

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

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MICHAEL GRESHAM,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:16-cv-428

v.

Honorable Janet T. Neff

JOHN CHRISTIANSEN et al.,

Defendants.

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**OPINION DENYING LEAVE  
TO PROCEED *IN FORMA PAUPERIS* - THREE STRIKES**

Plaintiff Michael Gresham, a prisoner incarcerated at Ionia Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Because Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim, he is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the \$400.00 civil action filing fee applicable to those not permitted to proceed *in forma pauperis* within twenty-eight (28) days of this opinion and accompanying order. If Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will order that his action be dismissed without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff will be responsible for payment of the \$400.00 filing fee in accordance with *In re Alea*, 286 F.3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002).

**Discussion**

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner's request for the privilege of proceeding *in forma pauperis*. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA

was “aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners – many of which are meritless – and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts.” *Hampton v. Hobbs*, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to “stop and think” before filing a complaint. *Id.* For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. *Id.* at 1288.

In addition, another provision reinforces the “stop and think” aspect of the PLRA by preventing a prisoner from proceeding *in forma pauperis* when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless lawsuits. Known as the “three-strikes” rule, the provision states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings *in forma pauperis*] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the “three-strikes” rule against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process, and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is *ex post facto* legislation. *Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); accord *Pointer v. Wilkinson*, 502 F.3d 369, 377 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing

*Wilson*, 148 F.3d at 604-06); *Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); *Rivera v. Allin*, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); *Carson v. Johnson*, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has been an active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan, having filed more than forty civil actions. In eight of his cases, all of his claims were dismissed because they were frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim. *See Gresham v. Caruso et al.*, No. 2:10-cv-196 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 27, 2011); *Gresham et al. v. Canlis et al.*, No. 2:11-cv-179 (W.D. Mich. July 29, 2011); *Gresham v. Paine et al.*, No. 1:10-cv-1146 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2011); *Gresham v. Caruso et al.*, No. 1:10-cv-1038 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 26, 2011); *Gresham v. Wolak et al.*, No. 2:10-cv- 239 (W.D. Mich. July 25, 2011); *Gresham v. Verville et al.*, No. 2:10-cv-198 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 19, 2011); *Gresham v. Caruso et al.*, No. 2:10-cv-195 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2011); *Gresham v. Mich. Dep't of Corr. et al.*, No. 2:07-cv-241 (W.D. Mich. June 9, 2008). Plaintiff also has been denied leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* in 17 cases. *See Gresham v. Austin et al.*, 2:16-cv-71 (W.D. Mich. May 2, 2016); *Gresham et al. v. Yunker et al.*, No. 2:13-cv-221 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2013); *Gresham v. Nader et al.*, 2:13-cv-212 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 2013); *Gresham et al. v. Napel et al.*, No. 2:13-cv-176 (W.D. Mich. June 12, 2013); *Gresham v. Prelesnik et al.*, No. 1:12-cv-276 (W.D. Mich. July 2, 2012); *Gresham v. Czop et al.*, No. 1:12-cv-494 (W.D. Mich. June 18, 2012); *Gresham v. Heyns et al.*, No. 1:12-cv-277 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 11, 2012); *Gresham v. Snyder et al.*, No. 1:12-cv-143 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 6, 2012); *Gresham v. Mutschler et al.*, No. 2:12-cv-12 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 20, 2012); *Gresham v. Snyder et al.*, No. 2:12-cv-22 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 30, 2012); *Gresham v. Mutschler et al.*, No. 2:12-cv-9 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 10, 2012); *Gresham v. Snyder et al.*, No. 2:12-cv-5 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 27, 2012); *Gresham v. Violetta et al.*, No. 2:12-cv-24 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012); *Gresham v. Dahl et al.*, No. 2:12-cv-21 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012); *Gresham v. Napel et al.*, No.

2:11-cv-520 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 6, 2012); *Gresham v. LaChance et al.*, No. 2:11-cv-231 (W.D. Mich. June 24, 2011); *Dennis et al v. Canlis et al.*, No. 2:11-cv-186 (W.D. Mich. June 6, 2011).

Moreover, Plaintiff's action does not fall under the exception for an inmate under "imminent danger of serious physical injury." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit set forth the following general requirements for a claim of imminent danger:

In order to allege sufficiently imminent danger, we have held that "the threat or prison condition must be real and proximate and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed." *Rittner v. Kinder*, 290 F. App'x 796, 797 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus a prisoner's assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the exception." *Id.* at 797–98; *see also* [*Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt.*, 508 F. App'x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2012)] ("Allegations of past dangers are insufficient to invoke the exception."); *Percival v. Gerth*, 443 F. App'x 944, 946 (6th Cir. 2011) ("Assertions of past danger will not satisfy the 'imminent danger' exception."); *cf.* [*Pointer v. Wilkinson*, 502 F.3d 369, 371 n.1 (6th Cir. 2007)] (implying that past danger is insufficient for the imminent-danger exception).

In addition to a temporal requirement, we have explained that the allegations must be sufficient to allow a court to draw reasonable inferences that the danger exists. To that end, "district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly baseless (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of irrational or wholly incredible)." *Rittner*, 290 F. App'x at 798 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); *see also Taylor*, 508 F. App'x at 492 ("Allegations that are conclusory, ridiculous, or clearly baseless are also insufficient for purposes of the imminent-danger exception.").

*Vandiver v. Prison Health Services, Inc.*, 727 F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013). A prisoner's claim of imminent danger is subject to the same notice pleading requirement as that which applies to prisoner complaints. *Id.* Consequently, a prisoner must allege facts in the complaint from which the Court could reasonably conclude that the prisoner was under an existing danger at the time he filed his complaint, but the prisoner need not affirmatively prove those allegations. *Id.*

In the instant case, Plaintiff complains about conduct that occurred between June and August 2015 more than six months prior to the filing of his complaint. He alleges that Correctional

Officers Watkins, Lyod and Thurlby (who are not Defendants in this action), together with Defendant Officers Maxim, Fineis and Desrochers, came to his cell. The officers told Plaintiff that Defendant Officers Dahl and Gibbs had instructed them to assault Plaintiff for attempting to expose Plaintiff's sexual relationships with Dahl and Gibbs. Maxim and Fineis also demanded the love letters written by Defendants Dahl and Gibbs. Plaintiff was taken to the shower, where Defendants Maxim and Fineis punched Plaintiff, while shouting that Plaintiff was resisting. Once back in the cell, the officers stated, "Payback Snitch." (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Defendant Fineis also allegedly confiscated Plaintiff's legal work and evidence. Plaintiff claims that he subsequently sought protection from the officers through Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) Director Heidi Washington, Administrator Johnson, Warden Smith, Deputy Schiebner, Resident Unit Manager Miniard, and Administrative Assistant Brooke Snyder, none of whom is a Defendant in this action, as well as Defendant Officer Christiansen. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants conspired to have him assaulted, covered up earlier sexual assaults by staff, retaliated against him, and failed to protect him. In addition, he alleges that Defendant Nurses Catela and Sickler failed to treat his injuries, in violation of the Eighth Amendment and in retaliation for his exercise of his First Amendment rights. He also contends that, because Defendants called him a "snitch" for filing lawsuits against their colleagues, he is in imminent danger of serious medical injuries from renewed assaults by Defendants and by other prisoners.

All of Plaintiff's factual allegations concern conduct that occurred more than six months ago. While Plaintiff makes a conclusory allegation that he remains in imminent danger from these Defendants and from other prisoners, he fails to allege any fact suggesting that he faces any risk of serious physical injury, much less that such risk is imminent. *Vandiver*, 727 F.3d. at 585. Such conclusory allegations are insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Plaintiff is in

imminent danger of serious physical injury within the meaning of § 1915(g). *Id.* (citing *Rittner*, 290 F. App'x at 797).

In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding *in forma pauperis* in this action. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of entry of this order to pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is \$400.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the Court will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the 28-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but he will continue to be responsible for payment of the \$400.00 filing fee.

Dated: May 13, 2016 \_\_\_\_\_ /s/ Janet T. Neff \_\_\_\_\_  
Janet T. Neff  
United States District Judge

**SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:**

Clerk, U.S. District Court  
399 Federal Building  
110 Michigan Street, NW  
Grand Rapids, MI 49503

**All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to “Clerk, U.S. District Court.”**