


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March 14, 2011, to respond to Defendant's motion, but she did not do so. Because Defendant's motion is meritorious on its face<sup>1</sup> and because Plaintiff has not opposed Defendant's motion, the Court **GRANTS** Defendant's motion. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims that Defendant's conduct violated Indiana Code Title 22, Article 9 are **DISMISSED**.

Defendant shall have through and including April 11, 2011, to file an answer to Plaintiff's Complaint.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 03/25/2011



SARAH EVANS BARKER, JUDGE  
United States District Court  
Southern District of Indiana

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<sup>1</sup> Ellis v. CCA of Tennessee, LLC, 2010 WL 2605870 at \*9 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (stating that “unless a complaint is filed with the Commission, a finding of probable cause rendered, and a stipulation entered into by the complainant and respondent, no private cause of action exists”); Thomas v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 2008 WL 491192 at \*4 (N.D. Ind. 2008) (explaining that the Indiana Civil Rights Law establishes an administrative process through which claims of discrimination are considered by the Indiana Civil Rights Commission); Vanderploeg v. Franklin Fire Dept., 2000 WL 428646 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (recognizing that the administrative process before the Indiana Civil Rights Commission can be “bypassed,” but only if all parties consent in writing to proceed directly to a court of law, otherwise, “there is no private right of action”).