

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
NORTHERN DIVISION

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KYLE JOSEPH LONGACRE,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 2:12-cv-206

v.

Honorable R. Allan Edgar

RICK SNYDER et al.,

Defendants.

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**OPINION**

This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's *pro se* complaint indulgently, *see Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, Plaintiff's action will be dismissed on immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim.

## Factual Allegations

Plaintiff presently is incarcerated at the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility. In his *pro se* complaint, he sues Michigan Governor Rick Snyder, the State of Michigan, the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), MDOC Director Daniel H. Heyns, Warden Unknown Curley, the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (AMF), the Michigan Parole Board, the Michigan Legislature and unknown parties for violating his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.<sup>1</sup>

Plaintiff's complaint concerns the parole system. Plaintiff first alleges that other states grant an inmate's parole after they complete their minimum sentence, whereas Michigan does not release a prisoner until the inmate has served his or her maximum sentence. Moreover, Plaintiff states that a parole denial wrongly enhances a prisoner's minimum sentence, the Michigan Parole Board routinely fails to state substantial and compelling reasons for departing from the parole guidelines, and prisoners erroneously lack the ability to appeal a parole denial under Michigan law and MDOC policy in violation of the Fifth Amendment. As for his Sixth Amendment claim, Plaintiff states that the denial of counsel at the Michigan Parole Board hearings violates his right to the effective assistance of counsel.

In violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, Plaintiff claims that prisoners are "held captive against their will, in an environment where very little is provided, violence by prisoners and

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<sup>1</sup>Plaintiff purports to bring this action on behalf of prisoners incarcerated at AMF and other facilities. Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the constitutional rights of other prisoners. *Newsom v. Norris*, 888 F.2d 371, 381 (6th Cir. 1989); *Raines v. Goedde*, No. 92-3120, 1992 WL 188120, at \*2 (6th Cir. Aug. 6, 1992). As a layman, Plaintiff may only represent himself with respect to his individual claims, and may not act on behalf of other prisoners. *See O'Malley v. Brierley*, 477 F.2d 785 (3d Cir. 1973); *Lutz v. LaVelle*, 809 F. Supp. 323, 325 (M.D. Pa. 1991); *Snead v. Kirkland*, 462 F. Supp. 914, 918 (E.D. Pa. 1978).

corrections officers alike is [imminent], food is unessential and at times [inadequate], health care is provided at an emergency needed basis, prisoner store prices are outrageously high, working wages are extremely low, . . . [and] prisoners who have been denied parole could have had the opportunity to put all these things behind them had parole been granted.” (Compl., docket #1, Page ID#4.) Plaintiff further alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment rights have been violated because prisoners are being treated as slaves and “denied the opportunity of obtaining an education by means of either secondary degrees, trade certificates and/or better thought process classes, where nothing is being provided to change the Michigan Parole Board’s decision to both deny parole and classify prisoners as menaces to society . . . .” (*Id.*)

Plaintiff finally complains that Governor Snyder appointed MDOC Director Heyns and “through the powers of the Michigan Legislation by way of the Truth In Sentencing have established grounds in which the Michigan Parole Board has carried out multiple decisions [that violate] . . . prisoners civil rights . . . .” (*Id.*, Page ID#5.)

For relief, Plaintiff requests changes in the parole system and in the MDOC prisons and to be awarded monetary damages.

## **Discussion**

### I. Immunity

Plaintiff may not maintain a § 1983 action against the Michigan Department of Corrections, the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, the Michigan Parole Board, the State of Michigan and the Michigan Legislature. Regardless of the form of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity

by statute. See *Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); *Alabama v. Pugh*, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); *O'Hara v. Wigginton*, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1993). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute, *Quern v. Jordan*, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. *Abick v. Michigan*, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). In numerous unpublished opinions, the Sixth Circuit has specifically held that the MDOC is absolutely immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., *McCoy v. Michigan*, 369 F. App'x 646, 653-54 (6th Cir. 2010); *Turnboe v. Stegall*, No. 00-1182, 2000 WL1679478, at \*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2000). In addition, the State of Michigan (acting through the Michigan Department of Corrections) is not a "person" who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See *Lapides v. Bd. of Regents*, 535 U.S. 613 (2002) (citing *Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58 (1989)). Moreover, the Michigan Parole Board and the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, as part of the Michigan Department of Corrections are immune from injunctive and monetary relief. See *Horton v. Martin*, 137 F. App'x 773, 775 (6th Cir. 2005) (Michigan Parole Board entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); *Lee v. Mich. Parole Bd.*, 104 F. App'x 490, 492 (6th Cir. 2004) (same); *Fleming v. Martin*, 24 F. App'x 258, 259 (6th Cir. 2001) (same). See *Wise v. Michigan*, No. 10-CV-11438, 2011 WL 4469151, at \*1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 27, 2011) (Michigan Legislature is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the Michigan Department of Corrections, the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, the Michigan Parole Board, the State of Michigan and the Michigan Legislature.

## II. Failure to state a claim

A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if “it fails to give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 555; *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged – but it has not ‘show[n]’ – that the pleader is entitled to relief.” *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)); *see also Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the *Twombly/Iqbal* plausibility standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *West v. Atkins*, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); *Dominguez v. Corr.*

*Med. Servs.*, 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).

Plaintiff fails to name Defendant Curley in the body of the complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. *See Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to *pro se* complaints. *See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am.*, 92 F. App'x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights); *Frazier v. Michigan*, 41 F. App'x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff's claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); *Griffin v. Montgomery*, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at \*2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); *Rodriguez v. Jabe*, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at \*1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) ("Plaintiff's claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries.") Because Plaintiff's claims fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"), his complaint must be dismissed against Defendant Curley.

Moreover, Defendants Snyder and Heyns are not liable for their roles as supervisors. Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1948; *Monell v. New York City Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691(1978); *Everson v. Leis*, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. *Grinter v. Knight*, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008); *Greene v. Barber*, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one's subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. *Grinter*, 532 F.3d at 575; *Greene*, 310 F.3d at 899; *Summers v. Leis*, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). "[A] plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution." *Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. at 1948.

In summary, Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants Snyder, Heyns and Curley engaged in any active unconstitutional behavior. Accordingly, he fails to state a claim against them.

### **Conclusion**

Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court determines that Plaintiff's action will be dismissed on immunity grounds and for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).

The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). *See McGore v. Wrigglesworth*, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the \$455.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), *see McGore*, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless

Plaintiff is barred from proceeding *in forma pauperis*, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g).

If he is barred, he will be required to pay the \$455.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.

This is a dismissal as described by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.

Dated: 6/21/2012

/s/ R. Allan Edgar  
R. Allan Edgar  
United States District Judge