Exhibit A

MOTION/CASE IS RESPECTFULLY REFERRED TO JUSTICE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON(S):

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK - NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: DEBRA A. JAMES Justice	PART 59
DENISE E. FINKEL, Plaintiff,	Index No.: <u>102578/09</u> Motion Date: <u>06/02/09</u>
- v -	Motion Seq. No.: 01
FACEBOOK, INC., MICHAEL DAUBER, JEFFREY SCHWARTZ, MELINDA DANOWITZ, LEAH HERZ, RICHARD DAUBER, AMY SCHWARTZ, ELLIOT SCHWARTZ, MARTIN DANOWITZ, BARI DANOWITZ, ALAN HERZ and ELLEN HERZ, Defendants.	Motion Cal. No.:7
The following papers, numbered 1 to 5 were read on this motio	n to dismiss.
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	PAPERS NUMBERED
Notice of Motion/Order to Show Cause -Affidavits -Emblts Answering Affidavits - Exhibits Replying Affidavits - Exhibits	
Upon the foregoing papers, □ Yes □ No □ VOUNTY CLA	16 2009 SPKS OFFICE
The court shall grant defendant Facebo	ook's motion to dismiss
this defamation action against it because Facebook is immune from	
liability under the Communications Decency	Act of 1996 as an
interactive computer service.	
According to the movant, Facebook is a	a "social networking"
internet website that is open to the public	c. The website allows
members to communicate with each other via	"group pages" and to
set up and post content to profiles and groups.	
Check One: ☐ FINAL DISPOSITION ☒ N Check if appropriate: ☐ DO NOT POST	ON-FINAL DISPOSITION ☐ REFERENCE

Plaintiff in opposition to the motion states that she was a member of the Facebook website while attending high school in January 2007. Four of the defendants in this suit, Michael Dauber, Jeffrey Schwartz, Melinda Danowitz and Leah Herz, were classmates of plaintiff and also members of the Facebook website. The complaint alleges that the four classmates-defendants created a group on the website and posted defamatory statements with negative sexual and medical connotations.

Facebook seeks dismissal based upon the Communications

Decency Act of 1996 (47 USC 230 et seg) that provides immunity to interactive computer services from civil liability for defamatory content.

Section 230 provides that "no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider," id. \$230 (c) (1), and that "no cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section," §230 (e) (3). Section 230(c) thus immunizes internet service providers from defamation and other, non-intellectual property, state law claims arising from third-party content. See Gucci Am., Inc. v Hall & Assocs., 135 F Supp 2d 409, 417 (SD NY 2001) (citing legislative history of the CDA); see also Zeran v Am. Online, Inc., 129 F 3d 327, 330 (4th Cir 1997) (holding that 'lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content-are barred' by the CDA); Barrett v Rosenthal, 40 Cal 4th 33, 51 Cal Rptr 3d 55, 146 P 3d 510, 518 n 9 (2006) (collecting cases)."

Murawski v Pataki, 514 F Supp 2d 577, 591 (SD NY 2007).

Plaintiff's opposition to the motion does not dispute that

Facebook qualifies as an interactive computer service under 47

USC 230 (f) (2) but plaintiff argues that because it is alleged that Facebook's Terms of Use grant the movant an ownership interest in the alleged defamatory content, the immunity granted by 47 USC 230 (c) is unavailable. Plaintiff's argument is meritless.

"By its plain language, \$230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service. Specifically, \$230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that would place a computer service provider in a publisher's role. Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's traditional editorial functions-such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content-are barred. . . Congress made a policy choice, however, not to deter harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other parties' potentially injurious messages." Zeran v America Online, Inc., 129 F 3d 327, 330 (4th Cir 1997). "Ownership" of content plays no role in the Act's statutory scheme. The only issue is whether the party sought to be held liable is an "interactive computer service" and if that hurdle is surmounted the immunity granted by 42 USC 230 (c) (1) is triggered if the content was provided by another party.

"Congress has made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others. In some sort of tacit quid pro quo arrangement with the service provider community, Congress has conferred immunity from tort liability as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material, even where the self-policing is unsuccessful or not even attempted." Blumenthal v Drudge, 992 F Supp 44, 52 (D DC 1998).

The allegations in the complaint establish that Facebook is entitled to the liability shield conferred by the Communications Decency Act and therefore the court shall dismiss this action against the movant as there is no claim Facebook had any hand in creating the content. The court shall deny movant's application for sanctions as the plaintiff's argument as to liability based upon the ownership of defamatory content court is not contrary to any prior precedent nor does the movant cite any precedent that renders such an argument frivolous.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the motion of FACEBOOK, INC., seeking to dismiss the complaint against it is GRANTED; and it is further

ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment
DISMISSING the action against FACEBOOK, INC., and upon service of
this Order with notice of entry upon all parties and the Clerk of
the County and the Clerk of the Trial Support Office (Room 158,
60 Centre Street), the Clerks are directed to amend their records
by amending the caption in this action to reflect the dismissal
against FACEBOOK, INC., by removing said defendant from the
amended caption; and it is further

ORDERED that the remaining parties shall appear at a preliminary conference on October 6, 2009, at 9:30 A.M, in Part 59, Room 1254, 111 Centre Street, New York, New York 10013.


This is the decision and order of the court.


Dated: September 15, 2009 ENTER:

J.S.C.

DEBRA A. JAMES

J.S.C.





Sutton, Theresa A.

From: Sutton, Theresa A.

Sent: Monday, October 18, 2010 2:00 PM

To: 'Jonathan B. Goldsmith'

Cc: Dalton, Amy

Subject: RE: Goldsmith v. Cooper

Mr. Goldsmith-

If you persist in pressing your meritless claims against Facebook, in light of clear, undisputed precedent, Facebook will seek sanctions, including its attorneys' fees and costs.

Please read the cases I sent to you and then read Rule 11 and the obligations it places on attorneys. Facebook will not settle this case by paying you, as you do not have claims against it.

Theresa

----Original Message----

From: Jonathan B. Goldsmith [mailto:JGoldsmith@lawrosen.com]

Sent: Friday, October 15, 2010 5:07 PM

To: Sutton, Theresa A.

Subject: Re: Goldsmith v. Cooper

Thanks. Is your firm facebook's Nevada counsel?

I would need to fully read these cases to form an opinion of the relation if any to the case at hand, and I will do so. However, I am not inclined to stipulate to any type of dismissal solely on the basis of non-binding case law.

I would at the very least want to argue the issue of dismissal, if Facebook brought it, in front of the Nevada state court. If I received an unfavorable ruling I could appeal directly to the Nevada Supreme Court.

On the other hand, I am open to discuss settlement possibilities. I would stipulate to dismiss with prejudice for a settlement of \$25,000.00, which could be kept confidential and without facebook admitting any liability. Please let me know if this offer is acceptable. If not, I will likely file an offer of judgment, which in Nevada, if you don't know, allows me to obtain attorney's fees by statute if not accepted and I receive a more favorable ruling at trial.

Jonathan B. Goldsmith, Esq. Rosenfeld & Rinato 9029 South Pecos Road, #2800 Henderson, Nevada 89074 702.386.8637 (phone) 702.385.3025 (fax) jgoldsmith@lawrosen.com

On Oct 15, 2010, at 4:48 PM, "Sutton, Theresa A." <tsutton@orrick.com> wrote:

> Mr. Goldsmith>
>

> I am writing to follow up on our phone conversation this afternoon in which I asked that you dismiss Facebook from the Goldsmith v. Cooper matter, currently pending in the Clark County District Court. As I also mentioned, the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230, immunizes Facebook from liability for the types of activity alleged in the Goldsmith complaint. I have attached several decisions related to the CDA immunity. I also have attached a decision from a New York Supreme Court, in which the Court specifically found that Facebook is a provider of interactive computer services and, thus, immune from

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liability pursuant to the CDA under circumstances analgous to those asserted here.
> While I understand that you disagree with the outcome in these cases, courts have
treated Section 230(c)(1) immunity as "quite robust, adopting a relatively expansive
definition of 'interactive computer service' and a relatively restrictive definition of
'information content provider.'" Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123
(9th Cir. 2003). Facebook is confident the Clark County District Court will follow well-
established precedent and encourages you to dismiss Facebook from this case, as there is
no basis for asserting claims against it.
> I look forward to resolving this expeditiously.
> Theresa
> O R R I C K
> Theresa A. Sutton
> Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP
> Silicon Valley Office
> 1000 Marsh Road, Menlo Park, CA 94025
> 650.614.7307 (Voice)
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> tsutton@orrick.com
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