-RJJ Morgan v. Makin

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Defendants removed the action to federal court on May 18, 2006 2 on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 3 Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint (#4) adding 4 Defendant Habir Makin, who had inadvertently been left out of the 5 caption in the original complaint (#1) filed in state court. and claim amounts do not appear to have been modified in the amended complaint (#4). It is undisputed that Plaintiff is a resident of Nevada, and Defendants are residents of Alaska.

Plaintiff now challenges the removal based on amount in controversy, and seeks to remand the action.

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II. Standard of Review

A defendant may remove an action from state court to federal 14 court if the federal court would have had original subject matter $15\parallel$ jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Original 16 jurisdiction must be based either on a claim involving the 17 Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, 28 U.S.C. § $18 \parallel 1331$, or on diversity of citizenship, which applies to suits 19∥totaling more than \$75,000 in controversy between citizens of 20 different states, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Federal jurisdiction under 21 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) requires "complete diversity of citizenship" 22 between the parties opposed in interest." Kimtz v. Lamar Corp., 385 23 F.3d 1177, 1181 (9th Cir. 2004).

"In cases where entities rather than individuals are litigants, 25 diversity jurisdiction depends on the form of the entity." Johnson 26 v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, LP, 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006).

27 An unincorporated association such as a partnership or limited

1 liability company has the citizenship of all of its members. 2 Thus, "the citizenship of unincorporated associations must be traced through however many layers of partners or members there may be." <u>Hart v. Terminex Int'l</u>, 336 F.3d 541, 543 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).

6 A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging Babasa v. LensCrafters, Inc., 498 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. removal. 2007). The removal statute must be strictly construed to limit the 9 federal court's authority to that expressly provided by Congress and $10 \parallel$ to protect the states' judicial powers. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. $11 \| \underline{\text{Sheets}}, 313 \text{ U.S. } 100, 108-09 (1941). Any doubt about the right of$ 12 removal is resolved in favor of remand. <u>Durham v. Lockheed Martin</u> 13 Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1252 (9th Cir. 2006). The party seeking 14 removal bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the |15| evidence that all removal requirements are met. Etheridge v. Harbor 16 House Rests., 861 F.2d 1389, 1393 (9th Cir. 1988).

When an amended complaint has been filed after removal, 18 propriety of removal is "determined according to the plaintiffs' 19 pleading at the time of the petition for removal." Pullman Co. v. 20 Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939); Sparta Surgical Corp. v. Nat'l <u> Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc.</u>, 159 F.3d 1209, 1213 (9th Cir. 1998).

The party asserting jurisdiction in federal court bears the 23 burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount 24 in controversy requirement has been met. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1996). 25

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III. Discussion

Plaintiff's complaint (#1)¹ alleges costs incurred in excess of thirty-two thousand dollars and also alleges that sixteen thousand dollars paid to Defendants through a secret settlement should have been paid to Plaintiff. Plaintiff also requests punitive damages and attorney's fees. Because the specified damages do not meet the amount in controversy, we consider Defendants' argument that the additional claims for punitive damages and attorney's fees suffice to bring this action under federal jurisdiction.

A. Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are "part of the amount in controversy in a civil action." Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 945 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Bell v. Preferred Life Assur. Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943)). Defendants cite Nevada law providing that in actions for breach of an obligation not arising from contract where fraud, oppression, or malice is proven, a plaintiff may recover damages in an amount of up to \$300,000 when the awarded compensatory damages are less than \$100,000. See Nev. Rev. Stat. § 42.005.

Defendants do not set forth, however, any factual support that punitive damages in this case should be considered and that the amount will, more likely than not, exceed the amount needed to increase the amount in controversy above \$75,000. A general recital of a statute awarding punitive damages in non-contractual fraud

The Court is aware of the amended complaint (#4), but will, for purposes of this motion to remand (#7), consider the original complaint (#1), attached as Exhibit 1 to the notice of removal (#1). We note, however, that there is no substantial difference between the two pleadings, other than the addition of Defendant Habir Makin to the caption.

1 cases is not sufficient. See, e.g., McCaa v. Massachusetts Mut. 2 Life Ins. Co., 330 F. Supp. 2d 1143, 1149 (D. Nev. 2004). 3 Therefore, we conclude that Defendants have failed to meet their 4 burden of proof that the amount in controversy in this case more $5 \parallel \text{likely than not exceeds the jurisdictional threshold based on}$ 6 Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages.

B. Attorney's Fees

Attorney's fees are part of the amount in controversy if 9 authorized by statute or contract. Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 $10 \parallel F.3d 976$, 980 (9th Cir. 2005). The contract at issue here provides 11 | that a party commencing or prosecuting an action in violation of the 12 contract shall be liable for attorney's fees and costs incurred by $13 \parallel$ the opposing party as a result of the action. Nevada law also 14 allows an award of attorney's fees when the prevailing party has not 15 ∥recovered more than \$20,000, or when a claim or defense was "brought 16 or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing 17 party." Nev. Rev. Stat. § 18.010. The contractual provision cited 18 by Defendants awards attorney's fees for a breach of a covenant not 19∥to sue, and does not expressly require a defendant in an action to 20 pay attorney's fees. Defendants have not provided any evidence that 21 Plaintiff will recover less than \$20,000, or that Defendants are 22 defending this claim without reasonable grounds or to harass 23 Plaintiff. McCaa, 330 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.

In further support of their argument that attorney's fees 25 increase the amount in controversy above \$75,000, Defendants provide 26 that Plaintiff stated in verified interrogatory responses that 27 Plaintiff incurred over \$173,000 in fees and costs (not including

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1 any costs incurred in this action) to prosecute and defend against a 2 separate lawsuit currently pending in state court. Plaintiff argues 3 that those fees and costs are sought in the separate state court 4 proceeding, and not in the present action. Plaintiff explains that 5 the state court action is a lien foreclosure action filed by 6 Plaintiff against Defendants for failure to pay monies due for the construction of the Makins' residence. Defendants have failed to 8 explain how attorney's fees incurred in an ongoing separate action 9 will, more likely than not, be awarded in this action as fees or $10 \parallel \text{special damages}$. Nor do the other grounds cited by Defendants 11 provide factual support that attorney's fees in this action will 12 increase the amount in controversy to exceed \$75,000. Plaintiff's 13 claim for attorney's fees, therefore, does not suffice to bring this 14 action under diversity jurisdiction.

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IV. Conclusion

Plaintiff does not seek damages in a specified amount over 18 \$75,000. Nor have Defendants proven, by a preponderance of the 19 evidence, that Plaintiff's claims for punitive damages and 20 attorney's fees may be awarded in an amount sufficient to increase 21 the amount in controversy to the amount required for federal 22 diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff's motion to remand (#7) shall, 23 therefore, be granted and the action shall be remanded to state court.

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1	IT IS, THEREFORE, HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to
2	remand (#7) is GRANTED .
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4	The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly.
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6	DATED: April 4, 2011
7	Elizab C Red
8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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