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## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

STARSH SEWELL \*

Plaintiff \*

v \* Civil Action No. JKB-16-3256

DEBORAH K. CHASANOW \*

Defendant \*

## **MEMORANDUM**

The above-captioned case was filed on September 21, 2016, together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Because she appears to be indigent, plaintiff's motion shall be granted. For the reasons set forth below, the complaint must be dismissed.

The complaint alleges that Judge Deborah K. Chasanow of this court engaged in "race based hate crimes" when plaintiff's prior civil complaints were dismissed. The convoluted narrative contained in the complaint spins a complicated web of alleged conspiracies which plaintiff blames for everything from foreclosure on her home to the loss of custody of her children. The theories of race and sex discrimination that underpin the widening conspiracy plaintiff claims is the cause of the problems she has suffered are now familiar to this court. Plaintiff asserts in this case that "Judge Chasanow conspired with [the father of Plaintiff's children, Prince George's County Court and other parties] to deprive Sewell of her rights to her children and her property" by "producing judicial orders that are judicial in nature, but are void and absent of all jurisdiction." ECF 1 at p. 2.

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See Sewell v. PG County Dept of Social Services, Civil Action DKC-12-2402; Sewell v. PG County Dept. of Social Services, Civil Action No. DKC-12-2522; Sewell v. Howard, Civil Action No. JFM-12-2736; Sewell v. Dore, Civil Action No. AW-12-2889; Howard v. Sewell, Civil Action No. DKC-14-2205; Sewell v. John Howard Sr., Civil Action PWG-15-1539; Sewell v. Fidelity National Financial, Civil Action PWG-15-3077; Sewell v. Fidelity National Financing, Inc., Civil Action DKC-16-906.

This cause of action cannot be maintained because it is prohibited by the doctrine of

judicial immunity. See Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 226-27 (1988). "If judges were

personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of suits, most of them frivolous

but vexatious, would provide powerful incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely

to provoke such suits. The resulting timidity would be hard to detect or control, and it would

manifestly detract from independent and impartial adjudication. Nor are suits against judges the

only available means through which litigants can protect themselves from the consequences of

judicial error. Most judicial mistakes or wrongs are open to correction through ordinary

mechanisms of review, which are largely free of the harmful side effects inevitably associated

with exposing judges to personal liability." Id.

Additionally, plaintiff's assertion that Judge Chasanow is "disqualified" to be an Article

III judge and should be impeached is not a matter this court has jurisdiction to consider. The

complaint shall be dismissed by separate order which follows.

September 29, 2016

Date

/s/

James K. Bredar

United States District Judge

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