

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS**

**RODNEY STANTON,
#B65491,**

Plaintiff,

Case No.18–cv–399–DRH

vs.

**WEXFORD HEALTH SOURCES,
INC.,
CHRISTINE BROWN, and
KAREN JAIMET,**

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

HERNDON, District Judge:

Plaintiff Rodney Stanton, an inmate in Pinckneyville Correctional Center (“Pinckneyville”), brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights. In his Complaint, plaintiff claims the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his serious medical issues in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1). This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which provides:

(a) **Screening** – The court shall review, before docketing, if feasible or, in any event, as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

(b) **Grounds for Dismissal** – On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint–

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

An action or claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). Frivolousness is an objective standard that refers to a claim that any reasonable person would find meritless. *Lee v. Clinton*, 209 F.3d 1025, 1026-27 (7th Cir. 2000). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross “the line between possibility and plausibility.” *Id.* at 557. At this juncture, the factual allegations of the *pro se* complaint are to be liberally construed. *See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv.*, 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009).

Upon careful review of the Complaint and any supporting exhibits, the Court finds it appropriate to allow this case to proceed past the threshold stage.

The Complaint

In his Complaint (Doc. 1), plaintiff makes the following allegations: on November 1, 2017, plaintiff was experiencing terrible chest pains. (Doc. 1, p. 5). Plaintiff wrote to Christine Brown and filed numerous sick call requests with the Health Care Unit about these pains. *Id.* The plaintiff made clear that he had a defibrillator pacemaker that needed to be serviced every 90 days. *Id.* This information was sent to the defendants on numerous occasions before November 1, 2017. *Id.*

While at Dixon Correctional Center in October 2017, plaintiff “experienced several episodes where the pacemaker had fired off.” *Id.* The medical personnel at Dixon contacted Christine Brown in order to retrieve the box that sets the defibrillator, but their request was ignored. *Id.* Plaintiff also wrote to Wexford regarding the need for his defibrillator to be set properly, but Wexford never responded. *Id.*

On February 1, 2018, plaintiff had not yet had the box set. *Id.*

He was “rushed to the Pinckneyville emergency room for chest pains,” because plaintiff’s defibrillator had not been properly maintained. *Id.* According to the cardiologist, the last time plaintiff’s box was set was April 27, 2015. *Id.*

Plaintiff requests monetary damages and for his defibrillator to receive proper maintenance. (Doc. 1, p. 6).

Discussion

Based on the allegations of the Complaint, the Court finds it convenient to designate a single count in this *pro se* action. The parties and the Court will use this designation in all future pleadings and orders, unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. The designation of this count does not constitute an opinion regarding its merit.

Count 1 – Defendants showed deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical need involving his pacemaker and chest pain associated therewith in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

As discussed in more detail below, Count 1 will be allowed to proceed past threshold. Any other intended claim that has not been recognized by the Court is considered dismissed without prejudice as

inadequately pleaded under the *Twombly* pleading standard.

Count 1

The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment. *See Berry v. Peterman*, 604 F.3d 435 (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme Court has recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” may constitute cruel and unusual punishment. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976); *see Erickson v. Pardus*, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2006) (*per curiam*). To state a claim, a prisoner must show that: (1) he suffered from an objectively serious medical need; and (2) state officials acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s medical need, which is a subjective standard. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).

This Court finds that the heart issues plaintiff alleges are sufficiently serious so as to satisfy the objective standard at this stage. With respect to the subjective standard, plaintiff claims that he alerted Brown that his pacemaker would need servicing every 90 days. Despite this, he claims that it was not serviced. He also claims that Dixon medical personnel contacted Brown in an effort to obtain the

equipment needed to service plaintiff's pacemaker when he was experiencing chest pain, but they were ignored. Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged that Brown was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs, and Count 1 will proceed against her.

With respect to plaintiff's claims against Wexford, a corporation can be held liable for deliberate indifference only if it had a policy or practice that caused the alleged violation of a constitutional right. *Woodward v. Corr. Med. Serv. of Ill., Inc.*, 368 F.3d 917, 927 (7th Cir. 2004). *See also Jackson v. Ill. Medi-Car, Inc.*, 300 F.3d 760, 766 n.6 (7th Cir. 2002) (private corporation is treated as though it were a municipal entity in a § 1983 action). Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the defendants either acted or failed to act as a result of an official policy espoused by Wexford. Therefore, plaintiff cannot maintain a deliberate indifference claim against Wexford, and Count 1 shall be dismissed as against it.

Finally, plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Jaimet. Plaintiff did not specifically mention Jaimet in his statement of claim, despite his having listed her among the defendants. Plaintiffs are required to associate specific defendants with specific claims, so that

defendants are put on notice of the claims brought against them and so they can properly answer the complaint. *See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Where a plaintiff has not included a defendant in his statement of claim, the defendant cannot be said to be adequately put on notice of which claims in the complaint, if any, are directed against her. Furthermore, merely invoking the name of a potential defendant is not sufficient to state a claim against that individual. *See Collins v. Kibort*, 143 F.3d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1998). Similarly, “[v]ague references to a group of ‘defendants,’ without specific allegations tying the individual defendants to the alleged unconstitutional conduct, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to those defendants.” *See Grieveson v. Anderson*, 538 F.3d 763, 777-78 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing *Alejo v. Heller*, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir. 2003)). And in the case of those defendants in supervisory positions, the doctrine of *respondeat superior* is not applicable to § 1983 actions. *Sanville v. McCaughtry*, 266 F.3d 724, 740 (7th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).

For these reasons, Jaimet shall be dismissed without prejudice from this action.

Pending Motions

Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 3) which is **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate Judge for a decision.

Plaintiff's Motion for Service of Process at Government Expense (Doc. 4) is **DENIED** as moot. Waivers of service of summons will be issued and served on the remaining defendant as ordered below. Plaintiff is advised that it is not necessary for a litigant proceeding *in forma pauperis* to file a motion requesting service of process by the United States Marshal Service or other process server. The Clerk will issue summons and the Court will direct service for any complaint that passes preliminary review.

Disposition

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that **COUNT 1** shall **PROCEED** against **BROWN** and is **DISMISSED** without prejudice as against **WEXFORD** and **JAIMET** for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that **WEXFORD** and **JAIMET** are **DISMISSED** without prejudice from this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that as to **COUNT 1**, the Clerk of Court shall prepare for **BROWN**: (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint, and this Memorandum and Order to the defendant's place of employment as identified by plaintiff. If the defendant fails to sign and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service on the defendant, and the Court will require the defendant pay the full costs of formal service, to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

With respect to a defendant who no longer can be found at the work address provided by plaintiff, the employer shall furnish the Clerk with the defendant's current work address, or, if not known, the

defendant's last-known address. This information shall be used only for sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk.

Defendant Brown is **ORDERED** to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g).

Pursuant to Local Rule 72.1(a)(2), this action is **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate Judge for further pre-trial proceedings. Further, this entire matter shall be **REFERRED** to a United States Magistrate Judge for disposition, pursuant to Local Rule 72.2(b)(2) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), *if all parties consent to such a referral*.

If judgment is rendered against plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment of costs under Section 1915, plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, despite the fact that his application to proceed *in forma pauperis* has been granted. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A).

Finally, plaintiff is **ADVISED** that he is under a continuing

obligation to keep the Clerk of Court and each opposing party informed of any change in his address; the Court will not independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later than **7 days** after a transfer or other change in address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this action for want of prosecution. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED.



Judge Herndon
2018.03.16
05:06:29 -05'00'
United States District Judge