

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
MACON DIVISION**

MICHAEL TODD STANTON,	:	
	:	
Claimant,	:	
	:	
v.	:	CASE NO. 5:07-CV-356 (CAR)
	:	Social Security Appeal
	:	
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,	:	
Commissioner of Social Security,	:	
	:	
Respondent.	:	

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

The Social Security Commissioner, by adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's determination, denied Claimant's application for social security disability benefits, finding that he was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act and Regulations. Claimant contends that the Commissioner's decision was in error, and he seeks review under the relevant provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c). All administrative remedies have been exhausted.

Legal Standard

The court's review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to a determination of whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. *Walker v. Bowen*, 826 F.2d 996 (11th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is defined as more than a scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. *Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 91 S. Ct. 1420, 28 L. Ed. 2d 842 (1971). The court's role in reviewing claims brought under the Social

Security Act is a narrow one. The court may not decide facts, reweigh evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner.¹ *Bloodsworth v. Heckler*, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). It must, however, decide if the Commissioner applied the proper standards in reaching a decision. *Harrell v. Harris*, 610 F.2d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 1980). The court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual findings. *Bloodsworth v. Heckler*, 703 F.2d at 1239. However, even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision, it must be affirmed if substantial evidence supports it. *Id.* The initial burden of establishing disability is on the claimant. *Kirkland v. Weinberger*, 480 F.2d 46 (5th Cir. 1973). The claimant's burden is a heavy one and is so stringent that it has been described as bordering on the unrealistic. *Oldham v. Schweiker*, 660 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1981).

A claimant seeking Social Security disability benefits must demonstrate that he suffers from an impairment that prevents him from engaging in any substantial gainful activity for a twelve-month period. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). In addition to meeting the requirements of these statutes, in order to be eligible for disability payments, a claimant must meet the requirements of the Commissioner's regulations pursuant to the authority provided by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1 et seq.

Under the regulations, the Commissioner determines if a claimant is disabled by a

¹ Credibility determinations are left to the Commissioner and not to the courts. *Carnes v. Sullivan*, 936 F.2d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1991). It is also up to the Commissioner and not to the courts to resolve conflicts in the evidence. *Wheeler v. Heckler*, 784 F.2d 1073, 1075 (11th Cir. 1986); *see also Graham v. Bowen*, 790 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1986).

five-step procedure. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, Appendix 1, Part 404. First, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant is working. Second, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant has an impairment which prevents the performance of basic work activities. Next, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's impairment(s) meets or equals an impairment listed in Appendix 1 of Part 404 of the regulations. Fourth, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's residual functional capacity can meet the physical and mental demands of past work. Finally, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience prevent the performance of any other work. In arriving at a decision, the Commissioner must consider the combined effect of all the alleged impairments, without regard to whether each, if considered separately, would be disabling. *Bowen v. Heckler*, 748 F.2d 629, 635 (11th Cir. 1984). The Commissioner's failure to apply correct legal standards to the evidence is grounds for reversal. *Id.*

Issues

- I. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Claimant's treating physician.**
- II. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting Claimant's credibility.**

Administrative Proceedings

Claimant filed for disability benefits on March 16, 2004. (T-60-65). Claimant's application was denied initially and on reconsideration. Claimant timely filed a request for a hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) which was ultimately held on April 26,

2006. (T-505-31). Subsequent to the hearing, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled in a decision dated October 26, 2006. (T-14-23). Claimant then requested a review of the ALJ's findings by the Appeals Council. Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (T-6-8).

Statement of Facts and Evidence

Claimant alleges in his disability application that he is disabled due to manic depressive/bi-polar disorder, obstructive pulmonary disease, a left wrist fracture, and a lumbar fracture. (T-73, 90). After examining the medical records, the ALJ determined that Claimant suffers from coronary artery disease with stent procedure, hypertension, bipolar disorder, and arthralgias, and had a history of fractures to the left arm and back as well as polysubstance abuse. (T-16-18). The ALJ determined that such impairments were severe within the meaning of the Regulations, but not severe enough to meet any of the relevant Listings. (T-19). Thereafter, the ALJ found that Claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work. (T-19-21). The ALJ then utilized the testimony of a vocational expert to determine that Claimant could not perform his past relevant work as a truck driver and painter but could perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy, thereby resulting in a finding of "not disabled." (T-21-22).

Discussion

I. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Claimant's treating physician.

Claimant first argues that the ALJ erred in disregarding the evidence provided by his treating physician, Asad Naqvi, M.D. ("Dr. Naqvi") without offering good cause for doing

so. (R-11, p. 8-15).

It is well settled that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to substantial weight unless good cause exists for not heeding it. *Broughton v. Heckler*, 776 F.2d 960, 961-62 (11th Cir. 1985). A treating physician's report may be discounted when it is not accompanied by objective medical evidence or when it is conclusory. *Schnorr v. Bowen*, 816 F.2d 578, 582 (11th Cir. 1987). The ALJ can also reject the opinion of any physician when the evidence supports a contrary conclusion or when it is contrary to other statements or reports of the physician. *Edwards v. Sullivan*, 937 F.2d 580, 583-84 (11th Cir. 1991); *see also Wilson v. Heckler*, 734 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir. 1984). To give a medical opinion controlling weight, the ALJ "must find that the treating source's opinion is 'well supported' by 'medically acceptable' clinical and diagnostic techniques. The adjudicator cannot decide a case in reliance on a medical opinion without some reasonable support for the opinion." S.S.R. 96-2p. Additionally, the ALJ must find that the treating source's opinion is "not inconsistent" with the other "substantial evidence" of record. *Id.*

The weight afforded a medical source's opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments depends upon the following factors: the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, the evidence the medical source submitted to support an opinion, the consistency of the opinion with the record as a whole, the specialty of the medical source and other factors. 20 C.F.R. §416.927(d).

The regulations define medical opinions as "statements from physicians and

psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(a); *see* SSR 96-5p. An ALJ is not required to give significance to opinions of any medical provider where the opinion relates to issues reserved solely for determination by the Commissioner; this includes any physician’s opinion which states that he or she finds the claimant disabled or that he finds that the claimant’s impairments meet or equal any relevant listing. 20 C.F.R. §416.927(e)(1), (2)& (3); SSR 96-5p. Determinations of disability or RFC “are not medical opinions, . . . but are, instead, opinions on issues reserved for the Commissioner because they are administrative findings that are dispositive of a case; *i.e.*, that would direct the determination of disability.” 20 C.F.R. 404.1527(e); *see* SSR 96-5p.

The record reveals that the ALJ discussed Claimant’s medical records and found that Claimant’s impairments failed to meet or medically equal the relevant Listed impairments. (T-19). The ALJ reviewed Dr. Naqvi’s records of his monthly appointments with Claimant from July 2004 through June 2005. (T-18). The ALJ also reviewed two Mental Impairment Questionnaires completed by Dr. Naqvi on September 14, 2005, and March 13, 2006, concluding that Claimant had no useful ability to function with his mental abilities and aptitudes needed to do any level of work, no ability to socially interact, marked restriction in his activities of daily living, and deficiencies in concentration, among other things. *Id.* In his March 13, 2006, Questionnaire, Dr. Naqvi concluded that Claimant’s limitations had become “extreme.” *Id.* The ALJ considered Dr. Naqvi’s opinions of “limited evidentiary

value,” explaining that such opinions were “entirely inconsistent with the rest of the record” and “not supported by any objective, clinical data.” (T-19, 21). Upon review of the entire record, the Commissioner appears to have applied the proper legal standard in discounting the medical records of Dr. Naqvi. As such, no error is found in the ALJ’s analysis of Claimant’s treatment records from Dr. Naqvi.

II. Whether the ALJ erred in rejecting Claimant’s credibility.

Claimant also contends that the ALJ erred in discounting his allegations of pain and symptom severity to the extent they would exceed the determined residual functional capacity (RFC). (R-11, p. 15-19).

Social Security Regulation 96-7p states in relevant part, that:

In determining the credibility of the individual’s statements, the adjudicator must consider the entire case record, including the objective medical evidence, the individual’s own statements about symptoms, statements and other information provided by treating or examining physicians or psychologists and other persons about the symptoms and how they affect the individual, and any other relevant evidence in the case record. An individual’s statements about the intensity and persistence of pain or other symptoms or about the effect the symptoms have on his or her ability to work may not be disregarded solely because they are not substantiated by objective medical evidence.

Additionally, 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a), in relevant part, states that:

Statements about your pain or other symptoms will not alone establish that you are disabled; there must be medical signs and laboratory findings which show that you have a medical impairment(s) which could reasonably be expected to produce the pain or other symptoms alleged and which, when considered with all of the other evidence (including statements about the

intensity and persistence of your pain or other symptoms which may reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical signs and laboratory findings), would lead to a conclusion that you are disabled.

The ALJ reviewed the entire record for supporting and conflicting indicators of Claimant's pain. (T-20). A review of the record reveals that the ALJ considered Claimant's testimony, medical evidence provided by Claimant, and his functional limitations to find that his allegations of pain were generally credible, but that the medical evidence of record did not support the severity alleged. *Id.*

In evaluating credibility, “[b]ased on a consideration of all of the evidence in the case record, the adjudicator may find all, only some, or none of an individual’s allegations to be credible.” S.S.R. 96-7p. A limitation cannot be established solely by a claimant’s own report. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 416.928(a). The record must contain medical evidence, in the form of observable abnormalities or laboratory findings, that “shows the existence of a medical impairment(s) . . . which could reasonably be expected to produce” the alleged limitation. *Id.*

The Eleventh Circuit has held that in order for a claimant’s subjectively alleged pain to be deemed credible by the ALJ, he must *first* show “evidence of an underlying medical condition and (1) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (2) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to give rise to the alleged pain.” *Holt v. Sullivan*, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991).

The Eleventh Circuit has also held that:

[W]here proof of a disability is based upon subjective evidence and a credibility determination is, therefore, a critical factor in the Secretary's decision, the ALJ must either explicitly discredit such testimony or the implication must be so clear as to a specific credibility finding. . . . Although this circuit does not require an explicit finding as to credibility, . . . the implication must be obvious to the reviewing court.

Foote v. Chater, 67 F. 3d 1553, 1562 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting *Tieniber v. Heckler*, 720 F.2d 1251, 1255 (11th Cir. 1983)). Applying the *Holt* test to Claimant's pain allegations, the Court concludes that Claimant failed to overcome the Findings of the ALJ by establishing either that the medical evidence confirmed the severity of his pain or that his medical condition was so severe as to reflect the alleged pain. As noted above, the court may not decide facts, re-weigh evidence, nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner, but must decide if the Commissioner applied the proper standards in reaching a decision. Here, the ALJ applied the proper standards and supported his credibility assessment with substantial evidence in the record.

CONCLUSION

In reviewing the record, no evidence of error is found to substantiate the Claimant's contentions that the ALJ committed reversible error in this case. This Court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the evidence of record and finds further that the decision of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, the record fails to reveal evidence of the ALJ acting outside of his judicial role in determining the extent of the Claimant's disability.

WHEREFORE, it is the recommendation to the United States District Judge that

the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Social Security be **AFFIRMED**. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), Claimant may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE within ten (10) days after being served a copy of this recommendation.

THIS the 4th day of December, 2008.

S/ G. MALLON FAIRCLOTH
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE