
EXHIBIT F

To: Google Inc. (trademarks@google.com)
Subject: TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77318565 - ANDROID - N/A
Sent: 8/20/2008 5:35:12 PM
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Attachments:

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE

SERIAL NO: 77/318565

MARK: ANDROID

77318565

CORRESPONDENT ADDRESS:

GOOGLE INC.
GOOGLE INC.
1600 AMPHITHEATRE PKWY
MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94043-1351

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION:

<http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm>

GENERAL TRADEMARK INFORMATION:

<http://www.uspto.gov/main/trademarks.htm>

APPLICANT: Google Inc.

CORRESPONDENT'S REFERENCE/DOCKET

NO:

N/A

CORRESPONDENT E-MAIL ADDRESS:

trademarks@google.com

OFFICE ACTION

TO AVOID ABANDONMENT, THE OFFICE MUST RECEIVE A PROPER RESPONSE TO THIS OFFICE ACTION WITHIN 6 MONTHS OF THE ISSUE/MAILING DATE.

ISSUE/MAILING DATE: 8/20/2008

THIS IS A FINAL ACTION.

This letter responds to the applicant's communication filed on August 14, 2008. The applicant (1) argued against the refusal to register the mark under Section 2(d), (2) amended the identification of goods, and (3) stated that the term ANDROID has no meaning other than as a trademark.

The following requirement has been satisfied: (1) Significance of the Mark. TMEP §§713.02, 714.04.

For the reasons set forth below, the refusal under Trademark Act Section 2(d) is now made **FINAL** with respect to U.S. Registration No. 2639556. *See* 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a). In addition, the following requirement is now made **FINAL**: (1) Identification of Goods. *See* 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a).

Refusal: Section 2(d) – Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

Registration was refused under Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. Section 1052(d), because the mark for which registration is sought so resembles the mark shown in U.S. Registration No. 2639556 as to be likely, when used in connection with the identified goods, to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive.

The examining attorney has considered the applicant's arguments carefully but has found them unpersuasive. For the reasons below, the refusal under Section 2(d) is maintained and is now made **FINAL**.

The applicant applied to register the mark ANDROID in standard character form for "mobile device hardware and peripherals; operating system software; software for use in developing, executing, and running other software on mobile devices, computers, computer networks, and global communication networks; computer software development tools; computer software for use in transmitting and receiving data over computer networks and global communication networks; computer software for managing communications and data exchange among and between mobile devices and desktop computers; computer middleware, namely, software that mediates between the operating system of a mobile device and the application software of a mobile device; computer application software for mobile devices." The registered mark is ANDROID DATA in typed form for "computer e-commerce software to allow users to perform electronic business transactions via a global computer network."

Taking into account the relevant *du Pont* factors, a likelihood of confusion determination in this case involves a two-part analysis. The marks are compared for similarities in their appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression. TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(b). The goods and/or services are compared to determine whether they are similar or commercially related or travel in the same trade channels. *See Herbko Int'l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.*, 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002); *Han Beauty, Inc. v. Alberto-Culver Co.*, 236 F.3d 1333, 1336, 57 USPQ2d 1557, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 2001); TMEP §§1207.01, 1207.01(a)(vi).

Comparison of the Marks

Regarding the first prong of the test, although a disclaimed portion of a mark certainly cannot be ignored, and the marks must be compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant in creating a commercial impression. Disclaimed matter is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. *See In re Dixie Rests. Inc.*, 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997); *In re Nat'l Data Corp.*, 753 F.2d 1056, 1060, 224 USPQ 749, 752 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Here, the registrant has disclaimed the wording DATA. Therefore, the examining attorney must closely examine the dominant portion of the registrant's mark against the applicant's mark.

The dominant portion of the registrant's mark and the applicant's mark are the identical term ANDROID. Thus, the dominant portion of the registrant's mark and the applicant's mark are identical with respect to

sound, appearance, and commercial impression. Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where there are similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appearing in both applicant's and registrant's mark. See *Crocker Nat'l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce*, 228 USPQ 689 (TTAB 1986), *aff'd sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat'l Ass'n*, 811 F.2d 1490, 1 USPQ2d 1813 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH); *In re Phillips-Van Heusen Corp.*, 228 USPQ 949 (TTAB 1986) (21 CLUB and "21" CLUB (stylized)); *In re Corning Glass Works*, 229 USPQ 65 (TTAB 1985) (CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS); *In re Collegian Sportswear Inc.*, 224 USPQ 174 (TTAB 1984) (COLLEGIAN OF CALIFORNIA and COLLEGIENNE); *In re Pellerin Milnor Corp.*, 221 USPQ 558 (TTAB 1983) (MILTRON and MILLTRONICS); *In re BASF A.G.*, 189 USPQ 424 (TTAB 1975) (LUTEXAL and LUTEX); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii).

The question is not whether people will confuse the marks, but whether the marks will confuse people into believing that the goods they identify come from the same source. *In re West Point-Pepperell, Inc.*, 468 F.2d 200, 201, 175 USPQ 558, 558-59 (C.C.P.A. 1972); TMEP §1207.01(b). For that reason, the test of likelihood of confusion is not whether the marks can be distinguished when subjected to a side-by-side comparison. The question is whether the marks create the same overall impression. See *Recot, Inc. v. M.C. Becton*, 214 F.2d 1322, 1329-30, 54 USPQ2d 1894, 1899 (Fed. Cir. 2000); *Visual Info. Inst., Inc. v. Vicon Indus. Inc.*, 209 USPQ 179, 189 (TTAB 1980). The focus is on the recollection of the average purchaser who normally retains a general rather than specific impression of trademarks. *Chemetron Corp. v. Morris Coupling & Clamp Co.*, 203 USPQ 537, 540-41 (TTAB 1979); *Sealed Air Corp. v. Scott Paper Co.*, 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Considering the above, the marks are sufficiently similar to cause a likelihood of confusion under Trademark Act Section 2(d).

Comparison of the Goods

Turning to the second prong of the test, the goods of the parties need not be identical or directly competitive to find a likelihood of confusion. See *Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Dresser Indus., Inc.*, 518 F.2d 1399, 1404, 186 USPQ 476, 480 (C.C.P.A. 1975); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i). Rather, they need only be related in some manner, or the conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source. *In re Total Quality Group, Inc.*, 51 USPQ2d 1474, 1476 (TTAB 1999); TMEP §1207.01(a)(i); see, e.g., *On-line Careline Inc. v. Am. Online Inc.*, 229 F.3d 1080, 1086-87, 56 USPQ2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 2000); *In re Martin's Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc.*, 748 F.2d 1565, 1566-68, 223 USPQ 1289, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The registrant is providing e-commerce software. This software can be used on the applicant's mobile device hardware and peripherals. Furthermore, the registrant's software may be executed by the applicant's "software for use in developing, executing, and running other software on mobile devices, computers, computer networks, and global communication networks." Thus, the goods are related and conditions surrounding their marketing are such that they would be encountered by the same purchasers under circumstances that would give rise to the mistaken belief that the goods come from a common source.

Furthermore, the applicant's "computer software for use in transmitting and receiving data over computer networks and global communication networks" is broad enough to include the applicant's e-commerce

software. Likelihood of confusion is determined on the basis of the goods and/or services as they are identified in the application and registration. *Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Packard Press Inc.*, 281 F.3d 1261, 1267-68, 62 USPQ2d 1001, 1004-05 (Fed. Cir. 2002); *In re Shell Oil Co.*, 992 F.2d 1204, 1207 n.4, 26 USPQ2d 1687, 1690 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1993); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii). In this case, applicant's goods are identified broadly. Therefore, it is presumed that the application encompasses all goods of the type described, including those in the registrant's more specific identification, that they move in all normal channels of trade, and that they are available to all potential customers. See TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii); see, e.g., *In re Americor Health Servs.*, 1 USPQ2d 1670, 1670-71 (TTAB 1986); *In re Equitable Bancorporation*, 229 USPQ 709, 710 (TTAB 1986).

Finally, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board has held that computer hardware products are related to computer software products, such that their marketing under the same or similar marks may be likely to cause source confusion. See *In re Emulex Corp.*, 6 USPQ2d 1312 (TTAB 1987) (holding JAVELIN for computer peripheral software storage unit likely to be confused with JAVELIN for "prerecorded computer programs in machine readable form"); *In re TIE/Commc'ns, Inc.*, 5 USPQ2d 1457 (TTAB 1987) (holding DATA STAR likely to cause confusion when used in connection with both registrant's "computer programs recorded on magnetic media" and applicant's "voice/data communications terminals and parts thereof"); *In re Digital Research Inc.*, 4 USPQ2d 1242 (TTAB 1987) (holding CONCURRENT PC-DOS likely to be confused with CONCURRENT TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION for "printed electronic circuit boards"); *In re Epic Sys. Corp.*, 228 USPQ 213 (TTAB 1985) (holding EPIC for computer software for use in health care facilities likely to be confused with EPIC DATA for "electronic data collection terminals and electronic data collection units"); *In re Teradata Corp.*, 223 USPQ 361 (TTAB 1984) (holding Y NET for computer hardware likely to be confused with XYNET for computer software); *In re Compagnie Internationale Pour L'Informatique-Cii Honeywell Bull*, 223 USPQ 363 (TTAB 1984) (holding QUESTAR for computer hardware likely to be confused with QUESTAN for computer programs); *In re Graphics Tech. Corp.*, 222 USPQ 179 (TTAB 1984) (holding AGILE for computer programs likely to be confused with AGILE for computer data terminals); *Alpha Indus., Inc. v. Alpha Microsystems*, 220 USPQ 67 (TTAB 1983) (holding ALPHA MICRO for digital computer equipment and programs likely to be confused with ALPHA MICROWAVE for microwave components and sub assemblies); see also *Octocom Sys. Inc. v. Houston Computer Servs., Inc.*, 918 F.2d 937, 16 USPQ2d 1783 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (affirming TTAB decision on summary judgment that found computer modems and computer programs highly related); cf. *In re Quadram Corp.*, 228 USPQ 863 (TTAB 1985).

Applicant's Arguments

The applicant argues that no likelihood of confusion exists because the registrant is no longer using the mark as evidenced by their lack of presence currently on the Internet. Furthermore, the applicant has provided documents showing that the registrant's corporate entity was involuntarily dissolved in May, 2004.

However, while these statements may be true, a trademark or service mark registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the validity of the registration and the registrant's exclusive right to use the mark in commerce in connection with the specified goods and/or services. See 15 U.S.C. §1057(b); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv). Evidence that constitutes a collateral attack on a cited registration, such as statements about a registrant's nonuse of its mark, is not relevant to a likelihood of confusion determination in ex parte examination. See *In re Dixie Rests.*, 105 F.3d 1405, 1408, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1534-35 (Fed. Cir. 1997); *In re Peebles Inc.*, 23 USPQ2d 1795, 1797 n.5 (TTAB 1992); TMEP §1207.01(d)(iv). Such evidence may, however, be pertinent to a formal proceeding before the Trademark

Trial and Appeal Board to cancel the cited registration.

Conclusion

The applicant's mark must be refused registration under Trademark Act Section 2(d). The applicant's mark is highly similar to the registrant's mark with respect to sound, appearance, and commercial impression. Both marks share the dominant term ANDROID. Furthermore, the applicant's goods are closely related to the registrant's goods and commonly emanate from the same source as the registrant's goods. As such, the refusal is maintained and is now made **FINAL**.

Requirement: Identification of Goods

The examining attorney informed the applicant that the identification of goods was indefinite and must be clarified because it was too broad. It was noted that applicant may adopt the following identification, if accurate:

International Class 009: *Computer hardware; Computer software for {specify the function of the programs, e.g., use in database management, use as a spreadsheet, word processing, etc. and, if software is content- or field-specific, the content or field of use}.*

The applicant responded and amended the identification to the following:

International Class 009: Mobile device hardware and peripherals; operating system software; software for use in developing, executing, and running other software on mobile devices, computers, computer networks, and global communication networks; computer software development tools; computer software for use in transmitting and receiving data over computer networks and global communication networks; computer software for managing communications and data exchange among and between mobile devices and desktop computers; computer middleware, namely, software that mediates between the operating system of a mobile device and the application software of a mobile device; computer application software for mobile devices.

However, the identification of goods remains indefinite because portions of the identification are too broad. Applicant may adopt the following identification of goods, if accurate:

International Class 009: Mobile device hardware and peripherals, *namely, {state the specific hardware and peripherals, i.e. devices for hands-free use of mobile phones, mobile phones, etc.}*; operating system software; software for use in developing, executing, and running other software on mobile devices, computers, computer networks, and global communication networks; computer software development tools; computer software for use in transmitting and receiving data over computer networks and global communication networks; computer software for managing communications and data exchange among and between mobile devices and desktop computers; computer middleware, namely, software that mediates between the operating system of a mobile device and the application software of a mobile device; computer application software for mobile devices, *namely mobile phones*.

Identifications of goods can be amended only to clarify or limit the goods; adding to or broadening the scope of the goods is not permitted. 37 C.F.R. §2.71(a); see TMEP §§1402.06 *et seq.*, 1402.07.

Therefore, applicant may not amend the identification to include goods that are not within the scope of the goods set forth in the present identification.

For assistance with identifying and classifying goods and/or services in trademark applications, please see the online searchable *Manual of Acceptable Identifications of Goods and Services* at <http://tess2.uspto.gov/netahtml/tidm.html>. See TMEP §1402.04.

Since the applicant failed to provide an acceptable identification of goods, this requirement is maintained and is now made **FINAL**.

Response Guidelines

If applicant does not respond within six months of the mailing date of this final Office action, the application will be abandoned. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §2.65(a). Applicant may respond to this final Office action by:

- (1) Submitting a response that fully satisfies all outstanding requirements, if feasible; and/or
- (2) Filing an appeal to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, with an appeal fee of \$100 per class.

37 C.F.R. §§2.6(a)(18), 2.64(a); TBMP ch. 1200; TMEP §714.04.

In certain rare circumstances, a petition to the Director may be filed pursuant to 37 C.F.R. §2.63(b)(2) to review a final Office action that is limited to procedural issues. 37 C.F.R. §2.64(a); TMEP §714.04; *see* 37 C.F.R. §2.146(b); TBMP §1201.05; TMEP §1704 (explaining petitionable matters). The petition fee is \$100. 37 C.F.R. §2.6(a)(15).

If applicant has questions about its application, please telephone the assigned trademark examining attorney directly at the number below.

/Seth A. Rappaport/
Seth A. Rappaport
Trademark Examining Attorney
Law Office 103
Phone: (571) 270-1508
Fax: (571) 270-2508

RESPOND TO THIS ACTION: Applicant should file a response to this Office action online using the form at <http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm>, waiting 48-72 hours if applicant received notification of the Office action via e-mail. For *technical* assistance with the form, please e-mail TEAS@uspto.gov. For questions about the Office action itself, please contact the assigned examining attorney. **Do not respond to this Office action by e-mail; the USPTO does not accept e-mailed responses.**

If responding by paper mail, please include the following information: the application serial number, the mark, the filing date and the name, title/position, telephone number and e-mail address of the person signing the response. Please use the following address: Commissioner for Trademarks, P.O. Box 1451, Alexandria, VA 22313-1451.

STATUS CHECK: Check the status of the application at least once every six months from the initial filing date using the USPTO Trademark Applications and Registrations Retrieval (TARR) online system at <http://tarr.uspto.gov>. When conducting an online status check, print and maintain a copy of the complete TARR screen. If the status of your application has not changed for more than six months, please contact the assigned examining attorney.

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Subject: TRADEMARK APPLICATION NO. 77318565 - ANDROID - N/A
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Attachments:

IMPORTANT NOTICE
USPTO OFFICE ACTION HAS ISSUED ON 8/20/2008 FOR
APPLICATION SERIAL NO. 77318565

Please follow the instructions below to continue the prosecution of your application:

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PLEASE NOTE: The Office action may not be immediately available but will be viewable within 24 hours of this notification.

RESPONSE MAY BE REQUIRED: You should carefully review the Office action to determine (1) if a response is required; (2) how to respond; and (3) the applicable response time period. Your response deadline will be calculated from 8/20/2008.

Do NOT hit "Reply" to this e-mail notification, or otherwise attempt to e-mail your response, as the USPTO does NOT accept e-mailed responses. Instead, the USPTO recommends that you respond online using the Trademark Electronic Application System response form at <http://www.uspto.gov/teas/eTEASpageD.htm>.

HELP: For *technical* assistance in accessing the Office action, please e-mail TDR@uspto.gov. Please contact the assigned examining attorney with questions about the Office action.

WARNING

- 1. The USPTO will NOT send a separate e-mail with the Office action attached.**
- 2. Failure to file any required response by the applicable deadline will result in the ABANDONMENT of your application.**