

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

*MA*  
**FILED**

JAN 30 2007 *10*

**MICHAEL W. DOBBINS**  
**CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT**

GOOGLE, INC. )

Plaintiff, )

vs. )

CENTRAL MFG. INC. a/k/a )  
CENTRAL MFG. CO., a/k/a )  
CENTRAL MFG. CO.(INC)., )  
a/k/a CENTRAL MANUFACTURING )  
COMPANY, INC. and a/k/a )  
CENTRAL MFG. CO. OF ILLINOIS; )  
and STEALTH INDUSTRIES, INC. )  
a/k/a RENTAMARK and a/k/a )  
RENTAMARK.COM, )

Defendants. )

Case No: 07-cv-385

Judge Kendall

Magistrate Judge Cole

**MOTION TO INTERPLEAD**

NOW COMES Leo Stoller, the President of the Defendants in this case, and moves to interplead as a necessary party. The Defendants and Leo Stoller are intertwined and it is necessary that Leo Stoller become a party as a defendant in this case. See Plaintiff's Complaint, paragraph numbers 1, 2, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 30, 39, 44, 52, 54, including sub-parts. Leo Stoller is an integral party and should be given an opportunity to interplead and to defend himself in this proceeding. Leo Stoller is the sole employee of the Defendant business entities.

The Plaintiff has moved before Judge Jack Schmetterer in Stoller's Chapter 7 bankruptcy, Case No. 05-64075, to lift the automatic stay and allow Stoller and his entities to be sued. Plaintiff has acknowledged that Stoller is a necessary party. See attached true and correct copy of Judge Schmetterer's order dated January 18, 2007.

WHEREFORE, Leo Stoller prays that this Court grant Stoller's motion to interplead in this case as a necessary party Defendant.

*Leo Stoller*

Leo Stoller  
7115 W. North Avenue #272  
Oak Park, Illinois 60302  
312/ 545-4554  
Email: ldms4@hotmail.com

Date: January 30, 2007

**Certificate of Mailing**

I hereby certify that this motion is being deposited with the U.S. Postal Service as First Class Mail in an envelope addressed to:

Clerk of the Court  
United States District Court  
219 S. Dearborn  
Chicago, Illinois 60607

*Leo Stoller*

Leo Stoller

Date: January 30, 2007

**Certificate of Service**

I hereby certify that the foregoing is being deposited with the U.S. Postal Service as First Class Mail in an envelope addressed to:

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*Leo Stoller*

Leo Stoller

Date: 1/30/07

ALL

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION

GOOGLE INC.,

Plaintiff,

vs.

CENTRAL MFG. INC. a/k/a CENTRAL  
MFG. CO., a/k/a CENTRAL MFG. CO.  
(INC.), a/k/a CENTRAL  
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.  
and a/k/a CENTRAL MFG. CO. OF  
ILLINOIS; and STEALTH INDUSTRIES,  
INC. a/k/a RENTAMARK and a/k/a  
RENTAMARK.COM,

Defendants.

07CV385

JUDGE KENDALL

MAGISTRATE JUDGE COLE

**FILED**

JAN 19 2007

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**MICHAEL W. DOBBINS**  
**CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT**

**COMPLAINT**

Plaintiff Google Inc. ("Google"), by its attorneys and for its Complaint against Defendants, alleges as follows:

**Nature of This Action**

1. As the Seventh Circuit, Courts in this District and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board repeatedly have found, Defendants and their alleged principal, Leo Stoller ("Stoller"), are engaged in a scheme of falsely claiming trademark rights for the purpose of harassing and attempting to extort money out of legitimate commercial actors, both large and small. Indeed, the judicial decisions awarding fees and otherwise imposing sanctions against Defendants and Stoller for their fraudulent and other illegal conduct, their assertion of rights that they do not own, their pattern of bringing meritless lawsuits and even their fabrication of evidence are legion.

2. Despite the admonitions of Courts and others, Defendants and Stoller have not only continued with, but expanded the scope of, their fraudulent scheme. Among other things, Defendants have fabricated, and threaten to continue to fabricate, non-existent entities that they falsely represent to unsuspecting victims are actual business entities. Defendants further falsely

claim that these non-existent entities have been using a wide array of trademarks on goods or services and otherwise have ownership and licensing rights to thousands of trademarks -- when in reality they have no such rights -- for the purposes of extracting money and obtaining the transfer of property to which Defendants are not entitled. To create an aura of legitimacy for their deceptive enterprise, Defendants have engaged in a widespread pattern of fraudulent acts that have included (i) preparing and circulating fabricated letterhead and other commercial documents supposedly evidencing the existence of their phony entities; (ii) repeatedly publishing advertisements and promotional materials which falsely claim rights to, and the ability to license, marks in which Defendants have no lawful interest and which falsely represent that Courts or others have upheld their alleged rights; (iii) disseminating false statements which represent that Defendants own federal registrations for marks when no such registration exists; (iv) asserting the ownership of fraudulently procured or fraudulently maintained federal registrations; (v) soliciting and employing perjured testimony and other materially false statements made under oath; and (vi) filing materially false documents with U.S. government agencies. Defendants employ these and other unlawful devices as described below to deceive, induce and coerce innocent parties into paying them money or else surrendering to Defendants property rights which Defendants then, in turn, use to defraud others. To date, Defendants have made hundreds of such misrepresentations to hundreds of legitimate companies.

3. Unfortunately, Plaintiff Google's widely-publicized success has attracted the attention of Defendants. As part of their scheme to defraud, Defendants have falsely represented that they own a federal registration for the GOOGLE mark, that they are owners of common law rights in the GOOGLE mark and that they have the right to license the GOOGLE mark to third parties. In order to effectuate their fraud, Defendants further have prepared and circulated, and continue to circulate, bogus letterhead and other corporate documents supposedly evidencing an entity they variously call "GOOGLE™ BRAND TRADEMARK LICENSING," "GOOGLE LICENSING [sic]" and "GOOGLE BRAND PRODUCTS AND SERVICES," even though by all indications no such entity exists. Defendants also have published, and continue to publish, promotional materials that falsely and deceptively represent that Defendants have rights to license the GOOGLE mark, that falsely claim that Defendants have successfully cancelled one or more of Plaintiff's federal trademark registrations for GOOGLE, and that otherwise misrepresent the nature of Defendant's goods, services and commercial activities.

4. Defendants' scheme is and has been with the intent to deceive. Defendants targeted Plaintiff Google, as well as hundreds of other legitimate companies, despite Defendants' knowledge that Defendants have no rights to the marks that they claim and no rights to license them to third parties. Defendants have falsely asserted, and continue to falsely assert, that they have such rights in order to defraud and extort their intended victims. After Plaintiff Google investigated Defendants' allegations of rights and refused Defendants' demands for money, Defendants not only persisted in their spurious demands for a pay-off, but also threatened to publicize their allegations which, they claimed, would bring about "the total destruction" of Plaintiff as a business.

5. Accordingly, Defendants have engaged in, and threaten in the future to engage in, acts of false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B), as well as acts of unfair competition. Furthermore, because Defendants constitute an enterprise engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity that has caused injury and damage to Plaintiff Google, they are liable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 *et seq.* As a consequence of the foregoing, Google is entitled to monetary and injunctive relief against Defendants.

#### **The Parties**

6. Plaintiff Google Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mountain View, California. Plaintiff Google offers a variety of services and products, including a web site that provides the world's most popular Internet search engine and that is visited by more than 380 million users each month.

7. On information and belief, Defendant Central Mfg. Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oak Park, Illinois and operates under one or more aliases, including without limitation as Central Mfg. Co., Central Mfg. Co. (Inc.), Central Manufacturing Company, Inc. and/or Central Mfg. Co. of Illinois (collectively, "Central Mfg."). Defendant Central Mfg. has at all times relevant hereto conducted activities in interstate commerce.

8. On information and belief, Defendant Stealth Industries, Inc. ("Stealth") is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Oak Park, Illinois. Defendant Stealth has at all times relevant hereto conducted activities in interstate commerce.

9. On information and belief, Rentamark, which is also known as Rentamark.com, is an unincorporated business entity with its principal place of business in Oak Park, Illinois.

According to sworn testimony by Stoller, Rentamark is operated by and a part of Defendant Stealth.

10. On information and belief, Stoller was CEO and shareholder of Defendant Central Mfg. and Defendant Stealth at all times relevant hereto. Stoller is also known by aliases that include Leo Reich. Stoller has at all times relevant hereto conducted the activities complained of herein in interstate commerce.

11. Defendant Stealth and Defendant Central Mfg. purport to be successors-in-interest of a defunct business named S Industries, Inc. Stoller was at all relevant times the President and a shareholder of S Industries, Inc.

### **Jurisdiction And Venue**

12. This action arises under the Trademark Act of 1946, Title 15, United States Code the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Title 18, United States Code and the law of Illinois and other states. The Court therefore has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) and principles of supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

13. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391(b) and 1391(c) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1965(b) and 1965(d). Defendants reside in, are found in, transact affairs in and are subject to personal jurisdiction in this District, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims herein occurred in this District.

### **Facts**

#### **Defendants' Fraudulent Conduct Using SI**

14. S Industries, Inc. ("SI"), the claimed predecessor of Defendant Central Mfg. and Defendant Stealth, was incorporated in or about 1985. Stoller acted as SI's principal. During that time in the 1980s, according to Stoller, SI engaged in the business of importing sporting goods such as tennis rackets from manufacturers in Taiwan and other Asian countries.

15. In or about January 1990, Stoller was evicted from the business premises of SI. By that point, while SI nominally moved to Stoller's house, it was defunct as a business. As Stoller subsequently admitted during a 2001 deposition, and contrary to his prior sworn statements otherwise to the Courts and the U.S. Trademark Office, SI had at best only "very nominal, or de minimis" sales by and throughout the 1990s.

16. No longer conducting legitimate operations by or in about 1990, SI and Stoller focused their energies on a new "business" model. This included, in particular, the implementation of a widespread scheme of asserting rights to trademarks, including by way of purported federal registrations, that SI and Stoller knew they had no rights to in order to fraudulently extract money from businesses and individuals.

17. Among other things, Stoller was well aware that common law trademark rights are acquired only through sufficient bona fide use in commerce and that such use is also required for the legitimate acquisition and maintenance of use-based federal trademark registrations. Even though SI was effectively dissolved and thus not using any marks in commerce in a manner and to an extent necessary for trademark rights, SI and Stoller nevertheless represented that they owned non-existent trademark rights and sought to assert them by demanding the payment of license fees and by threatening and filing sham litigation for the purpose of extorting money or property from their victims. Between 1995 and 1997 alone, SI and Stoller filed no fewer than 35 trademark lawsuits in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois alone. A list of those cases is attached as Exhibit A hereto and is incorporated herein by this reference.

18. The Seventh Circuit and this Court found that the suits filed and prosecuted by SI and Stoller were part of a pattern of vexatious litigation that falsely claimed rights to marks they did not own and had no lawful right to assert. Those rulings included the following:

(a) In *S Industries, Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc.*, 249 F.3d 625, 627-29 (7th Cir. 2001), the Seventh Circuit found that SI and Stoller's assertion of trademark rights was groundless and affirmed an award of attorneys' fees against SI for filing "meritless claims" and engaging in other litigation misconduct, which the Seventh Circuit found was part of a "pattern of abusive and improper litigation with which the company and Lee Stoller, its sole shareholder, have burdened the courts of this circuit." Although this suit resulted in a fee award against SI and/or Stoller, upon information and belief such award has not been paid.

(b) In *S Indus., Inc. v. Stone Age Equip., Inc.*, 12 F. Supp. 2d 796, 798-99, 810 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (Castillo, J.), the Court awarded attorney's fees against SI for its "continuing pattern of bad faith litigation." The Court also found that the documentary evidence submitted by SI and Stoller was "highly questionable" and "perhaps fabricated" and that Stoller's sworn testimony was "inconsistent, uncorroborated, and in some cases, demonstrably false."

(c) In *S Industries, Inc. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc.*, 17 F. Supp. 2d 775, 779 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (Andersen, J.), the Court awarded fees against SI based on findings that its claims were "patently frivolous" and that it had "apparently taken a legitimate procedure designed to protect trademark rights and turned [it] into a means of judicial extortion."

19. In addition to filing and prosecuting numerous sham lawsuits in the Courts, SI and Stoller instituted and prosecuted a flurry of sham proceedings before the United States Trademark Trial and Appeal Board ("TTAB" or the "Board") based on their fraudulent claims of trademark rights. Those proceedings resulted in decisions that included the following findings by TTAB:

(a) In *S Indus., Inc. and Central Mfg. Co. v. JL Audio, Inc.*, Opposition No. 110,672, Order of May 13, 2003 (TTAB), the Board stated that "Mr. Stoller's and opposers' litigation strategy of delay, harassment and even falsifying documents in other cases is well documented" and further noted Stoller's history of being "sanctioned, individually, for making material misrepresentations."

(b) In *S Indus., Inc. and Central Mfg. Co. v. Casablanca Indus., Inc.*, Cancellation No. 92024330, Order of Oct. 3, 2002 (TTAB), the Board likewise observed that Defendant Central Mfg.'s and Stoller's "litigation strategy of delay, harassment, and falsifying documents in other cases is well documented."

(c) In *S Indus., Inc. v. S&W Sign Co., Inc.*, Opposition No. 91102907 (Dec. 16, 1999), the Board noted that "[t]he lack of credibility of Mr. Stoller is a matter of public record."

(d) In *S. Indus. Inc. v. Lamb-Weston Inc.*, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1293, 1295 (TTAB 1997), the Board found that SI and Stoller had made "fraudulent" statements under oath in order to backdate pleadings filed with the Board.

#### **Defendants' Fraudulent Acquisition Of Federal Registrations From SI**

20. SI, through Stoller, purported to assign several federal trademark registrations and applications to Defendant Central Mfg. Many of the alleged assignments were dated on or about June 5, 1994, but were not recorded with the U.S. Trademark Office until various times in or after 1998. The registrations and applications allegedly assigned by SI to Defendant Central Mfg. include those that are listed in Exhibit B hereto and are incorporated herein by this reference.



21. The assignments from SI to Defendant Central Mfg. for the registrations and applications listed in Exhibit B hereto were knowingly and deliberately fraudulent on the part of Stoller and Defendant Central Mfg. Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller also utilized these purported registrations as vehicles to perpetrate an intentional pattern of fraud on a significant number of persons and companies, as well as on the Courts and TTAB. Among other things:

(a) SI had ceased operating as an actual business years before the alleged assignments. Not only had SI's rights in the marks accordingly been abandoned (assuming they ever existed), but the subsequent purported assignments were not accompanied by any assets or existing, on-going business. Nor did the assignment agreements -- which recited that the transfers of the registrations were only for nominal consideration -- reflect any such transfer of any assets or existing, on-going business. As such, and as has been known to Defendants at all material times, because no existing good will accompanied them, the ostensible transfers were assignments-in-gross that rendered invalid both the registrations and any common law rights, even assuming any such rights ever once existed.

(b) According to sworn testimony by Stoller, SI had allegedly transferred ownership of most or all of the registrations and applications set forth in Exhibit B to Defendant Central Mfg. in or about 1994. Nevertheless, after the alleged assignments, SI and Stoller continued to fraudulently hold out SI as the owner of intellectual property and to fraudulently file and prosecute, in the name of SI, lawsuits in the Courts and proceedings before TTAB. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois during the years 1996 and 1997, SI and Stoller initiated at least 35 suits in SI's name that misrepresented that SI was the owner of the registrations and applications asserted in those cases and that SI was the owner of the common law trademark rights asserted in those cases. See Exhibit A hereto.

(c) Likewise, in TTAB, SI and Stoller initiated numerous proceedings in SI's name that alleged SI was the owner of the registrations, both after SI had ceased to effectively exist and after SI had purportedly transferred the registrations to Defendant Central Mfg. Examples of such fraudulently commenced and prosecuted proceedings in TTAB include without limitation each of the following:

Proceeding No.	Registration No.	Filing Date of Proceeding by SI and Stoller	Date of Alleged Assignment of Registration to Central Mfg.	Other Party to Proceeding
91110672	1717010	05/29/1998	12/29/1997	JL AUDIO, INC.
91110659	2140524	03/23/1998	06/05/1997	ENTRA TECHNOLOGIES COMPANY
92027323	2057613	01/23/1998	11/01/1997	ROSE'S RESTAURANTS INC.
91108615	1326765	11/17/1997	06/05/1997	INTRACO FOODS PTE LTD.
91107902	1623790	09/12/1997	06/05/1996	REALITY BYTES, INC.
91107648	2064576	09/03/1997	06/05/1997	GLOBAL UPHOLSTERY COMPANY
91107040	1326765	07/10/1997	06/05/1997	ST. JOSEPH LIGHT & POWER CO.
91106515	1326765	06/06/1997	06/05/1997	SENTRACHEM LIMITED
91110350	1615004	05/01/1998	09/01/1997	KAYDON CORPORATION
91109973	1615004	03/25/1998	09/01/1997	MANCO PRODUCTS, INC.
91108480	1615004	11/05/1997	09/01/1997	TERMINATOR TURTLE, LP

(d) Stoller and SI also filed knowingly fraudulent papers with the U.S. Trademark Office in order to unlawfully maintain the registrations that had allegedly been

transferred to Defendant Central Mfg. For example, SI, through Stoller, purported to assign Registration No. 1,564,751 for AEROSPACE to Defendant Central Mfg. on or about June 5, 1994. Nevertheless, on or about November 11, 1994, SI, through Stoller, filed a sworn statement with the U.S. Trademark Office to obtain supposed incontestability status for the registration that averred SI had continuously been using the mark on the goods listed in the registration, that it was still doing so and that SI was the owner of the purported registration. Even to this day, SI holds itself out as the purported owner of Registration No. 1,564,751.

(e) The registrations and applications listed in Exhibit B attached hereto were, and are, invalid and fraudulent for the further, independent reason that the alleged assignments from SI were to a non-existent entity. The assignee named by SI and Stoller in their transfer documents and in their filings with the Courts and TTAB is listed as "Central Mfg. Co." Although a company named Central Mfg. Inc. apparently is a legal entity under the laws of Delaware, Central Mfg. Co. does not exist and never has existed. Nor was Stoller's misidentification inadvertent. Rather, as the Court found in *Central Mfg. Co. v. Pure Fishing Inc.*, No. 05 C 725 (N.D. Ill) (Lindenberg, J.) as discussed further below, Stoller's misrepresentations about the corporate status of "Central Mfg. Co." were intentional so as to mislead and defraud those who dealt with the non-existent "Central Mfg. Co." and to perpetrate a fraud on the Courts by enabling and concealing Defendants' false assertions of trademark rights.

(f) In addition, Stoller has obtained, through baseless assertions of rights and by threatening and instituting sham litigation, the transfer of trademark applications and registrations previously held by third parties to Defendant Stealth and Defendant Central Mfg. These include without limitation U.S. Trademark Application Nos. 74-735,867, 74-735,868, 74-493,718, 74-475,481, 74-340,300, 74-476,028, 74-630,176, 74-734,680, and 74-534,766 as well as U.S. Trademark Registration Nos. 1,717,010, 1,766,806 and 2,269,113. Upon information and belief, these transfers were also invalid assignments-in-gross, including without limitation in that they were not accompanied by any assets or existing, on-going business, and furthermore were not validly maintained, including without limitation in that the alleged marks were not used in commerce in connection with the goods or services set forth in the applications and registrations. Nevertheless, Defendants have misused these applications and registrations to claim rights they do not own, to fraudulently demand licensing fees and to threaten sham

lawsuits against others, despite Defendants' knowledge that such applications and registrations are not, and were not, valid.

**Defendants Continue, And Expand, Their Pattern Of Fraud**

22. Since the time of the alleged assignment of the registrations and applications from SI, Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller have engaged in, and continue to engage in, numerous fraudulent business practices as part of a scheme to extort money and property from innocent individuals and innocent companies, both large and small. As described further below, these practices include:

(a) false claims, including through the creation and circulation of fraudulent commercial documents, that non-existent entities are actual, legitimate businesses and that such non-existent entities have ownership and/or licensing rights to trademarks;

(b) false claims of right to intellectual property that Defendants know they do not own and have no colorable right to;

(c) false claims to own federal trademark registrations that Defendants know they do not own and in some instances do not even exist;

(d) the filing of fraudulent documents with U.S. government agencies;

(e) representations that Defendants offer or have offered goods or services that they have not, and in some cases never have, supplied;

(f) false representations that they provide legal services, even though they are not admitted in any State to practice law;

(g) unlawful threats to disseminate, and the unlawful dissemination of, false representations about targeted companies or individuals in the media or to the public if they do not pay money or surrender rights as demanded by Defendants; and

(h) threatening and instituting sham trademark lawsuits and other frivolous legal proceedings.

23. This and other Courts repeatedly have confirmed that Defendants continue to engage in a pattern of falsely claiming rights to marks they do not own, including by the fabrication of evidence and the provision of false testimony, and continue to attempt to enforce those non-existent rights by threatening and filing frivolous litigation, including in some instances by the use of false names. In addition to the decisions involving Stoller, Defendant Central Mfg. and SI that are discussed above, such decisions include the following:

(a) In *Central Mfg. Co. v. Brett*, No. 04 C 3049 (N.D. Ill) (Coar, J.), the Court ruled that Defendant Central Mfg. and Stoller lacked the trademark rights they had claimed and on that basis, among others, entered judgment against them. It further observed that "Stoller appears to be running an industry that produces often spurious, vexatious, and harassing federal litigation" and recited the findings by "several courts in this district" that Stoller and Defendant Central Mfg. are "engage[d] in a pattern and practice of harassing legitimate actors for the purpose extracting a settlement amount." The Court ordered them to pay an award of attorneys' fees based on findings that "Leo Stoller and his companies present paradigmatic examples of litigants in the business of bringing oppressive litigation designed to extract settlement" and that they had offered "questionable, and seemingly fantastical documents" and "inconsistent, uncorroborated, or arguably false testimony." As a further part of that decision, the Court reviewed and summarized the terms of the "settlement agreements" that Stoller and Defendant Central Mfg. alleged evidence their trademark rights and found that they, in fact, confirmed such Defendants had "engage[d] in a pattern and practice of harassing legitimate actors for the purpose of extracting a settlement amount. The judicial system is not to be used as an aid in such deliberate, malicious, and fraudulent conduct."

(b) In *Central Mfg. Co. v. Pure Fishing, Inc.*, No. 05 C 725 (N.D. Ill) (Lindenberg, J.), the Court entered judgment against Defendant Central Mfg. as a sanction for Defendant Central Mfg.'s and Stoller's abuse of the legal process. In doing so, the Court found that Stoller "has earned a reputation for initiating spurious and vexatious federal litigation." In the case before it, the Court found that Stoller, Defendant Central Mfg. Co. and their counsel had engaged in "gross misconduct" and "unethical conduct" which included Stoller's signing of pleadings with counsel's name even though Stoller is not a lawyer; had brought motions "that lacked any evidentiary support" and were otherwise "baseless"; and had evinced "flagrant contempt for this Court" and "an appalling lack of regard" for the judicial process. In particular, the Court ruled that "Central Mfg. Co., through Mr. Stoller," and their counsel violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(b) "by maintaining that Central Mfg. Co. was a Delaware corporation," even though it was not. As it explained:

Contrary to the statements in Central Mfg. Co.'s initial and amended complaints, it is not an independent legal entity and is not incorporated under the laws of Delaware. Central Mfg. Co. filed an amended complaint with this Court on May

26, 2005 stating that it was a Delaware corporation, while almost simultaneously filing a motion before Judge Hart stating that Central Mfg. Co. was a d/b/a for Central Mfg. Inc. See *Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc. v. Stoller, et al.*, 05 C 2052. Plaintiff, through Mr. Stoller, filed this case under a false name. Since the inception of this case, and unquestionably prior to filing the amended complaint, Mr. Stoller knew that he had not incorporated Central Mfg. Co. However, Mr. Stoller likely attempted to conceal this fact from the Court because the trademark registrations that are the basis for the infringement claims, state that Central Mfg. Co., not Central Mfg. Inc., owns sole title to the disputed marks. The conduct of Central Mfg. Co., through Mr. Stoller, is akin to the conduct in *Dotson*. 321 F.3d 663. In *Dotson*, the Seventh Circuit upheld dismissal of a plaintiff's case with prejudice as a sanction for filing suit under a false name. *Id.* at 668. Accordingly, Central Mfg. Co. and Mr. Stoller deserve the same sanction for filing suit on [be]half of a false corporation.

(c) In *Central Mfg. Co. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek Inc.*, Opposition Nos. 9115485 and 91154617 (TTAB Feb. 19, 2004), the Board imposed Rule 11 sanctions against Defendant Central Mfg. for filing motions that were "without merit, constitute harassment, and can only be assumed to have been brought for purposes of delay."

(d) In *Central Mfg. Inc. v. Third Millenium Tech. Inc.*, 61 U.S.P.Q. 1210, 1214-15 (TTAB 2001), the Board found that Stoller and Defendant Central Mfg. had "engaged in a pattern" of submitting papers that were based on "false statements and material misrepresentations." It ruled, in particular, that Stoller and Defendant Central Mfg. had filed requests for extensions of time on the basis of non-existent settlement negotiations and had "acted in bad faith and for improper purposes, i.e., to obtain additional time to harass the applicant, to obtain unwarranted extension of the opposition period, and to waste resources of applicant and the Board."

24. Undeterred by these and similar rulings, Defendants to this day have continued, and even expanded, their fraudulent scheme by now falsely claiming that they own rights in, and have the right and ability to license, many thousands of trademarks. As described below, Defendants have repeatedly made these misrepresentations in commercial advertising and to hundreds of companies and individuals, including Plaintiff, targeted by Defendants for extortion

25. Since November 2005 alone, Defendants filed more than 1800 requests for extensions of time to oppose applications for trademark registrations that had been published by the United States Trademark Office. Simultaneous with this proliferation of filings, Defendants have sought to extract money or property out of at least many hundreds of applicants by asserting that Defendants purportedly own rights to all of these many hundreds of marks which have been the subject of those applications.

26. Many of these extortionate demands and false representations directed to applicants for registration are evidenced in Defendants' sham filings with the Trademark Office itself. For example, Defendants' April 12, 2006 request for an extension of time to oppose Application Serial No. 78192386 for "VP VENTURES" includes the following:

Please contact (773-589-0915 FAX) VENTURE BRAND LICENSING to resolve this trademark controversy VENTURE v VP VENTURES and/or merely file an Express Abandonment! See rentamark.com, the nationally renowned trademark licensing and enforcement firm since 1974 for all of your VENTURE BRAND LICENSING, trademark valuations, expert witness testimony and trademark litigation support services, i.e., brief writing, trademark searches, legal research, appeals, etc.

A true and correct copy of the April 12, 2006 request is attached hereto as Exhibit C.

27. Many of Defendants' more than 1800 filings included virtually identical language, except that they substitute a different alleged licensing entity that purports to have a name supposedly similar to the mark which was the subject of the application -- such as "FILA BRAND LICENSING," "FINGO BRAND LICENSING," "SKILL BRAND LICENSING," "MERMAID BRAND LICENSING," "DIAMOND BRAND LICENSING," "STRA BRAND LICENSING," "WORKOUT BRAND LICENSING," "FRIENDS NETWORK BRAND LICENSING," "SIFI BRAND LICENSING," "PM BRAND LICENSING," "NANO BRAND LICENSING," "HAPPY BRAND LICENSING," "LAKE BRAND LICENSING" and "RUNNER BRAND LICENSING." True and correct copies of examples of these additional requests are attached hereto as Exhibit D.

28. The representations contained in Defendants' more than 1800 filings described above as well as their associated communications were, and are, knowingly false.

(a) The multitude of licensing companies claimed by Defendants do not exist, nor did they own the purported rights to the marks claimed. Not only did Stoller's bankruptcy

filing in December 2005 make no mention that he has ownership interests in any of these hundreds of supposed entities, but by an Order dated July 14, 2006 TTAB ruled that neither Stoller nor his supposed entities owned the rights they proclaimed to have. In its July 14, 2006 Order, TTAB initially referenced the "pattern of misconduct and abuse of the TTAB's processes" over the course of "many years" by Stoller and the purported entities associated with him. Although TTAB had ordered Defendants to provide "for each of the marks for which you requested an extension of time to file an opposition, evidence that supports a claim that you may be damaged by registration of the mark" and to "demonstrate that the extension requests were not filed for improper purposes but, instead, were based on cognizable rights you may have arising under the Trademark Act," Defendants provided no such proof: "Your submissions do not substantiate your rights in any of the claimed marks, let alone support a colorable claim of damage. . . . You submitted no evidence of products or services bearing these alleged marks, no evidence that you have sold any products or services under these marks, and no evidence of your advertising of goods or services with these marks." As TTAB observed, the evidence Defendants did submit only served to "reinforce the conclusion that you are holding up thousands of applications in an attempt to coerce applicants to license, i.e., 'rent,' trademarks to which you have not demonstrated any proprietary right." TTAB thus found that Defendants had "filed the extension requests for improper purposes, namely, to harass the applicants to pay you to avoid litigation or to license one of the marks in which you assert a baseless claim of rights." For those violations, which were deemed to constitute "egregious" misconduct, the Board imposed an array of sanctions, including dismissal of the TTAB proceedings filed by Defendants which were the result of their frivolous requests for extension of time. A true and correct copy of TTAB's July 14, 2006 Order is attached hereto as Exhibit E.

(b) Furthermore, Defendants are not qualified to practice law in any state and are not entitled to engage in the practice of law. Nevertheless, in their abusive filings described above, Defendants have solicited payment for the provision of legal services such as "brief writing," "drafting pleadings" and "legal research." Not only do such acts constitute the unauthorized practice of law by Defendants, but Defendants tout these false representations in order to cause targeted victims to erroneously believe that Defendants are authorized to engage in the practice of law, including for its *in terrorum* effect and to deceive victims into capitulating to their extortionate demands.



29. Defendants also have made fraudulent representations in advertising and promotions through commercial web sites that they have published and displayed, and continue to publish and display.

30. Defendant Stealth and Stoller have represented on the site located at [www.rentamark.com](http://www.rentamark.com), and continue to represent, that "RENTAMARK.COM is an independent, full service, international licensing and merchandising agency. RENTAMARK.COM owns and controls over 10,000 famous trademarks specializing in the trademark licensing business." Elsewhere on that site, Defendant Stealth and Stoller represent: "RENTAMARK.COM is able to license your company with any one of our famous trademarks that will allow your business to sell its products and services worldwide. Below are our Licensed Word Marks. To view our e-Marks, simply click on the button in the control panel." That page then links to other pages that list many thousands of terms that Defendants claim to own and have the right to license. True and correct hard copy excerpts from Defendants' web site pages are attached hereto as Exhibits F and G.

31. The foregoing representations contained on Defendants' site are false. As to all or virtually all of the marks to which Defendants claim rights, Defendants do not have, and never have had, subsisting federal registrations for such marks and have not used such terms as marks or trade names in interstate commerce. Furthermore, Stoller's bankruptcy filing in December 2005 made no mention that he has purported ownership interests in any of the thousands of marks listed on the [rentamark.com](http://rentamark.com) web site.

32. Confirming the bad faith and extortionate purpose behind Defendants' ever proliferating, false claims of right, Defendants' latest campaign also came on the heels of recent Court actions that raise the prospect of imposing substantial monetary liability for Defendants' frivolous legal proceedings and other misconduct. The *Central Mfg. Co. v. Brett* decision quoted above was issued on September 30, 2005. This was soon followed by the decision quoted above in *Central Mfg. Co. v. Pure Fishing, Inc.* on November 16, 2005. In both cases, the Court ruled that Defendant Central Mfg. and Stoller are liable to pay attorneys' fees and costs, and the parties in those cases are seeking more than \$700,000 in reimbursement from Defendant Central Mfg. and Stoller.

### **Defendants' Scheme To Defraud Targeting Plaintiff Google**

33. It is in the context of Defendants' expanded scheme of making spurious claims of right to many thousands of marks, and their continuing pattern of unlawfully demanding licensing fees and threatening and filing sham legal proceedings, that Defendants targeted Plaintiff Google.

34. As one of the some 1800 requests for extension of time filed by Defendants with TTAB since November 2005, Defendant Central Mfg. and Stoller sought on November 27, 2005 a request for an extension of time to oppose an application for registration filed by Plaintiff Google. A true and correct copy of Defendants' November 27, 2005 request, which was sent by means of the U.S. mail and interstate wires on or about November 27, 2005 and at times thereafter, is attached hereto as Exhibit H.

35. On or about November 29, 2005, by means of the U.S. mail and interstate wires, Defendants sent a letter that purported to be on the letterhead of an entity called "GOOGLE BRAND PRODUCTS & SERVICES," which claimed to have been in business "SINCE 1981." In it, Defendants alleged to "hold common law rights" in the mark GOOGLE and to "have been using the similar mark GOOGLE for many years." The letter was signed "Leo Stoller GOOGLE." A true and correct copy of Defendants' November 29, 2005 letter and its attachments is annexed hereto as Exhibit I.

36. The attachments to the November 29, 2005 letter were also sent by means of U.S. mail and the interstate wires. In the proposed "Agreement To Discontinue Use (Covenant Not To Sue)" and the proposed "Settlement Agreement" attached to the letter, Stoller and Defendant Stealth proclaimed their "ownership of the mark GOOGLE," and the signature block to the proposed agreement was signed by Stoller for "GOOGLE" and as a "[r]epresentative of GOOGLE." Furthermore, both documents purported to identify Defendant Stealth (under the alias "Rentamark") as "Google." Elsewhere in the attachments, Defendants purported to identify the entity preparing the attachments as an entity named "GOOGLE" and included an alleged notice that the materials were "© GOOGLE 2000."

37. In the attachments to the November 29, 2005 letter sent by U.S. mail and interstate wires, Defendants also repeatedly represented that they owned a federal trademark registration for "Google" by use of the "®" symbol, including in the attachments entitled: "Why

Obtain A GOOGLE® License . . .," "GOOGLE® Licensing Program Licensee Requirements," "GOOGLE® Licensing Program," and "Licensing GOOGLE® Enables You To . . .".

38. In or about April or May 2006, Defendants sent by U.S. mail to Plaintiff correspondence with a return address label which falsely represented that it had been sent by an entity called "GOOGLE LICENSING [sic]" and which reflected Defendants' address in Oak Park, Illinois. (The exact day of this fraudulent mailing cannot be ascertained because, in violation of U.S. Postal Service Regulations, Defendants omitted the date from their postage meter stamp.) A true and correct copy of this mailing label is attached hereto as Exhibit J.

39. On April 10, 2006, Stoller and Defendant Stealth transmitted to Plaintiff by the interstate wires two documents that purported to be from an entity called "GOOGLE™ BRAND TRADEMARK LICENSING." True and correct copies of these faxes from Defendants are attached hereto as Exhibits K and L.

40. Beginning on or about April 28, 2006, Stoller and Defendant Stealth also represented on the rentamark.com web site that that "GOOGLE" was, and is, among the marks that they purport to "own and control" and that they offer for licensing to third parties. True and correct copies of the relevant web pages are attached hereto as Exhibit M.

41. Each of the foregoing representations of fact by Defendants recited above in paragraphs 35 through 40 above were, and are, false and made by Defendants with the intent to deceive. As Defendants have known at all relevant times, those statements were false in at least each of the following respects:

(a) Defendants knowingly misrepresented the existence of an entity or entities variously called by Defendants as "GOOGLE BRAND LICENSING AND PRODUCTS," "GOOGLE LICENSING [sic]" and "GOOGLE™ BRAND TRADEMARK LICENSING." No such entities exist, but are a fabrication by Defendants, and the commercial letterhead, fax cover sheets, labels and other commercial documents allegedly reflecting their existence are fraudulent.

(b) Defendants' representations to have common law rights in or to "Google" as a mark or trade name are fraudulent. Defendants own no right, title or interest of any kind in "Google" as a mark, trade name or designation of origin. Defendants have not used "Google" as a mark or trade name, whether directly or through any licensee, in connection with bona fide sale of goods or services. No segment of the consuming public associates "Google" with Defendants or with any goods or services originating from or associated with Defendants. Defendants have

no right to license "Google" as a mark or trade name to any person or entity. Indeed, because Defendants' claim of right to "Google" was part and parcel of their more than 1800 filings with TTAB since November 2005, TTAB already has found pursuant to the July 14, 2006 Order that Defendants' assertion of rights to the "Google" mark was "baseless" and made for the unlawful purpose of seeking to extort money from Plaintiff. For those reasons, TTAB dismissed outright Defendant Central Mfg.'s sham opposition proceeding against Plaintiff. A true and correct copy of TTAB's dismissal Order is attached hereto as Exhibit N. Nevertheless, to this day and as shown above, Defendants continue to hold themselves out as the owner of rights to the "Google" mark and offer to license "Google" as a mark to third parties.

(c) Defendants' further claims that they have a federal trademark registration for "Google," made through their repeated uses of the statutory federal registration notice "®" and elsewhere, are false. Neither Defendants nor Stoller own any federal registration for "Google."

42. Defendants also have made materially false representations of fact regarding Defendants' purported success in litigation and in TTAB proceedings for the purpose of deceiving and coercing their victims into paying money and bolstering their false claims of right to trademarks, including as to "Google." Examples of such misrepresentations include:

(a) In a March 31, 2006 email to Plaintiff sent by means of the interstate wires, Defendants, through Stoller, falsely asserted that "99% of my opponents opt to settle" and that "Google is in the 1% category that refused to pay any deference to my early on trays [*sic*] for a quick settlement." A true and correct copy of the March 31, 2006 email is attached hereto as Exhibit O.

(b) According to claims on Defendants' rentmark.blogspot.com web site beginning on or about April 20, 2006 and continuing through the present: "Stoller has thus far prevailed in over 90% of its [*sic*] police actions against third party infringers. Companies like Wal-Mart, K-Mart and hundreds of other well known American companies have acknowledged Stoller's superior rights to its [*sic*] marks as a result of trademark litigation." A true and correct hard copy printout of Defendants' relevant web pages is attached hereto as Exhibit P.

(c) Beginning on or about April 20, 2006 and continuing through the present, Defendants claimed on the www.rentmark.blogspot.com web site that "STOLLER CANCELS THE GOOGLE TRADEMARK." See Exhibit P attached hereto.

(d) Beginning on or about June 16, 2004 and continuing through the present, Defendants claimed on the [www.rentmark.blogspot.com](http://www.rentmark.blogspot.com) web site that "Leo Stoller has participated in over 200 inter party [*sic*] proceedings over 25 years prevailing in [*sic*] over 95% of the time and over 60 district court trademark cases." A true and correct hard copy printout of Defendants' relevant web pages is attached hereto as Exhibit Q.

43. The foregoing representations of fact by Defendants set forth in paragraph 42 above were, and are, false. Neither Defendants nor Stoller have cancelled any registration owned by Plaintiff. Moreover, Defendants' representations as to its "success" in litigation are fictional. Defendants have not prevailed in "over 90%" or "over 95%" of its legal actions or obtained settlements from "99%" of those companies and individuals Defendants have targeted. To the contrary, as the Court observed in the *Brett* decision discussed above: "no Court has ever found infringement of any trademark allegedly held by Stoller or his related companies in any reported opinion." Indeed, as described above, Courts have repeatedly found lawsuits brought by Defendants and Stoller to be part of a pattern of sham litigation and have repeatedly sanctioned them for their groundless claims of trademark rights, their fabrication of evidence, their provision of false testimony and their other abuses of the judicial system.

44. In addition to their repeated assertion and dissemination of materially false statements, Defendants also made repeated unlawful threats against Plaintiff. These include without limitation:

(a) Defendants' November 29, 2005 letter attached as Exhibit I hereto contained threats to bring sham legal proceedings and to harass, including by threatening to conduct "extensive discovery" which included depositions of Applicant's "executive officers," and referenced the fact that the mere filing of a legal proceeding, regardless of its lack of merit, would cost Plaintiff at least \$150,000. In exchange for refraining from inflicting such damage, Defendants demanded that Plaintiff either pay them money in the amount of at least \$100,000 or else cease all use of GOOGLE in connection with Plaintiff's business.

(b) Defendants' March 31, 2006 email attached as Exhibit O hereto threatened to "refe[r]" Plaintiff's executives "to the US Attorney for a perjury charge should they lie under oath."

(c) In a February 9, 2006 email, Stoller and Defendant Stealth threatened to publicize their allegations, which they claimed would mean "Google's stock won't be worth

\$5.00 a share" and would result in "the total destruction" of Applicant. A true and correct copy of the February 9, 2006 email is attached hereto as Exhibit R.

(d) In a March 2, 2006 email, Stoller and Defendant Central Mfg. again threatened to publicize their allegations with the intention of "driv[ing] down Google stock price" and then concluded with the statement that "I would not be surprised [sic] if Google goes out of business by the conclusion of this proceeding." A true and correct copy of the March 2, 2006 email is attached hereto as Exhibit S.

### COUNT I

(15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B) -- Against All Defendants)

45. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 43 above, as though fully set forth at length.

46. Defendants have made and disseminated, and continue to make and disseminate, false statements of fact in commercial promotions and advertisements about their goods, services and commercial activities. Such misrepresentations by Defendants include without limitation those set forth in paragraphs 26(a) through 31, 40, 42(b)-(d) and 43 above. Such statements are literally false and have a tendency to deceive a substantial segment of their audience.

47. Defendants have caused and continue to cause their false and misleading statements to enter interstate commerce, including by means of the Internet.

48. By reason of the acts alleged herein, Defendants have misrepresented, in commercial advertising and promotion, the nature, characteristics and qualities of their goods, services and commercial activities in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).

49. Defendants' acts complained of herein have damaged and will continue to damage Plaintiff irreparably. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for these wrongs and injuries. The damage to Plaintiff includes harm to its reputation that money cannot compensate. Plaintiff is, therefore, entitled to an injunction restraining and enjoining Defendants and their agents, servants and employees, and all persons acting thereunder, in concert with, or on their behalf, from engaging in false advertising and from otherwise making or utilizing false and misleading statements in connection with the promotion, advertisement or sale of goods, services and commercial activities.

50. Plaintiff has been and is likely in the future to be injured as result of Defendants' false statements. Plaintiff is entitled to recover three times its damages, to an accounting of Defendants' profits and to disgorgement of Defendants' ill-gotten gains, together with Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117.

## COUNT II

(18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c) and 1964(c) -- Against All Defendants)

51. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 44 above, as though fully set forth at length.

52. Stoller is a "person" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3). Stoller, Defendant Central Mfg. and Defendant Stealth constitute an enterprise within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) in that they constitute a union and group of individuals and entities associated in fact although not a legal entity. Said enterprise evinces a hierarchy and structure separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering alleged herein, including without limitation in that Defendant Central Mfg. and Defendant Stealth purport to engage in legitimate activities in addition to the unlawful activities alleged in this Complaint.

53. Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller, directly and indirectly as stated in 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), execute an enterprise in and affecting interstate commerce by fraudulent, deceitful and extortionate practices as the term "enterprise" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4), including through without limitation the predicate acts of mail fraud and wire fraud and the predicate acts of extortion. In particular, these racketeering activities include:

(a) Acts And Threats Involving Extortion: On or about the date indicated in and as described in paragraph 44(b) above, Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller, without lawful authority and with an intent to cause another to perform or to omit the performance of any act, communicated a threat to accuse a person of an offense, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12-6 and 720 ILCS 5/15-5, and furthermore to harm the business reputes of another, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/15-5, all of which accordingly constitute acts and threats involving extortion which are chargeable under State law and punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). In addition, on or about the dates indicated in and as described in paragraph 44 above, Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller, with an intent to extort money and other property from Plaintiff, sent and delivered

letters and other writings that expressly and impliedly threatened to inflict unlawful injuries to property in violation of California Penal Code §§ 519 and 523, which pursuant to California Penal Code §§ 520 and 523 constitute acts and threats involving extortion which are chargeable under State law and punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year as set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

(b) Mail Fraud: On or about the dates indicated in and as described in paragraphs 35 through 38 above, Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller, having devised a scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiff by false representations, did for the purpose of furthering and executing such scheme or artifice to defraud, transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of mail communications in interstate commerce, writing, signs, signals, pictures or sound, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

(c) Wire Fraud: On or about the dates indicated in and as described in paragraphs 35 through 43 above, Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller, having devised a scheme or artifice to defraud Plaintiff by false representations, did for the purpose of furthering and executing such scheme or artifice to defraud, transmit and cause to be transmitted by means of wire communications in interstate commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures or sound, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.

54. Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller have executed within the past six years, and continue to execute, a pattern of racketeering activity within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). The pattern of racketeering activity, as defined by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(1) and (5), presents both a history of unlawful conduct and a distinct threat of continuing unlawful activity in the future. Such activity consists of multiple acts of racketeering, is interrelated, not isolated, and is perpetrated for the same or similar purposes. Such activity extends over a substantial period of time, up to and beyond the date of this Complaint, and threatens to continue and to project itself into the future, including without limitation in that the predicate acts and offenses alleged herein have been part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. Such activities occurred after the effective date of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 *et seq.*, and the last such act occurred within 10 years after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity. Defendant Central Mfg., Defendant Stealth and Stoller have done so by performing the acts set forth above, including but not limited to the acts set forth in paragraphs 35 through 43 above, which constitute repeated violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1342 relating to wire fraud and 18 U.S.C. § 1341



relating to mail fraud, and the acts set forth in paragraph 44 above, which constitute repeated violations of State laws prohibiting extortion within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

55. The enterprise as described herein is at all relevant times a continuing enterprise because, among obvious reasons, it is designed to unlawfully extract and has damaged legitimate businesses including Plaintiff based upon fraudulent statements and threats of extortion as alleged herein.

56. As a direct and proximate result of the racketeering activity alleged herein, including by reason of the predicate acts constituting such pattern of racketeering activity by said Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered, and will in the future suffer, injury in its business or property.

57. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), Plaintiff is entitled to recover damages, to be trebled in accordance with statute, plus interest, costs and attorneys' fees, by reason of the pattern of racketeering activity and violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) alleged herein.

### **COUNT III**

(Unfair Competition -- Against All Defendants)

58. Plaintiff repeats and realleges each and every allegation set forth in paragraphs 1 through 44 above, as though fully set forth at length.

59. Defendants are, and at all relevant times have been, perpetrating a scheme of fraudulently claiming trademark and other rights, including without limitation by means of false marketing materials, by the use and circulation of fraudulent letterhead and other documents, by threatening and filing sham legal proceedings and by other illegal means as described herein, for the purpose of extorting money and property from others, including Plaintiff.

60. Defendants' statements, misrepresentations, threats and conduct alleged herein were made not for the purpose of protecting or enforcing any legitimate, or even colorable, rights, but instead for the bad faith purpose of unlawfully extracting money from Plaintiff Google. Said statements, misrepresentations, threats and conduct by Defendants, made for such illegitimate reason, constitute unfair competition under the laws of this State and other jurisdictions.

61. Defendants' acts complained of herein have damaged and will in the future continue to damage Plaintiff Google irreparably. Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law for these actual and threatened wrongs and injuries. The damage to Plaintiff includes harm to its

good will and reputation in the marketplace that money cannot compensate. Plaintiff is therefore entitled to injunctive relief restraining Defendants and their agents, servants, and employees, and all persons acting thereunder, in concert with them, or on their behalf, from further engaging in acts of unfair competition as against Plaintiff.

62. As consequence of the foregoing acts of unfair competition by Defendants, Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of its actual damages, together with its costs and attorney's fees, and to the disgorgement of Defendants' ill-gotten gains.

63. Defendants' acts were in bad faith, in conscious disregard of Plaintiff's rights and were performed with the intention of depriving Plaintiff of its rights. Accordingly, Defendants' conduct merits, and Plaintiff seeks, an award of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and deter such conduct in the future.

#### **Prayer for Relief**

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff Google prays that this Court enter judgment as follows:

A. Enter an injunction prohibiting Defendants from engaging in further acts of false advertising, further acts of racketeering activity and further acts of unfair competition as to Plaintiff, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1116, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) and state law;

B. Enter an order requiring the dissolution and/or reorganization of the enterprise and requiring the divestment of any interest, whether direct or indirect, therein, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a);

C. Award Plaintiff three times its damages and Defendants' profits, together with Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and state law;

D. Award Plaintiff treble damages and costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys' fees, pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117 and 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c);

E. Award Plaintiff punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and deter such misconduct in the future;

F. Award Plaintiff prejudgment interest, as appropriate; and

G. Grant Plaintiff such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DATED: January 18, 2007

Respectfully submitted,

GOOGLE INC.

By: Michael T. Zeller  
One of Its Attorneys

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**UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS  
EASTERN DIVISION**

**In re**

**LEO STOLLER,**

**Debtor.**

**Chapter 7**

**Case No. 05-64075**

**Hon. Jack B. Schmetterer**

**Hearing Date: January 18, 2007**

**Hearing Time: 11:00 a.m.**

**ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR ORDER DECLARING PROPOSED SUIT TO BE  
OUTSIDE SCOPE OF STAY OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, MODIFYING STAY  
[DOCKET NO. 113]**

Google Inc. ("Google") having filed its Motion for Order Declaring Proposed Suit to be Outside Scope of Stay or, In the Alternative, Modifying Stay (the "Motion") on August 18, 2006, and hearings having been held on the Motion on August 23, 2006, August 31, 2006, September 14, 2006, October 5, 2006, October 19, 2006, November 9, 2006, December 5, 2006, December 12, 2006, December 19, 2006, and January 4, 2007 and Google having entered into a compromise with the Chapter 7 trustee appointed in this case concerning the relief sought in the Motion as to the estate and entities owned or controlled by the estate, which compromise has been approved by a separate Order of this Court entered on December 5, 2006 (such Order and the Settlement Agreement it approved being the "Settlement Order"), and the Debtor having objected to the Motion which objection the Court overruled in open court on January 4, 2007, and the Court having made, on the record at the January 4, 2007 hearing, findings of fact and conclusions of law, and the Court having found that there is cause to grant Google relief from the automatic stay,


IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Google is granted relief from the automatic stay so that it may take the actions, including filing an action against the Debtor in the United States District

Court, described in the Motion and any ancillary, necessary, or appropriate actions in connection therewith.

*in that fact or is the Third Circuit Appeal  
bound or not.*

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Google shall take no action to collect a monetary judgment against Leo Stoller personally without obtaining prior leave of this Court; provided however that if this case is dismissed or if Leo Stoller has been denied a discharge under 11 U.S.C. §727 then Google shall not have to obtain leave before collecting any judgment it obtains against Leo Stoller.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the relief granted herein pertains only to Leo Stoller personally and nothing herein amends or supersedes the provisions of the Settlement Order.

  
United States Bankruptcy Judge


JAN 18 2007

Date: January 5, 2007

**Certificate of Mailing**

I hereby certify that the foregoing is being  
hand-delivered to the following address:

Clerk of the Court  
United States Bankruptcy Court  
219 S. Dearborn  
Chicago, IL 60607



Leo Stoller


Date: January 5, 2007

**Certificate of Service**

I hereby certify that the foregoing is being deposited  
with the U.S. Postal Service as First Class mail in an  
envelope addressed to:

Richard M. Fogel, Trustee  
Janice A. Alwin, Esq.  
Counsel for Trustee  
Shaw, Gussis, Fishman, Glantz,  
Wolfson & Tow  
321 N. Clark Street, Suite 800  
Chicago, Illinois 60610

Timothy C. Meece  
BANNER & WITCOFF, LTD.  
10 South Wacker Drive, Suite 3000  
Chicago Illinois 60606



Leo Stoller

Date: January 5, 2007