

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

WILLIE JACKSON,

Petitioner,

Case No. 1:12-cv-1173

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

KENNETH McKEE,

Respondent.

_____ /

OPINION

This is a habeas corpus action brought by a state prisoner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, RULES GOVERNING § 2254 CASES; *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2243. If so, the petition must be summarily dismissed. Rule 4; *see Allen v. Perini*, 424 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1970) (district court has the duty to “screen out” petitions that lack merit on their face). A dismissal under Rule 4 includes those petitions which raise legally frivolous claims, as well as those containing factual allegations that are palpably incredible or false. *Carson v. Burke*, 178 F.3d 434, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1999). After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, the Court will dismiss the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies.

Discussion

I. Factual allegations

Petitioner is incarcerated in the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility. He pleaded guilty in the Wayne County Circuit Court to armed robbery, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529; car jacking, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.529a; receiving and concealing stolen property (motor vehicle), MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.5357; felon in possession of a firearm, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.224F; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.227b. The trial court sentenced Petitioner on November 4, 2011, to concurrent prison terms of ten to twenty years for the armed-robbery and car-jacking convictions, and three to five years for the felon-in-possession and receiving-and-concealing-stolen-property convictions. The trial court also imposed a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction.

Petitioner claims that he submitted a timely request to the trial court for appointment of appellate counsel, but received no reply. He made further inquiries, but, again, received no response from the court. Petitioner also submitted several requests to the trial court for a copy of the complete trial court record in his criminal case, but received no response. As a result, Petitioner did not file a direct appeal of his conviction.

In his application for habeas corpus relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court violated his right to appointment of appellate counsel on direct appeal as set forth by the Supreme Court in *Halbert v. Michigan*, 545 U.S. 605 (2005) (equal protection and due process principles require the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants seeking first-tier review in the Michigan Court of Appeals of convictions based on guilty pleas). In his second ground for habeas relief, Petitioner contends that the trial court failed to provide him with a copy of the record in violation of *Griffin v. Illinois*, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956).

II. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies

Before the Court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust remedies available in the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); *O'Sullivan v. Boerckel*, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). Exhaustion requires a petitioner to “fairly present” federal claims so that state courts have a “fair opportunity” to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon a petitioner’s constitutional claim. *See O'Sullivan*, 526 U.S. at 842; *Picard v. Connor*, 404 U.S. 270, 275-77 (1971), *cited in Duncan v. Henry*, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995), and *Anderson v. Harless*, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). To fulfill the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must have fairly presented his federal claims to all levels of the state appellate system, including the state’s highest court. *Duncan*, 513 U.S. at 365-66; *Wagner v. Smith*, 581 F.3d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 2009); *Hafley v. Sowders*, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). “[S]tate prisoners must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State’s established appellate review process.” *O'Sullivan*, 526 U.S. at 845. The district court can and must raise the exhaustion issue *sua sponte* when it clearly appears that habeas claims have not been presented to the state courts. *See Prather v. Rees*, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987); *Allen*, 424 F.2d at 138-39.

Petitioner bears the burden of showing that he has exhausted his available state court remedies. *See Rust v. Zent*, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994). Petitioner acknowledges that he has not raised his claims in the state courts, but seeks to invoke the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement where “there is an absence of available State corrective process,” or “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” § 2254(b)(1)(B)(i)-(ii). These exceptions do not apply as Petitioner may file a motion for relief from judgment under MICH. CT. R. 6.500 *et seq.* Under Michigan law, one such motion may be filed after August 1, 1995. MICH. CT. R. 6.502(G)(1). Petitioner has not yet filed his one allotted motion. Petitioner maintains

that trial court's failure to provide him with a copy of the trial record would render that process ineffective. This Court disagrees. A copy of the trial record is not necessary to file a motion for relief from judgment asserting the claims set forth in Petitioner's application for habeas corpus relief. The very nature of Petitioner's claims is that he was denied the constitutionally-required tools to pursue a direct appeal. Moreover, when it is uncertain whether the Michigan courts will consider the petitioner's habeas claims on the merits, this Court will presume that such state relief is available to the petitioner. *Hannah v. Conley*, 49 F.3d 1193, 1196 (6th Cir. 1995); *Brewer v. Dahlberg*, 942 F.2d 328, 340 (6th Cir. 1991). The state courts should have a full and fair opportunity to cure any constitutional infirmities in petitioner's conviction. *See Brewer*, 942 F.2d at 340. Petitioner, therefore, must attempt to exhaust his claims by filing a motion for relief from judgment.

Petitioner's application is subject to the one-year statute of limitations provided in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). In most cases, § 2244(d)(1)(A) provides the operative date from which the one-year limitations period is measured. *See Dodd v. United States*, 545 U.S. 353, 357 (2005). Under that provision, the one-year limitations period runs from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Petitioner was sentenced on November 4, 2011. He did not file a direct appeal of his conviction to either the Michigan Court of Appeals or the Michigan Supreme Court. Where a petitioner has not pursued an avenue of appellate review available to him, the time for seeking review at that level is counted under § 2244(d)(1)(A). *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (time for filing a petition pursuant to § 2254 runs from "the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review *or the expiration of time for seeking such review.*") (emphasis added). Petitioner had six months, until May 4, 2012, in which to file a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals. *See* MICH. CT. R. 7.205(F)(3).

Because Petitioner failed to file a timely appeal to the Michigan Court of Appeals, his conviction became final when his time for seeking review in that court expired. *See Gonzalez v. Thaler*, 132 S. Ct. 641, 655 (2012) (holding that, because the Supreme Court can review only judgments of a state’s highest court, where a petitioner fails to seek review in the state’s highest court, the judgment becomes final when the petitioner’s time expires for seeking state-court review). Petitioner, therefore, has one year from the time his conviction became final on May 4, 2012, in which to file his habeas corpus petition.

In *Palmer v. Carlton*, 276 F.3d 777, 781 (6th Cir. 2002), the Sixth Circuit held that when the dismissal of a “mixed”¹ petition could jeopardize the timeliness of a subsequent petition, the district court should dismiss only the unexhausted claims and stay further proceedings on the remaining portion until the petitioner has exhausted his claims in the state court. The Court indicated that thirty days was a reasonable amount of time for a petitioner to file a motion for post-conviction relief in state court, and another thirty days was a reasonable amount of time for a petitioner to return to federal court after he has exhausted his state-court remedies.² The instant case does not present a mixed petition because none of Petitioner’s claims are exhausted. It is unclear whether *Palmer* applies to a “non-mixed” petition. Assuming *Palmer* applies, Petitioner has more than sixty days remaining in the limitations period, and, thus, he is not in danger of running afoul of the statute of limitations so long as he diligently pursues his state court remedies. Therefore, a stay of these proceedings is not warranted.

¹A “mixed petition” is a habeas corpus petition that contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims.

²The running of the statute of limitations is tolled when “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss the petition for failure to exhaust available state-court remedies.

Certificate of Appealability

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a “substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This Court’s dismissal of Petitioner’s action under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases is a determination that the habeas action, on its face, lacks sufficient merit to warrant service. It would be highly unlikely for this Court to grant a certificate, thus indicating to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals that an issue merits review, when the Court already has determined that the action is so lacking in merit that service is not warranted. *See Love v. Butler*, 952 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1991) (it is “somewhat anomalous” for the court to summarily dismiss under Rule 4 and grant a certificate); *Hendricks v. Vasquez*, 908 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1990) (requiring reversal where court summarily dismissed under Rule 4 but granted certificate); *Dory v. Comm’r of Corr.*, 865 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1989) (it was “intrinsically contradictory” to grant a certificate when habeas action does not warrant service under Rule 4); *Williams v. Kullman*, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (issuing certificate would be inconsistent with a summary dismissal).

The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved the issuance of blanket denials of a certificate of appealability. *Murphy v. Ohio*, 263 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is warranted. *Id.* at 467. Each issue must be considered under the standards set forth by the Supreme

