



was “aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners--many of which are meritless-- and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts.” *Hampton v. Hobbs*, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to “stop and think” before filing a complaint. *Id.* For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. *Id.* at 1288.

In addition, another provision reinforces the “stop and think” aspect of the PLRA by preventing a prisoner from proceeding *in forma pauperis* when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless lawsuits. Known as the “three-strikes” rule, the provision states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings *in forma pauperis*] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

The statutory restriction “[i]n no event,” found in § 1915(g), is express and unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is “under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the “three-strikes” rule against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process, and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is ex post facto legislation. *Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d

596, 604-606 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 525 U.S. 1139 (1999); *accord Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); *Rivera v. Allin*, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); *Carson v. Johnson*, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has been an active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan. In at least three of these lawsuits, the court entered dismissals on the grounds of frivolousness. *See Clark v. Wayne County*, No. 2:94-cv-72424 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 14, 1994) (ord.); *Clark v. Smith*, No. 1:92-cv-31 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 3, 1992) (ord.); *Clark v. City of Detroit*, No. 2:91-cv-73892 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 1991) (ord.). Although each of the dismissals were entered before enactment of the PLRA on April 26, 1996, the dismissals nevertheless count as strikes. *See Wilson*, 148 F.3d at 604. In addition, the court has denied plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* based on 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) on at least six prior occasions. *See Clark v. Schroeder*, No. 2:01-cv-90 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 25, 2001) (mem. op. & order); *Clark v. Lemke*, No. 1:01-cv-15 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2001) (mem. op. & order); *Clark v. Palmer*, No. 1:99-cv-120 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 26, 1999) (mem. op. & order); *Clark v. Allen*, 1:99-mc-65 (W.D. Mich. July 9, 1999) (op. & ord.); *Clark v. Ball*, No. 4:97-cv-87 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 9, 1998) (mem. op. & ord.); *Clark v. Vidor*, No. 1:97-cv-509 (W.D. Mich. July 11, 1997) (op. & ord.). Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations do not fall within the exception to the three strikes rule, because he does not allege any facts establishing that he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Allegations that a prisoner has faced imminent danger in the past are insufficient to trigger the exception under § 1915(g). *Ashley v. Dilworth*, 147 F.3d 715, 717 (8th Cir. 1998); *accord Banos v. O'Guin*, 144 F.3d 883, 884 (5th Cir. 1998) ("The plain language of the statute leads us to conclude that a prisoner with three strikes is entitled to proceed with his action or appeal only if he is in imminent danger at the time that he seeks to file his suit in district court or seeks to proceed with his appeal or files a motion to proceed IFP."). *See also Luedtke v. Bertrand*, 32 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1077 (E.D. Wis. 1999) ("[T]he exception for claims concerning an 'imminent danger of serious physical injury' cannot be triggered solely by complaints of past abuse.")

In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding *in forma pauperis* in this action. Plaintiff has thirty days from the date of entry of this order to pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is \$350.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the court will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the thirty-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but he will continue to be responsible for payment of the \$350.00 filing fee. *In re Alea*, 286 F3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002).

Dated: \_\_\_\_\_

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R. ALLAN EDGAR  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

**SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:**

Clerk, U.S. District Court  
229 Federal Building  
202 W. Washington St.  
Marquette, MI 49855

**All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to “Clerk, U.S. District Court.”**