

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MATTHEW L. LOTT,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:20-cv-1255

v.

Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou

CORIZION et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Corizion,¹ Jindell, Lamb, Russell, and Rarbaugh. The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims against the remaining Defendants.

¹ The Court assumes that Plaintiff is referring to Corizion, Inc., and it will use "Corizion" hereafter.

Discussion

I. **Factual allegations**

Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility (ARF) in Adrian, Lenawee County, Michigan. The events about which he complains occurred at that facility and the Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues Corizon, ARF Physician's Assistant (P.A.) R. Jindell, LRF Doctor Peter Scices, LRF Doctor Richard Worel, LRF Registered Nurse (R.N.) Patricia Lamb, MDOC Grievance Coordinator Richard Russell, and MDOC Grievance Director for Medical R. Rarbaugh.

Plaintiff alleges that he only has one kidney. Plaintiff states that as of March 16, 2016, he had been hospitalized due to his kidney under-functioning, and had been seeing a urologist. While at the ARF on August 1, 2016, Plaintiff wrote his first kite asking to be seen by a specialist. After complaining to Defendant Jindell, Plaintiff's kite was responded to as if he had asked to see someone about shoes for his clubbed feet.

After being transferred to LRF, Plaintiff again sought to be seen by a urologist. On January 5, 2017, Plaintiff kited health care with a request to be seen by a cardiologist and a urologist. Plaintiff was told during a callout by Defendant Scices that he needed to drink more fluids because his renal function was impaired. Plaintiff was then seen by Defendant Worel, who told Plaintiff that he did not have to allow Plaintiff to see a urologist, he just had to keep Plaintiff stable. On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff was again seen by Defendant Scices, who told Plaintiff that his renal function was at 1.51, where the normal range was 0.7 to 1.3. However, Plaintiff was still not given the approval to see a urologist. Plaintiff went into renal failure on October 9, 2017, but staff at LRF treated Plaintiff as if he had a stomach flu. Plaintiff alleges that while at LRF, he was

forced to sit in his own urine, vomit, and fecal matter for four days. Finally, on October 13, 2017, a doctor from another facility examined Plaintiff and sent him to the hospital.

Plaintiff was hospitalized at DWH for a month and a half and received his first stents in his urethra and ureter. While there, the urologist issued an order that Plaintiff use a straight catheter to empty his bladder. Because Plaintiff's congenital birth defects prevented him from performing his own catheterizations, it had to be done by medical staff. However, when Plaintiff was sent back to LRF, medical staff refused to perform the procedure. Plaintiff was once again sent to the hospital with renal failure and a foley catheter was inserted. Plaintiff had his stents replaced on February 14, 2018, and was returned to LRF, where he suffered from discomfort and blood in his urine. Plaintiff kited health care with his symptoms, but his complaints were ignored.

Plaintiff was taken to the Macomb Correctional Facility (MRF), where medical staff informed Plaintiff that he had an infection. Plaintiff was sent back to the hospital for treatment. Following his hospitalization, Plaintiff was sent to the Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF), where he was subjected to numerous painful hospital visits to have his foley catheter changed. Plaintiff states that as a result of numerous prior infections, he suffered from scar tissue and a jagged urethra. After a discussion with medical staff, a decision was made to give Plaintiff a suprapubic catheter.

Plaintiff contends that all of the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to cover up their failure to address Plaintiff's serious medical needs and that their failure to act caused him to need surgical intervention for his renal failure. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Jindell was the first to be notified of Plaintiff's problems, but she ignored the issues and was not properly supervised by a doctor. Plaintiff states that Defendants Worel and Scices failed to take action as they watched Plaintiff's health slowly deteriorate. Plaintiff states that Defendants Lamb, Russell, and Rarbaugh

failed to investigate grievances or to properly supervise their subordinates. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Corizon is liable for the actions of its employees.

Plaintiff states that Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as his rights under state law. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as declaratory relief.

II. **Failure to state a claim**

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

III. **Defendants Lamb, Russell, and Rarbaugh**

Plaintiff's only claims against Defendants Lamb, Russell, and Rarbaugh are that they failed to investigate grievances or to properly supervise their subordinates. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676; *Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); *Everson v. Leis*, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. *Grinter v. Knight*, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); *Greene v. Barber*, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one's subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. *Grinter*, 532 F.3d at 576; *Greene*, 310 F.3d at 899; *Summers v. Leis*, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. *See Shehee v. Luttrell*, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 676. Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Lamb, Russell, and Rarbaugh engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.

IV. Defendant Corizon

The Court next notes that Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Corizon is that it is liable for the actions of its employees. A private entity which contracts with the state to perform a traditional state function like providing healthcare to inmates—like Corizon, Inc.—can “be sued under § 1983 as one acting ‘under color of state law.’” *Hicks v. Frey*, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 54 (1988)). The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipality apply equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983. See *Starcher v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc.*, 7 F. App'x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the holding in *Monell* has been extended to private corporations); *Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 102 F.3d 810, 817–18 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); *Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't Store, Inc.*, 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir. 1990) (same); *Cox v. Jackson*, 579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 851-52 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same).

Consequently, Corizon, like a governmental entity, may be held liable under § 1983 if it actually caused the constitutional deprivation. See *Starcher*, 7 F. App'x at 465 (citing *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 690). Liability in a § 1983 action cannot be based on a theory of *respondeat superior*. *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). A custom is a practice “that has not been formally approved by an appropriate decision maker,” but is “so widespread as to have the force of law.” *Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs v. Brown*, 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997). Moreover, the policy or custom “must be the moving force of the constitutional violation.” *Searcy v. City of Dayton*, 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts regarding Defendant Corizon. Therefore, Defendant Corizon is properly dismissed.

V. Defendant Jindell

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Jindell was the first to be notified of Plaintiff's problems in 2016, but she ignored the issues and was not properly supervised by a doctor. However, the only factual allegation against Defendant Jindell is that, after speaking to her, Plaintiff's August 1, 2016, kite was responded to as if he had asked to see someone about shoes for his clubbed feet, and completely ignored his request to see a urologist.

State statutes of limitations and tolling principles apply to determine the timeliness of claims asserted under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *Wilson v. Garcia*, 471 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1985). For civil rights suits filed in Michigan under § 1983, the statute of limitations is three years. *See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(2)*; *Carroll v. Wilkerson*, 782 F.2d 44, 44 (6th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); *Stafford v. Vaughn*, No. 97-2239, 1999 WL 96990, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1999). Accrual of the claim for relief, however, is a question of federal law. *Collyer v. Darling*, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th Cir. 1996); *Sevier v. Turner*, 742 F.2d 262, 272 (6th Cir. 1984). The statute of limitations begins to run when the aggrieved party knows or has reason to know of the injury that is the basis of his action. *Collyer*, 98 F.3d at 220.²

Plaintiff's claim against Defendant Jindell is untimely. He asserts claims arising in August of 2016. Plaintiff had reason to know of the "harms" done to him at the time they occurred. Hence, his claims accrued in 2016. However, he did not file his complaint until December 28, 2020, well past Michigan's three-year limit. Moreover, Michigan law no longer tolls the running of the statute of limitations when a plaintiff is incarcerated. *See Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5851(9)*.

² 28 U.S.C. § 1658 created a "catch-all" limitations period of four years for civil actions arising under federal statutes enacted after December 1, 1990. The Supreme Court's decision in *Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co.*, 541 U.S. 369 (2004), which applied this federal four-year limitations period to a suit alleging racial discrimination under § 1981 does not apply to prisoner claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 because, while § 1983 was amended in 1996, prisoner civil rights actions under § 1983 were not "made possible" by the amended statute. *Id.* at 382.

Further, it is well established that ignorance of the law does not warrant equitable tolling of a statute of limitations. *See Rose v. Dole*, 945 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1991); *Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp.*, 939 F.2d 380, 385 (6th Cir. 1991); *Mason v. Dep't of Justice*, No. 01-5701, 2002 WL 1334756, at *2 (6th Cir. June 17, 2002).

“If the allegations, for example, show that relief is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim” *Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199, 215 (2007); *see also Mattox v. Edelman*, 851 F.3d 583, 590 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that if, on the face of a complaint, the allegations show that relief is barred by an affirmative defense (lack of exhaustion), the complaint is subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim) (citing *Jones*, 549 U.S. at 215); *Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp.*, 676 F.3d 542, 547 (6th Cir. 2012) (when a complaint on its face is barred by the statute of limitations, it fails to state a claim). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s complaint against Defendant Jindall will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

VI. Defendants Scices and Worel

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Scices and Worel violated his Eighth Amendment rights because they were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical condition. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Scices and Worel violated his right under the Fourteenth Amendment to substantive due process.

A. Eighth Amendment

The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately

indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. *Id.* at 104-05; *Comstock v. McCrary*, 273 F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).

A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. *Id.* In other words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. *Id.* The objective component of the adequate medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” *Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty.*, 390 F.3d 890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); *see also Phillips v. Roane Cnty.*, 534 F.3d 531, 539–40 (6th Cir. 2008). Obviousness, however, is not strictly limited to what is detectable to the eye. Even if the layman cannot see the medical need, a condition may be obviously medically serious where a layman, if informed of the true medical situation, would deem the need for medical attention clear. *See, e.g., Rouster v. Saginaw Cnty.*, 749 F.3d 437, 446–51 (6th Cir. 2014) (holding that a prisoner who died from a perforated duodenum exhibited an “objectively serious need for medical treatment,” even though his symptoms appeared to the medical staff at the time to be consistent with alcohol withdrawal); *Johnson v. Karnes*, 398 F.3d 868, 874 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that prisoner’s severed tendon was a “quite obvious” medical need, since “any lay person would realize to be serious,” even though the condition was not visually obvious). If the plaintiff’s claim, however, is based on “the prison’s failure to treat a condition adequately, or where the prisoner’s affliction is seemingly minor or non-obvious,” *Blackmore*, 390 F.3d at 898, the plaintiff must “place verifying medical evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of the delay in medical treatment,” *Napier v. Madison Cnty.*, 238 F.3d 739, 742 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. *Brown v. Bargery*, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” *Id.* at 837. To prove a defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence . . . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” *Rhinehart v. Scutt*, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting *Farmer*, 511 U.S. at 842)).

However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. *Estelle*, 429 U.S. at 105. As the Supreme Court explained:

[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.

Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. *Sanderfer v. Nichols*, 62 F.3d 151, 154–55 (6th Cir. 1995); *Ward v. Smith*, No. 95-6666, 1996 WL 627724, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 1996). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and considerable suffering. *Gabehart v. Chapleau*, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 1997).

The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate medical treatment.” *Westlake v. Lucas*, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” *Id.*; see also *Rouster*, 749 F.3d at 448; *Perez v. Oakland Cnty.*, 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir. 2006); *Kellerman v. Simpson*, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); *McFarland v. Austin*, 196 F. App’x 410 (6th Cir. 2006); *Edmonds v. Horton*, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); *Brock v. Crall*, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); *Berryman v. Rieger*, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir. 1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, as here, he must show that his treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” *Mitchell v. Hininger*, 553 F. App’x 602, 605 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Alspaugh v. McConnell*, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). He must demonstrate that the care he received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See *Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.*, 408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting *Waldrop v. Evans*, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir. 1989)).

Plaintiff alleges that while at LRF, he sought to be seen by a urologist. Plaintiff states that Defendants Worel and Scices failed to take action as they watched Plaintiff’s health slowly deteriorate. The only allegations which specifically mention Defendants Worel and Scices in the body of Plaintiff’s complaint are that he kited health care on January 5, 2017, with a request to be seen by a cardiologist and a urologist. Plaintiff was told during a callout by Defendant Scices that he needed to drink more fluids because his renal function was impaired. Plaintiff was then seen by Defendant Worel, who told Plaintiff that he did not have to allow Plaintiff to see a

urologist, he just had to keep Plaintiff stable. On May 17, 2017, Plaintiff was again seen by Defendant Scices, who told Plaintiff that his renal function was at 1.51, where the normal range was 0.7 to 1.3. However, Plaintiff was still not given the approval to see a urologist. Plaintiff claims that Defendants Scices and Worel were aware of his worsening condition, but did nothing, which caused him to go into renal failure on October 9, 2017. The Court concludes that based on the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint, he succeeded in stating an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Scices and Worel. Therefore, Defendants Scices and Worel may not be dismissed on initial review.

B. Fourteenth Amendment

Plaintiff also asserts a violation of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits states from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “Substantive due process ‘prevents the government from engaging in conduct that shocks the conscience or interferes with rights implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” *Prater v. City of Burnside*, 289 F.3d 417, 431 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting *United States v. Salerno*, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)). “Substantive due process . . . serves the goal of preventing governmental power from being used for purposes of oppression, regardless of the fairness of the procedures used.” *Pittman v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs.*, 640 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting *Howard v. Grinage*, 82 F.3d 1343, 1349 (6th Cir. 1996)). “Conduct shocks the conscience if it ‘violates the “decencies of civilized conduct.””” *Range v. Douglas*, 763 F.3d 573, 589 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting *Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis*, 523 U.S. 833, 846–47 (1998) (quoting *Rochin v. California*, 342 U.S. 165, 172–73 (1952))). The Sixth Circuit has held that framing an inmate by planting evidence may violate substantive due process where a defendant’s conduct shocks the conscience and constitutes an “egregious abuse of governmental power.” *Cale v. Johnson*, 861 F.2d 943, 950 (6th Cir. 1988),

overruled in other part by Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 388 (6th Cir. 1999); *see also Davis v. Gallagher*, No. 1:16-cv-1405, 2016 WL 7403941, *4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 22, 2016); *Robinson v. Schertz*, No. 2:07-cv-78, 2007 WL 4454293 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 14, 2007).

“Where a particular [a]mendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that [a]mendment, not the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 269 (1994) (quoting *Graham v. Connor*, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that the Fourth Amendment, not substantive due process, provides the standard for analyzing claims involving unreasonable search or seizure of free citizens, and the Eighth Amendment provides the standard for such searches of prisoners), *overruled on other grounds by Saucier v. Katz*, 533 U.S. 194 (2001)). If such an amendment exists, the substantive due process claim is properly dismissed. *Heike v. Guevara*, 519 F. App’x 911, 923 (6th Cir. 2013).

In this case, the Eighth Amendment provides an explicit source of constitutional protection to Plaintiff concerning his medical claims. *See Whitley v. Albers*, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986) (rejecting a substantive due process claim where the Eighth Amendment supplies a textual source for prison-condition claims); *Dodson v. Wilkinson*, 304 F. App’x 434, 438 (6th Cir. 2008) (because the Eighth Amendment supplies the explicit textual source of constitutional protection for claims governing a prisoner’s health and safety, the plaintiff’s substantive due process claim was subject to dismissal). Consequently, Plaintiff’s substantive due process claim will be dismissed.

VII. **Pendant state law claims**

Plaintiff claims that Defendants Scices and Worel violated state law because they were grossly negligent in their treatment of him. Because Plaintiff continues to have Eighth

Amendment claims against Defendants Scices and Worel, the Court has pendant jurisdiction over his state law claims.

VIII. Pending request for copies of grievances

Plaintiff has filed a letter (ECF No. 5) requesting copies of step III grievances related to this lawsuit. Because Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that he currently needs to have copies of the requested grievances, this request is properly denied.

Conclusion

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Defendants Corizon, Lamb, Russell, Rarbaugh, and Jindall will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims against the remaining Defendants. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment and state law claims against Defendants Scices and Worel remain in the case.

An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.

Dated: March 30, 2021

/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE