id.* at 5.) The Court's Order discussed several areas that Google requested to be determined in Phase I of the litigation. These were, "the purported assignment of trademark rights from GCW to Silvers," whether or not Silvers could "show that either he or [Google's Childrens Workshop] continuously use Google's trademarks," and the cross-claim between Silvers and Stelor. (*Id.* at 5 and 6.) In granting Google's Motion, the Court explicitly excluded the issue of damages from Phase I, "[i]n this

case, the question of ownership involves different factual and legal determinations, compared to

the infringement damages issues." *Id.* at 8 (emphasis supplied.) The Court also ruled that there

was no prejudice to the parties due to bifurcation because "the preliminary issue of ownership is

relatively less complicated (and should require a shorter discovery period) than the infringement

and damages issues." Id. at 11 (emphasis added.) On September 11, 2006 the Court entered its

Order denying Silvers' Motion for Protective Order. (D.E. 119.) In that Order, the Court stated

"the Bifurcation Order ruled that Phase I litigation will determine ownership of the trademarks."

Id.

Having succeeded in bifurcating the litigation and to limit discovery and the trial in Phase

I to ownership of the trademarks (with "liability/relief" to be considered in Phase II), (D.E. 23 at

15), Google attempts to changes position and attempts to bring an improper summary judgment

motion as to "monetary relief." This attempt by Google contradicts its own motion to bifurcate

and violates the Court's Bifurcation Order.

Google's attempt to raise monetary relief in Phase I of the litigation is clearly

inappropriate. Stelor has prepared its case and conducted discovery based on the issues

properly raised in Phase I. Given the Bifurcation Order, Stelor has not had the

opportunity to take discovery on the monetary relief issue Google seeks to raise now.

Permitting Google to change position, ignore the Court's Orders and file a summary

judgment motion as to relief will prejudice Stelor, Steven Esrig and Steven Silvers

greatly and should not be permitted.

Google's summary judgment motion as to "monetary relief" is at odds with

Google's motion to bifurcate, the Bifurcation Order that Google requested, and Google's

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counsel's representations as to the issues on Phase I. Furthermore, Google will have ample opportunity to raise the Phase I issues in the twenty pages provided by the Local Rule. Google's motion should, therefore, be denied.

WHEREFORE, Stelor respectfully requests that this Court deny Google's Motion to File Separate Summary Judgment Motions.

Respectfully submitted,

Kevin C. Kaplan - Florida Bar No. 933848 s/David J. Zack - Florida Bar No. 641685 Email: kkaplan@bskblaw.com dzack@bskvlaw.com BURLINGTON, SCHWIEP, KAPLAN & BLONSKY, P.A. Office in the Grove, Penthouse A 2699 South Bayshore Drive Miami, Florida 33133

Tel: 305-858-2900 Fax: 305-858-5261 Counsel for STELOR PRODUCTIONS, LLC and STEVEN ESRIG

### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on October 16, 2006, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is being served this day on all counsel of record or pro se parties identified on the attached Service List in the manner specified, either via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF or in some other authorized manner for those counsel or parties who are not authorized to receive electronically Notices of Electronic Filing.

s/David J. Zack

#### SERVICE LIST

# STEVEN A. SILVERS, Plaintiff, v. GOOGLE INC. CASE NO. 05-80387 CIV RYSKAMP/VITUNAC UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT, SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Steven A. Silvers, pro se gewrue@hotmail.com Suite 202 – PMB 203

8983 Okeechobee Boulevard West Palm Beach, Florida 33411

Tel: 954-4445-6788 Fax: 561-784-9959

Method of Service: Facsimile & U.S. Mail

Ramsey Al-Salam, Esq. RAlsalam@perkinscoie.com

William C. Rava, Esq. PERKINS COIE LLP

**Suite 4800** 

1201 Third Avenue

Seattle, Washington 98101-3099

Tel: 206-359-8000 Fax: 206-359-9000

Attorneys for Defendant Google Inc.

Method of Service: Facsimile and U.S. Mail

Robert H. Cooper, Esq. robert@rcooperpa.com ROBERT COOPER, P.A. Concorde Centre II, Suite 704

2999 N.E. 191 Street Aventura, Florida 33180 Tel: 305-792-4343

Fax: 305-792-0200

Attorney for Plaintiff Steven A.

Method of Service: Facsimile and

U.S. Mail

Jan Douglas Atlas, Esq. jatlas@adorno.com ADORNO & YOSS LLP

**Suite 1700** 

350 East Las Olas Boulevard Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33301

Tel: 954-763-1200 Fax. 954-766-7800

Attorneys for Defendant Google

Method of Service: Facsimile and

U.S. Mail

Johanna Calabria, Esq. PERKINS COIE LLP

**Suite 2400** 

Four Embarcadero Center San Francisco, CA 94111

Tel: 415-344-7050 Fax: 415-344-7124

E-mail: jcalabria@perkinscoie.com Attorneys for Defendant Google Inc.

Method of Service: Facsimile and U.S. Mail