



1 construction and mezzanine loans which were initially due in March 2008, but were extended to  
2 March 2009. Plaintiffs allege that they entered into a joint venture with Defendants pursuant to  
3 which the joint venture would obtain a new \$448 million loan from Senior Lenders to replace the  
4 construction and mezzanine loans. The deal contemplated that the Senior Lenders would conduct a  
5 “friendly foreclosure” on the deed of trust securing the construction loan and the joint venture  
6 would use the new loan to bid on the property at the foreclosure sale. The foreclosure would  
7 eliminate the mezzanine loan.

8 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used the joint venture agreement as a means to acquire  
9 detailed proprietary business and leasing plans from the Plaintiffs and then steal the property from  
10 them. Defendants allegedly undermined the issuance of the new loan from the Senior Lenders by  
11 slowing down the documentation process with the intent to block the loan from closing and by  
12 making derogatory and defamatory statements about the Plaintiffs to the Senior Lending Group.  
13 The Defendants also purchased an interest in the Senior Lending Group which allowed them to  
14 block approval of the new loan to the joint venture. The Senior Lenders thereafter declined to issue  
15 the new loan and instead foreclosed on the deed of trust securing the construction loan on March 4,  
16 2011. The property was sold at the foreclosure sale to a limited liability company owned by the  
17 Senior Lending Group, which included the Defendants who ultimately gained control of the  
18 property.

19 Defendants state that prior to the commencement of this action, they produced 39,364 pages  
20 from 6,037 documents in response to a non-party subpoena issued by Plaintiffs in a related Nevada  
21 state court action. Plaintiffs served requests for production of documents on the Defendants in this  
22 action on January 18, 2013. The parties reached agreement as to the list of custodians and search  
23 terms for potentially relevant electronically stored information (“ESI”).<sup>1</sup> In response to Plaintiffs’  
24 requests for production, Defendants produced an additional 9,734 pages from 1,180 documents.  
25 Defendants, however, limited their search for potentially relevant ESI to the time period from  
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27 <sup>1</sup> The Court infers from the parties’ briefs that most, if not all, of the requested documents  
28 are contained in electronic data bases.

1 December 1, 2008 through March 4, 2011, the day of the foreclosure sale. *Motion to Compel*  
2 (*#56*), *Exhibit 2, Defendants' Response to Document Requests, General Objection D, pg. 2.*

3 Plaintiffs do not contest the beginning date for the search period, but argue that there is no basis to  
4 cut off the search for potentially relevant information as of March 4, 2011. Plaintiffs argue that the  
5 Defendants should be required to search for and produce relevant documents that may have been  
6 created up through the date of their responses to the discovery requests. Prior to the filing of the  
7 motion to compel, Plaintiffs made a compromise offer to limit their requests to the period through  
8 July 31, 2012, which is "roughly the date Plaintiffs commenced this action." *Motion (#56),*  
9 *Declaration of Christopher Major, ¶ 9.* Plaintiffs also "offered to exclude documents between  
10 Defendants and their counsel, such that Defendants could avoid the process of collecting and  
11 reviewing those documents altogether." *Id.* Defendants, however, rejected this compromise. As  
12 discussed hereafter, Plaintiffs also reportedly modified the search terms or combination of search  
13 terms to narrow the scope of the search.

14 Defendants argue that the cut-off date of March 4, 2011 is reasonable because any  
15 electronically stored records relevant to Plaintiffs' claim for interference with a prospective  
16 contractual relationship would have been created prior to the foreclosure sale and have been  
17 produced to Plaintiffs. Defendants also argue that because they have owned and operated the Town  
18 Center development since March 4, 2011, there are numerous electronically stored records that fall  
19 within the scope of the agreed search terms, but do not contain information relevant to Plaintiffs'  
20 cause of action for interference with a prospective contractual relationship.

21 Defendants state that they ran an electronic search for documents responsive to the agreed  
22 search terms for the period from March 4, 2011 through July 25, 2012 (the date the complaint was  
23 filed). This search identified 15,105 documents containing the search terms. *Opposition to Motion*  
24 *to Compel (#59), Declaration of David Fleisher, ¶ 11.* Defendants state that to determine whether  
25 any of these documents contain non-privileged relevant information which should be produced,  
26 Defendants' lawyers would be required to review all 15,105 documents for relevancy and privilege.  
27 Defendants estimate that 240 hours (30 days of 8 hours each) would be required to review the  
28 documents and produce any which are relevant. Defendants estimate the cost of this search to be



1 351, 98 S.Ct. 2380 (1978) relevancy includes “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could  
2 lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” *See also Miller v.*  
3 *Pancucci*, 141 F.R.D. 292, 296 (C.D.Cal. 1992); *Renfrow v. Redwood Fire & Cas. Ins. Co.*, 288  
4 F.R.D. 514, 521 (D.Nev. 2013). The relevant time period for which a party may be required to  
5 search for and produce documents depends on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.  
6 The date by which a defendant’s allegedly wrongful conduct was complete does not necessarily  
7 preclude discovery of information or documents created after that date. *See In re Control Data*  
8 *Corp. Securities Litigation*, 1988 WL 92085, \*3 (D.Minn. 1988) (“There are numerous instances in  
9 securities fraud litigation where post-offering statements, documents, or conduct have been treated  
10 as admissible evidence on the issue of scienter, intent, and knowledge.”) On the other hand,  
11 communications and documents that occurred or were created after the completion of the events in  
12 issue are probably less likely to contain relevant information than those which occurred or were  
13 created while the events were taking place.

14 The decision on this motion ultimately turns on the balancing test in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)  
15 which provides that the court must limit the extent of discovery otherwise allowed if it determines  
16 that the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the  
17 needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of the issues at  
18 stake in the litigation and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues. Plaintiffs do not  
19 assert that they are unable, or are somehow impaired in their ability, to prove their case against  
20 Defendants based on the information they have already obtained, including the documents that  
21 Defendants have produced up through the date of the foreclosure sale. Plaintiffs have not identified  
22 any specific transactions or events that occurred after the foreclose sale which leads them to believe  
23 that relevant nonprivileged communications and documents after March 4, 2011 exist. Instead,  
24 Plaintiffs apparently want to make sure that nothing relevant is missed by requiring Defendants to  
25 search and review their post-March 4, 2011 ESI for relevant documents.

26 Plaintiffs’ assertion that the 15,105 documents identified by Defendants’ use of search  
27 terms are “presumptively relevant” is, at best, debatable. The search terms and combination of  
28 search terms provided to the Court do not appear to be particularly precise. While the use of

1 relatively broad search terms for the time period prior to the foreclosure sale was reasonable to  
2 ensure that all relevant communications and documents were captured, this does not hold true in  
3 the post-foreclosure period. This is particularly true in light of Defendants' undisputed  
4 representation that they have operated Town Center since March 4, 2011 and have engaged in  
5 communications and dealings with the individuals or entities identified in the search terms which  
6 have nothing to do with Defendants' alleged conduct prior to the foreclosure.

7 Although the estimated cost of reviewing the post-March 4, 2011 ESI is substantial,  
8 Defendants have substantial financial resources to bear such costs. Plaintiffs have also stated a  
9 willingness to share the expense. The cost of production is therefore not a determinative factor in  
10 deciding this motion.

11 Resolution of this discovery dispute does not necessarily require a choice between ordering  
12 Defendants to review all 15,105 documents or denying Plaintiffs' request for any discovery of post-  
13 March 4, 2011 ESI. As the information in Plaintiffs' August 16, 2013 letter suggests, the  
14 reasonable solution may be for the parties to work together to further refine and narrow the scope of  
15 search terms and combinations thereof to identify post-March 4, 2011 documents that are more  
16 likely to be relevant. It is possible that the restrictions and modifications set forth in Plaintiffs  
17 counsel's August 16th letter will result in a smaller number of potentially relevant documents that  
18 require further review for relevancy and privilege. The Court directs that Plaintiffs' and  
19 Defendants' counsel, together with their technical experts, consult on a revised search of the post-  
20 March 4, 2011 ESI which should be directed at a more focused initial search designed to identify a  
21 smaller universe of potentially relevant documents for manual review. The Court will limit the  
22 time period covered by such search to the period from March 5, 2011 through July 25, 2012 (the  
23 date that Plaintiffs filed their original complaint.) As part of their discussions, the parties should  
24 also negotiate a reasonable cost sharing agreement for conducting the search and review for  
25 relevant documents. Although the cost of production is generally born by the producing party,  
26 *Lightguard Systems, Inc. v. Spot Devices, Inc.*, 281 F.R.D. 593, 606 (D.Nev. 2012), the Court will  
27 consider allocating an appropriate share of the costs of production to Plaintiffs once a  
28 determination of the cost is made.

