UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

ROBERT CA	AMPBELL,
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	Plaintiff,		Case No. 1:15-cv-957
v.			Honorable Robert J. Jonker
MICHIGAN REI	FORMATORY,		
	Defendant.		
		/	

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed on grounds of immunity and failure to state a claim.

Factual Allegations

Plaintiff Robert Campbell presently is incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Michigan Reformatory (RMI). RMI is the sole Defendant named in Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff's allegations are limited to two brief statements. He contends that unidentified RMI correctional officers have issued false misconduct tickets against him and against prisoner Bruce and that the warden has not done anything about it. Plaintiff states that correctional officers keep putting "stuff" in his room (Compl., docket #1, PageID #3) and then writing tickets against him, presumably for possession of contraband. For relief, he seeks an injunction barring future such conduct, together with compensatory damages.

Discussion

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails "to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "'probability requirement,' . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*,

550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not 'show[n]' – that the pleader is entitled to relief." *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs.*, 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

Plaintiff seeks damages solely from RMI, an administrative unit of the MDOC. An express requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant be a "person." *See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. *Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). Plaintiff therefore fails to state a claim against RMI.

Furthermore, Plaintiff's claim against RMI is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. *Alabama v. Pugh*, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978). That amendment prohibits suits in federal court against the state or any of its agencies or departments, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. *Pennhurst State School & Hosp.* v. *Haldermann*, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984); *Pugh*, 438 U.S. at 782. A state's Eleventh Amendment

immunity is in the nature of a jurisdictional defense and may be raised on the court's own motion.

Estate of Ritter v. University of Michigan, 851 F.2d 846, 851 (6th Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court

squarely has held that the Eleventh Amendment bars federal suits against state departments of

corrections. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); see also McCoy v. Michigan,

369 F. App'x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010). RMI therefore is immune from suit under § 1983.

Conclusion

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court

determines that Plaintiff's action will be dismissed on grounds of immunity and failure to state a

claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith

within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611

(6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no

good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the

\$505.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless

Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g).

If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: October 5, 2015

/s/ Robert J. Jonker

ROBERT J. JONKER

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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