1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
3	DOUGLAS EUGENE SMITH,
4	Plaintiff,
5	Cause No. 4:14cv-1722CDP
6	CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
7	Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
8	Defendant.
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9	EXCERPT OF RULING FROM HEARING MARCH 10, 2016
10	BEFORE THE HONORABLE CATHERINE D. PERRY
11	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE EASTERN DIVISION
12	APPEARANCES:
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24	United States District Court 111 South 10th Street
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MARCH 10, 2016

THE COURT: Counsel, this is Judge Perry. Are you there?

MR. WOLF: Yes.

MR. LEIFERT: Yes.

THE COURT: I pushed the hang-up button. I'm very glad I didn't actually hang up on you. So I have counsel back on the record, and I am going to tell you my decision in this case. This oral opinion that I am stating now, this portion will be transcribed and attached to the judgment in the case and made part of the record. There will not be a further written opinion.

The case, as we stated, has been fully-briefed, and your arguments have been helpful, counsel. So it is ready for resolution. As you all know, my responsibility is to affirm the decision of the Commissioner, if the decision is supported by substantial evidence when considering the record as a whole. I do not have the authority to substitute my judgment for that of the Administrative Law Judge or the Commissioner.

On reviewing all of this, and considering all of the arguments, I do conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Administrative Law Judge's determination in this case, and I will affirm the decision, because it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. The plaintiff has raised arguments that the -- both in the briefs and here today -- criticizing the credibility analysis and the residual functional capacity determination, and although today's arguments have focused on whether the RFC adequately considered the moderate limitations on concentration, persistence, and pace, the briefs did talk about the physical issues as well, and so I'm going to address both of them.

The ALJ is not required -- let me talk about credibility first. These obviously run together. But the ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each Polaski factor. It is sufficient if he acknowledges and considers those factors before discounting the claimant's subjective complaint. And so, but he is allowed to disbelieve subjective complaints, if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole, and I must defer to the ALJ's credibility findings as long as he explicitly discredits the testimony and gives a good reason for doing so.

I agree with the counsel for the Commissioner that in this case, the ALJ was thorough in explaining the how each limitation ties to the residual functional capacity, and also explaining and citing medical evidence in the record, and also explaining his credibility determinations.

The ALJ did conclude that he -- that Mr. Smith's impairments could cause some of the alleged symptoms, but not

-- didn't agree, didn't find credible, the statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effect of those symptoms. He noted noncompliance with treatment, and objective evidence that was inconsistent with the plaintiff's claims, as well as some other credibility issues. And those are all supported by the record.

with regard to the noncompliance, there are several reports of times that Smith was not taking his medications, and also the ALJ concluded that the condition generally improved when he was getting regular treatment and was compliant with his medications. And noncompliance is a reason to discredit allegations, especially where the evidence tends to show that the impairments are well-controlled when the claimant is in compliance, but the ALJ has to consider whether a good reason supports the failure to comply.

Obviously, financial -- lack of financial resources to follow treatment is something that could be considered a justifiable cause for noncompliance; and additionally, the mental health issues can also sometimes be a cause for noncompliance.

The evidence in the case does show that there were many times when the claimant reported difficulty in obtaining medication for financial reasons, and that could constitute justifiable cause, except that there are many times when the

medication was available to the plaintiff, and he refused to take it. And in particular, he was incarcerated for sometime in early 2012 and again in December of 2012. And during those times, there is many references that the claimant refused his medications time and again, and there were a couple of references in the record that were noted by plaintiff's counsel here today where he said that he had side effects of the medication. He said they made his head spin. But if you look at those records, or take the record as a whole, during that time, he was refusing everything. refusing to even be evaluated a couple of times. He basically was just saying "no" to everything. There is no evidence that that was because of side effects, and when you look at all of the other medical records, the others don't indicate that he had side effects; in fact, they indicate the contrary.

He does have, obviously, a history of major depressive disorder as well as suicidal ideation. He spent days when he was in jail on suicide watch and made statements that sounded like, you know, that sounded suicidal, saying things like "It is my time to go." At one point, he said he was trying to give himself a heart attack. There was one, at least, apparent suicide attempt; however, there is also references that he was manipulative and often manipulated the system. This was while in prison certainly that there really

-- the doctors there said they agreed there was some mental illness, including depression, but that his actions seem to be more motivated by trying to, you know, get certain things, or get what he wanted.

So I think because there is substantial evidence in the records to conclude that the noncompliance was not a result of his mental illness, the ALJ's reliance on this was within the zone of reasonable choice. I note also in making the credibility determinations, the financial noncompliance is in there, but there is so much else that indicates other reasons that he was simply noncompliant, because that's what he chose to do. On at least one occasion, he told the hospital personnel that he wasn't really suicidal, but he told the police that he was, because he wanted to get into the hospital.

So I think that the noncompliance reason for discrediting his opinions is supported by evidence, and the ALJ did not err in doing that. The other reason he gave was for discrediting, or not, the credibility determination, has to do with the claimant's physical issues, and he has -- he has some physical issues obviously the degenerate disk disease, the joint disease in his hips, the coronary artery disease, COPD, those are all -- the ALJ did find those to be severe, but the ALJ's -- the claimant's testimony about those things was the ALJ found not to be credible; and you know, he

complained he had difficulty ambulating, but there were several instances where the claimant had reported to the police, or the hospital personnel, that he ran or walked great distances.

I saw that he said he walked 12 miles. He said that he was running from the police. There was an extreme example where he said he walked 50 or 60 miles, or he had been walking 20 hours, and although that sounded kind of incredible, it may have, in fact, been true, based on what the records show about where he was, and how he got where he was. But in any event, it looks pretty clear that he had -- was physically able to walk much better than he -- and move about and do things much better than he claims. So that's a legitimate reason for discrediting his testimony.

The ALJ also found his testimony about illegal drugs to be -- to have not been true, and then there was an issue about his shoveling snow. I know that was shortly before the alleged onset date, but these were all things that the ALJ was entitled to consider, and I believe that he did give sufficient reasons for his adverse credibility finding, and so substantial evidence supports those reasons, and he wasn't required to say, under Polaski factor A, Polaski factor B, as long as he did consider the daily activities and the effectiveness of the medication and the objective medical evidence, this is not err.

And again, even if, as counsel has reminded us, as they do, if there is evidence to support the ALJ's determination, I have to affirm it, even if there is other evidence as well, as long as you consider all of it.

Now the residual functional capacity, in the briefs, the plaintiff argued that he had not argued a number of things, and here today, has focused on the mental issue of not being -- and argued that there should have been limitation on not staying on task. I will get to that in a moment, but I want to briefly discuss the physical limitations as well. And those physical limitations -- hold on a second -- I believe the ALJ did thoroughly consider and discuss all of the medical evidence on the activities of daily living, etc., and supported by reference to the medical records each of the physical limitations, such as the lifting requirements, the ability to ambulate, and the ability to sit and stand, and things like that.

So the ALJ talks about the medical evidence that he believes supported each of those, and he did have a limitation in his RFC that the claimant would need to change positions every 30 minutes for one or two minutes, although he did conclude that he could remain on task while doing so. So I believe the physical issues were adequately determined by the ALJ.

With regard to the mental issues, the plaintiffs

argued that the ALJ failed to give sufficient weight to the opinion of treating doctor, the psychiatrist, Dr. Arain, and that the plaintiff had received psychiatric care under the Crider Health Center in 2013 and 2014. The plaintiff also argues that the ALJ should have included limitations regarding concentration, persistence, and pace, and the ALJ did find that he had moderate difficulties in this area, and limited him to simple and routine tasks.

Limiting him to simple and routine tasks, there are cases that I would cite the <u>Howard v.Massanari</u> case 255 F.3d 577, from the Eighth Circuit, saying that a limitation of doing simple routine repetitive tasks does capture deficiencies in concentration, persistence, and pace. There are other cases saying the same thing. And so I don't think that the ALJ erred by failing to include any specific limitations regarding production quotas, or the other things that the plaintiff has argued for.

And I just want to -- you know, when the ALJ carefully analyzed his credibility, and found his testimony not to be credible, that included his statement that he didn't, because of that finding, he did not err in excluding limitations arising from his statements that he had crying spells, you know, as often as he did, because I think that there is evidence to show that's not credible.

So in terms of the treating doctor's opinions, they

are to be given, obviously, the treating source opinions are to be given controlling weight, if they are well-supported by medically-acceptable clinical and laboratory techniques, and are not inconsistent with other evidence in the records, or other substantial evidence. But it doesn't automatically control, and the record has to be evaluated as a whole.

Dr. Arain did find, in his opinion letter, that the claimant had a history of anxiety and mood swings that caused episodes of decompensation, although these were more limited in duration than would count under the other part of the analysis, but also difficulties in maintaining social functioning. And he said that the plaintiff may have difficulty working full-time, dealing with work-related stress, demonstrating reliability, and that his impairment may cause him to be absent from work.

The ALJ actually quoted this, and treated this as if he said he would have those limitations, which is the same argument that plaintiff's counsel has made here today. So I think the ALJ treated him as if he had said "would" instead of "may". If I were evaluating it, I might not have done it the same way, but assuming that that should be the same. I know Dr. Arain also recommended vocational rehabilitation, which the ALJ noted was indicative that the plaintiff was capable of working in some capacity. But the ALJ didn't credit Dr. Arain's opinion, because he concluded that it was

inconsistent with the mental health treatment history, the clinical notes, and the mental status examination finding, which all showed only mild to moderate limitations, and also with the treatment records from his own clinic, which showed he had appropriate cooperative behavior, intact abstract reasoning, and fair judgment and reasoning, as well as normal intellect and memory.

I concluded that the ALJ's accounting for the mental concerns related to the depression and anxiety were appropriate, as he did include it in his residual functional capacity, and that the limitations he used were supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and that was that limiting it to simple and routine tasks, which does adequately account for potential concentration or persistence issues, concentration, persistence, and pace, and then limiting him to the limitations that accounted for the social anxiety, and the interactions with coworkers and supervisors were limited, as well as work regarding negotiation or working with the general public.

So when you consider everything in the records, including the timeframes when Dr. Arain treated the claimant, as well as when other people had treated him, and you consider all of the records, the ALJ did not err in affording no weight to that opinion that the plaintiff would have difficulty maintaining full-time employment.

So for all of the reasons I believe that the Administrative Law Judge's or the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, and I'm not, under the standards, I am to make that determination, whether the decision complies with the relevant legal requirements. I'm not to reweigh the evidence, and so because it is so supported, I will affirm the decision.

So that is my opinion in the case. I will affirm the Commissioner. I will issue a judgment consistent with this opinion. I will attach a transcript of this oral opinion to that judgment. Because we need to prepare the transcript, the judgment won't come out immediately, although our court reporter is pretty fast on these things, so it might be a few days that you will get the judgment with the attached opinion fairly soon. All right, anything further from either counsel at this time?

MR. WOLF: No, your Honor.

MR. LEIFERT: Nothing further, Judge. Thank you.

THE COURT: Thank you all. So I will disconnect the phone, and court is in recess.

(End of proceedings)

1	REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
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3	I, LISA M. PACZKOWSKI, RPR, CCR, Official Court
4	Reporter for the United States District Court for the Eastern
5	District of Missouri do hereby certify that the foregoing is
6	a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in this
7	cause as same appears from my stenotype notes made personally
8	during the progress of said proceedings.
9	
10	/S/ Lisa M. Paczkowski
11	LISA M. PACZKOWSKI RPR, CCR
12	Official Court Reporter
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