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where I have some concern that there's not complete clarity. I realize that you particularly addressed the partnership agreement issue. The defendants also requested information about the former partners' performance at their new law firms, including hours billed, revenues generated, efforts to attract new clients. There's no basis for saying that that information is relevant to determine mitigation.

As you know, the way that mitigation is calculated is by looking at whether the individual actually sought comparable employment and whether they retained it. So getting into exactly how these former partners performed at a new law firm is just not relevant to that.

At some points the defendants have also suggested it might be relevant to pretext, but that has no basis. decision to demote and downgrade the partners were made in 1999 on the basis of their performance at Sidley, and there's no reason to say that how they performed subsequently at a new law firm with different support and different expectations bears on that decision.

So I understand what you said with regard to partnership agreements, but we, obviously, are very concerned even about producing those, but we simply do not believe there's any basis for producing this performance information at the individuals' subsequent firms.

THE COURT: Well, maybe and maybe not.

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conceive of a case, and although the case settled, I have had a case in which somebody was ostensibly fired and the given reason for firing was that the individual committed a series of violations of firm procedures. And not terribly important firm decisions, just there were procedures and their attitude was this guy just doesn't follow the rules and that's why we got rid of him. And he had a lot of other explanations of reasons that are prohibited by the law.

Investigation of his subsequent employer established that at the subsequent employer he did the same thing, and at the employer after that he did the same thing. And I thought it did a pretty good job of destroying the pretext argument that was offered by the plaintiff, so good a job that the case settled for what was essentially a nominal amount.

But the reason that both of you may have a point with respect to this is, to do this in the best way to ascertain the truth, what Sidley has to do, and they should do this first so that you are not facing a shifting stance, what Sidley has to say is, we changed the status of partner X because the guy would never have a lunch with the client, never went out and solicited business, worked a lot of hours but somebody else always had to make the rain. Or terrific lawyer but if the client was coming to our office, we had to send them out because he was always angry at the client for one reason or another and communicated this and this is why we

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thought he was not as productive as others, had nothing to do with the fact that he was 58 years old and somebody who was 38 years old started doing their work. It would be important for them to know if at a subsequent firm they had the same opinion of him and if he did the same things.

That, I think, is what they're looking for, and they're entitled to find that, but for the purposes of the plaintiff in this case you don't want to put them in a position -- or let's put it this way, if I were in your shoes, I wouldn't want to put them in a position where they discover that some guy goes to a new firm and does a series of things which the firm thinks they're not good, not bad enough to get rid of him but really things that are problems, becomes a problem partner in another firm and these are the problems, X, Y and Z. You don't want to have that kind of discovery and then have Sidley come and say, well now that we think about it, in addition to these other things that we raised with you there was also X, Y and Z.

So you don't want to put them in a position where they've heard the story. And that I'm willing to let you avoid. But eventually when they have stated their reasons why they have done what they have done with respect to each of these individuals, they're entitled to mine the future conduct of those individuals to find out if there is anything which supports their theory and where applying the Sussannah and the Elders technique from the Apocrypha. Do you remember this?

MS. HAMILTON: I have to admit that I don't.

MS. MURRAY: No.

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THE COURT: When I was starting out, this was a staple of closing arguments in cases. The story of Sussannah and the Elders is that there's a young attractive woman -- the Apocrypha, as you recall, are the books that many people think should have been in the Bible but aren't. She comes to the authorities, to the prophet, whoever it is, and says -- you know, I can't even remember which way it goes. I can't remember if she says they assaulted her or they come and report that she had seduced them, that she was a wanton woman. Maybe it's Solomon who does this, he separates the elders. And he said, "And where did all this happen, these acts of which you complain?" And the first elder says, "under yonder oak tree." Then he sends that elder away, goes to the other elder and says, "where did this happen?" "It was under the elm tree." The separation of witnesses.

And this is basically the technique that you're entitled to use. You're entitled to have Sidley commit to its stated reasons, but once they commit to their stated reasons they are free to see if there is anything in the subsequent conduct that would confirm their judgment with respect to this. Unless, of course, you are going to take the position, which I can't believe you would do, that these are the real

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reasons but the real reasons aren't permitted by the law. Well, you're not going to say that because they're not going to say something like that.

MS. HAMILTON: If I could raise one other point, which is much of the information they've requested may or may not even be accessible to these individuals at their new law firms. We simply don't know whether these individuals are able to access --

THE COURT: What is inaccessible is inaccessible. And if we get past the first wave of this stuff, we may very well be dealing with ways in which that information can be made accessible.

I guite agree with you that a lot of it will not be accessible to the individuals. It's accessible in other ways, but that raises a whole other issue. And what happens is that they start dropping subpoenas on various law firms, they're going to get a series of Rule 45 letters and it's all going to wind up here anyway. But this basic theory permits them a certain amount of discovery, but I'm willing to require them to go first and state their reasons, and I'm sure they're quite capable to doing it.

MS. MURRAY: Your Honor, we have on September 14th given a long description pursuant to an earlier order of the Court and we can work with the EEOC on that.

> THE COURT: Okay. So those are my parameters for

that one.

MS. HAMILTON: And I do expect it quite likely that even if the individual could look at the information themselves, they will not be able to turn it over to Sidley. But, obviously, we will speak to the individuals involved and get back to you once we have more information about they can or cannot turn over.

THE COURT: And, in all honesty, I don't know that in practical terms it's going to be an enormous problem because if these individuals have gone on to other firms and done reasonably well, it's not likely to be a very promising area for Sidley to mine, but let's see where we go.

MR. GOCHANOUR: So if I understand correctly, we're going to look at these on an individualized basis in terms of the reasons given first for these individuals --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GOCHANOUR: -- and then if there is some basis, you know, from the information that we've given them about their subsequent performance, if there is no indication of problems subsequent in employers, I take it there's no real basis for this sort of intrusive discovery.

THE COURT: Well, no, we're going to have to establish a threshold there. We're going to have to establish a threshold there. And one of the things that makes life very difficult for employers who want to raise this defense is,

they may very well fire somebody because they're habitually late to work, works fine but they're habitually late, and then you look at all the future employees and it's a disaster for the defendant because they're never late now. It is true that usually the reasons they're never late now is because they got fired in the first place and realized the concept. So sometimes this stuff doesn't work, but I'm not going to say no to them right off the bat.

MS. MURRAY: Your Honor, just as an example, I'd say more than two-thirds of the folks here had, in our view, very low hours and we've asked for their hours in post-Sidley employment at law firms and --

THE COURT: Look, some of this stuff is going to be simple, some of it is not going to be simple. I mean, if you have a fairly complicated reason for changing the status of a partner — by "complicated" I mean the kind of thing where the partner has undoubted merits and claimed demerits and they're kind of closely balanced, then these things become very complicated and the investigation becomes very contemplated. If you're talking about something relatively simple, like hours, it's easier. So, basically, you'd be a better judge of that than I am knowing what I know now. Later, if I know more it might be difference.

MS. HAMILTON: I think we would argue that this point of low hours at Sidley, how they performed elsewhere, you

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know, the hours are what the hours are in the sense they've produced to us the charts that show the hours, and so there's really no need to inquire at their subsequent employer what their hours are. I don't think it's a factual basis. going to be saying, no, they actually worked more than the 15-, 16-, 1700 hours that are illustrated on the documents.

If, for THE COURT: It's more complicated than that. example, somebody leaves Sidley because Sidley says we want 2000 hours, and they haven't been at 2000 hours, and then they go to another law firm that says we don't want 2000 hours, we may not pay you as much but we want 1800 hours.

The significance of that is a little more equivocal, but Sidley could be in a position of saying the person really wasn't willing to do this, this was the real reason we let him go and look at what happened, he went to another place and he chose this place because they only wanted 1800 hours. may matter. It may matter. Comparative hours, in and of itself, don't establish anything one way or the other. And if, for example, that's all they have, they may have discovery of it but their chances of getting it admitted are nil.

MS. HAMILTON: I think in that kind of a circumstance, you know, we may not object, but what we would ask is if they take the depositions of these individuals and if the individual says yes, I chose someplace that had a lower hour expectation, then I think that provides a much more

significant basis on which to ask the individuals to give up this private information that belongs to their firm. But to do it solely on the basis of an assertion of low hours, it seems like a great -- you know, as you yourself said, is very unlikely to be admissible except in certain limited circumstances. So if we were able to require Sidley to make somewhat more of a showing than just low hours --

THE COURT: Look, I will stop them from doing a fishing expedition, but I have a feeling that in many cases they will be able to define exactly what they're interested in. And the reason why I think they'll be able to do that is, these are pretty much people who worked for them for a long time, and whatever warts there are, I think they're probably quite precise in their description of them and they will be able to look for stuff and ask questions. The other thing is, I am perfectly willing to seal this stuff if it turns out to be a dead end too.

MS. HAMILTON: Well, I think it would absolutely need to be sealed, but perhaps, as I'm looking at the language of their subpoena, what would make more sense is to place on Sidley the burden of identifying for which individuals they believe they need which subpoena requests, because for each individual they have asked --

THE COURT: It's implicit in what I've said that they're going to have to do that.