

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
NORTHERN DIVISION

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MICHAEL GRESHAM,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:10-cv-196

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

PATRICIA L. CARUSO, et al.,

Defendants.

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**OPINION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* without payment of an initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

**Factual Allegations**

Plaintiff Michael Gresham, an inmate at the Ionia Maximum Correctional Facility, filed this *pro se* civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants MDOC Director

Patricia Caruso, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), Mailroom Administrator J. Bolton, Mailroom Staff T. Dusseaut, Mailroom Business Office Staff T. Maynard, S. Paul, Resident Unit Manager Ben Mercier, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Chad A. Lancour<sup>1</sup>, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Mark Pokley, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Nicole Dahl, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Karen Gieson, Acting Inspector L. Marshall, Administrative Assistant Sarah Schroeder, James Alexander, Warden Robert Napel, Grievance Manager Richard Russell, Unknown Parties John and Jane Doe Defendants, Sergeant Unknown Makela, Sergeant Unknown Burnett, Sergeant Unknown Tasson, Resident Unit Manager Ken Niemisto, Inspector Shane Place, Sergeant Unknown Sunholm, Hearing Investigator Rick H. Mohr, Governor Granholm, Governor Snyder, Corrections Officer Unknown Kangas, Unknown Verville, Unknown Karki, Resident Unit Officer P. Lay, Resident Unit Officer Ron Segoi<sup>2</sup>, Hearing Officer Thomas O. Mohrman, Hearings Administrator Matthew D. Young, and Hearings Administrator Richard B. Stapleton.

In his amended complaint (docket #16), which is somewhat incoherent, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts with regard to the majority of the listed Defendants. Plaintiff asserts that on August 12, 2010, he received a false misconduct ticket from Defendant Kangas. Plaintiff states that this ticket was in retaliation for Plaintiff's prior conduct in filing grievances and lawsuits. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Mohr destroyed Plaintiff's statement, that Defendants Verville and Karki "harassed" him, and that Defendants Lay and Segoi refused to allow him to attend his hearing. Plaintiff was found guilty of the misconduct ticket by Defendant Mohrman on August 20, 2010, and his appeal was subsequently denied by Defendants Young and Stapleton.

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<sup>1</sup>Also named as Chad Lacount.

<sup>2</sup>Also named as Ron Sego.

In support of his complaint, Plaintiff attaches a copy of the misconduct hearing report for the misconduct he received on August 12, 2010. Plaintiff was charged with threatening behavior. In the Evidence/Statements section of the report, Defendant Mohrman notes:

Per [Resident Unit Officers] Sego and Lay, the prisoner when asked said he was not going to his hearing which I take as a refusal and hold this hearing without the prisoner present.

This hearing officer then read the misconduct; entered a not guilty and noted the prisoner was interviewed but declined to give a statement on the charge.

The prisoner had requested video but the video has no audio so would not tell me if the prisoner did or did not make the comment.

Defendant Mohrman found Plaintiff guilty of threatening behavior, stating:

The prisoner is guilty of the charge based upon the report which is logical and persuasive. The officer came to the prisoner's cell because he was yelling and had clothing and sheets on the bars. The prisoner got upset. The prisoner told the officer fuck you. He then threw an orange juice container at the officer. The act of throwing something at a statement member was done to make him believe he would be attacked and physically injured and abused.

As a result of his misconduct conviction, Plaintiff was sentenced to 30 days detention and 30 days loss of privileges. (See docket #16, attachment #1.)

Plaintiff claims that Defendants' conduct violated his right to be free from retaliation, as well as his due process rights. For relief, Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as equitable relief.

### **Discussion**

#### **I. Failure to state a claim**

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp.*

*v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."). The court must determine whether the complaint contains "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a "probability requirement," . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not 'show[n]' – that the pleader is entitled to relief." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); see also *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs.*, 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

Initially, the court notes that Plaintiff has named the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) as a Defendant in this case. Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the Michigan Department of Corrections. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. *See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); *Alabama v. Pugh*, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); *O'Hara v. Wigginton*, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, *Quern v. Jordan*, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. *Abick v. Michigan*, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. *See, e.g., McCoy v. Michigan*, 369 F. App'x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. Mar. 12, 2010); *Turnboe v. Stegall*, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at \*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. *See Lapidus v. Bd. of Regents*, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing *Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Therefore, the Court dismisses the Michigan Department of Corrections.

As noted above, Defendant Mohrman was employed as a hearing officer during the pertinent time period. The Sixth Circuit, recognizing that a Michigan hearings officer has adjudicatory functions spelled out by statute in the nature of an administrative law judge, has held that hearings officers are entitled to absolute judicial immunity in relation to actions within the officer's authority. *Shelly v. Johnson*, 849 F.2d 228, 229 (6th Cir. 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 791.251-255. *See also Williams v. McGinnis*, Nos. 02-1336, 02-1837, 2003 WL 245352, at \*2 (6th

Cir. Jan. 31, 2003) (recognizing that Michigan's prison hearings officers are entitled to absolute immunity); *Thompson v. Mich. Dep't of Corr.*, No. 01-1943, 2002 WL 22011, at \*1 (6th Cir. Jan. 2, 2002) (same); *Gribble v. Bass*, No. 93-5413, 1993 WL 524022, at \*2 (6th Cir. Dec. 16, 1993) (same). Plaintiff's action fails because Defendant Mohrman is absolutely immune under the circumstances of this case.

Much of Plaintiff's complaint is incoherent, conclusory and unsupported by specific factual allegations. Plaintiff makes generalized conclusory allegations regarding the failure of supervisors to take corrective action when notified of their subordinates' misconduct. Liability under Section 1983 must be based on more than merely the right to control employees. *Polk Co. v. Dodson*, 454 U.S. 312, 325-26 (1981); *Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Thus, Section 1983 liability cannot be premised upon mere allegations of *respondeat superior*. *Monell*, 436 U.S. at 691; *Polk*, 454 U.S. at 325. A party cannot be held liable under Section 1983 absent a showing that the party personally participated in, or otherwise authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. *See e.g. Leach v. Shelby Co. Sheriff*, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989), *cert. denied*, 495 U.S. 932 (1990); *Hays v. Jefferson*, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 833 (1982). *See also Bellamy v. Bradley*, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir.), *cert. denied* 469 U.S. 845 (1984).

Supervisory officials can be held liable for the acts of their subordinates only if plaintiff establishes that the supervisor failed to appropriately discharge his supervisory duties, and that this failure resulted in a denial or deprivation of plaintiff's federal rights. *See e.g. Leach*, 891 F.2d at 1246; *Hayes v. Vessey*, 777 F.2d 1149, 1154 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the failure of a supervisor to supervise, control or train the offending employee is not actionable absent a showing that the official implicitly encouraged, authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in, or in some

other way directly participated in, the offensive conduct. *Leach*, 891 F.2d at 1246. Such a claim requires, at a minimum, that the official had knowledge of the offending employee's conduct at a time when the conduct could be prevented, or that such conduct was otherwise foreseeable or predictable. *See e.g. Gibson v. Foltz*, 963 F.2d 851, 854 (6th Cir. 1992). In addition, plaintiff must show that defendant had some duty or authority to act. *See e.g. Birrell v. Brown*, 867 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1989) (lower level official not liable for shortcomings of building); *Ghandi v. Police Dept. of City of Detroit*, 747 F.2d 338, 351 (6th Cir. 1984) (mere presence at the scene is insufficient grounds to impose Section 1983 liability in the absence of a duty to act); *accord Hall v. Shipley*, 932 F.2d 1147 (6th Cir. 1991). In addition, merely bringing a problem to the attention of a supervisory official is not sufficient to impose such liability. *See Shelly v. Johnson*, 684 F. Supp. 941, 946 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (Hillman, C.J.), *aff'd* 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988). Finally, supervisory liability claims cannot be based on simple negligence. *Leach*, 891 F.2d at 1246; *Weaver v. Toombs*, 756 F. Supp. 335, 337 (W.D. Mich. 1989), *aff'd* 915 F.2d 1574 (6th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiff has not alleged facts establishing that Defendants Caruso, Bolton, Dusseaut, Maynard, Paul, Mercier, Lancour, Pokley, Dahl, Gieson, Marshall, Schroeder, Alexander, Napel, Russell, Unknown Parties John and Jane Doe Defendants, Makela, Burnett, Tasson, Niemisto, Place, Sunholm, Granholm, Snyder, Young, and Stapleton were personally involved in the underlying misconduct in this case. In fact, Plaintiff fails to specifically mention the majority of these Defendants in the body of his amended complaint. The court notes that the only involvement that any of these Defendants had in this action was to respond to grievances or to otherwise fail to act on Plaintiff's behalf. Defendants Caruso, Bolton, Dusseaut, Maynard, Paul, Mercier, Lancour, Pokley, Dahl, Gieson, Marshall, Schroeder, Alexander, Napel, Russell, Unknown Parties John and Jane Doe Defendants, Makela, Burnett, Tasson, Niemisto, Place, Sunholm, Granholm, Snyder,

Young, and Stapleton cannot be liable for such conduct under § 1983. *Shehee v. Luttrell*, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 530 U.S. 1264 (2000). Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Caruso, Bolton, Dusseaut, Maynard, Paul, Mercier, Lancour, Pokley, Dahl, Gieson, Marshall, Schroeder, Alexander, Napel, Russell, Unknown Parties John and Jane Doe Defendants, Makela, Burnett, Tasson, Niemisto, Place, Sunholm, Granholm, Snyder, Young, and Stapleton are properly dismissed for lack of personal involvement.

Plaintiff makes a conclusory assertion that Defendants Verville and Karki "harassed" him, but fails to allege any specific facts regarding this harassment. Claims of abusive language and general harassment do not state a claim under the Eighth Amendment or the substantive due process clause. *Ivey v. Wilson*, 832 F.2d 950 (6th Cir. 1987); *Ishaaq v. Compton*, 900 F. Supp. 935, 944 (W.D. Tenn., 1995); *Meadows v. Gibson*, 855 F. Supp. 223, 225 (W.D. Tenn., 1994). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Verville and Karki are properly dismissed.

Plaintiff claims that the conduct of Defendants Mohr, Kangas, Vien, Lay and Marshall violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. "The Fourteenth Amendment protects an individual from deprivation of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." *Bazetta v. McGinnis*, 430 F.3d 795, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). To establish a Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that one of these interests is at stake. *Wilkinson v. Austin*, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005). Analysis of a procedural due process claim involves two steps: "[T]he first asks whether there exists a liberty or property interest which has been interfered with by the State; the second examines whether the procedures attendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally sufficient." *Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson*, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). The Supreme Court long has held that the Due Process Clause does not protect every change in the conditions of confinement having an impact on a prisoner. *See Meachum v. Fano*, 427



U.S. 215, 225 (1976). In *Sandin v. Conner*, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995), the Court set forth the standard for determining when a state-created right creates a federally cognizable liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. According to the *Sandin* Court, a prisoner is entitled to the protections of due process only when the sanction “will inevitably affect the duration of his sentence” or when a deprivation imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” *Sandin*, 515 U.S. at 486-87; *see also Jones v. Baker*, 155 F.3d 810, 812 (6th Cir. 1998); *Rimmer-Bey v. Brown*, 62 F.3d 789, 790-91 (6th Cir. 1995). The *Sandin* Court concluded that mere placement in administrative segregation did not implicate a liberty interest because the segregation at issue in that case did not impose an atypical and significant hardship. *Sandin*, 515 U.S. at 484; *Wilkinson v. Austin*, 545 U.S. 209, 222-23 (2005).

Here, Plaintiff clearly has failed to suggest that the 30 days of detention and 30 days loss of privileges imposed an atypical and significant hardship. Therefore, Plaintiff’s due process claim is properly dismissed.

Plaintiff makes a conclusory claim that Defendants Mohr, Kangas, Vien, Lay and Marshall retaliated against him in their handling of his major misconduct ticket. Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the Constitution. *See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter*, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least in part, by the protected conduct. *Thaddeus-X*, 175 F.3d at 394. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged

retaliatory conduct. *See Smith v. Campbell*, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing *Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle*, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).

Although Plaintiff claims that he filed prior grievances and lawsuits, he fails to allege any specific facts in support of his claim that Defendants' conduct was motivated by a desire to retaliate against him. Filing a grievance is constitutionally protected conduct under the First Amendment. *See Smith v. Campbell*, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001); *Noble v. Schmitt*, 87 F.3d 157, 162 (6th Cir. 1996). Temporal proximity may be “significant enough to constitute indirect evidence of a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive.” *Muhammad v. Close*, 379 F.3d 413, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting *DiCarlo v. Potter*, 358 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir. 2004)). However, “[c]onclusory allegations of temporal proximity are not sufficient to show a retaliatory motive.” *Skinner v. Bolden*, 89 F. App'x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2004).

Moreover, *Muhammad* does not stand for the proposition that temporal proximity alone is sufficient to create an issue of fact as to retaliatory motive.

In *Muhammad* the Sixth Circuit did not resolve the issue, but merely observed that “temporal proximity alone **may be** ‘significant enough to constitute indirect evidence of a causal connection so as to create an inference of retaliatory motive.’” *Id.* at 418 (quoting *DiCarlo v. Potter*, 358 F.3d 408, 422 (6th Cir.2004) (emphasis added). Even if temporal proximity may in some cases create an issue of fact as to retaliatory motive, it would only be sufficient if the evidence was “significant enough.” Plaintiff’s conclusory and ambiguous evidence is not “significant enough” to create an issue of fact as to retaliatory motive.

*Brandon v. Bergh*, 2010 WL 188731, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Mich., Jan. 16, 2010). As noted above, Plaintiff fails to allege any specific facts in support of his retaliation claims against Defendants Mohr, Kangas, Vien, Lay and Marshall. Because, Plaintiff’s retaliation claims are entirely conclusory, they are properly dismissed.

### **Conclusion**

Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's action will be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: October 27, 2011

/s/ Gordon J. Quist  
GORDON J. QUIST  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE