

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

DAVID B. FRIED,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:09-cv-1017

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

PAULINE C. REEVES et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed as legally frivolous.

Factual Allegations

Plaintiff is incarcerated in the Ingham County Jail. In his *pro se* complaint, Plaintiff sues Pauline C. Reeves, the Ingham County Probate Court, the Ingham County Circuit Court, the Michigan Supreme Court and the Michigan Court of Appeals. Plaintiff's allegations are somewhat

difficult to follow, but he appears to be challenging mental health commitment that was entered by the state court on August 15, 2007, and a subsequent guardianship order that was entered on July 3, 2008. Plaintiff seeks the following relief (verbatim):

I want the court to get in contact with Lyle D. Warren. Attorney who represented me in guardianship case. Review the probate court files and this writers appeal filed in the C.O.A. Also recognize that the order and judgment were entered illegitimately and reverse them as I should have never been committed or had a guardianship entered.

(Compl., 4, docket #1.) It is unclear from the complaint whether Plaintiff is being held in jail under the civil commitment order, or whether he is incarcerated under criminal charges or pursuant to a criminal conviction.

Discussion

Plaintiff appears to be challenging his confinement under the civil commitment order. A challenge to the fact or duration of confinement should be brought as a petition for habeas corpus and is not the proper subject of a civil rights action brought pursuant to § 1983. *See Preiser v. Rodriguez*, 411 U.S. 475, 484, 493 (1973) (the essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody and the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody). Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiff's complaint challenges the fact or duration of his incarceration, it must be dismissed. *See Barnes v. Lewis*, No. 93-5698, 1993 WL 515483, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 10, 1993) (dismissal is appropriate where § 1983 action seeks equitable relief and challenges fact or duration of confinement); *Moore v. Pemberton*, 110 F.3d 22, 23-24 (7th Cir. 1997) (reasons for not construing a § 1983 action as one seeking habeas relief include (1) potential application of *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), (2) differing defendants, (3) differing standards of § 1915(a)(3) and § 2253(c), (4) differing fee requirements, (5) potential application of second or successive petition doctrine or three-strikes rules of § 1915(g)). Thus, to

the extent Plaintiff seeks release from his confinement under the civil commitment order, his complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff asks this Court to “reverse” the decisions of the Michigan state courts with regard to his civil commitment and guardianship, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has the burden of proving the Court’s jurisdiction. *United States v. Horizon Healthcare*, 160 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1998). Even where subject matter jurisdiction is not raised by the parties, the Court must consider the issue *sua sponte*. See *City of Kenosha v. Bruno*, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); *Norris v. Schotten*, 146 F.3d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1998); *Mickler v. Nimishillen & Tuscarawas Ry. Co.*, 13 F.3d 184, 189 (6th Cir. 1993).

A federal district court has no authority to review final judgments of state court judicial proceedings. *District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman*, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); *Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs., Inc.*, 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). Even constitutional claims which are inextricably intertwined with the state court decisions are not reviewable. *Feldman*, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16; *Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.*, 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); *Patmon v. Michigan Supreme Court*, 224 F.3d 504, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2000); *United States v. Owens*, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment “if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.” *Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley*, 305 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting *Catz v. Chalker*, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998)) (other internal citations omitted); see also *Johnson v. De Grandy*, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (under the *Rooker-*

Feldman doctrine, “a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”); *Tropf v. Fid. Nat’l Title Ins. Co.*, 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002); *Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti*, 266 F.3d 487, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2001); *Patmon*, 224 F.3d at 506-07. A defendant who loses in state court and then sues in federal court is asserting injury at the hands of the state court and his federal suit is making an impermissible attempt to obtain federal collateral review. *Garry v. Gels*, 82 F.3d 1362, 1367-68 (7th Cir. 1996); *Stewart v. Fleet Financial Group*, No. 96-2146, 129 F.3d 1265, 1997 WL 705219, *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 1997).

Plaintiff’s claims are “inextricably intertwined” with decisions of the state courts because they amount to nothing more nor less than a “prohibited appeal” from the decisions of the Michigan state courts. *Peterson Novelties*, 305 F.3d at 390. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit previously has found that the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine bars an action challenging the termination of parental rights in state court proceedings because such an action would be an attempted appeal from a state court decision. *See Bodell v. McDonald*, No. 00-5679, 2001 WL 137557, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2001); *accord Evans v. Yarbrough*, No. 00-3588, 2001 WL 1871701, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 13, 2000) (applying *Rooker-Feldman* to bar review of a decision by the state courts regarding parental visitation). The recourse available to plaintiff in response to adverse state-court decisions was to pursue timely appeals in the Michigan Court of Appeals, thereafter seek leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, and if necessary apply for a writ of *certiorari* to the United States Supreme Court. *Gottfried*, 142 F.3d at 330 (“[L]ower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.”).

Because the *Rooker - Feldman* doctrine clearly precludes a lower federal court from reviewing state-law decisions, Plaintiff's case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine. A claim dismissed on the basis of the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine is legally frivolous and constitutes a dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See *Alpern v. Lieb*, 38 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 1994); *Parker v. Phillips*, No. 01-5325, 2001 WL 1450704 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding action to be frivolous under § 1915(g) where one ground for dismissal is *Rooker-Feldman*); *Carlock v. Williams*, No. 98-5545, 1999 WL 454880 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (same).

Conclusion

Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's action will be dismissed as legally frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See *McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see *McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: December 29, 2009

/s/ Gordon J. Quist
GORDON J. QUIST
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE