UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICAH FIALKA-FELDMAN,

Plaintiff,

HONORABLE PATRICK J. DUGGAN

No. 08-14922

v.

OAKLAND UNIVERSITY BOARD OF

TRUSTEES, ET AL,

Defendants.

HEARING ON MOTIONS

Detroit, Michigan -- Thursday, December 17, 2009

APPEARANCES:

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1	Detroit, Michigan
2	Thursday, December 17, 2009
3	2:45 p.m.
4	
5	THE CLERK: Civil action number 08-14922,
6	Fialka-Feldman versus Oakland County Board of Trustees,
7	Et Al.
8	THE COURT: All right. Identify yourselves, for
9	the record, please.
10	MR. DAVIS: Chris Davis, for the plaintiff, Your
11	Honor, from Michigan Protection Advocacy Service, on
12	behalf of the plaintiff.
13	MR. BOONIN: Robert Boonin, of Butzel Long, on
14	behalf of defendants.
15	THE COURT: This is Defendant's Motion?
16	MR. BOONIN: Pardon me?
17	THE COURT: This is Defendant's Motion.
18	MR. BOONIN: Cross motions, Your Honor, whichever
19	way.
20	THE COURT: Whatever you want to handle it, I
21	don't care. Let's go with defendant's first and you
22	go.
23	MOTION TO DISMISS DISPARATE IMPACT CLAIM
24	ARGUMENT BY MR. BOONIN
25	MR. BOONIN: Thank you, Your Honor, and good

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1 afternoon.

I do believe that the plaintiff has agreed to dismiss counts one and six regarding disparate impact. It's my understanding of their response, they did not respond directly to our motion on that.

THE COURT: Hold on. You agree?

RESPONSE BY MR. DAVIS

MR. DAVIS: That is correct. The disparate impact claims, we agree to default dismissal at this time.

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

ARGUMENT BY MR. BOONIN

MR. BOONIN: So, that's two out of six. I'll then therefore focus on the remainder of the complaint.

Your Honor, I know that you've studied the briefs. What this case is not about, this case is not about an accommodation of a handicap or a disability.

This case is, instead, an attempt for the plaintiff to be allowed to live in the University's dorms, despite the fact that he does not meet the eligibility requirements to reside in those dorms.

He wants a preference allowed to him over all other non-degree pursuing students because of his disability. He wants this Court to legislate that his vision of inclusion is better public policy.

He wants to fundamentally alter the nature and

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purposes of the dorms provided by the University. 1 2 of these quests are permitted or authorized by the Fair 3 Housing Act, by Section 504 or by the Americans with Disabilities Act. 4 This is a case that boils down to his claims for 5 6 accommodation and disparate treatment. Those claims 7 fail because he is not otherwise qualified with or without an accommodation. That's the extent of the 8 analysis that's required for this Court to grant our 9 10 motion. Now, let's understand what's really involved here. 11 Plaintiff is admitted to only one program at Oakland 12 13 University, the OPTIONS Program. And that's a pilot program for persons with cognitive impairments. 14 There's no dispute about that. 15 16 And there's no dispute that he's not been admitted 17 into the regular academic program. There is absolutely

no dispute on those critical issues.

THE COURT: Excuse me, why has he not been in the regular program?

MR. BOONIN: He never applied.

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THE COURT: Well, do you really believe he could participate in a regular program?

MR. BOONIN: Well, we don't know that. One of the OPTIONS, former OPTIONS participants did apply and did

get admitted. But it's not necessarily because of
one's disability that they're not able to get in.

There is essays that one has to write. There's tests
that they have to take. There are many, many
non-disabled people who are not eligible for admission
at the University.

THE COURT: What if his inability to get into the

THE COURT: What if his inability to get into the regular program is because of his disability?

MR. BOONIN: Well, we're going to have to lead to that conclusion. We know that he's not a student. And presumably it is his disability that is an apparent for him to pursue it; but that does not conclusively mean that if he weren't disabled, that he would be in the University, we do not know that.

The point is, though, he has never even applied to be in the University to try to compete on that platform. So, there's no dispute about the fact that he's not been admitted to that program.

Thus, his rights under the Fair Housing Act, under Section 504, and under the ADA, are only with regard to the right to the program to which he's been admitted, and that's the OPTIONS Program.

There's no dispute the housing benefit, that the University provides for some people, is not a part of the OPTIONS Program. He's only entitled to the

benefits and the perks of the OPTIONS Program.

The only aspect of the proposal for the OPTIONS that was approved by the dean and submitted to the Provost and processed by the University, was that there was -- a certain curriculum was going to be provided to the participants and a certain fee would be charged. There's nothing in the proposal that was approved. The part of the proposal that was approved that discusses housing.

Yet, the plaintiff seeks to have this benefit, which is not a part of the OPTIONS Program and which is not available to other non-degree pursuing students. For this reason, and this reason alone, his claims fail.

None of the laws at issue here require the
University to make available services not available to
OPTIONS participants, it's as clear as that. This
includes housing, but it also includes other services
to which he's not entitled. He's not entitled to
financial aid. He's not entitled to student
employment. Use of the academic skill center. Use of
the student technology center, those are just a few.

Seeking a benefit of a program to which you're not admitted into is an admirable goal, perhaps, but it's not a legal requirement.

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It reminds me of just what my daughter went through. She was a student at the University of Michigan. She went there for undergraduate school and graduate school. She was not allowed to live in the law quad. She was not a part of the law school program. The law quad is reserved for law students. She was only entitled to live in the dorms to which students like her were permitted to live as part of her program. She can enjoy those programs to which she was a part of.

OPTIONS participants at this University are the They can only enjoy the benefits of the programs that they're a part of. Housing is not available to them, under the terms of their program, just as it's not available to most other non-degree pursuing people at the University.

Plaintiff attempts to twist around this reality by saying that he's a student. There are certainly many types of students at the University; but not all students are entitled to the same benefits. It depends on the program that they're in.

Housing, again, is reserved for those enrolled students who are pursuing degrees. That has been the practice at the University for so long as anyone can remember. The reason has been consistently presented 1 throughout this case.

As Vice President Snyder testified, and she is here today, housing is designed to facilitate a student's quest for a degree to make that happen.

That's the purpose of housing. It's an intracal part of the academic program to facilitate, to make the degree-seeking quest successful.

The dorms do have special --

THE COURT: Why might it not help in the academic, attempted academic achievements of the OPTIONS Program? Why do they have to be seeking a degree for it to help, for the housing to help?

MR. BOONIN: The focus of a housing program is to work with the students that have the common denominator of seeking a degree.

The focus of RA's, resident advisers, are trained to handle, are students who are dealing with, "How are they going to deal with the professor? How do they deal with the fact they're not doing well in class?

What kind of study aides are available to them to counsel them?" The dorms are not set up to deal with people that don't have that common interest in mind.

There are special dorms for freshmen, so that we can deal with the common issues unique to freshmen and to help them stay in school, be successful their

freshman year so that they become sophomores, juniors and seniors and finish that degree. There are special dorms for business students. There are special dorms for nursing students. There are special dorms for honor students because it's all part of the fundamental part of the academic program to help them get a degree.

If Mr. Fialka-Feldman were in the dorms, then we would have someone who does not have that common purpose. The RA's are not trained to deal with those issues and does not have the common, even though he may wish to share that common purpose, in reality, he does not have the common motivation factors, "Am I going to graduate? Am I going to get a good grade? Am I going to succeed in the Academic environment?" That's what the dorms are set up to do. They're set up to support the academic environment.

OPTIONS students just don't have that. OPTIONS students don't have to get grades. OPTIONS students don't carry a GPA. OPTIONS students don't get credit for their participation. The goal of that program is totally different from the goal of the other academic program.

THE COURT: Are you suggesting that an RA might have difficulties dealing with an individual OPTIONS student?

MR. BOONIN: Well, I'm saying the RA is not there to deal with people who are not pursuing degrees.

THE COURT: I understand that. But if someone were placed there, don't you think the RA can deal with that in a just situation?

MR. BOONIN: Well, I don't know. The RA certainly is not trained to do that, to deal with any special needs. But we never get to that issue if the person is not a student.

The law does not require us to waive a rule for participation. It requires us to modify a rule, if it's necessary, for participation. But it's not the handicap that we're accommodating here, it's his non-student status that he's seeking for us to accommodate.

The plaintiff is just not a part of the academic program. He doesn't get that GPA. He doesn't have the common interest as I've already said. The exclusion is not, the exclusion from the dorms is not because of the disability. The exclusion is only because he doesn't have the degree-bearing commonality in place.

We have plenty of disabled students in the dorms. We have plenty of disabled students in the University. We accommodate those, but they have to otherwise meet the criteria to be a student. Once you meet the

criteria of being a student, then we have to accommodate it so that they can be successful in their student quest. But they still have to meet that threshold, under the law, in order for them to be in the dorms. Plaintiff is just not in that category.

If he were admitted into the regular program, then the University would certainly accommodate whatever it needed to accommodate so that he could be successful. But first he'd have to meet that first criteria: He has to be a student. If he's a student, then we have an obligation to accommodate our programs to make it successful so long as it's a reasonable accommodation.

Because he's not in the program, he can't maintain his claims of disparate treatment. He doesn't meet the threshold of a prima facie case, in this case, for the stated reasons. And he also cannot overcome the pretext. But again, I don't think the Court ever needs to get that far in the analysis.

A reasonable jury cannot find that he met the eligibility requirements for housing, even though it's not really, necessarily a jury issue under the Fair Housing Act, since that could be tried directly to the Court.

But the Court need not reach the accommodation issue, which is the other issue. We have the disparate

treatment and we have the accommodation issue. The Court need not reach the accommodation issue because he's not trying to meet the eligibility requirements, which is the standard in Zukle, he wants the eligibility requirements waived. That's not a reasonable accommodation.

His accommodation request fails for a number of reasons. But perhaps the most obvious is that his requests are not for an accommodation of his disability, it's only for a wavier, an accommodation of his student or non-student status. He's expressly asked the University to waive that requirement. To waive the requirement that he need to be one pursuing a degree.

This case is really a repeat of what occurred in Schanz, in the Eastern District of Michigan; in Wilson, in the Tenth Circuit; and the Salute case in the Second Circuit.

And all of these cases bluntly hold that such an accommodation is not required under the law. In Schanz it was a disabled person who wanted certain creditworthiness rules to be waived by a landlord.

The Court said that it was his economic status that he wanted to accommodate and not his disability. And that he was trying to transform his financial

status into a handicap. "Accommodations are required if they are only needed due to the handicap", the Court held. If the accommodation would be needed absent, the handicap, then it's not reasonable. That's what we have here.

In <u>Wilson</u>, the housing in each building was only made available to students, one for males and one for females. The Plaintiffs were not students and therefore their claims failed. "Discrimination on the basis of student versus non-student status--", the Court held, "--was not even actionable."

In <u>Salute</u>, <u>Salute versus Stafford Greens</u>, the issue is whether a landlord had to allow Section Eight Housing, so that those who were poor, due to their handicaps, not able to go to school, due to your handicap, those who were poor, due to their handicaps, could have access to housing.

The Court of Appeals held, at page 301, that the Fair Housing Act is to accommodate handicaps, not the alleviation of economic disadvantages which may be correlated with having handicaps. "The Fair Housing Act does not elevate the rights of the handicapped poor over the rights of the non-handicapped poor", the Court said.

Here the plaintiff is asking this Court to hold

that the Fair Housing Act is to alleviate plaintiff's student status. That's not accommodating a disability. It's improper to ask this Court to elevate his rights, as a disabled, continued education student, over non-disabled continued education students.

I think the Sixth Circuit explained this issue well in its decision just earlier this year in <u>Sutton</u> <u>versus Piper</u>. "Accommodation is an issue--", the Court held," "--when the rule in question, if left unmodified, hurts handicapped people by reason, if there are any, rather than by virtue of what they have in common with other people, such as limited amount of money to spend on housing", which was the issue there. An owner only has to only lower the barriers to housing that are created by the disability itself.

Here, it's Plaintiff's status of not being a degree-pursuing student that's blocking his request. Many people, who are not disabled, are not students pursuing a degree; therefore his claim should fail.

This is also the lesson from the Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court, <u>Alexander versus Choate</u>, which regarded the claim about the number of allowable days someone could stay in a hospital under a Medicaid Program.

There the state capped the number of days to 14

days. Rejecting the argument and allowing the State to set the rule as to the maximum number of days someone could get, both handicapped and non-handicapped people.

At 14 days the Court said, "Section 504 does not require the State to alter its definition of the benefit, simply to meet the reality that handicapped have greater medical needs. The rule leaves both handicapped and non-handicapped people with identical access."

That's the rule at Oakland University. Both non-handicapped and non-students and handicapped non-students, are treated the same. Once you are a student, if you are a handicap, then you are given the accommodation.

So, in this case, Oakland "U" should not have to open its dorms to OPTIONS students simply because they can't meet the admission requirements. That's a wavier of the admission requirements.

Oakland "U" is instead allowed to set the criteria for who lives in the dorms. And if one meets those requirements, those criteria, then it must consider accommodations to make it possible for that person to live in the dorms. And as the Court held on Davis, a grantee, such as the University, can always preserve the integrity of its program.

Therefore, plaintiff's request of this Court would really give him a privilege or a preference over non-disabled persons and that's not what the statute allows. None of these statutes allow that.

If he gets his way, then the dorms would have to be open to all students, whether they're pursing a degree or not. Anyone who wishes to claim that a handicap prevents them from being a regular student and so on.

If it were just his disability that was barring him from campus housing, then all other persons who were students at the University, who were not disabled, would be able to live in the dorms.

THE COURT: Why do you say that? Why?

MR. BOONIN: If it were just his disability, if the University's policy was to discriminate against the plaintiff, and that's the only reason we have the policy, then presumably all other continuing education students will be eligible to live in the dorms. He's being treated just like they are being treated.

THE COURT: I'm not following you. If the Court were to determine, in this situation, that this individual, that the University should be required to waive his policy to accommodate this disabled person, are you suggesting that might somehow open the

floodgates to non-disabled people coming in?

MR. BOONIN: Well, that means any disabled person could ask to go into the dorms and have the student requirement waived, when we have all the other people, who are not disabled, not able to go into the dorms.

My point is is that if we were discriminating against just people with disabilities, people because of their disable status, then all these other people would be allowed to be in the dorms and they're not allowed to be in the dorms.

THE COURT: You stated a few minutes ago, simply because he can't meet the admission's requirement, do you dispute the fact that he can't meet the admission requirements because of the disability?

MR. BOONIN: Your Honor, I understand that most individuals with his disability would find that to be challenging. I do know that an OPTIONS participant did leave the OPTIONS Program and was admitted into the University and if that person went to live in the dorms, then they can be accommodated if they need an accommodation to live in the dorms.

I just don't know because it is a student status. We -- it's not just because of his disability that he's not there, it's because he's not a part of the academic program that he's not in-housing.

THE COURT: Maybe he's not a part of the academic program because of his disability.

MR. BOONIN: But that elevates his disability status, his student status to his disability status and that's not what the Courts say what we're supposed to do because there's a lot of people who are not eligible for that benefit.

If you take it -- this is the in-spite-of argument under the regulations. You know, the 504 deals with this in its explanation. They say, "If you take away the disability, is he qualified?" We don't know that. What is needed for him to be a student with an accommodation under those -- it says, "Will a person be able to meet the standards of the program?"

He can't meet the standards of the program with an accommodation because the standard is that you be a student. And the law says we don't have to waive our standards, we just have to make it possible for him to succeed in the program and he can't show that he can succeed in the program of being a student with or without an accommodation.

THE COURT: Well, if it were clear to you and the Court that the only reason he can't get in the regular program is because of his disability and you'll acknowledge that if he's in the regular program, he'd

be entitled to housing. 1 MR. BOONIN: But the thing is, "An accommodation", 2 does not make him a student, and that's the question. 3 The accommodation is not making him an eliqible student 4 where you're getting grades and all that. 5 6 **THE COURT:** I understand that, but so what? 7 If the Court were to order it to be waived for 8 this individual, how would that adversely affect the 9 University's program to allow this one individual in? 10 Based on, assuming I conclude there's a legitimate reason for it, how would that affect? 11 MR. BOONIN: I'm sorry, based on what? 12 13 THE COURT: Let's assume that I come to the conclusion that his disability is a significant reason 14 15 why he's not in the dorm, how would admitting him adversely affect the University? 16 17 MR. BOONIN: Well, it would alter the nature of 18 that program because --**THE COURT:** Because of one student? 19 20 MR. BOONIN: Well, again, it would be anyone with 21 a handicap who's not able to qualify to be a student would be allowed in. 22 THE COURT: Not true. You know, we take 23 handicapped individuals individually. And you'll have 24 25 to admit that handicapped people are often given

preferences at work. They're allowed to do this or 1 2 that that the other employees aren't, to accommodate 3 their disability. MR. BOONIN: To be successful in that program, but 4 5 he's not in that program. 6 THE COURT: Well, what's, "That program", that 7 you're talking about? 8 MR. BOONIN: Well, the regular academic program 9 because he's only in the OPTIONS Program. 10 THE COURT: And if I'm satisfied that he's not in that is because of the disability, and if he were in 11 that program, he would be in the housing, why wouldn't 12 13 that lead to a conclusion that the disability is precluding him from getting the housing? 14 15 MR. BOONIN: Well, that's just like the Court in Schanz to say you, "Well, just because have your 16 17 disability, you can't get a job that would meet the 18 credit requirements", it elevates the disability -- the economic status to a disability status and that's not 19 20 what the Court said you're supposed to do. 21 The accommodation is supposed to make you 22 successful in the program that you're trying to get 23 into, not to waive those requirements. 24 The HUD regulations talk about, you know, waiving 25 the requirements of the, "No pet policies." Now, if a

blind person, with a seeing-eye dog needs to live in that apartment, you must waive it because without that, the person can't live in there, but the person is otherwise qualified. The accommodation doesn't upset the qualification requirements.

If a person has a dog and they're deaf and unless the dog is a hearing dog, "Sorry, that's not related to your disability." That's what the HUD regulations call for.

Even Congress has recognized that housing is not an obligation for programs such as the OPTIONS Program. As stated in our brief, the recent amendments to the Higher Education Act provides grants to schools to pilot these kinds of programs.

And that's what the OPTION Program is. It's a brand new program. It's a pilot program. And the school is trying to undertake it. Congress has said, "You can have a pilot program and you may or may not have housing in that program."

There's three ways that you can qualify for grants, having housing is one of the criteria. You can do that or you can do two other things, but you do not have to have housing.

In fact, you do not have to have a program that doesn't give -- that you could have a program that

would require the person to earn credit and to be admitted, you can do that. They're very flexible about it.

But Congress has said these types of programs, and this really fits it perfectly, these types of programs do not have to provide housing in order to qualify.

If Congress is saying that it's optional to the University and it's up to the academic officials to determine what's appropriate in the academic program and they'll yield to that judgment, they just start giving them an incentive to try something out; then I don't think it would be proper for the plaintiffs to ask this Court to do something that Congress specifically says is within the school's discretion.

So, what is he really asking for? He's not only asking that this Court change the housing rules, he's also asking this Court to change the OPTIONS Program by adding a housing component to that program. There's not a need to do so. There's not a requirement to do so. He can still enjoy all of the benefits of the housing program -- of the OPTIONS Program, without housing.

This Court should not redesign the housing program or the OPTIONS Program, but that's what he's asking this Court to do. For those reasons, we believe that

1 Summary Judgment is appropriate.

He's not qualified as a student. There's not a reasonable accommodation that's available to them, under the law. And for those reasons, we believe we're entitled to Summary Judgment.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Response.

RESPONSE BY MR. DAVIS

MR. DAVIS: Thank you, Your Honor, both in response and also presenting our own Summary Judgment Motion, in this matter.

First of all, I'd like to thank the Court for hearing this matter as quickly as it did. Micah's final semester at Oakland University is going to start in January of this year and I want to thank the Court for hearing this matter as quickly as it did.

I think the defense counsel has, kind of, muddled the analysis between the reasonable accommodation claim and the disparate treatment claims.

Under reasonable accommodation analysis. First of all, there is a cause for reasonable accommodation for failure to reasonably accommodate a person with a disability pursuant to <u>Southeastern Community College</u> <u>versus Davis</u>, a (1979) case by the Supreme Court.

The cases relied upon by the defendant are

primarily Fair Housing cases, rather than reasonable accommodation -- or rather than Rehab Act cases, Your Honor.

Under <u>Southeastern Community College</u>, there's a two-part test to determine whether it's a reasonable accommodation or not. And one of the requested accommodations fundamentally alters the program or creates an undue burden on the program.

Here, this accommodation request would not fundamentally alter the housing program, in this case. The housing program primarily is to provide housing for the students at the University. And Micah is a student at the University.

Their own advertisements emphasize the fact that the O.U. Program is to build relationships, home socialization skills. It's for the convenience of the students to develop independence, living-independent skills. The person making a transition from living at home with their parents to being adults living on their own.

These are the purposes behind the housing program.

And there are certainly educational benefits to it

also. But the primary purpose of a program will not be
altered by admitting Micah into this program.

If this Court did an individualized analysis of

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the situation, as is required by the Arline case and 1 2 the Wong case that we cited in our brief, if the Court does an individualized analysis of the matter, the 3 undisputed facts, in this case, show that Micah takes 4 12 credits a semester. 5 He and his family pay tuition at the same rate as 6 7 undergraduate students. He is willing and able to pay 8 all housing program fees or cafeteria plan fees. 9 There's no request here to modify the economic nature of the cost. 10 THE COURT: I assume there is a cost related to 11 the housing? 12 13 MR. DAVIS: There is a cost related to the housing. 14 15 THE COURT: Supposing an individual contends that, "I'm denied the housing part of it because I can't 16 17 afford it. And the reason I can't afford it is because 18 I'm disabled. And I'll bring in an expert who will say, 'But for his disability, he could earn sufficient 19 20 funds to pay the cost of the housing. 21 MR. DAVIS: I think in that situation, Your Honor, 22 if it could be shown and proof could be presented but for his disability, then I would believe the 23 24 accommodation would be appropriate.

I think part of the major problem in Schanz was

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that you couldn't show the connection between the disability and the economic hardship. And a good example of this is actually the Fair Housing case that we cited in our brief. It was the case of -- it's a Ninth Circuit case. It's M & B Associates versus -- I'm drawing a blank. But I did cite it in my brief, it's M & B Associates.

In this case, the Court was able to show, it's a Ninth Circuit case. And it showed that this individual, before he became disabled, had a perfect credit history. Once he became disabled, his credit history went to pieces and he was denied admissions into housing.

In that case the Court, Ninth Circuit found, I'm sorry if I said Sixth Circuit, it was the Ninth Circuit. The Court found that there was a clear connection between the disability and the financial problems that this individual was having and a reasonable accommodation was legitimate in that circumstance.

THE COURT: What was the accommodation?

MR. DAVIS: That he would be allowed into housing, I believe, with a co-signer and the credit score of his would be waived.

THE COURT: They didn't say that he could come in

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at no cost because of his inability to earned money,
did they?

MR. DAVIS: No, that was not the circumstance. It was the credit history. He was having problems getting credit history in that particular case. So, I would say if there was a, "But for" situation, yes, an accommodation would be merited in that circumstance.

Here, again, the undisputed facts of this case is that he is capable of paying the housing fees. He's not seeking any additional accommodations. He's capable of living on his own or with a roommate, if assigned a roommate, at the housing. We've submitted an independent living assessment to support that, Your Honor.

Instead of looking at an individual assessment, the defendant attempts to shift the analysis and look at what would happen if rules were waived for everybody in continuing education.

First of all, I want to clear up one statement that's been made and that's that all continuing education students are barred from housing, that's not true. English as a Second Language students are allowed into housing at Oakland University.

Now, defendants contend that they have to be matriculating students at their other post-university;

otherwise, they're not allowed in. But we've shown, through an affidavit of at least one former student at Oakland University, that she was not a matriculating student at any University when she was admitted into housing at Oakland University. She was a continuing education student.

They've made numerous exceptions to this rule.

They try to portray this as a bright-line rule but they've admitted in their own brief, and I point this out on page eight of my response brief, that this rule is not a bright-line rule, there's numerous exceptions to this rule.

They allow in students from the English is a Second Language Program. They allow students in through Summer Camp Programs. Hospital Programs. They allow students from Cooley Law School there, who aren't even taking classes at Oakland University, but are taking classes at Cooley down the street. Now, they may be matriculating students, but they are not even students of the University.

They have reciprocity agreements with other
Universities that allow students in there. Again, not
their own students, students at other Universities.
And they also allow individuals in from journalism
programs also. All of these are non-matriculating

students -- I'm sorry, some of them are non-matriculating students. Some of them are not even students of the University. So, this is not a bright-line rule as they are trying to portray it here.

I also want to address the issue of the preference that they're alleging here. We are not seeking a preference for Micah, he is seeking his place in line for housing.

The testimony shown in the depositions, they traditionally have in the winter -- I'm sorry, in the fall term, they're usually full, with a waiting list. It's a first-come, first-serve situation. He's requesting his place in line.

In the winter term, usually starting in January, they have extra space through attrition. They usually use up the waiting list, plus they have extra space in housing. He's not being asked to jump ahead of anybody in line, he's asking for his place in line. He needs an accommodation that would allow him equal opportunity to access housing at Oakland University.

Granted, it would be a different treatment, but it's not preferential treatment. A good example of this is a case that we did not cite in our brief and that's, <u>U.S. Airways</u>, <u>Incorporated versus Barnette</u>, this is a Supreme Court case of (2002). The cite to it

1 is 535 U.S. 391.

That was a case that involved -- it was an 88

Title I case on reasonable accommodation where an individual with a disability was seeking, as an accommodation, to access another job, but he was denied that requested accommodation.

The Supreme Court said, "There are going to be times--", every case is looked at individually and the specific facts, do an individualized assessment and, "--there are going to be times where preference is appropriate." They found, in this case, different treatment is appropriate.

But in this case, jumping him ahead of other persons in the seniority line was preferential treatment and they denied the accommodation request, finding it wasn't reasonable.

Any accommodation does involve some different treatment, but that doesn't necessarily make it "preference treatment." "Preference is a practical advantage given to one over other persons." That's a common understanding of the word "Preference" from Dictionary.com that I looked at today. That's what a preference is.

He is simply seeking his place in line by having this accommodation provided to him. Congress has

recognized that accommodations are absolutely necessary, in many instances, in order to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity.

And it furthers the national goal of any exclusion of persons with disabilities and their exclusion from the mainstream in society. And this is a national goal that has been expressed by Congress consistently over 40 years of numerous acts of legislation.

I also want to point to the fact they have suggested there may be some undue burden to the University if this accommodation is granted.

The only way that any undue burden is alleged by defendants is when they compare the situation to completely waiving the rule and allowing all continuing education students in, then they might have to build housing then.

But the case law, under the Rehab Act, clearly shows you do an individual assessment and you look at Micah and what his presence in this dorm would do and whether it would fundamentally alter the program.

Now, is it possible that other students with disabilities may apply for this wavier as an accommodation? Yes. But in the OPTIONS Program there's only nine other students. This is not going to lead to an overwhelming of the University or a

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fundamental alteration of the program either.

They have put forward suggesting, without any analysis, mere speculation about the fact that their presence would take away from the educational aspect of the program.

They've never presented any evidence, and there's no evidence in the record, and this is undisputed, that Micah's presence would take away from that academic nature of the program, even if the Court were to find that housing was an academic program in and of itself. And that's why they tried to shift the burden away from individual analysis to this broader analysis.

Finally, I'm going to move on to the disparate treatment claims. We've brought three disparate treatment claims under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disability Act, as well as the Fair Housing Act.

First of all, he is a student at the University. He is an admitted student into the OPTIONS Program, a program of the University. He has all the attributes of a student.

He's enrolled in classes, which he actively participants in. He studies. He pays tuition at the same rate of other undergraduate students. He takes quizes and tests. He attends full time, taking 12 to

15 credit hours per semester, depending on the semester.

The other thing, they've admitted he's a student. They've issued him a student ID. They've issued him a student number, which they call Grizzly numbers or "G" numbers. This is important because when looking at the original contract of Micah or application/contract that Micah signed, it said, "He must be an enrolled student."

Micah was treated differently from other students similarly situated. If you look at their own policies and procedures, which we submitted in our reply brief, when they process these applications, they look at whether the student has a grizzly number. That's how they verify whether he's an enrolled student or not. And he had a grizzly number.

Yet, they do not check, I think it's important to point out, according to these policies and procedures, they do not check to see what program they're in, what degree they're seeking, what their grade point average is or whether they're even taking classes or not. These things are not verified or checked.

He has a grizzly number, which would indicate that he's a student at the University. Micah's original denial letter denied him because he wasn't a student

and he wasn't enrolled for the winter. Both of which were factually wrong. So, he did meet the enrollment, the requirements for admission under that contract for the '07/'08 school year.

Now, the defendant -- the plaintiff must also show why was he treated differently. There must be a discriminatory purpose behind it.

In this case, the misperception expressed by the defendant, Vice President Snyder, these are statements to Howell, to Professor Howell. These are undisputed statements. They've submitted no affidavits disputing these statements where she said, "His inability to read--", which relates to his disability, she said that, "--these programs", referring to the OPTIONS program, "--always fail."

She feared how other students would treat him.

Rather than dealing with how other students might treat him, she feared how they might treat him as a reason to deny him access.

She said that he could not care for himself, even though where that statement come or on what basis is, I do not know and it is not said. And he couldn't deal with an emergency situation. Again, nowhere is this evidence provided.

And it goes back to the misperceptions about the

ability or inability of persons with disabilities.

THE COURT: With respect to your disparate treatment claim, it's my understanding that the Court have stated, and I quote, <u>Jones v City of Monroe</u>, 341 F.3d 477, that, "The plaintiff must demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination by establishing, number one, he has a disability; two, that he's otherwise qualified; and three, that he is being excluded from participation in and being denied the benefits of or being subject to discrimination solely because of his handicap."

You don't contend here that he's being discriminated against solely because of his handicap, do you?

MR. DAVIS: I think it's uncontested. It's a motivating factor. And they've presented nothing that would support their reason for turning -- for their different treatment of him.

I mean, they've proffered a reason, but without any backing up of it or supporting it. They have to do more than just bring forth a reason. It has to be -- a reasonable conclusion has to be drawn from their facts or it has to be supported by some evidence.

THE COURT: Well, they denied him because he's not a student.

MR. DAVIS: He is a student. 1 2 THE COURT: I mean, a matriculating student. 3 denied it because he doesn't fit their criteria for housing students, that's a legitimate reason, isn't it? 4 Forget the handicap, for a moment. 5 6 MR. DAVIS: Right. 7 **THE COURT:** That would be legitimate. If some 8 other student, not handicap, say, "Boy, I'd like to live in that housing, very convenient to my work and 9 10 other things", they'd have a right to deny him, 11 wouldn't they? MR. DAVIS: If that was their rule in October or 12 13 November of 2007, maybe. But that was not their rule in October of 2007. That's not nowhere in their 14 15 application. THE COURT: Well, what's the rule now? 16 17 The rule now that they put forward is MR. DAVIS: 18 they must be a matriculating student, they must have a 19 certain grade point average and they must carry a minimal number of credits, though the number is 20 21 escaping me, at the moment. 22 THE COURT: You're asking me now to enter an order 23 compelling them, for the future, to admit him. 24 therefore don't you think I should apply their current

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criteria?

MR. DAVIS: Two reasons on that. First of all, I 1 2 believe the reasonable accommodation would allow 3 perspective relief, if the Court were to find that. THE COURT: I'm not on the reasonable 4 accommodation. 5 MR. DAVIS: Correct, Your Honor. 6 7 But under this, if we can show that this new rule 8 is a mere pretext to cover up their discriminatory action, I would think that there would be problems with 9 10 them being allowed to enforce that. 11 **THE COURT:** How are you going to show that? MR. DAVIS: The way we would show that it's 12 13 pretext is this, Your Honor. First of all, the closeness in time of what happened. Micah submitted 14 15 his application on November 1st, 2007 and they did not 16 have a matriculating student requirement in there. 17 On November 8th, Associate Dean Wiggins sent an 18 email to the Plaintiff's father, as well as his counselor, Kim Dembrosky, as well as Lee VanAmberg, the 19 20 head of the OPTIONS Program. And he says in that 21 email, and I've quoted it in the brief, "This very clearly demonstrates that this was a considered 22

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decision.

That the question of enrolled credits was

resolved. That the total number of CEU's--", which I'm

assuming is Continuing Education Units, "--showed that

he was enrolled in classes and that Micah was a registered student."

Seven days after that, on November 14th, Roxanne Fisher, from the Housing Department, sent an email saying, "You're all set." Now, defendants have tried to portray this as saying, "Well, that meant we've got all the application materials."

But if you look at that email, Your Honor, it's very detailed about, "If you use a microwave or not. What the sign-in date was. Whether he would get his room assignment."

If this was simply saying, "We got your application and we don't need any more material to process it", you would think that that email would say, "We've got your application. You're all set for that. We'll notify you of our decision."

It wouldn't go into what things you can move into your dorm and what date you're to move in. The email was very specific. And to see it as anything other than an acceptance of his application, an approval of his application, would require a stretch of the imagination.

Coming after the Wiggin's email, it showed that this was a considered decision because they also proffered the fact that or trying to allege that Ms.

Fisher looked at the "G" number, approved him, and somehow accidently it slipped through. But the email from Wiggins, seven days before Fisher's email show that this was a considered decision. And they have not countered that by any other evidence.

Secondly -- or thirdly, Maten went and checked with Snyder regarding denying Micah's application.

Snyder is the Vice President at the University, she certainly doesn't get involved in approving every single application that comes through the housing department. The fact that she was even involved in this shows that he was being treated differently than other persons.

Again, the Maten denial letter, no mention of matriculating student in the original denial letter. I think it's very important to look at that fact. And that's not in dispute.

They changed the application in March of 2008.

And in their own brief they said that it was supposed to be effective for the 2008/2009 school year. He was denied in October of 2007, the winter, January of 2007.

This means they were retroactively applying a new policy that wasn't even in effect yet to Micah's application, which was submitted almost a year earlier.

I believe these things show that this is a

made-up, after-the-fact reason that's being provided to cover the real reason that he was denied, which was because of his disability as is shown by the undisputed statements in the Howell affidavit that we submitted, Your Honor.

I think we've shown that he was a qualified student for housing under the contract he signed in 2007/2008. We've shown that the reason he was turned down was because of his disability. We've shown that they've come back under the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis they've proffered, on its face, appears to be a legitimate reason.

And I believe that the timeline and the emails and the way things have happened show that this was a pretext to cover their actions. There's also one other important point I wanted to make.

Vice President Snyder met with Micah in May of 2008 and his parents in August of 2008. Both Vice President Snyder and Defendant Lionel Maten. In both those instances, they portrayed the March, 2008, as if that was Micah's -- the same application Micah signed. It wasn't. It had undergone extensive changes and extensive rule changes and requirement changes.

The fact that they were misrepresenting that fact in these meetings I think is further evidence of a

pretext, Your Honor.

Do you have any questions?

THE COURT: Any response?

MR. BOONIN: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Before you start addressing, how do you respond to brother counsel's statement that the University has made, quote, "Exceptions", unquote. That is, they've had non-matriculating students permitted to live in the housing?

RESPONSE BY MR. BOONIN

MR. BOONIN: Well, Your Honor, the identification of this individual didn't come out until about a week ago. And you know the University has scoured its records and could not find any exceptions. And it took until last week for the plaintiff to come up with a name.

But it's only one ESL student, an ESL student who was admitted full time into the University under an F-1 visa and who was pursuing a degree. And that's still the common thread is that during the academic years, during the academic term, the only people that are in those dorms are people pursuing degrees.

And there's no question that this was her intent and she was here under an F-1 visa. I do have the documents and I said in my reply that I'll bring those

documents. I do have the documents that will show that 1 2 she was here on an F-1 visa. And to be an F-1 visa, 3 you must be full-time enrolled in a program that results in a degree, a certificate, or a diploma. 4 THE COURT: He indicated that there are a number 5 6 of students, I thought he said, that were at other 7 Universities --8 MR. BOONIN: Yes, that's true. People with Cooley, there's a special contract and this has always 9 10 been the policy at the University. They still have that common denominator that 11 they're pursuing a degree. They're all there with the 12 13 same burden or responsibility or goal of, "Why are we here? We're here because we want to get a degree and 14 15 we want to succeed." And if you don't, by the way, 16 follow the rules, you're going to be kicked out of this 17 University and you may lose your opportunity to get a 18 degree. A continuing education student normally doesn't 19 have that incentive. Doesn't have that ramification 20 21 should they violate a rule. 22 THE COURT: Did the University change its policy 23 after 2007? 24 MR. BOONIN: Not with respect to the enrollment 25 status, Your Honor, that's absolutely a

misrepresentation of what the University has done.

That's not what any of the testimony supports.

Certainly the language did change and the language did become clear. But the effect of that language is the same.

If he used the 2007 contract application for housing today, he would still be denied because under the University's definition of what an enrolled student is, how the University interprets what the term "Enrolled" means, means that you have to be in a degree-granting program. And that's the way they've always applied that rule. That's the way they've always applied that term.

And they routinely change the application form. In think it was three of the last five years the housing contract has changed in many ways. There were a half of dozen other ways that the application form changed in 2008 as part of their standard process. They tweak it all the time.

But the bottom line is that under either the original form or the new form, he still does not meet that enrollment requirement.

I think the University is entitled to say, "When we use enrollment--", as long as they're consistent about it and there's no evidence that they're not

consistent about it, "--when we use enrollment, that means you're pursuing a degree. You're a person that we could count when we submit things to the federal government. We follow that as the guidance for what we need, in this context, of enrollment."

There's no evidence that we've treated people otherwise. In fact, the evidence is is that when a disabled student applies and becomes enrolled, we do accommodate that person.

THE COURT: All right. You've answered the question. Now is your time for any rebuttal you want to give based on brother counsel's argument?

MR. BOONIN: Well, that was going to be one of the points and I'm glad you brought that out because I think that enrollment often becomes a term of art. But this isn't a contract case, this is, "What did we mean or what was our policy at the time?"

And in terms of enrollment, we did not change that policy. We just are now requiring students to have a higher level of commitment because it's part of the goal of the University to make being in the dorms a way to facilitate that degree. So, we want to make sure people are taking a lot of credits in order to do it.

Now, it was said that the plaintiff has all the attributes of a student. And I just disagree with

that. He doesn't have all the attributes of the students.

Yes, he does pay a fee. And yes, he does attend classes. Some of those classes are special learning skills classes that are not, you know, a part of the regular academic program. And then he can audit other classes and attend them. And whatever he does in those classes and attend them. And whatever he does in those classes, whatever he arranges with the teacher, he doesn't have to do anything, he doesn't get a grade.

But it doesn't have the attributes of being admitted into the University. Doesn't have the attribute of a grade point average. Doesn't have the attribute of earning credits and those are huge distinctions. The statement that having the "G" number is indicia of student status is really an overstatement.

Many people, and I do have an affidavit from the University, if the Court would allow me to present it. But many people at the University have grizzly numbers. The employees have grizzly numbers. The venders have grizzly number. Donors have grizzly numbers and students have grizzly numbers.

The housing clerk used the grizzly number as her first check to see, "Are you real?" Are you connected,

somehow, to the University. The testimony is that that housing clerk doesn't make the final decision. She makes the preliminary decision, that's Roxanne Fisher.

She made the preliminary decision that, "Yes, looks like your application is complete." And as she stated in her affidavit, the body of that email, the information that she gives, she didn't set what the date is. She said, "You'll be learning later what your rights are, what the obligations are, what your move-in date would be."

But there was still more to be checked. And sure enough, it got to the attention of the housing directer, Mr. Maten and he did not go to the Vice President Snyder for approval. She was not in the approval set. He wanted to know, "Did we change the rules? Are the OPTIONS participants now enrolled students?" That would make a difference to him because his contact with them would that they weren't, did that change?

Or did the University change it's rule allowing non-enrolled students to be in there. You know, "Am I still doing the right thing because I'm about to reject this application, but would that be right?"

And she says, "Well, you know, the rule hasn't changed." And they checked and they found out that the

OPTIONS students were still classified as continuing
education students. So, that statement, I believe,
needed to be responded to and was inaccurate and not
supported by the record.

The fact there's nothing in the record that supports the claim that the grizzly numbers is the key to the dorms. It was just -- the deposition testimony is is that that's what Roxanne Fischer did.

Then we get to the statement of Dean Wiggins made in an email to plaintiff's father and to MORC. And if you look at the email he's saying, "This is what I found out after talking to a secretary in the housing department." Well, that would be hearsay as to what he found out.

But certainly the secretary of the Housing
Department doesn't speak for what the housing policies
are. And neither does Dean Wiggins speak for what the
Housing Department policies are. He can't set that.
He admitted that in his deposition, that's not his
role. He was trying to facilitate this process for the
family, but he was unsuccessful.

But his statements as to what the housing policies are no more significant than if the Secretary of Agriculture makes a statement as to what the Department of Defense's policy is in Iraq. It's just not the

policy of the U.S. Government when that kind of statement is made.

As to the individualized analysis. The Courts have said that you only have to have individualize analysis if it's to accommodate a disability. And we still hadn't gotten to that. We don't have to accommodate a disability because there's no accommodation that makes him a student. And he wants to be a student without having the requirements of a the student.

Now, if we had to bend the rule so that he had to take more tests or so that he could reapply or do something to accommodate a disability, so that he could meet the qualifications of being a student, we would have had to do that.

If his disability made it impossible for him to live in the housing because he was blind or needed a wheelchair roll-in shower, we would have to accommodate that. But he's not asked for an accommodation of his disability, he has asked us to waive his student status and that's inappropriate.

We really don't know how the plaintiff would succeed if he were in housing. But he wasn't denied the housing because of his disability. If he were a student, we would have granted him the housing.

That, I think, in and of itself shows that it's not his handicapped status or his disability status that is motivating the University, it's the student status that was motivating the University.

Disabled students are constantly, often given generous accommodations because that's appropriate for them to succeed in the program.

There is also a statement, and we touched on this, that were numerous exceptions, and one was the ESL student. That's one person we've been able to find in decades of records.

"A", if it were, if that person slipped in, I don't think there's no mistake, changes the fact that this is what our policies is and what our intentions are. But this person does, in reality, and again, I can show the Court documents to this effect, was here on an F-1 visa.

And if you're here on an F-1 visa, just so that you could see, if you look at the regulations under that, and that's 8 CFR 214.2, (F)(1) and (F)(6), that it says, "You must be enrolled full-time in a course of study that culminates in a degree, diploma or certificate." And that's who we thought we had and what we thought we had.

And actually if you look at the affidavit

submitted, the affidavit that's yet to be notarized.

But if you look at the affidavit that's been submitted, it just says that, "Prior to being accepted, I wasn't a student." Well, that's the case with any high school student. She doesn't talk about her housing commitment and when she got accepted at the Turkish University, that we reported to what her status was at the University. We have a document to that. And I can show the Court a document to that where we reported to, in September, to the Turkish University as to what her status was at our University.

But there are other exceptions that were pointed out, though those exceptions don't make a difference because the reality is, and this is the distortion that I think has been presented. That during the academic year, it's only the people that are pursuing degrees that are in the dorms that intermingled with other, you know, that's the core of the dorms.

Do we have summer camp programs? Sure. High school students come in. It's not a university program, necessarily, it could be a university program or some outside program. They put their summer campers in our dorms for a week at a time.

But that's not part of the academic program and we're not contesting that it is. You know, if he would

qualify for one of those summer programs and wanted to attend the dorms in the summer, absolutely, that's not a concern of ours.

The Residential Journalism Program, as we said in our affidavit, it called a Residential Journalism Program, but it's a day camp. It's not an overnight camp. There's no living in the dorms for that program. Residential journalism campers do not live in the dorms, it's a one- or two-week program that they come to school.

And given these are high school kids. Again, it's not part of the regular academic program, and we're not suggesting that it is. But again, that's not a fact that I think is appropriately making a difference in the outcome of this case.

Then we get to the issues of Dr. Snyder's statements. And Dr. Snyder has said over and over again that the core purpose of the dorms is move someone through the pipeline toward a degree. That's what it's been.

Did she make those statements? Well, we certainly don't have the affidavit. She denies making all those statements. But some of those statements were made in 2003, 2004, before the OPTIONS Program was even stated.

If you look at the timeline and all the records,

it's clear these predated the making of a movie, which he made when he was still in the transitions program in 2006, before the OPTIONS program was even a concept.

But those statements, in and of themselves, are some stray remarks. Could event reflect a personal opinion. But doesn't change the fact how she's has administered, how the University has administered the housing program. The rules have always been the same, you must be pursuing in a degree in order to be in the housing program.

And under her leadership we've seen that there are a number of people, with disabilities, in housing, people with reading and writing disabilities, who are in housing and who are in the University. And that's all under her leadership. She's the one that helps facilitate the accommodations for these individuals when they're in the program.

And then finally, I'm going to say finally, but it may not be, don't hold me to that. But I want to address this issue of the pretext based on the timing of this changeable contract.

We never said that the new contract is made retroactively. As I said, under the new contract or the old contract, he's not qualified under either contract to be in there.

When they met -- when the parents met, when the plaintiff met with the Vice President, they asked for a copy of the contract. They were given a copy of the contract that was in effect at that time. There was no indication that there was anything other than that explanation. And that contract explains it just as well as the old contract, at least in the opinion of the University. It does not at all indicate any kind of effort on the part of the University to discriminate on the basis of a disability.

And I do want to say too that the statement by Sharon Howell, we believe, contains a lot of hearsay. But again, it's not enough, in the Court's opinion -- I'm just trying to find the name of the decision that we cited in our case.

Said that those kinds of statements, it was one of the Michigan cases, <u>City of Taylor</u> case, that those kinds of statements by officials, when you look at it in the overall context, aren't enough to establish pretext. You have to look at the overall context. And the overall context is that the rule has been consistent forever.

And Dr. Snyder's and the Housing Department's interpretation of those rules have been consistent or intended to be consistent forever. You must look at it

in that overall context.

In fact, if you look at the context of her statement to the board of trustees, it was that she believed, in her professional judgment, that it was the inability to fully engage in the academic life that was critical to her decision.

THE COURT: I think you're starting to cover ground you've already covered.

MR. BOONIN: I think I'm virtually done. Just want to double check my notes. I think I am done, Your Honor, if you have any further questions?

THE COURT: All right. Court will take the matter under advisement -- I'm sorry, did you have something?

MR. DAVIS: I did, yes, just a few.

THE COURT: Go ahead. Sure.

RESPONSE BY MR. DAVIS

MR. DAVIS: Concerning the ESL students. They originally said, "We do not admit continuing education students." We showed they do admit ESL students. Then they fell back and said, "We only allow matriculating students." Then we produced a student that was not a matriculating student. Now, they're falling back further and saying, "Well, that's one exception." So, it keeps changing.

On the changing of the policy, we've already

pointed out, it's not just our assertion for policy and procedure manual, but I also pointed out that the application that Micah signed contained nothing about what program or what his grade point average is or how many credits he was taking. It just asked for his grizzly number, that's the only thing you could ask for.

Also, the Higher Education Opportunity Act, which they say somehow implies no right to housing, it doesn't say that they don't have a right to housing, it says they will reward programs that has housing as a component.

For example, when this program was originally put together in an email, the second email that Mr. Wiggins sent to Kim Dembrosky, he laid out a curriculum for the OPTIONS Program that was rejected later.

But originally it included classes on living independently and would require them to be in-housing. Those types of programs would get a reward under the Higher Education Opportunities Act. That doesn't mean that the Higher Education Act mandates that they are entitled to the housing.

I'd also point out that the Higher Education Act, and we pointed this out in our brief, has made financial aid available to students starting in the

fall of 2010, specifically pell grants. 1 2 Also, the counting question about the IPEDS definition. They said that that's their definition. 3 That's the standard they go by. But they admit that 4 5 they let students in from Cooley, they can't be counted 6 under their count. They're not even taking classes at 7 Oakland University. 8 They allow students that are enrolled at other Universities to take some classes there and enroll in 9 10 housing. There's no indication that they're included in the account. 11 The IPEDS definition is a reporting definition to 12 13 the Federal Government. It has nothing to do about eligibility standards and housing. 14 15 And I think that's the points I wanted to cover, 16 Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: All right. Court will take the matter 18 under advisement. Court is in recess.

MR. BOONIN: Your Honor, would you like the

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affidavit?

THE COURT: I don't know that I need more information. If you want to file something, make sure -- you know, I don't like it coming in at this late date. But if you want to, submit it right away because I want to decide. So, whatever you're going to file,

1	make sure the other side sees it.
2	MR. BOONIN: You prefer that I file
3	electronically?
4	THE COURT: Sure.
5	(Whereupon proceedings concluded at 3:56 p.m.)
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	08-14922; Feldman v. Oakland University, Et Al

CERTIFICATION I, Nefertiti A. Matthews, official court reporter for the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, appointed pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 753, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript of the proceedings in the above-entitled cause on the date hereinbefore set forth. I do further certify that the foregoing transcript has been prepared by me or under my direction. Date: February 2, 2010 s:/Nefertiti A. Matthews Nefertiti A. Matthews, Official Court Reporter