

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
AT PADUCAH
CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:12CV-P169-GNS**

ANTOINE ROACH

PLAINTIFF

v.

STEVE HILAND et al.

DEFENDANTS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Antoine Roach, a pro se prisoner, initiated this civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Upon filing the instant action, he assumed the responsibility of keeping this Court advised of his current address and to actively litigate his claims. See LR 5.2(d) (“All pro se litigants must provide written notice of a change of address to the Clerk and to the opposing party or the opposing party’s counsel. Failure to notify the Clerk of an address change may result in the dismissal of the litigant’s case or other appropriate sanctions.”). In addition, the Revised Scheduling Order (DN 31) entered in this case directed Plaintiff to provide written notice of a change of address to the Clerk and to Defendants’ counsel. The Revised Scheduling Order stated, “Plaintiff is **WARNED** that his failure to notify the Clerk of any address change or failure to comply with this or any subsequent order of the Court **MAY RESULT IN A DISMISSAL OF THIS CASE.**”

The Clerk of Court sent a mailing to Plaintiff on August 19, 2015. The mailing was returned by the United States Postal Service marked “Return to Sender, Not Deliverable as Addressed, Unable to Forward.” Plaintiff apparently is no longer housed at his address of record, and he has not advised the Court of a change of address. Therefore, neither notices from this Court nor filings by Defendants in this action can be served on Plaintiff.

Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes the involuntary dismissal of an action if a plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with an order of the court. See *Jourdan v. Jabe*, 951 F.2d 108, 109 (6th Cir. 1991) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) recognizes the power of the district court to enter a sua sponte order of dismissal.”). Although federal courts afford pro se litigants some leniency on matters that require legal sophistication, such as formal pleading rules, the same policy does not support leniency from court deadlines and other procedures readily understood by laypersons, particularly where there is a pattern of delay or failure to pursue a case. *Id.* at 110. “As this court has noted, the lenient treatment generally accorded to pro se litigants has limits. Where, for example, a pro se litigant fails to comply with an easily understood court-imposed deadline, there is no basis for treating that party more generously than a represented litigant.” *Pilgrim v. Littlefield*, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing *Jourdan v. Jabe*, 951 F.2d at 110). “Further, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that courts have an inherent power to manage their own affairs and may dismiss a case sua sponte for lack of prosecution.” *Lyons-Bey v. Pennell*, 93 F. App’x 732, 733 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing *Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.*, 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962)).

Because Plaintiff has failed to comply with LR 5.2(d) and has failed to comply with the Revised Scheduling Order, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has abandoned any interest in prosecuting this action. The Court will dismiss the action by separate Order.

Date: September 22, 2015



**Greg N. Stivers, Judge
United States District Court**

cc: Plaintiff, pro se
Counsel of record
4416.010