# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA STATESBORO DIVISION

ERNEST LEE BRAZIEL,

Plaintiff,

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 6:17-cv-65

v.

SGT. MCCLOUD; and OFFICER HARDEN,<sup>1</sup>

Defendants.

## ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Georgia, submitted a Complaint, as amended, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 4.) For the reasons set forth below, I **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DISMISS** Plaintiff's Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim, **DIRECT** the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and **CLOSE** this case, and **DENY** Plaintiff *in forma pauperis* status on appeal.

### BACKGROUND<sup>2</sup>

Plaintiff is on the Tier II program and as a result, all his property—including legal work—is removed to the property room. (<u>Id.</u> at p. 4.) On March 15, 2016, Defendant McCloud logged Plaintiff's property out of the room and gave it to Plaintiff even though it "was not suppose[d] to be out [of the] property room." (<u>Id.</u>) That same night, Plaintiff was moved to the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, (doc. 4), only lists Defendants McCloud and Harden as Defendants. Accordingly, the Court **AUTHORIZES** and **DIRECTS** the Clerk of Court to terminate Defendant Georgia State Prison from the docket and record of this case.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The below-recited facts are taken from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, (doc. 4), the operative Complaint in this action, and are accepted as true, as they must be at this stage. <u>See Lowery v. Ala. Power Co.</u>, 483 F.3d 1184, 1219 (11th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n amended complaint supersedes the initial complaint and becomes the operative pleading in the case.").

"self-harm room" without his property. (<u>Id.</u>) This property was never logged back into the property room, and Plaintiff has been unable to recover his legal materials since that date. (<u>Id.</u> at p. 5.) Plaintiff claims that, because he did not have access to his legal work, he could not "get [his] case back into court . . . ." (<u>Id.</u>)

#### STANDARD OF REVIEW

Plaintiff seeks to bring this action *in forma pauperis*. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), the Court may authorize the filing of a civil lawsuit without the prepayment of fees if the plaintiff submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all of his assets, shows an inability to pay the filing fee, and also includes a statement of the nature of the action which shows that he is entitled to redress. Even if the plaintiff proves indigence, the Court must dismiss the action if it is frivolous or malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). Additionally, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity. Upon such screening, the Court must dismiss a complaint, or any portion thereof, that is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or which seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

The Court looks to the instructions for pleading contained in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when reviewing a Complaint on an application to proceed *in forma pauperis*. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 ("A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain [among other things] . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10 (requiring that claims be set forth in numbered paragraphs, each limited to a single set of circumstances). Further, a claim is frivolous under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) "if it is 'without

arguable merit either in law or fact." Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bilal v. Driver, 251 F.3d 1346, 1349 (11th Cir. 2001)).

Whether a complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Thompson v. Rundle, 393 F. App'x 675, 678 (11th Cir. 2010). Under that standard, this Court must determine whether the complaint contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plaintiff must assert "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not" suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Section 1915 also "accords judges not only the authority to dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual contentions are clearly baseless." Bilal, 251 F.3d at 1349 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)).

In its analysis, the Court will abide by the long-standing principle that the pleadings of unrepresented parties are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys and, therefore, must be liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Boxer X v. Harris, 437 F.3d 1107, 1110 (11th Cir. 2006) ("Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys . . . .") (quoting Hughes v. Lott, 350 F.3d 1157, 1160 (11th Cir. 2003)). However, Plaintiff's unrepresented status will not excuse mistakes regarding procedural rules. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) ("We have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel.").

#### **DISCUSSION**

### I. Access to the Courts Claim

Plaintiff appears to allege that Defendants frustrated his ability to access the courts by losing his legal materials. (Doc. 4, pp. 4–5.) "Access to the courts is clearly a constitutional right, grounded in the First Amendment, the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Fifth Amendment, and/or the Fourteenth Amendment." Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 n.12 (2002)). However, to bring an access-to-courts claim, an inmate must establish that he suffered an actual injury. In interpreting the actual injury requirement, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:

The actual injury which the inmate must demonstrate is an injury to the right asserted, i.e. the right of access. Thus, the . . . official's actions which allegedly infringed on an inmate's right of access to the courts must have frustrated or impeded the inmate's efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous legal claim. See Lewis [v. Casey, 518 U.S. [343, 352–54 (1996)]. Further, the legal claim must be an appeal from a conviction for which the inmate was incarcerated, a habeas petition or a civil rights action. See id., 518 U.S. at 352–57.

Bass v. Singletary, 143 F.3d 1442, 1445 (11th Cir. 1998).

Plaintiff does not allege enough in his Complaint to plausibly satisfy the actual injury prerequisite. Plaintiff simply states that Defendants' actions prevented him from "get[ting his] case back into court . . . ." (Doc. 4, p. 5.) However, Plaintiff does not provide any information as to what claim he was pursuing and whether it was a non-frivolous legal claim. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are not enough to satisfy the pleading requirements.

For these reasons, the Court should **DISMISS** Plaintiff's access to court claims against Defendants.

### **II.** Loss of Personal Property

To the extent Plaintiff seeks to bring a Section 1983 action for his lost his property, these claims also fail. A lost property claim implicates a plaintiff's rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law . . . ."); see also Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992) ("The most familiar office of that Clause is to provide a guarantee of fair procedure in connection with any deprivation of life, liberty, or property by a state.")

However, even if a state actor has continued to wrongfully retain a person's personal property, "no procedural due process violation has occurred if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." <u>Case v. Eslinger</u>, 555 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting <u>Lindsey v. Storey</u>, 936 F.2d 554, 561 (11th Cir. 1991)). "[T]he state's action is not complete until and unless it provides or refuses to provide a suitable postdeprivation remedy." <u>Hudson v. Palmer</u>, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984).

Georgia law provides a postdeprivation remedy through an action for conversion of personal property, which "is a sufficient postdeprivation remedy when it extends to unauthorized seizures of personal property by state officers." Case, 555 F.3d at 1331. This claim arises under O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1. Lindsey, 936 F.2d at 561. This statute provides that "[t]he owner of personalty is entitled to its possession," and "[a]ny deprivation of such possession is a tort for which an action lies." O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1. The Eleventh Circuit has noted that, "[t]his statutory provision covers the unauthorized seizure of personal property by police officers. Therefore, the state has provided an adequate postdeprivation remedy when a plaintiff claims that the state has retained his property without due process of law." Lindsey, 936 F.2d at 561 (quoting Byrd v.

Stewart, 811 F.2d 554, 555 n.1 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam)); see also Allen v. Peal, No. CV 312-007, 2012 WL 2872638, at \*2–3 (S.D. Ga. June 18, 2012) (dismissing a due process claim for lost or seized personal property because O.C.G.A. § 51-10-1 provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy).

Consequently, Plaintiff's claims regarding the alleged deprivation of his property comprise a matter for determination by the courts of the State of Georgia. Therefore, Plaintiff may not present his claims to this Court under Section 1983. Thus, the Court should also **DISMISS** Plaintiff's claims as to his lost property.

### II. Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis

The Court should also deny Plaintiff leave to appeal *in forma pauperis*.<sup>3</sup> Though Plaintiff has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in the Court's order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal is not taken in good faith "before or after the notice of appeal is filed").

An appeal cannot be taken *in forma pauperis* if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an *in forma pauperis* action is frivolous, and thus, not brought in good faith, if it is "without arguable merit either in law or

6

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> A certificate of appealability is not required in this Section 1983 action.

fact." Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at \*1–2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).

Based on the above analysis of Plaintiff's action, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should **DENY** Plaintiff *in forma pauperis* status on appeal.

#### CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, I **RECOMMEND** that the Court **DISMISS** Plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim, **DIRECT** the Clerk of Court to enter the appropriate judgment of dismissal and **CLOSE** this case, and **DENY** Plaintiff *in forma pauperis* status on appeal.

The Court **ORDERS** any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the Complaint must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.

Upon receipt of Objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a *de novo* determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Court **DIRECTS** the Clerk of Court to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the Plaintiff.

**SO ORDERED** and **REPORTED and RECOMMENDED**, this 5th day of February, 2018.

R. STAN BAKER

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA