

assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account; or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds \$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1),(2). A review of plaintiff's account statement indicates an average monthly deposit of \$00.00, and an average monthly account balance of \$00.00. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and the Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee at this time.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is

immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action is malicious if it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named defendants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. *Spencer v. Rhodes*, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), *aff'd* 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." *Id.* at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. *Id.* at 1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." *Id.* at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." *Id.* The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine

if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." *Id.* at 1951. When faced with alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff's conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. *Id.* at 1950, 51-52.

Moreover, in reviewing a *pro se* complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32 (1992).

The Complaint

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Cape Girardeau County Jail, seeks monetary relief in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Jesse Houseman (Deputy) and John Jordan (Sheriff) in their individual and official capacities, and the Cape Girardeau County Sheriff's Office. Plaintiff alleges that on August 12, 2014, defendant Houseman arrested plaintiff at his home. Plaintiff claims that Houseman tasered him for no reason and that defendant Jordan is Houseman's supervisor and should have known "of the illegal or violative actions of Deputy Houseman." A review of Missouri CaseNet reveals that plaintiff is presently facing charges arising out of this incident for, *inter alia*, assault and attempted assault and resisting and

interfering with a felony arrest.

Discussion

In *Younger v. Harris*, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971), the Supreme Court directed federal courts to abstain from hearing cases where "the action complained of constitutes the basis of an ongoing state judicial proceeding, the proceedings implicate important state interests, and an adequate opportunity exists in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." *Harmon v. City of Kansas City, Missouri*, 197 F.3d 321, 325 (8th Cir. 1999); see also, *Fuller v. Ulland*, 76 F.3d 957, 959 (8th Cir. 1996).

Having carefully reviewed the case at bar, the Court concludes that the *Younger* criteria are satisfied and that abstention is warranted. There is an ongoing state criminal judicial proceeding arising out of the August 12 arrest; plaintiff's allegations implicate important state interests; and an adequate opportunity exists in the state proceeding to raise constitutional challenges. Finding no "extraordinary circumstances" that would justify interfering with pending state judicial proceedings, the Court will dismiss the instant action, without prejudice. See *Younger*, 401 U.S. at 43-44.

As additional grounds for dismissing this action, the Court finds that the complaint is also legally frivolous as to defendant John Jordan, because plaintiff

has failed to assert any claims or allegations against him, and the doctrine of respondeat superior is not applicable in § 1983 actions. See *Boyd v. Knox*, 47 F.3d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1995); *Jeffers v. Gomez*, 267 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 liability arises only upon a showing of personal participation by defendant); *Madewell v. Roberts*, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990) (liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights); *Martin v. Sargent*, 780 F.2d 1334, 1338 (8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff).

The complaint is also frivolous as to the Cape Girardeau County Sheriff's Office, because sheriff's departments are not suable entities. See, e.g., *Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark.*, 974 F.2d 81, 82 (8th Cir. 1992) (departments or subdivisions of local government are "not juridical entities suable as such"); *Catlett v. Jefferson County*, 299 F. Supp. 2d 967, 968-69 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (same); *Dean v. Barber*, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992) ("[s]heriff's departments and police departments are not usually considered legal entities subject to suit"); *McCoy v. Chesapeake Correctional Center*, 788 F.Supp. 890 (E.D.Va. 1992) (local jails are not "persons" under § 1983).

In accordance with the foregoing,


IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [Doc. #2] is **GRANTED**, and no initial partial filing fee will be assessed .

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, based upon the Younger abstention doctrine, the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [Doc. #4] is **DENIED** as moot.

A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

Dated this 7th day of July, 2015.



JOHN A. ROSS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE