UNITED STATES OF AMERICA UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

BILLY JOE PAIGE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:11-cv-289

v.

Honorable Gordon J. Quist

MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION DENYING LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS - THREE STRIKES

Plaintiff Billy Joe Paige, a prisoner incarcerated at Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Because Plaintiff has filed at least three lawsuits that were dismissed as frivolous, malicious or for failure to state a claim, he is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Court will order Plaintiff to pay the \$350.00 civil action filing fee within twenty-eight (28) days of this opinion and accompanying order, and if Plaintiff fails to do so, the Court will order that his action be dismissed without prejudice. Even if the case is dismissed, Plaintiff will be responsible for payment of the \$350.00 filing fee in accordance with *In re Alea*, 286 F.3d 378, 380-81 (6th Cir. 2002).

Discussion

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), which was enacted on April 26, 1996, amended the procedural rules governing a prisoner's request for the privilege of proceeding *in forma pauperis*. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the PLRA was "aimed at the skyrocketing numbers of claims filed by prisoners – many of which are meritless – and the corresponding burden those filings have placed on the federal courts." *Hampton*

v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1286 (6th Cir. 1997). For that reason, Congress put into place economic incentives to prompt a prisoner to "stop and think" before filing a complaint. *Id.* For example, a prisoner is liable for the civil action filing fee, and if the prisoner qualifies to proceed *in forma pauperis*, the prisoner may pay the fee through partial payments as outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The constitutionality of the fee requirements of the PLRA has been upheld by the Sixth Circuit. *Id.* at 1288.

In addition, another provision reinforces the "stop and think" aspect of the PLRA by preventing a prisoner from proceeding *in forma pauperis* when the prisoner repeatedly files meritless lawsuits. Known as the "three-strikes" rule, the provision states:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under [the section governing proceedings *in forma pauperis*] if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The statutory restriction "[i]n no event," found in § 1915(g), is express and unequivocal. The statute does allow an exception for a prisoner who is "under imminent danger of serious physical injury." The Sixth Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of the "three-strikes" rule against arguments that it violates equal protection, the right of access to the courts, and due process, and that it constitutes a bill of attainder and is *ex post facto* legislation. *Wilson v. Yaklich*, 148 F.3d 596, 604-06 (6th Cir. 1998); *accord Rodriguez v. Cook*, 169 F.3d 1176, 1178-82 (9th Cir. 1999); *Rivera v. Allin*, 144 F.3d 719, 723-26 (11th Cir. 1998); *Carson v. Johnson*, 112 F.3d 818, 821-22 (5th Cir. 1997).

Plaintiff has been an active litigant in the federal courts in Michigan, having filed more than twenty-five civil actions in this Court. The Court dismissed at least three of Plaintiff's lawsuits because the complaints were frivolous, malicious or failed to state a claim. *See Paige v. Manisto*, No. 2:06-cv-32 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2006); *Paige v. Pennell*, No. 2:02-cv-169 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 7, 2003); *Paige v. Pandya*, No. 1:00-cv-33 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 8, 2000). Plaintiff also has been denied leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* because he has three strikes. *See, e.g., Paige v. Cox*, No. 2:08-cv-116 (W. D. Mich. Aug. 13, 2008); *Paige v. Johnson*, No. 2:06-cv-155 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 23, 2006).

Moreover, Plaintiff's allegations do not fall within the exception to the three strikes rule, because he does not allege any facts establishing that he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). Congress did not define "imminent danger" in the PLRA, but it is significant that Congress chose to use the word "imminent," a word that conveys the idea of immediacy. In a recent decision, the Sixth Circuit recognized the standard adopted by other circuit courts:

While the Sixth Circuit has not defined the term "imminent danger" for purposes of this section, other Circuits have held that to meet the requirement, the threat or prison condition "must be real and proximate" and the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the complaint is filed. *See, e.g., Ciarpaglini v. Saini*, 352 F.3d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 2003); *Abdul-Akbar v. McKelvie*, 239 F.3d 307, 313 (3d Cir. 2001) (en banc). Thus a prisoner's assertion that he or she faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the exception. *Id.* Other Circuits also have held that district courts may deny a prisoner leave to proceed pursuant to § 1915(g) when the prisoner's claims of imminent danger are "conclusory or ridiculous," *Ciarpaglini*, 352 F.3d at 331, or are "clearly baseless' (i.e. are fantastic or delusional and rise to the level of 'irrational or wholly incredible)." *Gibbs v. Cross*, 160 F.3d 962, 967 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)).

Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App'x 796, 797-98 (6th Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff, who refers to himself in the complaint as "God the Father, Jesus the Son,

The Sweet Devine Holy Spirit," makes the following allegations in his complaint (verbatim):

The unidentified Islam prisoners group have threaten my life to go too G.P. because I worship & witness to Jesus.

The rest of (MDOC) Def's know this & know there is documentation in my files but wont do any thing about. All acting under color of law this is specific constitutional 8th am. right alleged infringed is identified which is the right secured by the federal constitution who deprivation was committed by a person)s) acting under of state law to our RLUIPA 2000.

(Compl., docket #1, Page ID#3.) For relief, Plaintiff seeks transfer to a level II facility in the Eastern District of Michigan. He also seeks an order to "disapprove this revolt sect attacking Jesus people & place us under court protection." (*Id.* at Page ID#4.) Plaintiff's factual allegations are far too vague and conclusory to constitute imminent danger. While Plaintiff generally alleges that a group of Islam prisoners have threatened his life because he worships Jesus, he does not provide any specific factual allegations regarding who made the threats, when and where the threats were made, etc. Plaintiff, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that he is in real and proximate danger of serious physical injury.

In light of the foregoing, § 1915(g) prohibits Plaintiff from proceeding *in forma pauperis* in this action. Plaintiff has twenty-eight (28) days from the date of entry of this order to pay the entire civil action filing fee, which is \$350.00. When Plaintiff pays his filing fee, the Court will screen his complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). If Plaintiff fails to pay the filing fee within the 28-day period, his case will be dismissed without prejudice, but he will continue to be responsible for payment of the \$350.00 filing fee.

Dated: August 24, 2011

/s/ Gordon J. Quist GORDON J. QUIST UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SEND REMITTANCES TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS:

Clerk, U.S. District Court 399 Federal Building 110 Michigan Street, NW Grand Rapids, MI 49503

All checks or other forms of payment shall be payable to "Clerk, U.S. District Court."