

3. Qualifying contractual language is “language which provides the court with clear grounds to grant relief without addressing the merits of the underlying arbitrable dispute.” *Manion*, 255 F.3d at 539 (quoting *Peabody Coalsales Co. v. Tampa Elec. Co.*, 36 F.3d 46, 48, n.3 (8th Cir. 1994)). Here, the arbitration provision states, “If Kane and USPA should have a major disagreement that we can not work out among ourselves we both agree to settle said disagreement in Arbitration, according to the law of the State of New York.” (ECF No. 5-1 at 2). The Court holds that this is not “qualifying language” as defined by the Eighth Circuit.

4. The Court holds that it lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief, which should be brought pursuant to the arbitration agreement. Under Eighth Circuit precedent, this Court cannot enter injunctive relief where the Arbitration Act is applicable and there is no qualifying language. *See Manion*, 255 F.3d at 538; *Hovey*, 726 F.2d at 1292 (“where the Arbitration Act is applicable and no qualifying contractual language has been alleged, the district court errs in granting injunctive relief”).

5. Thus, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order.

Dated this 9th day of June, 2017.



RONNIE L. WHITE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE