Pugh v. Dorthy et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI

**EASTERN DIVISION** 

CHARLES PUGH PLAINTIFF

v. No. 1:05CV281-D-A

NURSE "UNKNOWN" DORTHY, ET AL.

**DEFENDANTS** 

Doc. 7

## **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

This matter comes before the court on the *pro se* prisoner complaint of Charles Pugh, challenging the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. The plaintiff alleges that the defendants have refused to permit him to use his Continuous Positive Airway Pressure ("CPAP") machine to treat his sleep apnea. The plaintiff has not, however, alleged that he has suffered any harm whatsoever from not using the machine. For the reasons set forth below, the instant case shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

## **Discussion**

In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners [which] constitutes 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . . . whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors or prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care . . . ." *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 260 (1976); *Mayweather v. Foti*, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992). The test for establishing deliberate indifference is one of "subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law." *Farmer v. Brennan*, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Under this standard, a state actor

may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless plaintiff alleges facts which, if true, would establish that the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." *Id.* at 838. Only in exceptional circumstances may knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm be inferred by a court from the obviousness of the substantial risk. *Id.* Negligent conduct by prison officials does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. *Daniels v. Williams*, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), *Davidson v. Cannon*, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). This same subjective deliberate indifference standard applies to pre-trial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment as well as convicted inmates under the Eighth Amendment. *Hare v. City of Corinth*, 74 F.3d 633, 648 (5th Cir. 1996).

In this case, the plaintiff has not alleged that he faces a substantial risk of serious harm from sleeping without the CPAP machine; nor has he alleged that he has actually suffered any harm. As such, the staff of the Lee County-Tupelo Adult Jail cannot be liable for knowing of and disregarding a substantial risk of serious harm to the plaintiff. Therefore, the instant case shall be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion shall issue today.

**SO ORDERED,** this the <u>8th</u> day of November, 2005.

/s/ Glen H. Davidson CHIEF JUDGE