

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

DUBLIN DIVISION

KENDALL DEANARD SCOTT,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	
v.)	CV 314-106
)	
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting)	
Commissioner of Social Security)	
Administration,)	
)	
Defendant.)	

ORDER

On January 27, 2016, United States District Judge Dudley H. Bowen granted a reversal and remand pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) in the above-captioned social security appeal, and a judgment was entered in Plaintiff’s favor. (Doc. nos. 17, 18.) Plaintiff now moves for \$3,357.29 in attorney’s fees and \$20.07 in expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). (Doc. no. 19.) In her response, the Acting Commissioner states she does not object to the award in the amount requested. (Doc. no. 21.)

In Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 589 (2010), the Supreme Court held, based on the “plain text” of 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), that an EAJA award “is payable to the litigant and is therefore subject to a Government offset to satisfy a pre-existing debt that the litigant owes the United States.” Based on Ratliff, the proper course is to “award the EAJA fees directly to [the litigant] as the prevailing party and remain silent regarding the direction of payment of those fees.” Bostic v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1301, 1306 (M.D. Fla. 2011).


Indeed, this approach has recently been followed in this District. See Brown v. Astrue, CV 411-152, doc. no. 24 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2013) (awarding EAJA fees to plaintiff without directing payment to counsel despite plaintiff's assignment of award to counsel); Scott v. Colvin, CV 313-004, doc. no. 26 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 11, 2013) (same).

In accord with this practice, the Court awards the EAJA fees to Plaintiff, subject to offset by any debt owed by Plaintiff to the United States. The Court leaves it “to the discretion of the government to accept Plaintiff’s assignment of [the] EAJA [award] and pay [the award] directly to Plaintiff[’s] counsel after a determination that Plaintiff does not owe a federal debt.” Bostic, 858 F. Supp. 2d at 1306; see also Robinson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:13-CV-2073-T-23TGW, 2015 WL 176027, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 13, 2015) (allowing EAJA fees “to be paid by virtue of a fee assignment, to plaintiff’s counsel by the defendant if the plaintiff does not owe a debt to the United States Department of the Treasury”); Griffin v. Astrue, 1:10CV115, 2010 WL 5211548, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 16, 2010) (“There is nothing in Ratliff to indicate that it is intended to divest the government of its discretion to enter into direct payment arrangements where there is no debt to the government or where funds remain after satisfaction of such debt.”).

The Court therefore **GRANTS** Plaintiff’s motion and awards fees in the amount of \$3,357.29 and expenses in the amount of \$20.07 (doc. no. 19), and, for the reasons discussed

above, the Court does not direct the manner in which the EAJA award is to be paid.

SO ORDERED this 14th day of March, 2016, at Augusta, Georgia.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Brian K. Epps". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "B".

BRIAN K. EPPS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA