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1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
3	No. 1:07-cv-11673-MLW
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6	WILLIAM V. AGUIAR, III, Plaintiff
7	VS.
8	v 5 .
9	FLOYD WEBB, et al,
10	Defendants
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14	For Hearing Before: Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf
15	
16	Motion Session
17	United States District Court
18	District of Massachusetts (Boston) One Courthouse Way
19	Boston, Massachusetts 02210 May 9, 2008
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22	REPORTER: RICHARD H. ROMANOW, RPR
23	Official Court Reporter United States District Court
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23	United States District Court One Courthouse Way, Room 5200, Boston, MA 02210

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PROCEEDINGS 1 (Begins, 11:30 a.m.) 2 3 THE CLERK: Civil Action 07-11673, William 4 Aquiar versus Floyd Webb. The Court is in session. You 5 may be seated. 6 THE COURT: Good morning. Would counsel 7 please identify themselves for the record. 8 MR. ROFFMAN: Good morning, your Honor. I'm Ian Roffman with Heather Repicky, we're from Nutter 9 10 McClennen & Fish, and we're appearing on behalf of the 11 plaintiff, William Aguiar. We filed an appearance in 12 this case probably about 45 minutes ago or so. THE COURT: I have it. 13 MR. KLUFT: Your Honor, David Kluft for 14 defendant, Floyd Webb, and with me is Walead Esmail. 15 16 THE COURT: All right. Mr. Roffman and Miss 17 Repicky each appeared today. Is Mr. Aguiar present? 18 MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, yes, he is. He's 19 right over here. 20 THE COURT: And who is with him? 21 MR. ROFFMAN: A family friend by the name of 22 Ray. 23 THE COURT: Ray what? 24 MR. ROFFMAN: I can't pronounce his last name. 25 MR. AGUIAR: Your Honor, Ray Karnasiewicz.

THE COURT: Would you spell that.

MR. KARNASIEWICZ: K-A-R-N-A-S-I-E-W-I-C-Z.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, you may be seated.

On several occasions prior to today, Mr. Roffman, as you probably know, I ordered Mr. Aguiar to let me know whether he would be represented by counsel or proceed Pro Se and I gather it's only very recently that he obtained your services. I do think this case, or whatever of it survives today's proceedings, would benefit from Mr. Aguiar being represented by counsel. I wonder if you have any familiarity, though, with the criminal law and particularly the appropriate scope of the assertion of Fifth Amendment rights, because I'm going to be discussing that momentarily.

MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, I do have some familiarity with the Fifth Amendment, yes. I am not a criminal lawyer by training. And as you point out -- and it's not to bring up an aside, Ms. Repicky and I were brought into this case based on a referral from a group called "Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts," which has an interest in copyright protection, your Honor, and we've come into this case just in a matter of days. And so we're not fully up to speed on everything that's happened both procedurally and substantively to date. And one of the things I would ask your Honor -- and I

don't mean to preempt your Honor's agenda, is that we at least be given a short period of time to come up to speed and to speak with defense counsel. Perhaps we can have some sort of agreement in terms of a process for going forward.

THE COURT: Well, we'll see because I've had many hearings in this case. But you can have a seat.

That's not where we're going right now. You can have a seat.

MR. ROFFMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: This is a civil case and I've, of course, read the defendant's motion for a default judgment and other sanctions. It suggests to me that there may be evidence of crimes committed by Mr. Aguiar and others -- "Ray" is mentioned in the communications that caused me to have the question. And I feel an obligation to describe the issue because it's possible that things that Mr. Aguiar might say or some of his colleagues might say could conceivably prove to be information that Mr. Aguiar or they have a Fifth Amendment right not to provide.

Mr. Roffman, I assume you've read the defendant's motion. It includes some statements placed on the Internet, I believe, by somebody named John Creeden that refers to "Ray." Have you read that?

MR. ROFFMAN: I've seen that, yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: And 18 United States Code, Section 241, a provision of the criminal code, prohibits a conspiracy to violate a person's rights under the Constitution of the United States, and I would confidently expect including your right to access to the It's a crime, a Federal crime punishable by up to 10 years in prison and a fine of \$10,000 to threaten somebody for their participation in a lawsuit in Federal court. And some of the statements included in the -with the defendant's motion, attributed to Mr. Creeden, and in the defendant's submissions linked to Mr. Aquiar, the mentioning, I think, "The allegedly dangerous Ray," could be evidence of a violation of that statute. It's also possible that 18 United States Code, Section 245(b)(1) is implicated.

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And so I handle civil cases and I handle criminal cases and this is a civil case, but if the parties' conduct in this case appears to me to violate the Federal criminal law, it's my duty, and on the rare occasions when it occurs, my practice to refer the matter to the United States Attorney's Office. So I really feel an obligation to explain that. And some of the points raised by the defendant, which I intend to address today, at least hear argument on today, could

implicate Mr. Aguiar's Fifth Amendment rights. So I wanted to let you know that.

MR. ROFFMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Then you are -- well, let me ask the following and not presume that I know the answer.

Does Mr. -- and Mr. Roffman, understandably, and I'd say foreseeably asked for some time to talk to counsel and I do continue to think that this case might benefit considerably from Mr. Aguiar being represented, but does the defendant want me to provide a short number of days for counsel for both parties to confer or do you want to go ahead now on your motion for default judgment and dismissal?

MR. KLUFT: Your Honor, we do want to go ahead now on our motion for default judgment and dismissal.

We're thrilled to have counsel involved, going forward, on behalf of Mr. Aguiar, but we are where we are and we feel, because of Mr. Aguiar's choices and because of the harm being caused to Mr. Webb, that it's an appropriate time to proceed on the motion. We will certainly confer with him anyway about where we are after today's hearing.

THE COURT: Well, I'm going to at least hear you and, to the best of his ability, Mr. Roffman on this. It may -- I mean, I'll say the following. The

defendant's motion, while setting forth certain factual matters and citing some rules and cases, doesn't, from my perspective, cite the most relevant provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which are Rule 16(f) and Rules 37(b)(2), (b), (c), and (D). Rule 16(f) provides for sanctions that are just for violation of pretrial orders, and among those sanctions are those enumerated in Rule 37(b)(2), (B), (C), and (D). Although those are not the exclusive possible sanctions. Others might be just in the circumstances.

In addition, Rule 16(f) requires, in most circumstances, the payment of a party who's violated pretrial orders of the reasonable attorneys fees and costs, although that would be excused if there was substantial justification or if there was some other reason it wasn't just to require that, but that's a sanction expressly provided by Rule 16(f), in addition to or in lieu of other sanctions. So now --

And it might help, because Mr. Roffman and his colleague are new to this case, for me to recite what I think is part of the relevant chronology, but I say this also so that the defendant can correct and amplify it, if necessary.

But Mr. Webb initially filed his counterclaims with his answer on October 9, 2007. Under Rule

12(a)(2), Mr. Aguiar had 20 days to respond to the counterclaims. He did not make any response to the counterclaims at that time.

I conducted a hearing on February 15, 2008 and I issued some oral orders that were memorialized in a later written order. I ordered Mr. Aguiar to either cause counsel to appear or file a statement that he would continue Pro Se by February 29, 2008. He didn't meet that deadline. He did file a statement on March 4, 2008 after repeated attempts by my docket clerk to contact him and remind him to do so.

The February 15, 2008 order also required the parties to file, preferably jointly, a proposed schedule and statement regarding mediation by March 5, 2008.

Mr. Aguiar's statement that he would continue Pro Se, filed on March 4, 2008, also stated that he would go to mediation, but it contained no information about the proposed schedule. Although Mr. Webb stated, in his timely-filed case management statement of March 5, 2008, that his counsel had been unable to obtain Mr. Aguiar's cooperation in preparing a statement.

On March 6, 2008, I issued a scheduling order memorializing the schedule set at the scheduling conference the same day. Mr. Aguiar's amended complaint and answer to counterclaim, as I said orally, were to be

filed by March 21, 2008. This is reflected in the docket entry. However, I note that the actual order that's on the docket, which was sent to Mr. Aguiar, doesn't print correctly. The date is missing. However, it seems clear to me, at the moment, that Mr. Aguiar knew the deadline. He was told at the scheduling conference that the deadline was March 21. He could have called to confirm that if he was unsure. And indeed, he filed an amended complaint on March 24th, the Monday after the Friday on which it was due. However, he did not file an answer to the counterclaims at all until April 7th, over two weeks late.

On March 6th, I warned him that he must abide by court orders and deadlines and that the consequences for not doing so could be as severe as dismissal. Up to this point I think there were at least -- that is, up until the belated response to the counterclaims filed on April 7th, there were at least six times that Mr. Aguiar failed to meet the Court's deadlines or to obey rules or orders. In addition, Mr. Aguiar's response to Mr. Webb's motion for sanctions came 20 days after Mr. Webb filed a motion. That doesn't satisfy the requirement of Local Rule 7.1(b)(2) that such a response be filed within 14 days.

So that's my present understanding of the context

in which this motion arises. Now, a Pro Se defendant's pleadings are to be liberally construed, but he has to obey orders, he has to comply with the substantive law. The First Circuit has explained that in cases like Ahmed, 118 F. 3rd 886 at 890. My present sense is that Mr. Aguiar, despite given on several occasions opportunities and warnings, failed to timely respond to the counterclaims.

Construing them liberally, he may be disputing some of them, like the fair use claim. He doesn't address at all the trademark claims, which I believe he's orally told me he wasn't maintaining anyway. But it's just to let you know my present state of mind, that I'm inclined to dismiss the trademark claims, permit relatively prompt amended answers to the other counterclaims, and order Mr. Aguiar to pay the defendant's reasonable attorneys fees relating to this motion, unless he can demonstrate just cause why he shouldn't pay some or all of them.

MR. KLUFT: Thank you, your Honor. I generally agree with your statement of the facts, but we have a few things to add for your consideration and a few things to say about the relief.

First of all, I want to remind the Court that when Mr. Aguiar filed this complaint, initially it was about

eight months ago, and right before that, he had counsel involved with this case, Mr. John Francure, who was the author of the cease and desist letters to the various on-line Internet service providers, which really led up to this case. He chose to proceed, at that time, without Mr. Francure.

I would also like to point out that in the eight months that followed, Mr. Webb has suffered real harm even though the injunction was not granted. Not only has his attention and limited resources -- he's an independent artist, have been diverted away from the expression of his First Amendment rights to the defense of his First Amendment rights, but, in addition, he has had real, tangible problems, because of the pendency of this case, raising money and you have affidavits before you that go to this point. Every time I talk to my client, I get another -- he tells me about another person that said, you know, "We won't deal with you if the case is ongoing."

Today, in fact, there's a fiscal sponsor in

Chicago, and for reasons outlined in the default motion,

I'm not going to say their name right now, and I'm happy

to tell the Court, because I just don't want them to be

bothered, but they're awaiting the outcome of this

hearing to decide whether to be his fiscal sponsor so

they can then apply for a State of Illinois Art Council grant. And all of this harm is in addition to the harassment on-line and the other things.

In effect, even though the injunction wasn't granted, Mr. Aguiar has achieved a lot of what he set out to achieve, which is to harm Mr. Aguiar's ability to

THE COURT: Mr. Webb's.

MR. KLUFT: I'm sorry. Thank you, your

Honor. -- Mr. Webb's ability to make the film. And to

-- as he has stated in open court, to try to control the

story, which may be tangentially related to his father.

I also want to point out, your Honor, with regard to the sanctions you mentioned, that it, in part to try to move this matter along faster in our own client's interest and in part in reliance on Mr. Aguiar's repeated statements twice that he's going to proceed without counsel, Mr. Webb and his counsel have proceeded to follow the Court's orders and the rules of procedure in their filings, they have filed not only a motion, but the answer, case management statements, you know, local Rule 26 automatic disclosures. We've expended a lot of time and wasted a month really since the last case management conference in addition to the motion for default.

Your Honor, if I were in Mr. Roffman's position, I would be making the same type of request, and I do want to work with him from this point going forward, but we are where we are because of Mr. Aguiar's choices. And I would hope that the Court would still consider an outright dismissal with prejudice of the case pursuant to our motion. And I understand there's a predilection for some kind of procedure on the merits and --

THE COURT: Well, there is a preference for decisions on the merits and, with regard to the counterclaims other than the trademark counterclaim, which is, I think, is not addressed at all, while Mr. Aguiar evidently just took your responses and tried to convert them, that liberally construing them, I'm inclined to believe, you know, that he's denying, there's a fair use defense, and there's a third issue — and I do have to liberally construe them. And my inclination, if I come out this way, would be not to dismiss those counterclaims, but — and I'll give Mr. Roffman a relatively brief period of time to respond to the counterclaims, maybe amend the complaint again, and to come up with a schedule.

Because I've met with the parties. I'm not going to sit down with Mr. Aguiar in the back again. I see mischaracterizations on the Internet of what was

discussed. I didn't consider that a proceeding closed to the public. I wanted an informal session to try to understand what this is about better and ideally mediate, which strikes me, at least absent the assistance of counsel, is hopeless. One of the things Mr. Aguiar needs is somebody to explain the law to him because my perception is that his -- some of his positions are based on misunderstandings of the law.

But this has -- you know, one of the things I have been educated to understand is that the mere pendency of this case is injurious to Mr. Webb's interests and efforts to make his film and therefore it really does need to proceed with all deliberate speed.

Would you like to be heard on the motion with regard to the sanctions?

MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, I'm actually sort of of two minds. I'm not sure I do want to be heard specifically on their motion because we've just come into the case late and I -- recently, and I would ask your Honor to not rule specifically on their motion.

But I would like to address the substance of your Honor's comments and Mr. Kluft's comments.

With respect to any potential injury to the defendant, um, that, in my mind, is -- I think "injury" is the wrong word. Because if a filmmaker is

intentionally infringing upon legitimate copyrights, then it certainly is the appropriate functioning of the market for people who are potentially going to finance that operation to want those legal rights sorted out.

Mr. Webb agrees and I agree. It's something, though, that gives some urgency to this case going forward in an informed way. It shouldn't linger for a long time. If Mr. Aguiar's rights are being violated, his First Amendment rights, that should stop as soon as reasonably possible. If Mr. Aguiar's rights aren't being violated, the Court should issue a decision that makes that clear so Mr. Webb's First Amendment rights are not, in effect, chilled by the -- improperly chilled by the pendency of the case.

MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, I couldn't agree more. And one of the things that we would like to do is really get to the heart of the substance and to the merits and, first of all, see if there's a way to work things out and if not, have the right to adjudicate it. And I don't think this is that complex a matter that that can't be done under a relatively quick time frame.

We've come in, as you know, just within the last couple of days and so I'm not in a position to discuss the procedural problems that have happened in the case

to date. Now, obviously, as attorneys, we all have an interest in preserving the Court's rules and the Court's time frame. I would just ask your Honor to be -- to consider that Mr. Aguiar's -- and I know you have been considering it, has been operating Pro Se and is not familiar with the rules and --

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't really take a lawyer to cause somebody to understand that if he's given a deadline for answering the counterclaims, he doesn't have the right to answer them two weeks late.

And, you know, the first time this came up, there was no answer. That's why I went through the chronology. And then I issued orders and unless my docket clerk hounded Mr. Aguiar, he didn't file anything. And the last time I was here, I spelled it out. I said, "If you don't make the filings on time, the case might get dismissed."

MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, I don't dispute any of that and I'm not -- and I'm asking you to excuse deadlines that have been missed. I do know, from having spoken with Mr. Aguiar, yesterday and today, that he's been really trying in good faith to keep up with this system, which is very unfamiliar to him. And I hope now that we've filed an appearance, going forward, we obviously will keep with all of the Court's deadlines and we will be able to explain to him and do ourselves

what we need to do both on the procedural side of the law and the substantive side of the law.

In terms of the specific sanctions that your Honor is considering, with respect to dismissing potential trademark claims, if your Honor wants to do that, I would ask that it be made explicit that that dismissal is without prejudice, because he does have certain trademark rights and those rights -- and I've seen, from meeting with him, may potentially be being infringed by others who are unrelated to this lawsuit as well and I wouldn't want to see those other rights, as a collateral consequence of the procedural errors in this case, be in any way dismissed.

THE COURT: Well, "with prejudice" would only be with prejudice with regard to Mr. Webb. Do you think you may assert that Mr. Webb is violating possible trademark rights of Mr. Aguiar?

MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, at this point I do not expect to make such a claim, however, I haven't had the time to do the work to figure it out.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROFFMAN: And then secondly, with respect to the financial sanction of attorneys fees, um, I haven't seen Mr. Aguiar's financial statements. My suspicion is that there may be a financial difficulty in

complying with that.

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THE COURT: Well, the way the rule operates, I would provide the defendant an opportunity to make an application for the reasonable attorneys fees relating to this motion, that's 16(f). I'd give you a chance to respond. Your response could have two dimensions, "That's an unreasonable amount for this matter" or, you know, "There are circumstances that make an award of expenses unjust," and you would cite cases, if there are cases, saying, "Well, the Court should consider ability to pay," and then the defendant would reply. And, indeed, you know, we could talk about what the appropriate amount is. I have no evidence telling me whether or not Mr. Aguiar has the capacity to pay. Certainly he seems to have the time to devote to this case, but I don't know what his financial circumstances are.

MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, I apologize. I had misunderstood. I had thought you were considering entering the order today. But we would --

THE COURT: I would enter the order, but the amount would have to be briefed, or you could confer on it, maybe you can agree on some amount in the circumstances. But it would have to be briefed. And I would give you a chance to respond and the amount

wouldn't be determined today.

MR. ROFFMAN: I appreciate that. We would obviously be willing and able to brief that matter, your Honor.

And, I guess, lastly in terms of really sort of cutting to the chase in terms of the schedule, I would ask your Honor, assuming that your Honor --

THE COURT: Well, I think I'm actually going to get to that in a minute.

MR. ROFFMAN: Okay.

THE COURT: But I'm going to rule on the motion for default or sanctions. It's hereby allowed to the following extent.

On March 6th, 2008, I orally ordered Mr. Aguiar, who was present, to respond to -- to file an amended complaint and respond to the counterclaims by March 21, 2008. This was in the context of the previous failure to respond to the counterclaims and the other failures to obey scheduling. Mr. Aguiar filed an amended complaint three days late. He did not file the response to the counterclaims until April 7th, 2008, more than two weeks late. I had warned Mr. Aguiar that the failure to meet the deadlines or to seek relief from them would -- could result in sanctions as drastic as dismissal.

So I find that Mr. Aguiar failed to obey that March 8th scheduling order, particularly -- that March 6th scheduling order particularly by not filing any answer to the counterclaims until April 7th, 2008 and therefore sanctions under Rule 16(f), which must be just, are appropriate.

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The answer to the counterclaim doesn't address the trademark claims at all. And I don't recall whether it was on the record or in the lobby, but Mr. Aquiar, at least before he had counsel, told me or led me to understand that he wasn't asserting that Mr. Webb violated any trademark claims. So I am, as a sanction, authorized, when just, by Rule 37(2)(b), hereby dismissing -- I'm basically granting the motion for declaratory judgment on the trademark claims. However, I'm doing that without prejudice. If there's an amended complaint that asserts trademark claims submitted by counsel on a schedule that we'll develop, it will have to be accompanied by a memorandum addressing why I should permit the trademark claims to be reintroduced to the case. That is, addressing why they have potential merit, reminding me, although I won't forget that there's a preference for resolving claims on the merits, and why the failure, the repeated failure, including the most recent failure to obey court orders, isn't an

appropriate sanction. And you must confer with defendant's counsel to see if they're going to oppose that. Perhaps they will or perhaps they won't.

With regard to the other counterclaims -- although Mr. Aguiar didn't do what I expected him to, which is, in a layman's way, tell me his position, liberally construed, his belated counterclaim informs that the defendant did meet, that he denies their right to relief, um, and so I'll treat those as contested, although I am going to require a new response to the counterclaims filed by counsel.

However, Rule 16(f) provides that when there's a -- when a party or attorney fails to obey a scheduling order, as has occurred here, a Court may make such orders as are just. It specifically provides: "In lieu of or in addition to any other sanction, the judge shall require the party to pay the reasonable expenses incurred because of any noncompliance with this rule, including attorneys fees, unless the judge finds that the noncompliance was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." In the circumstances of this case, Mr. Aguiar's failure to timely file an answer to the counterclaim was not substantially justified. I'll take up the issue of whether there's something that makes an award or a

fuller award not just in the circumstances in response to the defendant's submission for costs and attorneys fees.

(Pause.)

THE COURT: Mr. Kluft, is there any problem in making that submission in a week? You would have to file by May 16th an affidavit with time records showing what you would charge Mr. Webb, in these circumstances, or maybe not charging Mr. Webb.

MR. KLUFT: I have no problem making that, your Honor.

THE COURT: By May 16th. And, generally speaking, you understand fee applications. Just say "This is our fee." You know, "This is reasonable in this community." You know, "This is the number of hours we put in. This is reasonable. So we're seeking under 16(f) the following." And the two of you should confer before you file that. I don't want you to run up more expenses. If Mr. Roffman can provide you information that Mr. Aguiar really doesn't have the means to pay that amount and you agree on some lesser amount, then fine.

Mr. Roffman, you are to respond by May 23rd. And if any reply is required, it's to be filed by May 30th.

All right. Mr. Roffman, do you want to file an

amended complaint and an amended response to the 1 2 counterclaim? 3 MR. ROFFMAN: Yes, your Honor, I think the 4 case would benefit from an amended complaint and amended 5 answer to the counterclaim. 6 THE COURT: And is two weeks sufficient for 7 that? 8 MR. ROFFMAN: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. That shall be filed by May 9 10 23rd. A response shall be filed by June 6th. 11 And by June the 6th, you're to have conferred and 12 come up jointly, if possible, individually, if 13 necessary, with a proposed schedule for the case, to 14 proceed as quickly as possible. And we'll have a further conference at 3:00 on June 12th. 15 16 MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, one clarification 17 question, please. When we file our amended complaint on 18 May 23rd, would you like us, at that point then, to file 19 our reply to the current counterclaim? 20 THE COURT: Yes. 21 MR. ROFFMAN: Okay. So then their answer to 22 the amended --23 THE COURT: I'm sorry. The reply -- I'm 24 sorry. You mean the answer to the counterclaim? 25 MR. ROFFMAN: Yes. There's another term under

Rule 8 and I just can't remember what it is. 1 2 THE COURT: You've got to respond to the 3 counterclaim. 4 MR. ROFFMAN: So, I guess, to ask that 5 question more clearly, we're going to file an amended 6 complaint and, at the same time, file the answer to the 7 counterclaim that currently exists? 8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. ROFFMAN: Okay. And then after that we'll 10 get a new answer on June 6th from the defendant on the 11 amended complaint that we filed? 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. ROFFMAN: Okay. Thank you. 14 THE COURT: Is there anything else from the 15 parties' perspective for today? 16 MR. ROFFMAN: Not from us, your Honor. Thank 17 you. 18 MR. KLUFT: Not from us either, your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Okay. Well, Mr. Roffman, you're 20 familiar somewhat with the Fifth Amendment, but you say you're not a criminal lawyer. I think in your firm 21 22 there are lawyers like Mr. Ullmann who have substantial 23 experience with the criminal law. I don't know how 24 these people interested in martial arts ordinarily

communicate on the Internet, but if there's something

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that can properly be perceived as threatening harm to somebody for litigating something in Federal court, threats like that could result in people who participate in making them serving up to 10 years in prison, probably for each threat. So it may be that among the services you want to provide Mr. Aguiar is some advice on what is protected First Amendment activity with regard to this case and what might expose him to criminal prosecution and potential imprisonment. MR. ROFFMAN: Your Honor, thank you. I will look into that with all due haste. THE COURT: Anything else? The Court is in recess. (Ends, 12:15 p.m.)

C E R T I F I C A T EI, RICHARD H. ROMANOW, OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER, do hereby certify that the foregoing record is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes, before Chief Judge Mark L. Wolf, on May 9, 2008, to the best of my skill and ability. /s/ Richard H. Romanow RICHARD H. ROMANOW