

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI  
EASTERN DIVISION**

JAMES EDWARD YOUNG, JR.,	)	
	)	
Plaintiff,	)	
	)	
v.	)	No. 4:13CV2507 CDP
	)	
TERRY L. WETZEL, et al.,	)	
	)	
Defendants.	)	

**MEMORANDUM AND ORDER**

This matter is before the Court upon the motion of James Young, Jr. (registration no. 342824), an inmate at Farmington Correctional Center, for leave to commence this action without payment of the required filing fee. For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that plaintiff does not have sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee and will assess an initial partial filing fee of \$3.90. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Furthermore, based upon a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

**28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these

monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds \$10, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit and a certified copy of his prison account statement for the six-month period immediately preceding the submission of his complaint. A review of plaintiff's account indicates an average monthly deposit of \$19.50, and an average monthly balance of \$0.01. Plaintiff has insufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will assess an initial partial filing fee of \$3.90, which is 20 percent of plaintiff's average monthly deposit.

#### **28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)**

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if the action is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. An action is frivolous if it "lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989); Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). An action is malicious if it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named defendants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. Spencer v. Rhodes, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). A complaint fails to state a claim if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

#### **The Complaint**

Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Named as defendants are Terri Wetzel, a social worker; Lynn Calcote, a psychologist; and the Farmington Correctional Center. Plaintiff alleges that he had a conditional release date in 2013, and he claims that the Board of Probation and Parole (the "Board") did not release him on that date because he had not

completed the Missouri Sex Offender Program ("MoSOP"). Plaintiff asserts that he failed out of MoSOP in 2004 because of lack of sufficient progress. Plaintiff then signed a Refusal to Participate form, and as a result, he was no longer eligible to complete the program. Plaintiff asserts that he was wrongly placed in MoSOP Phase I in 2008 but that he never completed the program.

### **Discussion**

A suit against Farmington Correctional Center is, in effect, a suit against the State of Missouri. The State of Missouri, however, is absolutely immune from liability under § 1983. See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63 (1989). As a result, plaintiff's allegations against Farmington Correctional Center are legally frivolous.

"Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights." Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203, 1208 (8th Cir. 1990); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1948 (2009) ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution."). In the instant action, plaintiff has not set forth any facts indicating that defendants Wetzel or Calcote were directly involved in or personally responsible for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. As a result, the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to these defendants.

"[A]n inmate does not have a constitutionally-protected liberty interest in the possibility of parole, and [the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit] has held that the Missouri parole statutes 'create no liberty interest' under state law in the parole board's discretionary decisions." Adams v Agniel, 405 F.3d 643, 645 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Corrections, 442 U.S. 1, 9-11, (1979)). Consequently, plaintiff did not have a constitutional right to be released on his 2013 conditional release date, and his

§ 1983 claims fail as a matter of law.

Accordingly,


**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is **GRANTED**.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that the plaintiff shall pay an initial filing fee of \$3.90 within thirty (30) days of the date of this Order. Plaintiff is instructed to make his remittance payable to "Clerk, United States District Court," and to include upon it: (1) his name; (2) his prison registration number; (3) the case number; and (4) that the remittance is for an original proceeding.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that this action is **DISMISSED** under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A separate Order of Dismissal will be filed forthwith.

Dated this 28<sup>th</sup> day of January, 2014.

  
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CATHERINE D. PERRY  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE