Stewart v. Fienerman et al Doc. 7

# IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

| OTIS H. STEWART,              | ) |                         |
|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------|
| Plaintiff,                    | ) |                         |
|                               | ) |                         |
| vs.                           | ) | CIVIL NO. 08-cv-212-DRH |
| DR. ADRIAN FIENERMAN, et al., | ) |                         |
| Defendants.                   | ) |                         |

## MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

# **HERNDON**, Chief Judge:

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Western Illinois Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks damages for allegedly being denied adequate medical attention and for allegedly being deprived of his personal property. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:

- (a) **Screening.**—The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
- (b) **Grounds for Dismissal.** On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—
  - (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
  - (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A. An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which

relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007).

Also before the Court is Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 3).

#### THE COMPLAINT

Briefly, Plaintiff alleges that, while confined at the Menard Correctional Center (Menard), he injured his knee after he jumped from the top bunk in his cell. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Fienerman and Irwin have denied him adequate medical care for his knee injury. Although Plaintiff alleges that he has received some care for his injury (e.g. he was briefly housed in the medical unit, briefly given the use of a wheelchair, and provided some pain medication), Plaintiff alleges that he has torn ligaments and cartilage damage in the knee and that the Defendants have not provided constitutionally sufficient care for the nature and extent of his injury.

While Plaintiff was confined in the medical unit with his knee injury, the personal property in his cell was suppose to be secured and inventoried. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Dilday, Kloath, and Neff failed to secure and inventory his personal property and, therefore, certain items of his personal property were lost or stolen.

#### **DISCUSSION**

Plaintiff's claim that Defendants Fienerman and Irwin denied him adequate medical care in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights survives review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and should not be dismissed at this time.

Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Dilday, Kloath, and Neff, however should be dismissed pursuant to § 1915A. The only constitutional right that might be implicated by the alleged facts is Plaintiff's right, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to be free from deprivations of his property by

state actors without due process of law. To state a claim under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Plaintiff must establish a deprivation of liberty or property *without due process of law*; if the state provides an adequate remedy, plaintiff has no civil rights claim. *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 530-36 (1984) (availability of damages remedy in state claims court is an adequate, post-deprivation remedy). The Seventh Circuit has found that Illinois provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy in an action for damages in the Illinois Court of Claims. *Murdock v. Washington*, 193 F.3d 510, 513 (7th Cir. 1999); *Stewart v. McGinnis*, 5 F.3d 1031, 1036 (7th Cir. 1993); 705 ILCS 505/8 (1995). Accordingly, Plaintiff has no claim under § 1983.

Furthermore, a defendant can never be held liable under § 1983 for negligence. *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986); *Zarnes v. Rhodes*, 64 F.3d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1995). Consequently, the Defendants' alleged negligence in failing to secure and inventory his personal property does not state a § 1983 claim.

With regard to Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel, there is no absolute right to appointment of counsel in a civil case. *Cook v. Bounds*, 518 F.2d 779 (4<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1975); *Peterson v. Nadler*, 452 F.2d 754 (8<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1971). When presented with a request to appoint counsel, the Court must make the following inquiries: "(1) has the ... plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or effectively been precluded from doing so and (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself." *Pruitt v. Mote*, 503 F.3d647, 854-55 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2007). With regard to the first step of the inquiry, there is no indication at all whether Plaintiff has attempted to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion to appoint him counsel will be denied, without prejudice.

## **DISPOSITION**

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's claims concerning his personal property are DISMISSED.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that because there are no other claims pending against them, Defendants Dilday, Kloath, and Neff are **DISMISSED** from this action.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (Doc. 3) is **DENIED**, without prejudice.

The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to prepare Form 1A (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons) and Form 1B (Waiver of Service of Summons) for Defendants **Fienerman** and Irwin. The Clerk shall forward those forms, USM-285 forms submitted by Plaintiff, and sufficient copies of the complaint to the United States Marshal for service.

The United States Marshal is **DIRECTED**, pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to serve process on Defendants **Fienerman and Irwin** in the manner specified by Rule 4(d)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Process in this case shall consist of the complaint, applicable forms 1A and 1B, and this Memorandum and Order. For purposes of computing the passage of time under Rule 4(d)(2), the Court and all parties will compute time as of the date it is mailed by the Marshal, as noted on the USM-285 form.

With respect to former employees of Illinois Department of Corrections who no longer can be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the Department of Corrections shall furnish the Marshal with the Defendant's last-known address upon issuance of a court order which states that the information shall be used only for purposes of effectuating service (or for proof of service, should a dispute arise) and any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Marshal.

Address information obtained from I.D.O.C. pursuant to this order shall not be maintained in the court file, nor disclosed by the Marshal.

The United States Marshal shall file returned waivers of service as well as any requests for waivers of service that are returned as undelivered as soon as they are received. If a waiver of service is not returned by a defendant within **THIRTY (30) DAYS** from the date of mailing the request for waiver, the United States Marshal shall:

- Request that the Clerk prepare a summons for that defendant who has not yet returned a waiver of service; the Clerk shall then prepare such summons as requested.
- Personally serve process and a copy of this Order upon the defendant pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and 28 U.S.C. § 566(c).
- Within ten days after personal service is effected, the United States Marshal shall file the return of service for the defendant, along with evidence of any attempts to secure a waiver of service of process and of the costs subsequently incurred in effecting service on said defendant. Said costs shall be enumerated on the USM-285 form and shall include the costs incurred by the Marshal's office for photocopying additional copies of the summons and complaint and for preparing new USM-285 forms, if required. Costs of service will be taxed against the personally served defendant in accordance with the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(2) unless the defendant shows good cause for such failure.

Plaintiff is **ORDERED** to serve upon defendant or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon that attorney, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for consideration by this Court. He shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk of the Court a certificate stating the date that a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to defendant or his counsel. Any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge which has not been filed with the Clerk or which fails to include a certificate of service will be disregarded by the Court.

Defendants **Fienerman and Irwin** are **ORDERED** to timely file an appropriate responsive

pleading to the complaint, and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this cause is **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate

Judge for further pre-trial proceedings.

Further, this entire matter is hereby **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate Judge for

disposition, as contemplated by Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), should all the parties

consent to such a referral.

Plaintiff is under a continuing obligation to keep the Clerk and each opposing party informed

of any change in his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than seven (7) days

after a transfer or other change in address occurs.

**DATED:** September 22, 2008.

<u>DavidRHerndon</u>

**DISTRICT JUDGE** 

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