

either law or fact." *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). An action is malicious if it is undertaken for the purpose of harassing the named defendants and not for the purpose of vindicating a cognizable right. *Spencer v. Rhodes*, 656 F. Supp. 458, 461-63 (E.D.N.C. 1987), *aff'd* 826 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1987). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544,570 (2007).

To determine whether an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the Court must engage in a two-step inquiry. First, the Court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth. *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950-51 (2009). These include "legal conclusions" and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action [that are] supported by mere conclusory statements." *Id.* at 1949. Second, the Court must determine whether the complaint states a plausible claim for relief. *Id.* at 1950-51. This is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." *Id.* at 1950. The plaintiff is required to plead facts that show more than the "mere possibility of misconduct." *Id.* The Court must review the factual allegations in the complaint "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." *Id.* at 1951. When faced with

alternative explanations for the alleged misconduct, the Court may exercise its judgment in determining whether plaintiff's conclusion is the most plausible or whether it is more likely that no misconduct occurred. *Id.* at 1950, 51-52.

In reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court must give the complaint the benefit of a liberal construction. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The Court must also weigh all factual allegations in favor of the plaintiff, unless the facts alleged are clearly baseless. *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992).

The Complaint

Plaintiff, a resident at the Northwest Missouri Psychiatric Rehabilitation Center, brings this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action Nancy Kassebaum (a former senator for the State of Kansas).

Plaintiff alleges that, when he resided at the Farmington State Hospital in 1995, he wrote to defendant Kassebaum about his idea to cure numerous diseases. Plaintiff states that he sent defendant his “foot spray formula.” Plaintiff states that he needs an attorney to contact Nancy Kassebaum.

Although a pro se complaint is to be liberally construed, the complaint must contain a short and plain summary of facts sufficient to give fair notice of the claim asserted. *Means v. Wilson*, 522 F.2d 833, 840 (8th Cir. 1975). The Court will not

supply additional facts or construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded. Having carefully reviewed the complaint, the Court concludes that plaintiff's factual allegations are delusional and fail to state a claim or cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or *Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics*, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For these reasons, the complaint will be dismissed, without prejudice.

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is **GRANTED**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 3] is **DENIED as moot**.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall not issue process or cause process to issue upon the complaint, because it is legally frivolous and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.

So Ordered this 22nd day of January, 2015



E. RICHARD WEBBER
SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE