McDonald v. C.C.A. et al Doc. 11

## IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI GREENVILLE DIVISION

FREDRICK MCDONALD

**PLAINTIFF** 

v. No. 4:08CV7-A-B

C.C.A., ET AL. DEFENDANTS

## **MEMORANDUM OPINION**

This matter comes before the court on the *pro se* prisoner complaint of Fredrick McDonald (# 96257), who challenges the conditions of his confinement under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the purposes of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court notes that the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed this suit. For the reasons set forth below, the instant case shall be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

## **Factual Allegations**

The plaintiff alleges that he has problems with his left knee and that Nurse Mike Beckum arranged for the plaintiff to see a specialist in Jackson, Mississippi, on September 10, 2007. The plaintiff saw Dr. Dailami Pour in September. Dr. Pour examined the plaintiff's knee and prescribed painkillers as treatment. The plaintiff believes his knee requires surgery and thus alleges that Medical Director Dawn Perry denied him medical treatment in September.

## **Denial of Medical Treatment**

In order to prevail on an Eighth Amendment claim for denial of medical care, a plaintiff must allege facts which demonstrate "deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners [which] constitutes 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment . . . whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors or prison guards

in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care . . . ." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-105, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251, 260 (1976); Mayweather v. Foti, 958 F.2d 91, 91 (5th Cir. 1992). The test for establishing deliberate indifference is one of "subjective recklessness as used in the criminal law." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). Under this standard, a state actor may not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless plaintiff alleges facts which, if true, would establish that the official "knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety: the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." *Id.* at 838. Only in exceptional circumstances may knowledge of substantial risk of serious harm be inferred by a court from the obviousness of the substantial risk. *Id.* Negligent conduct by prison officials does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662 (1986), Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 106 S.Ct. 668 (1986). A prisoner's mere disagreement with medical treatment provided by prison officials does not state a claim against the prison for violation of the Eighth Amendment by deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545 (5th Cir.2001), Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 292 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1997).

The plaintiff sought medical treatment for his knee, and he received it. Although he disagrees with the type of treatment, as discussed above, such disagreement does not state a constitutional claim. *Gibbs*, *supra*. As such, the instant case shall be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief could be granted. A final judgment consistent with this memorandum opinion shall issue today.

**SO ORDERED,** this the <u>20th</u> day of February, 2008.

/s/ Sharion Aycock
U. S. DISTRICT JUDGE