

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS**

<p><b>TIMOTHY HOLLIS, #S11294,</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Plaintiff,</b></p> <p><b>vs.</b></p> <p><b>DR. CLEVELAND RAYFORD and DEBBIE MAGNUSON,</b></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><b>Defendants.</b></p>	<p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p>	<p><b>CIVIL NO. 11-227-GPM</b></p>
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**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**

**MURPHY, District Judge:**

Plaintiff Timothy Hollis, an inmate in Vandalia Correctional Center, brings this action for deprivations of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is serving a three year sentence for drug possession. This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:

- (a) **Screening.**– The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
- (b) **Grounds for Dismissal.**– On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–
  - (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or
  - (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, *see Smith v. Peters*, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff’s claim. *Brooks v. Ross*, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts “should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements.” *Id.* At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. *See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.*, 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

Upon careful review of the complaint, the Court finds it appropriate to exercise its authority under § 1915A and shall dismiss this action.

### **The Complaint**

Plaintiff suffers from degenerative hip disease. Prior to incarceration, Plaintiff’s doctor told him that he needed a hip replacement on the right side, but that his left hip might not need to be replaced if he had proper treatment. According to the website of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”), Plaintiff was placed in IDOC custody on November 24, 2010.<sup>1</sup>

In January 2011, Plaintiff suffered a fall while in Vandalia Correctional Center. He sought medical treatment, and was given a cane and medication. He made repeated visits to the Health Care

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<sup>1</sup> Inmate Search feature on <http://www.idoc.state.il.us/subsections/search/default.asp> (last visited December 12, 2011).

Unit seeking additional treatment, but was told by Defendant Magnuson that the prison's policy was to "maintain" his hips by giving him pain medication. His requests for surgery were refused, allegedly based on cost, and on the prison policy "not to fix anyone" (Doc. 1, p. 6). Plaintiff claims that his condition cannot be "maintained" with medication alone, and that his hips get worse every day, because he has to walk up steps every time he goes to the commissary store or to other locations in the basement. He seeks damages for the Defendants' refusal to provide him with hip surgery.

### **Discussion**

The Supreme Court has recognized that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners" may constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); see *Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). This encompasses a broader range of conduct than intentional denial of necessary medical treatment, but it stops short of "negligen[ce] in diagnosing or treating a medical condition." *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 106. See also *Sanville v. McCaughtry*, 266 F.3d 724, 734 (7th Cir. 2001).

To prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that the responsible prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. See *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); *Dunigan ex rel. Nyman v. Winnebago Cnty.*, 165 F.3d 587, 590 (7th Cir. 1999). Deliberate indifference involves a two-part test. The plaintiff must show that (1) the medical condition was objectively serious, and (2) the state officials acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, which is a subjective standard.

*Sherrod v. Lingle*, 223 F.3d 605, 619 (7th Cir. 2000). However, the Supreme Court stressed that this test is not an insurmountable hurdle for inmates raising Eighth Amendment claims:

[A]n Eighth Amendment claimant need not show that a prison official acted or failed to act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm . . . . Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk

is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence . . . and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.

*Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 842.

The Seventh Circuit considers the following to be indications of a serious medical need: (1) where failure to treat the condition could “result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain;” (2) “[e]xistence of an injury that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment;” (3) “presence of a medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities;” or (4) “the existence of chronic and substantial pain.” *Gutierrez v. Peters*, 111 F.3d 1364, 1373 (7th Cir. 1997). In addition, a condition that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention is also considered a “serious” medical need. *Id.*

Plaintiff’s allegation that he suffers from a degenerative hip condition that causes pain, makes it difficult for him to use stairs, and may require joint replacement, likely meets the objective showing of a serious medical condition. The remaining question is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged deliberate indifference on the part of the Defendants.

The Seventh Circuit’s decisions discussing the standard for deliberate indifference in the denial or delay of medical care require evidence of a defendant’s actual knowledge of, or reckless disregard for, a substantial risk of harm. The Circuit also recognizes that a defendant’s inadvertent error, negligence or even ordinary malpractice is insufficient to rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment constitutional violation. *See Duckworth v. Ahmad*, 532 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2008); *Chavez v. Cady*, 207 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2000) (officers were on notice of seriousness of condition of prisoner with ruptured appendix because he “did his part to let the officers know he was

suffering”); *Ciarpaglini v. Saini*, 352 F.3d 328, 331 (7th Cir. 2003) (Courts will not take sides in disagreements with medical personnel’s judgments or techniques). However, a plaintiff inmate need not prove that a defendant intended the harm that ultimately transpired or believed the harm would occur. *Walker v. Benjamin*, 293 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing *Haley v. Gross*, 86 F.3d 630, 641 (7th Cir. 1996)).

According to the complaint, Plaintiff received treatment promptly upon requesting care after he fell—he was given a cane, and put on medication. He does not complain that the medication was ineffective in relieving his pain. The essence of his complaint is that he is dissatisfied with the Defendants’ “maintenance” treatment, and claims that his deteriorating condition requires surgery without delay. However, mere disagreement with a physician’s chosen course of an inmate’s medical treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. *See Ciarpaglini*, 352 F.3d at 331; *Garvin v. Armstrong*, 236 F.3d 896, 898 (7th Cir. 2001) (courts will not take sides in disagreements about medical personnel’s judgments or techniques); *Snipes v. DeTella*, 95 F.3d 586, 591 (7th Cir. 1996). The Eighth Amendment does not give prisoners entitlement to “demand specific care” or “the best care possible,” but only requires “reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm.” *Forbes v. Edgar*, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997). Further, a difference of opinion between medical professionals concerning the treatment of an inmate will not support a claim for deliberate indifference. *Norfleet v. Webster*, 439 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir. 2006); *see also Garvin*, 236 F.3d at 898.

Plaintiff’s disagreement with the treatment given to him by the Defendants does not rise to the level of a violation of his constitutional rights. Therefore, this case shall be dismissed pursuant to § 1915A.

**Disposition**

**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, and thus is **DISMISSED** with prejudice. Defendants **RAYFORD** and **MAGNUSON** are **DISMISSED** from this action with prejudice.

Plaintiff is advised that this dismissal shall count as one of his allotted “strikes” under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

Plaintiff’s obligation to pay the filing fee for this action was incurred at the time the action was filed, thus the filing fee of \$350 remains due and payable. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1); *Lucien v. Jockisch*, 133 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir. 1998).

The Clerk shall **CLOSE THIS CASE** and enter judgment accordingly.

**IT IS SO ORDERED.**

DATED: December 14, 2011

*s/ G. Patrick Murphy*  
G. PATRICK MURPHY  
United States District Judge