EXHIBIT D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

VICKI L. PINERO

CIVIL ACTION NO. 08-3535 NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA WEDNESDAY, APRIL 1, 2009

VS.

11:00 A.M.

JACKSON HEWITT TAX SERVICE,

SECTION "R"

HEARING ON MOTIONS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE DANIEL E. KNOWLES, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF, VICKI L. PINERO:

SESSIONS, FISHMAN, NATHAN &

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Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography. Transcript produced by computer aided transcription.

Let's talk about the plaintiff's motion first.

MR. SHARTLE: Your Honor, just to bring to speed where we are. We just left Judge Vance.

THE COURT: Yes. What happened?

MR. SHARTLE: Judge Vance denied our motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.

The second amended complaint actually asserts three causes of action, and I'm going let me clarify that.

The second amended class action complaint actually asserts three causes of action. They were attempting to dismiss all three. The Court denied their motion with respect to the invasion of privacy claim and the Unfair Trade Practice claim.

With respect to the fraud claim, she has granted us 15 days leave to assert some additional facts that she deemed necessary.

With that ruling, we would request that the motion to stay now be denied.

With respect to our motion for leave, obviously we're going to have to file this third amended class action complaint in light of Judge Vance's ruling. So what we are actually seeking to do now is amend some complaint, whether it be by way of fourth amended complaint or add those causes of action to the third amended complaint we have to file now, we want to include in this amended complaint this new cause of action under the Louisiana Loan Broker Statute. We briefed the cause of action.

We believe that it's a viable cause of action and I can go through the details as to why, Your Honor.

THE COURT: That's all right. I've read them.

I mean, I read what you submitted, so basically I think I understand.

MR. SHARTLE: Sure.

THE COURT: We don't have a scheduling order in this case yet?

MR. SHARTLE: No, they haven't even answered yet.

THE COURT: All right. Let's hear from your opponent.

What's your interpretation of Judge Vance's ruling?

MR. WEIN: Andrew Wein.

First of all, as to what just occurred and the interpretation as to what we just saw where we came from.

Judge Vance ruled from the bench that she did not find the allegations as to fraud, and presumably as well as she found as exclusive as to the Unfair Trade Practices Statutue, which also sounded in fraud in which had been originally dismissed, that she found those allegations insufficient. How you interpret that to be a denial of a motion to dismiss is I think a stretch. So what she did she said I'm going to give you 15 days to fix this and you better get it right this time, and furthermore gave him some caution about Rule 11 and the importance of making sure that when one alleges fraud that one is careful about what specificity with which one does so. So

she didn't say anything about what she was ruling, I don't believe with regard to the invasion of privacy claim. She didn't rule from the bench on that. Perhaps a ruling would be forthcoming, but in any event, I would certainly think it's a stretch to interpret that as a denial of our motion to dismiss.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. WEIN: With regard to the motions that are here today, Your Honor, can I have a simple time line which I think will actually help the Court a little bit? And I want to describe it.

May I approach.

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. WEIN: Thank you very much.

But before I address the points that Mr. Shartle raised, I want to give you some contacts to this case.

On January 7th, Judge Vance dismissed six or seven counts in the first amended complaint, and on January 27th, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint, which we just were discussing which she had granted leave to do by Judge Vance purportedly procuring deficiencies as to two of the dismissed claims. The claim under the Unfair trade Practices Act and the fraud claim, fraudulently induced claim. One month later, the plaintiff filed this motion before Your Honor saying that I want to file a third amended complaint with these new allegations.

Now, what happened in that one month I think is

illustrative. The first thing that happened is that Jackson

Hewtitt moved to dismiss the second amended complained, a

motion, which as I just explained, the judge found merit, and in
fact ordered the plaintiff to go and fix her claims.

Secondly, plaintiff requested leave to file a motion for reconsideration asking Judge Vance to reconsider her dismissal of one of the six causes of action she had dismissed.

Both Jackson Hewtitt and plaintiff asked for oral argument on these motions. So the third important thing that happened in the last month is that Judge Vance made it clear that she wanted to hear oral argument on our motion to dismiss, but was not interested in hearing oral argument on the motion for reconsideration. Perhaps after seeing the writing on the wall, plaintiff then files this motion coming before this Court saying I want to file a third amended complaint. And most interestingly, in her opposition to the motion to dismiss before Judge Vance on page 3 says, Judge Vance, don't rule on this motion to dismiss. It's moot, because I'm filing a request to file a third amended complaint before Magistrate Judge Knowles.

I think this time line speaks of volumes of the plaintiffs intent with regard to this motion. The real goal being to avoid and explicitly asking for a delay on a ruling that in fact wound up dismissing a portion of her claims, which brings us to where we are now, plaintiffs seeking to add a new claims based on a transaction which occurred over three years

ago, and while we're prepared to discuss all the issues raised by the opposition and any other issue that interest the Court, I think the simplest basis to understand our request that the Court denied this motion is that the proposed claim is seemingly obviously time barred. Whether you're dealing with a 60-day statute of limitations covered by the Consumer Credit Law or you're dealing with the general one year Statute of limitations, plaintiffs claim would still be barred.

Not only has plaintiff not rebutted this position in his reply, he has totally ignored the issue, and I would argue that he's waived it. Certainly has not suggested any alternative suggestions as what the Statute of limitations ought to apply, and while there are other issues out there, I think that's frankly the simplest one at the end of the day. We could get into arguments about I could point out that the plaintiff has no case law that's ever interpreted this statute the way he's asking the Court to interpret it, but at the end of the day, I don't think this issue of you need to get there. If the complaint seeks to put in a claim that's timed barred, it's obviously futile. I don't think there's been any sort of rebuttal position taken by the defendant -- by the plaintiff that it isn't time barred.

THE COURT: What about the motion to stay?

MR. WEIN: With regard to the motion to stay, Your Honor, I think the fact that after we filed the motion to stay

he then said, well, I have a total new set of allegations he wants to make part of this case, I think speaks to the merits of our motion to stay frankly.

All we want to get done is clear out what are the allegations particularly as to Jackson Hewitt from my client's prospective, given the fact, that, where we just came from a courtroom where Judge Vance said you still have not alleged for purposes of specificity under a Rule 9(b), what are you allegeing that the different parties did? And so I just think that before we proceed with answering discovery, and this is —she's giving them 15 days. So this is going to move quickly. Once we can get a complaint before us that we actually know is what we're looking and what the allegations are, that makes more sense and then proceed with discovery.

THE COURT: But don't we have on the books -- I mean, didn't Judge Vance order you all to submit a joint discovery schedule? I mean, has that been done?

MR. WEIN: We're happy to sit down and talk about a schedule that would begin once, you know, we get a complaint before us, we're happy to sit down. That not what happened. What happened is that plaintiff just served discovery and said answer it before I even filed a response -- before I've even filed a second amended complaint.

THE COURT: My concern is not so much what the plaintiff did. My concern is what Judge Vance has ordered, and

I read the record and I may be wrong to say the parties are to 1 2 jointly submit a discovery schedule and it has not been done, 3 has it? I apologize. That's not our interpretation. MR. WEIN: 5 I mean, we argue that is with regard to class certification. 6 THE COURT: I could be wrong. I certainly will look at 7 it again. 8 MR. WEIN: We're certainly happy to discuss a 9 reasonable schedule. Frankly, that's never been something that 10 plaintiff has been interested in doing. 11 THE COURT: But you made a good point. I mean, if 12 we're going to know a lot more in 15 days than we know now, 13 perhaps that --MR. WEIN: I would just suggest that a schedule that 14 15 would be agreed to would be tied off of a resolution of whatever 16 the actual complaint is going to be. 17 THE COURT: That might be make more sense, but let me 18 take a look it. 19 Counsel, do want to respond to the time bar part of 20 this? 21 MR. SHARTLE: Absolutely, Your Honor. 22 First of all, they're throwing out a bunch of 23 arguments, and so I tried to address them all as best as I can.

Obviously, we're not interested in filing a claim that is time barred. The 10-year prescriptive period applies to

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this. I've spoken with opposing counsel about this fact. If Your Honor would like we can bore you through supplemental briefing the issue. I have a memorandum here. I have the relevant cases. I was anticipating they might raise this issue. There are plenty of cases which find that the 10-year prescriptive period applies for personal actions, statutes where it doesn't tell you what the prescriptive period is many courts have held to be subject to the 10-year period.

As to our attempt to continue to delay this case, I don't understand that argument. This is the first request we've made to the Court to permit us to amend. We could have filed these claims outside this lawsuit. In all honesty that was an issue discussed amongst everyone on our side. And we thought that this was the most efficient way to do it. Why not amend the complaint, we already all the parties here? Rather than have two lawsuits, let's have one. So I don't understand that argument, Your Honor. These are viable claims that are not barred by the statute of limitations, so we would request that you grant us an amendment here.

One point I will add, and again, I think this shows that we are not trying to be unreasonable or unfair here. I will agree that to the extent Judge Vance's order, which I would expect to be entered today, does not deny the motion to dismiss as I thought she did with respect to the invasion of privacy claim and their interpretation of that ruling today is correct,

I'll stay discovery, because I agree it doesn't make any sense to do any discovery if that part of the case is still subject to possible dismissal.

I heard Judge Vance, she was only focused on the fraud claim. Her limitation as to permitting us to amend related to the fraud claim. I heard her deny, while I acknowledge she did not specifically say their motion to dismiss with respect to the invasion of privacy claim, but if her order comes out and she says that she's dismissing all the claims subject to us amending, then I'll agree to stay discovery until that amended complaint is filed.

One other issue, Your Honor, that I'd like to raise, because again, I have put everyone on notice and we're not trying to burden the Court or the defendants, these are complicated legal issues here, they really are, and I think opposing counsel will knowledge that. We do intend on adding another plaintiff to the complaint. So to the extent Your Honor's inclined to grant leave to add to our complaint these additional claims, I think opposing counsel would agree that there will be no opposition to adding the plaintiff. It's not going to in any way change the claims, we're just adding another plaintiff. The same type of loan as the current plaintiff got, so it's not going to in any way fundamentally change the case. So with that, Your Honor, I request leave to amend.

THE COURT: What I'm going to do, folks is I need to

take a look at what Judge Vance did before I rule, so I'm going to take it under advisement.

With regard to the time bar, if you want to file something else, do it by Monday, okay. And you've briefed it, but if you want to file anything else, you may do so.

MR. WEIN: Yes. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: But I'll take it under advisement. Let me see what Judge Vance did first.

MR. SHARTLE: One other thing. The only thing I would ask, because Judge Vance only gave us 15 days to amend, what I was hoping we could do, so that we don't have to have a fourth amended complaint, that in the third amended complaint in response to Judge Vance's order today, that I could not only add the additional facts that Judge Vance thought were necessary to keep the fraud claim viable, but to also add these additional claims.

THE COURT: You'll have a ruling on that shortly. Yes, sir.

MR. WEN: Judge, the only thing I would like to clarify one issue.

With regard to this figment of adding an additional plaintiff, we had not agreed to that, and, frankly, what I had asked plaintiff's counsel to discuss if you have something. Why don't you let me look at it, and then I can give you an answer as to whether or not we agree we agree with your

characterization, since obviously we have some differences as to characterization, that it's the same claim, so I would like to see that. I think we have a right to see that before the Court sort of, without anything before it, grants the right to add an additional plaintiff.

MR. SHARTLE: I'm hopeful that we can work this out,

MR. SHARTLE: I'm hopeful that we can work this out, and I'm hopeful that opposing counsel will trust my representation that it's the same loan, and the cause of action changes not at all. It is the same claim.

THE COURT: I suggest you notify the Court once you've had a chance to look at it.

MR. WEIN: The only other thing I wanted to clarify is I wanted to make sure I didn't mishear. If there's something about Mr. Shartle's filing as to the time bar issue, that we take issue with, that we have permission to file --

THE COURT: His are due on Monday. You can file something by Wednesday if you have a response, but don't feel the need to.

MR. WEIN: No, I understand.

THE COURT: We'll take it under advisement.

Thank you very much.

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THE CLERK: Clerk all rise all rise.

Court's in recess.

Victor *** THE LAW CLERK: Civil Action Number 08-3535.

Vicki L. Pinero versus Jackson Hewitt Tax Service, Inc., et al.

Will counsel make their appearance for the record. 1 2 MR. SHARTLE: Bryan Shartle on behalf of plaintiff. 3 THE COURT: Good morning. MR. HOMES: Justin Holmes also with the plaintiff, Your 4 5 Honor. 6 MR. AUCOIN: Harold Aucoin on behalf of plaintiff. 7 MR. WEIN: Andrew Wein on behalf of defendants Jackson 8 Hewitt Tax Service and Jackson Hewitt, Inc. 9 MS. WILSON: Donna Wilson on behalf of Jackson Jewitt, Inc, and Jackson Hewitt Tax Services. 10 11 THE COURT: Good morning. 12 MR. BUCK: Thomas Buck on behalf of Crescent City Tax 13 Services, Incorporated. 14 THE COURT: All right, folks. I think we have two 15 motions. 16 We have plaintiffs leave to file the third amended 17 class action, and we have a motion to stay, is that right, by the defendants? 18 19 Let's talk about the plaintiff's motion first. MR. SHARTLE: Your Honor, just to bring to speed where 20 21 we are. We just left Judge Vance. 22 THE COURT: Yes. What happened? 23 MR. SHARTLE: Judge Vance denied our motion to dismiss 24 the second amended complaint.

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With respect to the fraud claim, she has granted us 15 days leave to assert some additional facts that she deemed necessary.

With that ruling, we would request that the motion to stay now be denied.

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THE COURT: That's all right. I've read them.

I mean, I read what you submitted, so basically I think I understand.

MR. SHARTLE: Sure.

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Now, what happened in that one month I think is illustrative. The first thing that happened is that Jackson Hewtitt moved to dismiss the second amended complained, a motion, which as I just explained, the judge found merit, and in fact ordered the plaintiff to go and fix her claims.

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plaintiffs claim would still be barred.

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THE COURT: What about the motion to stay?

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purposes of specificity under a Rule 9(b), what are you allegeing that the different parties did? And so I just think that before we proceed with answering discovery, and this is — she's giving them 15 days. So this is going to move quickly. Once we can get a complaint before us that we actually know is what we're looking and what the allegations are, that makes more sense and then proceed with discovery.

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MR. WEIN: I apologize. That's not our interpretation.

I mean, we argue that is with regard to class certification.

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THE COURT: But you made a good point. I mean, if we're going to know a lot more in 15 days than we know now, perhaps that --

MR. WEIN: I would just suggest that a schedule that would be agreed to would be tied off of a resolution of whatever the actual complaint is going to be.

THE COURT: That might be make more sense, but let me take a look it.

Counsel, do want to respond to the time bar part of this?

MR. SHARTLE: Absolutely. Absolutely, Your Honor.

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