IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

PATRICK WILLIAMS,

*

Petitioner

v.

* Civil Action No. JKB-12-3450

TYRONE CROWDER,

*

Respondent

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On November 20, 2012, petitioner Patrick Williams filed the instant 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus application attacking his conviction for armed robbery entered on May 23, 2012, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. ECF No. 1. After examining these papers, the court finds no need for an evidentiary hearing. See Rule 8(a), Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). For the reasons that follow, the petition will be denied without prejudice as unexhausted.

Procedural History

Petitioner indicates that after a jury trial conducted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City he was convicted of armed robbery. ECF No. 1. He was sentenced to a fifteen year prison term. *Id.* Petitioner's direct appeal to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland remains pending. *Id.* He has not instituted state post conviction proceedings. *Id.*

When filing a federal habeas corpus application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a petitioner must show that all of his claims have been presented to the state courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491 (1973). This exhaustion requirement is

¹ Because he appears indigent, petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) shall be granted.

satisfied by seeking review of the claim in the highest state court with jurisdiction to consider it.

For a person convicted of a criminal offense in Maryland this may be accomplished either on direct appeal or in post-conviction proceedings.

To exhaust a claim on direct appeal in non-capital cases, it must be raised in an appeal, if one is permitted, to the Maryland Court of Special Appeals and then to the Maryland Court of Appeals by way of a petition for writ of certiorari. *See* Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann., §12-201 and §12-301.

To exhaust a claim through post-conviction proceedings, it must be raised in a petition filed in the Circuit Court and in an application for leave to appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. See Md. Code Ann., Crim. Pro. Art., §§ 7-101-7-301 and § 7-109. If the Court of Special Appeals denies the application, there is no further review available and the claim is exhausted. See Sherman v. State, 593 A. 2d 670, 670-71 (1991). If, however, the application is granted but relief on the merits of the claim is denied, the petitioner must seek certiorari to the Court of Appeals. See Grayson v. State, 728 A.2d 1280 (1999).

Petitioner has not completed either his direct appellate process or post-conviction review and his petition here shall be dismissed without prejudice as unexhausted, to allow him to refile this case after completion of state remedies.

Petitioner is advised that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 amended 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to impose a one-year filing deadline on state prisoners filing applications for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.² Should he wish to refile this petition

²This section provides:

⁽¹⁾ A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-

once he has exhausted his available state court remedies, petitioner should take care not to miss this deadline.

A habeas petitioner has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his motion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1). A certificate of appealability ("COA") may issue "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. at § 2253 (c) (2). When a district court dismisses a habeas petition solely on procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner can demonstrate both "(1) 'that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid clam of the denial of a constitutional right' and (2) 'that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Rouse v. Lee, 252 F.3d 676, 684 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Slack v. Daniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). The court will not issue a COA because petitioner has not made the requisite showing.

⁽A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

⁽B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

⁽C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

⁽D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

⁽²⁾ the time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

A separate order follows.

DATED this _____ day of December, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

James K. Bredar

United States District Judge